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ABSTRACT 
Interim protection of rights (through provisional, including protective, 
measures) is as important as the final protection of those rights. 
This thesis examines several problems and uncertainties surrounding 
provisional measures in international commercial arbitration. Those 
problems and uncertainties influence the effectiveness of arbitration; thus, they constitute a threat to the future of arbitration. The thesis aims to identify, analyse, and offer solutions to those problems and 
uncertainties. 
The thesis initially examines the roots and evolution of the concepts of 
arbitral powers to grant provisional measures and court assistance to 
arbitration. This examination highlights the roots of the problems and 
uncertainties and demonstrates how the approach towards provisional 
measures shifted, in due course of time, from judicial authorities' 
exclusive power to arbitrators' power to grant those measures and how 
the courts' role regarding interim protection has evolved into assistance. 
It further deals with the forum to seek provisional measures mainly to 
demonstrate that today an arbitrator or another party-determined 
authority is and should be the natural judge regarding interim protection 
of rights and that the courts' assistance should be restricted to ensure 
the effectiveness of arbitration. 
It, in addition, investigates complementary mechanisms to arbitration for 
providing interim protection in order to show that such mechanisms 
enhance the effectiveness of arbitration for a period prior to the 
appointment of an arbitrator. 
The thesis also endeavours to establish the standards of procedure and 
principles in regard of arbitral provisional measures, for instance, form, 
requirements and types of arbitral provisional measures. The 
establishment of these standards and principles makes arbitration a 
more consistent and predictable dispute resolution mechanism. It thus 
boosts the effectiveness of arbitration. 
It finally discusses the enforcement of arbitral provisional measures to 
show that some of these measures are effective without any coercion 
and that some others, however, necessitate the use of coercive powers, 
which are lent by judicial authorities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a perfect world, contracting parties perform all their obligations 
throughout their contract's life. Indeed, contracting parties comply with the 
terms of international commercial contracts in thousands of transactions 
every day. In a few cases, however, disputes arise. Some of the disputes 
are settled amicably. 
In many disputes, depending on the type of contract, arbitration is 
generally preferred over litigation as a dispute settlement mechanism; 
some other disputes end in litigation before national courts. The 
contracting parties are aware of the need to protect their rights. They 
choose to arbitrate convinced that arbitration is better suited for resolution 
of their future or existing disputes than litigation or alternative (out of court) 
dispute resolution ("ADR") mechanisms. ' 
Arbitration, like litigation, takes time. 2 For instance, a typical International 
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") arbitration usually takes over one and a 
For advantages of arbitration over litigation, see, e. g., Martin Domke, Commercial 
Arbitration (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 1965); Pieter Sanders, Quo Vadis Arbitration? - 
Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice (The Hague: Kluwer 1999), 2-9 ("Quo Vadis"). On 
ADR, see, e. g., Henry Brown / Arthur Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice, 2"d ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999); and ICC (ed. ), ADR International Applications, ICC 
Publication No. 640E, (Paris: ICC Publishing 2001). 
2 This is due partially to "procedural safeguards and opportunities for all parties to be 
heard. " Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration Commentary and 
Materials, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Transnational Publishers / Kluwer 2001) ("International 
Arbitration"). It is noteworthy that in the 'good old days, ' arbitration was conducted in 
a short period of time. 
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half years. 3 Consequently, protection of parties' rights often includes 
interim protection. Indeed, parties' expectations from a dispute resolution 
mechanism for interim and final protection of their rights are very high. 
Such protection has to be effective The question is whether or not 
arbitration meets all these expectations. 
Undoubtedly, international commercial arbitration4 is very effective in 
providing final protection of rights. Both arbitration agreements and 
awards concerning international commercial contracts are recognised 
today in nearly most states in the world thanks mainly to the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards. 5 Indeed, arbitration has evolved over time and has 
become the main mechanism for resolving international business 
disputes. 6 
3 W. Laurence Craig / William W. Park / Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration, 3rd ed. (New York: Oceana 2000), para. 108 ("ICC Arbitration 
2000"). 
4 Unless otherwise stated, a reference to "arbitration" is hereinafter a reference to 
"international commercial arbitration. " 
5 Done at New York, 10 June 1958,330 UNTS 38, No. 4739 (the "New York 
Convention"). Other conventions relevant for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitration agreements and awards in the international plane mainly are the 
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done at Geneva, 24 September 1923,27 
LNTS 258 (1924) No. 678 (the "Geneva Protocol"); and the Geneva Convention on 
the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at Geneva, 26 September 1927,52 
LNTS 302 (1929), No. 2096 (the "Geneva Convention"); the Inter-American 
Convention on Arbitration, done at Panama City, 30 January 1975, reprinted in 14 ILM 
336 (1975) ("Inter-American Convention"). 
6 See, e. g., Alan Redfern / Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1999), 1; and Eric Robine, "L'evolution 
de I'arbitrage commercial international ces dernieres annees (1990-1995) (The 
Evolution of International Commercial Arbitration Over These Past Years (1990- 
1995))", (1996) RDAI/IBLJ 145. One of the illustrations of its wide usage is the 
growing number of arbitration cases, on which see generally infra Chapter IV. 
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As to interim protection of rights in arbitration, meeting expectations of 
business persons poses a challenge. Such challenge is related to 
problems and uncertainties surrounding provisional measures in 
arbitration; these difficulties mainly concern the jurisdiction of arbitrators or 
another party-determined authority to grant provisional measures, and the 
role of courts' in respect of interim protection of rights. Further, the 
problems extend to standards of procedure and principles as regards 
arbitral provisional measures and their enforceability. In order to meet the 
expectations of business persons, in other words, the users of arbitration 
services, these uncertainties and problems should be resolved. In fact, 
UNCITRAL is currently undertaking, upon suggestions made by various 
experts in a special commemorative New York Convention Day held on 10 
June 1998, a study in order to propose solutions to, among other issues, 
the problems and uncertainties regarding provisional measures in 
arbitration. 8 The study aims "for improvement of arbitration laws, rules, 
practices". 9 UNCITRAL's study will be examined and referred to, as and 
where appropriate, throughout this thesis. 10 
Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that arbitration should, in principle, be the 
forum to grant provisional measures and that the role of courts is limited to 
Judicial provisional measures are available either from "state courts" or other "judicial 
authorities" in various states. These two terms are used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis. 
8 See, e. g., UN Doc A/53/17. 
9 See UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 5. 
10 This study currently deals with three main issues of interim protection of rights in 
arbitration: arbitral provisional measures, judicial provisional measures and 
enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. See, e. g., A/CN. 9/524, paras. 1-14. On 
the initial two issues, UNCITRAL's work has not been sufficiently advanced to 
comment on it. Id. However, on the issue of enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures, there has been enough progress for comment, which is done in infra 
Chapter V, Part 3.3. 
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assistance to arbitration. However, there are several questions and 
uncertainties related to such measures. These questions and uncertainties 
weaken the effectiveness of arbitration. Thus they constitute a threat to its 
future. This thesis further aims to identify, analyse, clarify, and offer 
solutions to those problems and uncertainties. Solutions will be offered for 
enhancing effectiveness of arbitration in regard of interim protection of 
rights. Arbitration needs to be effective to reach its raison d'etre, meeting 
the needs of the business world and, thus, to survive. " 
Methodology 
In order to achieve its objectives, the thesis examines the historical 
evolution of provisional measures in arbitration. It further analyses and 
compares theory, law, and practice. All major arbitration conventions, 
many laws and rules, the practice of the main arbitration institutions, and of 
courts of various states as well as the views of several commentators are 
critically assessed. 
F)Afinitinn 
Although "[t]he interim protection of rights is no doubt one of those general 
principles of law common to all legal systems", 12 there is no widely 
See Introduction, infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
12 Lawrence Collins, "Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation", 
1992(111) RdC 9,23, reprinted in. L. Collins, Essays in International Litigation and on 
the Conflict of Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), 1-188. See also, e. g., Jerome 
B. Elkind, Interim Protection: A Functional Analysis (The Hague: The Martinus Nijhoff 
1981), Chapters 11 and III. On interim protection under private international law, see, 
e. g., Collins, id.; Catherine Kessedjian, "Preliminary Document No. 10 - Note on 
Provisional and Protective Measures in Private International Law and Comparative 
Law" (Hague Conference on Private International Law Enforcement of Judgments, 
October 1998), available at <http: //www. hcch. net/e/workprog/jdgm. html, 
ftp: //hcch. net/doc/jdgmpolO. doc> last visited at 28 October 2003; George A. 
Bermann, "Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation", 35 Colum J Tran L 553 
(1997). On interim measures in public international law, see, e. g., Elkind, id.; Karin 
Oellers-Frahm, "Interim Measures of Protection" in: Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (1981), v. 1,69-72, Shigeru Oda, "Provisional Measures" in: 
Vaughan Lowe / Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds. ), Fifty Years of the International Court of 
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accepted definition of the concept of interim measures. 13 In fact, no 
uniformity in respect of the concept of interim protection of rights exists in 
public and private international law. 14 Nor is a concrete definition of that 
concept or its scope found in international commercial arbitration. 15 A 
provisional measure is, broadly speaking, a remedy or a relief that is aimed 
at safeguarding the rights of parties to a dispute pending its final 
Justice - Essays in honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Grotius 1996), 541- 
556; and J. G. Merrills, "Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of 
the International Court of Justice", 44 ICLQ 90-146 (1995). For general justification of 
interim protection of rights, see, e. g., A. A. S. Zuckerman, "Interlocutory Remedies in 
Quest for Procedural Fairness", 56 MLR 325-341 (1993). 
13 See, e. g. Kessedjian, para. 2, note 3; and Bermann, 556. It is stated, in this regard, 
that 
the notion of "conservatory measure" is one of the most obscure that there can be. 
Etymologically, it is understood as a measure which tends to safeguard a right. But 
when one seeks to go more thoroughly into this concept, the certainties slip away 
because, in reality, the "conservatory measure" covers very disparate hypotheses. 
Stephen R. Bond, "The Nature of Conservatory and Provisional Measures" in: ICC 
(ed. ), Conservatory and Provisional Measures in International Arbitration, ICC 
Publication No. 519 (ICC Publishing 1993), 8 ("Conservatory Measures"). Further, it is 
noteworthy that most, if not all, arbitration rules do not provide for a definition of 
provisional measures. See UN Doc A/CN. 9/460, para. 116. The arbitration rules 
could have given such definition but they refrain from doing so. That is probably 
because they intend to leave to arbitrators and courts the freedom to decide how the 
term "provisional measure" (or, in some cases, interim and conservatory measures, 
etc. ) should be defined. 
14 See "Second Interim Report - Provisional and Protective Measure in International 
Litigation of the International Law Association's [("ILA")] Committee on International 
Civil and Commercial Litigation", 67 ILA Rep 185,202, para. 3 (1996), reprinted in 62 
RabelsZ 128-130 (1998) ("Second Interim Report"). The Committee also indicated a 
certain principles in respect of provisional and protective measures in international 
litigation (the "ILA Principles"). Id., 192-204. On these Principles, see also Peter 
Nygh, "Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation - The Helsinki 
Principles", 62 RabelsZ 115-122 (1998). Indeed, 
[d]ifferent legal systems have characterized interim measures of protection in 
different ways and using different classification. In addition, the scope and variety 
of interim measures available differ from country to country. 
UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 111, para. 7. Kessedjian indicates that "legal systems 
diverge to a greater or lesser extent" in the area of law regarding provisional 
measures. Kessedjian, para. 2. Indeed, the diversity in respect of the types of 
remedies in a legal system, in some cases, is extreme. For example, thirty types of 
protective measures are reported to be available in France. Id., note 4. 
15 UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 65. 
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resolution. 16 The underlying principle in respect of provisional measures is 
that no party right should be damaged or affected due to the duration of 
adjudication. 7 The objective of such measures is generally to facilitate the 
"effectiveness of judicial [or arbitral] protection 08 by providing interim relief, 
which complements the final relief. 
Characteristics 
It may be difficult to list all of the characteristics of provisional measures 
since they contain, inter alia, "very disparate hypotheses. "19 The difficulty 
also lies in the fact that the types of provisional measures vary, at least to a 
certain extent, from one country to another. 20 There are, however, certain 
essential characteristics of provisional measures in arbitration. 
The first characteristic is that applications for a provisional measure 
"presuppose the existence of a dispute" final protection of which has 
16 According to the European Court of Justice (the "ECJ"), provisional measures are 
"intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights .... 
" Mario 
Reichert and Others v. Dresdner Bank, Case C-261/90, [1992] ECR 1-2149, para. 34. 
See, e. g., Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 
F2d 1019,1022-23 (9th Cir 1991) (holding that "[t]emporary equitable relief in 
arbitration may be essential to preserve assets or enforce performance which, if not 
preserved or enforced, may render a final award meaningless. "); and "Final Report on 
Intellectual Property Disputes and Arbitration" (A Report of the ICC Commission on 
International Arbitration Chaired by Julian D. M. Lew) published in 9(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb 
Bull 37 (1998) ("Final Report on Intellectual Property Disputes"). 
17 Mario Reichert and Others v. Dresdner Bank, Case C-261/90, [1992] ECR 1-2149, 
para. 34. German Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal of 1924 stated, in this respect, that 
"[b]y means of interim protection the courts seek to make up for the law's delays in 
such a way that as possible the outcome of the proceedings is the same as if they 
could have been completed in one day. " Id. For the French original, see Ellermann v. 
Etat polonais (1924) 5 TAM 457,459. In other words, provisional measures aim to 
neutralise any actual or potential imbalance between the contracting parties at the 
beginning of arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract and the applicable 
law. See Bernardo M. Cremades, "Is Exclusion of Concurrent Courts' Jurisdiction 
over Conservatory Measures to be Introduced through a Revision of the 
Convention? ", 6(3) J Int'l Arb 105,106 (1989) ("Exclusion"). 
18 Advocate General Tesauro's Opinion, Case C-213/89, R. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) (1990) ECR 2433,2450, para. 18. 
19 See Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 8. 
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already or will be sought from the same or a different forum. 21 In other 
words, there has to be a dispute that is to be litigated or arbitrated. This is 
tenable in that interim protection should only be available where final 
protection is or will be sought. 
The second characteristic is that a remedy should be temporary / 
provisional in nature. This is self-evident. 22 A temporary protection is only 
needed "for a specified limited time, 23 at most until the final protection is 
24 granted. In other words, a provisional relief should preserve a right 
pending the final relief. A caveat, however, has to be borne in mind. 
Provisional relief, at the end of adjudication of the merits of the case, 
"should be taken into account and [as the case may be] merged in the 
arbitral tribunal's final adjudication of the dispute. "25 
20 See Introduction, infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
21 See, e. g., Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 18. To this end, it should be 
noted that when a measure is ordered by a court prior to formation of a tribunal, the 
subsequent initiation of arbitration proceedings should normally be expected. 
22 The measure is subject the tribunal's final adjudication. See Section 39(3) of the 
English Arbitration Act ("EAA") 1996. See also ICC Interlocutory Award 10596 of 
2000 (unpublished) (holding that a decision on a provisional measure "makes no final 
findings of fact or law. In other words, no findings made herein prejudice the merits of 
the dispute. "). 
23 See Principle 12 of the ILA Principles. Indeed, an ICC tribunal granted its interim 
injunction for a specified period of time (ICC Interim Conservatory Award 10021 of 
1999) (unpublished) and upon the termination of such period extended it further (ICC 
Partial Award 10021 of 2000) (unpublished). In this regard, see also Bernardo M. 
Cremades, "The Need for Conservatory and Preliminary Measures", 27(5) Int'l Bus 
Law 226,228 (1999) ("The Need"); Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,460. 
24 See, e. g, Section 26(2) of the Hungarian Act LXXI on Arbitration 1994. 
25 UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, paras. 66 and 100. That is to say that a provisional 
measure shall in no way prejudice the final award of an arbitral tribunal on the 
substance of the case under adjudication. See, e. g., Article 37(3) of the Netherlands 
Arbitration Institution ("NAI") Arbitration Rules. 
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The third characteristic is that interim relief should not exceed the final 
relief or the legal protection sought as the interim relief aims to 
complement and, in this sense, is ancillary to the final relief. 26 
The fourth characteristic is derivative of the second. Interim relief should 
normally be granted where it is risky to await the final relief. 27 This is the 
requirement of urgency. 28 Where the parameter is safeguarding a party 
right pending final protection, urgency generally seems to be a requirement 
for grant of interim relief. 
The fifth characteristic also is another derivative of the second: the interim 
nature of the protection dictates that an interim measure could be 
reviewed, modified, or terminated prior to final determination of a dispute "if 
the circumstances of the case or the progress of arbitral [or judicial] 
proceedings require". 29 
26 See, e. g., Bond in. ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 9. In another words, a 
provisional measure shall not constitute "prejudice to the rights of the [arbitrating] 
parties or to the final determination of the dispute [in question]. " Article 35 of the 
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") Commercial Arbitration Rules 1944. See 
infra Chapter I, Part 1.2.2.1. 
27 See, e. g., Bond, 18. Bond rightly indicates that urgency may not always constitute 
one of the characteristics of provisional measures as such determination depends 
upon the competent law, if there is any. Id. One example of where urgency is not a 
requirement for the grant of a provisional measure is interim payment. See infra 
Chapter IV, Part 7.5. 
28 See, infra Chapter IV, Part 3.1.3. 
29 UN Doc A/CN. 9/468, para. 64. See also UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 66; 
and Principle 13 of the ILA Principles. On the issue of review, modification or 
termination of an interim measure, see infra Chapter IV, Part 6. ICC Interlocutory 
Award 10596 of 2000 (unpublished) (holding that "[t]he provisional nature of the 
present dispute further means that all issues addressed in this decision may be 
reargued by the parties in the later course of the arbitration and revisited by the 
Arbitral Tribunal in the final award. "). 
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The sixth characteristic is that "there would be no need for interim 
protection if the final decision on the merits could, in and of itself, satisfy all 
the interests of the parties at stake in a dispute. , 30 
The seventh characteristic is that, under certain circumstances, a 
provisional measure may generally be decided without notice, ex parte. 31 
However, because of due process considerations, an inter partes decision 
on the measure should be given following the previous ex parte decision. 32 
The eighth characteristic is that unlike judicial interim measures, arbitral 
provisional measures are not themselves self-executing. This is because 
of the fact that an arbitral tribunal does not have imperium, coercive 
powers to enforce its own decision. 33 Accordingly, legally binding force is 
not one of the characteristics of arbitral provisional measures. 
The final characteristic is that an arbitral interim measure does not itself 
bind third parties to arbitration. However, it may affect interests of third 
parties "holding, for example, money or other assets of the party 
30 See, e. g., Bond, 18. 
31 See, e. g., UN Doc A/CN. 9/468, para. 70; and D. Alan Redfern, "Arbitration and the 
Courts: Interim Measures of Protection - Is the Tide About to Turn? ", 30 Texas Int'l LJ 
71,79 (1995) ("Arbitration and the Courts"). 
32 It seems that this is what is envisaged by the Principle 7 of the ILA Principles. On this 
issue, see infra Chapter IV, Part 8. 
33 Private parties like arbitrators are not empowered with imperium. That is because 
they are private individuals not judges or enforcement officers of a state. Nor do they 
hold any other post in the judiciary of or appointed by a state. Empowering a private 
party is thought to cause anarchy. It is, in this regard, interesting to note that an 
arbitrator (iudex) a private person appointed by parties to a dispute under early 
Roman law did not also have imperium to enforce its decision. The Imperium was left 
with the Praetor. See W. W. Buckland / A. D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 
(ed. by F. H. Lawson), 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1965), 400. 
The administration of justice by iudex at that time seemed to work. It should, 
however, be noted that iudex later appointed by the state. 
concerned since they may be obliged to take some action in respect of that 
property by virtue of the order directed to the party. "34 
Terminology 
In international commercial arbitration, provisional measures35 are known 
and referred to as, for instance, provisional and protective measures, 
interim measures, interim measures of protection, interim or conservatory 
measures, preliminary measures, 36 preliminary injunctive measures, urgent 
measures, 37 precautionary measures, and holding measures38. These 
terms are often used interchangeably. 39 The references to the terms 
"provisional", "interim", "interlocutory", "preliminary", and "urgent" measures 
are, on one hand, references to the nature of these measures. 40 On the 
other hand, the references to the terms "protective" and "conservatory" 
measures are references to the purpose of these measures. 41 This 
34 UN Doc A/CN. 9/468, paras. 64 and 70. In addition, an arbitral tribunal could request 
from a party to arbitration to cause a third party who, for instance, works for such 
arbitrating party to comply with an arbitral provisional measure. For more information 
on this issue, see infra Chapter II, Part 4.1. Further, an arbitrator may merely request 
from a third party to cooperate in implementing of a measure albeit the failure to 
comply with such request has no consequences. Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, 
International Arbitration Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (The Hague / London / Boston: 
Kluwer 2001), 631. 
35 The term "measure" is, in some cases, replaced by the terms "remedy" or "relief". The 
terms will hereinafter be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
36 See, e. g., Section 21 of the Arbitration Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the Slovak 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
37 See, e. g., Article 14 of the International Arbitration Rules 1996 of the Chamber of 
National and International Arbitration in Milan. 
38 This term refers to measures that inherently necessitate the use of coercive powers 
once they are granted, e. g. attachments. Rubino-Sammartano, 631. 
39 On some of these terms, see UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 63. 
40 See, e. g., Emmanuel Gaillard / John Savage (eds. ), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration (The Hague / Boston / London: Kluwer 1999), 
para. 1303. 
41 See, e. g., id. It should be noted that, under such law as the Italian law, there is a 
distinction between conservatory and provisional measures. In accordance with 
Article 818 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP"), an arbitral tribunal could not 
order a conservatory measure but could order "interlocutory payment or any other 
'provisional' measure. " Bond, 10. It has also been argued that some provisional 
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purpose is, for international commercial arbitration, preservation of 
arbitrating parties' rights. 42 
It should be noted that, the terms "provisional measures" and "protective 
measures" are not precisely defined in arbitration. 43 They are loosely used 
to mean the same thing most of the time. These terms are probably 
derived from the references made in various legal systems to those 
measures. In a move to include every possible measure in the armoury of 
a decision-maker, or arbitrator, on an interim relief request, the term 
"conservatory" or "protective" is used along with the term "interim" or 
"provisional" 
. 
44 
Types of Provisional Measures 
The types of provisional measures vary nearly in every national jurisdiction 
and under both public and private international law; although it is possible 
to trace functionally similar or identical types of measures (albeit under 
different names) in each of those jurisdictions. 45 Perhaps because of this 
measures, e. g., disposing of property, ordering production of documents, ordering 
payment of security for costs, etc. are not of a conservatory nature. 
42 Perhaps, this is the reason why Article 26 of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules makes reference to "interim 
measures of protection". 
43 Nor is the term "interim and conservatory" measures defined. For instance, no 
definition of these terms is found in a prominent dictionary on arbitration. See K. 
Seide (ed. ), A Dictionary of Arbitration and Its Terms (New York: Oceana / Dobbs 
Ferry 1970). 
as Under certain circumstances, an arbitral tribunal may render a decision on a request 
for a provisional measure in accordance with a particular national law. See infra 
Chapter IV, Part 3. In these circumstances, the applicable national law's definition of 
interim relief and the distinction, if any, between interim and conservatory measures 
becomes relevant. Otherwise, "[i]n arbitral practice, little importance is given to 
semantical distinctions. " Blessing, para. 834. 
45 See Collins, 24. On provisional measures available in various jurisdictions, see, 
generally, Kessedjian, para. 9 etc.; Axel Bösch (ed. ), Provisional Remedies in 
International Commercial Arbitration -A Practitioner Handbook (Berlin: De Gruyter 
1994). To illustrate this, the following measures could be listed as examples: 
preliminary injunction, appointment of experts for preservation of evidence, 
ýý 
variety, it is difficult to clearly determine the types of measures that are 
available for the use of arbitral tribunals. In fact, institutional arbitration 
rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for ad hoc arbitration generally 
refer to the types of interim measures broadly, sometimes indicating 
certain examples. 46 Nonetheless, considering their function (or objective), 
provisional measures in arbitration can generally be dealt with under three 
broad categories: 47 measures related to the preservation of evidence, 
measures related to the conduct of arbitration and "relations between the 
parties during arbitral proceedings", 48 and measures aimed to "facilitate 
later enforcement" of an award. 49 An atypical provisional measure, interim 
payment, may be added to those categories. 
Measures Related to Preservation of Evidence 
A need to preserve evidence might arise prior to its presentation or 
collection at an advanced stage of arbitral proceedings. Evidence might 
fade away in a routine or exceptional course of events or due to intentional 
sequestration, freezing orders, pre-award attachment, security for claim, and security 
for costs. It is interesting to note, in regard of the type of a measure, that the United 
States ("U. S. ") Supreme Court, in Grupo Mexicano, denied permitting a preliminary 
injunction prior to entry of a money judgment. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., at 
el. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., et al., 527 US 308,119 S Ct 1961. It should be further 
noted that such measures as orders for clarification of statements, measures for 
taking evidence, the appointment of an expert, fixing the date of a hearing, or 
summoning a party or a witness to appear before the arbitral tribunal should not be 
considered as provisional measures. See, e. g., Zhivko Stalev, "Interim Measures of 
Protection in the Context of Arbitration" in: Albert Jan van den Berg (ed. ), International 
Arbitration in a Changing World, ICCA Congress Series No. 6 (The Hague: Kluwer 
1993), 103,104 ("Arbitration in a Changing World"). 
46 See UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 65. 
47 Apparently, neither the categories nor the examples provided under them are 
exhaustive. On some other ways of categorising provisional measures, see, e. g., UN 
Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 63; Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 9- 
10, and Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts, 78. On the examples of types of 
measures that may be granted in practice, see infra Chapter IV, Part 7. 
48 See Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 9. Provisional measures aim to 
prevent aggravation of a dispute or delay and disruption of arbitration proceedings are 
likely to fall into this category. 
49 See UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 63. 
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conduct of a party. Alternatively, a key witness' statement or an expert 
report about rotting goods might be required in order to establish the case 
that is to or will be adjudicated. 
The power to preserve evidence should not be confused with the power 
regularly available to arbitral tribunals in respect of production or collection 
of evidence. Arbitral tribunals are generally empowered to make certain 
orders for the collection of evidence. 50 Such orders on production of 
documents are different from provisional measures regarding preserving 
evidence in that the production of documents aim more to collect evidence 
than to preserve it. Apparently, the orders for production of documents 
could aim to preserve evidence as well as to collect it. In fact, in some 
cases it may be more appropriate to make an application for a production 
order than an order to preserve evidence on an interim basis. 
Measures Related to Conduct of Arbitration and Relations between 
the Parties during Arbitral Proceedings 
This is the broadest category of provisional measures, which are more 
common in practice. In general terms, these measures involve ordering 
parties to do or refrain from doing something. These are simply injunctions 
that aim to protect a legal right. 51 Some examples of measures falling into 
this category include: 
orders to continue performing a contract during the arbitral 
proceedings (e. g., an order to a contractor to continue construction 
works despite its claim that it is entitled to suspend the works); 
orders to refrain from taking an action until the award is made; 
orders to safeguard goods (e. g., to take specific safety measures, to 
sell perishable goods or to appoint an administrator of assets); 
orders to take the appropriate action to avoid the loss of a right 
50 See, generally, Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,449. On the collection 
of evidence, see infra Chapter IV, note 202. 
51 In close examination, any provisional measure that an arbitrator can order involves 
some positive or negative action (inaction). 
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(e. g., to pay the fees needed to extend the validity of an intellectual 
property right); orders relating to clean up of a polluted site. 52 
Measures Aimed to Facilitate Later Enforcement of Award 
There may be a need to avoid dissipation of assets from which the final 
judgment / award could be satisfied. This type of measure is apparently 
aimed at not leaving the winning party empty-handed with a Pyrrhic victory, 
where all assets of the losing party were flown away. Examples for this 
category include: 
orders not to move assets or the subject-matter of the dispute out of 
a jurisdiction; orders for depositing in a joint account the amount in 
dispute or for depositing movable property in dispute with a third 
person; orders to a party or parties to provide security (e. g. a 
guarantee) for costs of arbitration or orders to provide security for all 
or part of the amount claimed from the party. 53 
Interim Payment 
Interim payment is "an outright payment to the plaintiff which may be 
subsequently revised on final judgment [or award]"54. It is an atypical 
provisional measure in that the moving party is often granted, in full or in 
part, the remedy it is seeking. Interim payment is available in the laws of 
many states, but is foreign to the laws of as many states too. 55 Interim 
52 UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 63. This list is not exhaustive. To this end, 
"orders to the parties and other participants in arbitral proceedings to protect the 
privacy of the proceedings (e. g., to keep files in a certain place under lock or not to 
disclose the time and place of hearings)" also, in the view of this author, fall into this 
category. For example, see id. 
ss Id. 
54 Second Interim Report, 67 ILA Rep 200, para. 37 (1996). Provisional payment 
enables a party to survive or contributes to such survival by preserving the party's 
cash flow. See also Julian DM Lew / Loukas Mistelis / Stefan Kröll, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration, (The Hague / London / New York: Kluwer 2003), 
para. 23-55. 
55 For instance, the ILA Principles exclude interim payment from their scope. Principle 
22 of the ILA Principles. In addition, some legal systems, e. g. Switzerland do not 
recognise provisional payment as interim measure. See Wirth, 35. Further, it is 
noteworthy that a provisional payment is excluded from the domain of court remedies 
where the underlying case is referred to arbitration. See, e. g., Societe Eurodif et autre 
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payment could in principle be granted on an interim basis by arbitral 
tribunals. 56 
Importance of Interim Protection of Rights 
Provisional measures play a very important role in international arbitration. 
Indeed, the view that provisional measures are not important in 
international commercial arbitration was abandoned a long time ago. 57 
The availability of provisional measures was often deemed detrimental to 
"the progress and the outcome of proceedings on the merits of a case. "58 
To this end, interim protection of rights in international commercial 
arbitration today is as significant as the final protection of those rights. 59 
This is because once it is granted either by a court or an arbitral tribunal, a 
provisional measure, "in its own terms, may have final and significant 
v. Republique Islamique d'Iran (14 March 1981), Rev Arb 69 (1985) (Court of 
Cassation). 
56 See infra Chapter IV, Part 7.5. 
57 In fact, the importance of interim protection of rights was recognised in the 1920s as, 
during the preparation of the first ICC arbitration rules, particular attention was given 
to such protection. See Roberto Pozzi, "Conciliation and Arbitration between 
Merchants of Different Countries", ICC Brochure No. 13,20 (1920). But see Pieter 
Sanders, "Procedures and Practices under the UNCITRAL Rules", 27 Am J Comp L 
453-454 (1979) ("Procedures") (indicating that in the mid the 1970s, "[t]he question of 
interim measures only occasionally present[ed] itself in an arbitration. "); Georgio Gaja, 
International Commercial Arbitration - The New York Convention (New York 1984), 
Binder I, Introduction, D. B. I. Indeed, within the 1960s, in accordance with Broches' 
experience "arbitral tribunals were extremely loath to order provisional or interim 
measures and one should have some confidence in the self-restraint which tribunals 
would impose upon themselves. " Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States - Documents Concerning the 
Origin and the Formulation of the Convention (Washington, D. C. 1968), v. II, Part I, 
515 ("History"). The contrast between the above approaches is tenable as following 
the period of permissiveness in the 1920s, the power of arbitrators to grant provisional 
measures faced with resistance from judiciary and legislatures in the 1950s. Such 
resistance was begun to relax in the 1980s. See generally infra Chapter I. 
58 Kessedjian, para. 5. See also Collins, 27. 
59 Born, International Arbitration, 920 (indicating that provisional measures are often 
more important in international arbitration than domestic arbitration. ). It is even 
argued that provisional remedies "are often more important than final judgment [or 
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consequences that cannot be reversed even if the measure is later 
modified or turns out to be unnecessary in the light of the final award . 
, 60 
Indeed, "a final award may be of little value to the successful party if, in the 
meantime, action or inaction on the part of a recalcitrant party has 
rendered the outcome of the proceedings largely useless .... 
"61 
The importance of and the need for interim protection of rights in arbitration 
have grown immensely over the last twenty years. 62 The growth owes 
much to globalisation63 and increased confidence in arbitration. 64 The 
award]". See, e. g., Trevor C. Hartley, "Interim Measures under the Brussels 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention", 24 EL Rev 674 (1999). 
60 UN Doc. A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 66. 
61 UN Doc A/CN. 9/460, para. 117. See also, Cremades, The Need, 226-227. 
62 This growth is, for instance, confirmed with the increasing number of decisions on 
provisional measures, particularly over the last ten years. A survey conducted by the 
AAA indicates that the number of requests for interim measures in international 
commercial arbitration is nearly double the number of such requests under domestic 
arbitration. See Richard W. Naimark / Stephanie E. Keer, "Analysis of UNCITRAL 
Questionnaires on Interim Relief', 16(3) Mealey's IAR 23,26 (2001). See generally 
infra Chapter IV. 
63 The number of international commercial transactions has recently increased due 
mainly to globalisation. See Coleen C. Higgins, "Interim Measures in Transnational 
Maritime Arbitration", 65 Tulane L Rev 1519,1520 (1991); and ICC Interim 
Conservatory Award 10021 of 1999 (unpublished). For the importance of interim 
measures as regards construction contracts disputes, see, e. g., Peiro G. Parodi. 
"Interim Measures in Respect to Arbitration in the Construction Business" in: Albert J. 
van den Berg (ed. ), I. Preventing Delay and Disruption of Arbitration - ll. Effective 
Proceedings in Construction Cases, ICCA Congress Series No. 5 (Deventer: Kluwer 
1991), 485-86 ("Preventing Delay"); as regards maritime disputes see, e. g., Higgins, 
1519-1549; and as regards intellectual property disputes, see, e. g., Final Report on 
Intellectual Property Disputes published in 9(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb Bull 37-73 (1998). As 
a result of globalisation, the number of disputes with international character has 
increased immensely. For instance, the number of cases registered with the ICC 
increased from 250 (in 1980) (see "News From the Court and Its Secretariat", 6(1) ICC 
Int'l Ct Arb Bull 3 (1995)) to 593 (in 2002) (see <www. iccwbo. org/court/ 
english/right_topics/stat_2002. asp> last visited at 28 October 2003) within nearly 
twenty years. Further, each year, nearly 5000 international arbitrations and 
mediations are held in or from London. Judith Gill / Lord Hacking / Arthur Marriott / 
Geoff Prevett / Peter Rees (eds. ), Delivering Results - Dispute Resolution in London 
(London 2000), 5. Also, each year, approximately 2300 new arbitration cases register 
with the thirteen major arbitration institutions (e. g., AAA, CIETAC, ICC, ICSID, LCIA, 
and SIAC). This is in accordance with unpublished research entitled "Statistics on 
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growth is further related to the longer duration of arbitration proceedings 
due to globalisation, the complexity, bureaucratisation, 65 or 
institutionalisation of arbitration. 66 
In addition, legal assistance is today available to arbitrating parties from 
able lawyers familiar with the tools and strategies of international 
adjudication (more specifically, of international commercial arbitration). 
Indeed, perhaps due to such availability, provisional measures "are 
sometimes misused as offensive weapons intended to exert undue 
pressure on the other party or a means to delay or obstruct the 
proceedings. "67 Misuses or abuses of provisional measures must be 
Arbitration Centers' Activities" and done, in 2000, by Sylvie Picard Renuat and Esther 
van Rossen of the ICC International Court of Arbitration. In sum, globalisation has a 
positive effect on arbitration. Indeed, it is rightly argued that "[a]rbitration has become 
more and more international following the globalisation of the economy. Arbitration 
may be the juridical response to this globalisation. " Sanders, Quo Vadis, 24. See 
also Bernardo Cremades, "Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of 
Interactive Arbitration", 14(2) Arb Int'l 157,172 (1998) ("Cultures"). 
64 This is partly observed in the fact that an increasing number of states, precisely 134, 
adopted the New York Convention. In this regard, see <www. uncitral. org/ en- 
index. htm> last visited at 28 October 2003. See, e. g., Sanders, Quo Vadis, 9. 
65 See, e. g., Catherine Kessedjian, "Court Decisions on Enforcement of Arbitration 
Agreements and Awards", 18(1) J Int'l Arb 1,11 (2001) (stating that "arbitration has 
become increasingly 'procedure-oriented"'. ) ("Court Decisions"); Higgins, 1525 
(indicating that "[r]ising concern over the abuse of procedural devices for purposes of 
delay is spawned by the increasing trend of arbitral proceedings to acquire 
characteristics of contested court litigation. "); and Fall S. Nariman, "The Spirit of 
Arbitration", 16 Arb Int'l 261,263 (2000) (noting that, in arbitration, "'ceremonies' are 
multiplying, formalities are on the increase and much time spent in adapting the arts of 
litigation. "). 
66 See Redfern/Hunter, para. 1-04; and Born, International Arbitration, 919. For 
instance, the average length of an ICC arbitration is between one and two years. See 
Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,14. 
67 See, e. g., Klaus P. Berger, International Economic Arbitration (Deventer/Boston: 
Kluwer 1993), 336 ("International Economic Arbitration"); Axel Bösch, "The Problem of 
Provisional Remedies in International Commercial Arbitration" in: Bösch (ed. ), 4-5; 
"Final Report on Interim and Partial Awards" (A Report of the ICC Commission on 
International Arbitration chaired by Martin Hunter), published in 1(2) ICC Ct Bull 26, 
para. 30 (1990) ("Final Report on Awards") (indicating that arbitration becomes to 
have "increasingly adversarial character ... with a consequently greater emphasis on disputing such matters as" interim protection of rights. ). See also Alan H. Kaufman, 
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controlled for maintaining the effectiveness of arbitration and the flexibility 
needed in international trade. 68 The control is thus necessary for the 
"benefit of trade , 69 and its promotion. 
Further, the growth in the importance of arbitral provisional measures is 
related to "the ease and speed with which assets can be transferred in the 
modern world to avoid a court judgement or an arbitral award .... 
"70 
Indeed, where no assets to enforce a final award are in existence, the final 
protection envisaged to safeguard a right is simply a Pyrrhic victory. " 
In sum, the existence and availability of effective interim protection of rights 
in arbitration is vital for the further success of this institution. Luring 
business persons to arbitration or keeping their satisfaction high with the 
arbitral process could in practice prove to be very difficult only with 
arbitration's other advantages72 where the availability of effective arbitral 
interim protection is in question. 73 The degree of difficulty increases when 
one is reminded that a comparatively effective interim protection of rights is 
generally available from judicial authorities in international litigation. 74 
"Major Strategic Issues in International Litigation", in: International Business Litigation 
& Arbitration 2000 (New York: Practising Law Institute 2000), 1-20. The undue 
pressure may have "psychological effects". See, in this regard, Cremades, The Need, 
227. Further, some provisional measures actually force a party to settle the case. Id. 
For instance, the issuance of a measure e. g., freezing assets of a party may pressure 
it to settle the dispute on unfavourable terms where such measure could destabilise its 
financial condition. 
68 Cremades, Exclusion, 106. 
69 Cremades, The Need, 227. 
70 UN Doc. A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 111, para. 7. 
71 See, e. g., Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention - Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation (The Hague / Deventer: TMC Asser Institute / Kluwer 
1981), 143 ("New York"). 
72 On the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, see sources cited in Introduction, 
supra note 1. 
73 See, e. g., Note - "Arbitration-Availability of Provisional Remedies in Arbitration 
Proceedings", 17 NYULQ Rev 638 (1940). 
74 See generally infra Chapter V, notes 1 and 13. 
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(Litigation remains the main competitor of arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. ) Problems and uncertainties regarding interim 
protection of rights in arbitration affect the quality of justice provided for 
parties in arbitration and its effectiveness. Consequently, such problems 
and uncertainties pose a threat to the future of arbitration. To this end, 
Bond states 
[w]hile it is inevitable that litigation and arbitration each has certain 
advantages and disadvantages vis-ä-vis the other, should parties 
consider that the quality of justice rendered or the obtaining of 
satisfaction on an arbitral award is substantially diminished by the 
selection of arbitration over litigation, it would obviously bode ill for the 
future of arbitration. 75 
What would be a further threat to the future of arbitration is if arbitrating 
parties were, in each case, referred to judicial authorities to obtain 
provisional measures. Such referral would generally undermine the 
parties' basic choice to resolve a dispute by way of arbitration rather than 
by recourse to the courts. 76 
In order to reach its aim, this thesis will examine: 
" the evolution of provisional measures in arbitration; 
" the forum to obtain such measures; 
" complementary mechanisms; 
" arbitral provisional measures; and 
" enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. 
75 Bond, 10. 
76 See infra Chapter II, Part 1.1. Apparently, the interaction between the jurisdiction of 
judicial authorities and that of arbitrators is unavoidable for the effectiveness of 
arbitration and better distribution of justice. For the reasons with respect to such 
interaction, see infra Chapter II, Part 4.1. 
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Evolution of Provisional Measures in Arbitration 
Recognising the commercial need for interim protection of rights, some of 
the early arbitration rules were permissive as regards arbitral competence 
to grant provisional measures. In the first quarter of the 20th century, 
national laws were generally silent on such competence. Both legislatures 
and courts often mistrusted arbitration and arbitrators. Further, courts 
were jealous of arbitration. Only a handful of laws dealt with the role of 
courts with respect to provisional measures. These laws generally 
envisaged court assistance to arbitration in rudimentary form. Within this 
period, provisional measures were, in general, exclusively available from 
courts regardless of where the final protection was sought. The second, 
third, and even a part of the fourth quarter of the last century witnessed 
dramatic changes. Some national laws and court decisions provided for 
the exclusive jurisdiction of courts for interim protection of rights even 
though the final protection of such rights was, by agreement, sought from 
arbitrators. The negative attitude of legislatures and courts affected the 
drafters of arbitration rules and thus these rules generally refrained from 
empowering arbitrators to issue provisional measures. The rules were 
generally permissive of court involvement in arbitration for interim 
protection of rights. Regardless of such involvement, the substance of the 
case in dispute remained within the arbitral domain. Such approach paved 
the way for wide recognition of arbitral competence to issue provisional 
measures in the last decade of the 20th century. Within the same period, 
the courts' role was generally restricted to assistance for enhancing the 
effectiveness of arbitration. 
The evolution of the concept of court assistance to arbitration and the 
power of an arbitrator to grant provisional measures as well as historical, 
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political, and commercial causes that affected such evolution will be 
examined. Such examination will enlighten the roots of some of the 
problems and uncertainties about provisional measures in arbitration. " 
The examination will also enhance understanding of some of the trends 
concerning those measures and assist in shaping such trends for the 21St 
century. 
Forum to Obtain Provisional Measures 
Nowadays, an arbitral tribunal is and should be the "natural forum" for 
providing both final and interim protection of arbitrating parties' rights, 
despite the fact that this view is not fully accepted. 78 The principle of party 
autonomy in arbitration dictates such conclusion. Indeed, for instance, if 
the tribunal is entrusted to finally determine the parties' rights, it is natural 
that the tribunal should be entrusted to deal with the interim protection of 
these rights. 79 However, there are still three salient problems and certain 
other shortcomings with the tribunal's power. 80 A tribunal has no power 
over third parties. Arbitration is a contractual mechanism binding upon the 
contracting parties. Interim protection of rights against third parties has to 
be sought from judicial authorities. 
In addition, the tribunal cannot use coercive powers to force a party to 
comply with its decision. An arbitral tribunal is not an organ of a sovereign. 
Sovereigns do not entrust their functions to private individuals. 
Accordingly, provisional measures that require use of coercive powers 
could only be obtained from state courts. 
77 See infra Chapter I. 
78 See infra Chapter II, Part 1. 
79 For further reasons in favour of the power of an arbitrator to grant provisional 
measures, see infra Chapter II, Part 1.1. 
80 See infra Chapter II, Part 4.1. 
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Further, an arbitral tribunal could only be available to provide interim 
protection of arbitrating parties' rights when it is formed. At the stage prior 
to constitution of the arbitral tribunal or, in some case, prior to the 
transmittal of the file to the tribunal (collectively referred to as the "pre- 
constitutional stage"), interim protection may be available from either 
another party-determined authority, e. g. emergency arbitrator, 81 or a court. 
The above problems along with the shortcomings require court 
involvement in the arbitral process. How such involvement is and should 
be regulated is determined by arbitration rules and state laws. 82 Court 
involvement in arbitration is necessary for the support of arbitration's 
effectiveness. In determining the necessary degree of involvement, the 
needs of international commerce should to be taken into account. The 
effectiveness of arbitration requires a limited level of court support where 
the exercise of power to grant provisional measures by an arbitral tribunal 
is impossible or ineffective. In such cases, the courts' role is to 
complement and assist the arbitration process. Thus it is necessary to 
clarify the manner of coordination of the power between arbitrators or 
party-appointed authorities and courts. 
Complementary Mechanisms 
No provisional measures are available from an arbitral tribunal at the pre- 
constitutional stage, which is a very important phase of arbitration. This 
phase unfortunately extends over a certain period of time due to 
bureaucratisation or internationalisation of arbitration. The majority of 
disputes are resolved within that period. In the absence of arbitral 
81 See infra Chapter M. 
82 See infra Chapter II, Part 4. 
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provisional measures, courts are generally the parties' only option for 
interim protection of their rights. However, such option is, inter alia, 
contrary to the parties' intention to resolve their disputes before a neutral / 
party-determined authority. Referring a party to a court means channelling 
such party to a forum (a court) it just opted out of by the agreement to 
arbitrate. In addition, petitioning a court for interim protection may infringe 
upon the confidential nature of arbitration intended by the parties. 
Furthermore, such request may be considered a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. Finally, judicial provisional measures may, in some cases, not be 
effectively available, or available at all. 
In order to overcome the above salient problems, complementary 
mechanisms were proposed83 and are also supported by the principle of 
party autonomy. These mechanisms envisage entrusting a neutral person 
with the issue of provisional measures. This neutral person may be a head 
or an organ of an arbitration institution. Alternatively, contracting parties 
may opt for emergency measure procedures, under which a neutral person 
called an emergency arbitrator, pre-arbitral referee, or an arbitrator decides 
a request for an interim protection of rights. It is necessary to examine 
how such mechanisms operate and whether or not they would be effective 
in providing provisional measures. Such examination will demonstrate that 
the complementary mechanisms may be useful and effective at the pre- 
constitutional stage. 
Arbitral Provisional Measures 
Once the power of an arbitral tribunal is established then it is necessary to 
determine the standards of procedure and principles for the granting of 
83 See infra Chapter III. 
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provisional measures. 84 The determination of standards and principles is 
vital. The determination assists consistency and predictability of the 
arbitration process. Thus the determination of standards or procedures 
and principles affects the efficiency of that process. 
Arbitration rules and laws are generally silent on these standards and 
principles. However, arbitrators are often equipped with broad powers and 
exercise wide discretion. The standards and principles should be flexible 
so that they can suit the circumstances of each individual case. In 
determination of such standards and principles, inter alia, the temporary 
nature of provisional measures should be taken into consideration. Such 
standards and principles should be pragmatic in order to suit the practical 
needs of international commerce and arbitration. 
For the determination of standards and principles, arbitrators, occasionally, 
refer to or take inspiration from the law of the place of arbitration or any 
other relevant law. Further, parties rarely make specific reference to 
national laws in practice. In using their discretion for such determination, 
arbitrators may be guided by arbitral case law and a comparative analysis 
of various arbitration rules. To this end, it is useful to examine, in light of 
that case law and such analysis, the standards of procedure and principles 
for the grant of provisional measures. Seventy-two sets of arbitration rules 
and arbitral practice mainly under the arbitration rules of the AAA, ICC, 
ICSID, and UNCITRAL are examined in the thesis. 
84 See infra Chapter IV. 
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Enforcement of Arbitral Provisional Measures 
Arbitral provisional measures are, unlike judicial measures, not self- 
executing. They have, however, certain weight. 85 Arbitrating parties may 
voluntarily abide by the decisions of their tribunals. Otherwise, certain 
sanctions may be available against a recalcitrant party. Adverse 
inferences may be drawn where a party refuses to comply with a 
provisional measure concerning preservation of evidence. Alternatively, 
the recalcitrant party may be held liable for costs and damages concerning 
two categories of provisional measures; namely, (i) measures related to 
the conduct of arbitration and the relations between the parties during 
arbitral proceedings, and (ii) measures aimed to facilitate later enforcement 
of the award. 
Drawing adverse inferences may be very effective. However, holding a 
party liable for costs and damages in regard of provisional measures may 
not always be effective. Particularly against the dissipation of assets, the 
potential liability is not considered effective protection. The effectiveness 
of arbitral provisional measures is directly related to the effectiveness of 
arbitration. The success of arbitration lies in its appeal to its main users. 
By taking the importance of the enforceability issue into account, several 
legislatures introduced judicial assistance to arbitration for enforcement of 
arbitral provisional measures. However, these efforts are not sufficient. 
This is because there is disharmony in regard of the provision of judicial 
assistance. Further, only a few laws provide for judicial assistance to 
foreign arbitration. No arbitration convention expressly contains a 
provision on the enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. The weight 
85 See infra Chapter V, Part 1. 
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of arbitral provisional measures and how their effectiveness would be 
enhanced through enforcement will be examined below. 
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CHAPTERI 
EVOLUTION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
Interim protection of rights is not a new phenomenon. Some of the 
interdicts of the Roman law aimed at protecting property on a 
provisional basis. ' Later, in the middle ages, for instance in England, 
the possessory assizes, which were inspired from possessory 
interdicts2 were used to "mitigate the long delay which occurred 
between the issuance of a writ of right and the trial -a delay which was 
due to the solemnity of the writ of right. ,3 
In international content, the regulation of interim protection of rights 
seems to date back to the beginning of the 20th century .4 
The drafters 
Buckland / McNair, 420-423. 
2 Id., 421. 
Elkind, 27. 
Interim protection in international plane was contained in series of treaties dated 
the early 1900s. See Elkind, 38-43. Perhaps, the most influential provisions in 
respect of interim protection were placed in the Treaties for the Advancement of 
Peace or Bryan Treaties of 1914. The Bryan treaties were signed between the 
United States ("U. S. ") and China, France, and Sweden. For the U. S. -China 
(Advancement of Peace) Treaty, see Charles I. Bevans, Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, v. 6 
(Washington: Department of State 1968-1976), 711-713; for the U. S. -France 
(Advancement of Peace) Treaty see id., v. 7,883-885; and for the U. S. -Sweden 
(Advancement of Peace) Treaty see, id., v. 11,741-743. Article IV(2) of each treaty 
provided: 
In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts already 
committed or about to be committed, the Commission [to be constituted in 
accordance with the terms of each treaty] shall as soon as possible indicate 
what measures to preserve the rights of each party ought, in its opinion, to be 
taken provisionally and pending the delivery of its report. 
The treaties affected the drafting of Article 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice. See Elkind, 41,43-46. That Article was the basis of Article 
41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In this period, the function of 
interim protection differed under various legal systems. See, generally, Elkind, 23- 
31. The function was generally prevention of deprivation or disturbance of 
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of international commercial arbitration rules in those days were 
probably affected by such regulation. Indeed, it was in 1915 when the 
concept of interim protection of rights was introduced into international 
commercial arbitration for mainly the satisfaction of commercial and 
business needs. 
The growth of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, in general, 
and, the idea of interim protection of rights, in particular, was naturally 
related to evolution of international trade and business. In the evolution 
of the international commercial arbitration practice, there are two 
periods within which there were significant developments: the first and 
the last quarters of the 20th century. These developments were no 
haphazard. It was the rapid expansion of international trade and 
business that triggered in the first place the flourishment of international 
commercial arbitration in the beginning of the 20th century. 5 Increasing 
trade relations between Latin American states and the U. S. resulted in 
creation of a mechanism for settling disputes arising from such relations 
in 1915. This mechanism was composed of a set of arbitration rules. 
Recognising the importance of interim protection of rights, these rules 
were, for the first time, empowered a party-appointed authority to grant 
interim measures for the protection of property in dispute. 
National legislatures and courts soon after accepted that court 
assistance in respect of interim protection was sometimes necessary 
for success and effectiveness of international commercial arbitration 
and effective distribution of justice. The necessity for courts' 
involvement in arbitration in regard of interim protection of rights was 
possession, prevention of violence and protection of status quo ante pending trial. 
Id. 
On the evolution of international business, particularly business environment, in the 
1880s and afterwards see Geoffrey Jones, The Evolution of International Business 
-An Introduction (London/New York: Routledge 1996), 29-41. 
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also recognised by arbitration rules. However, national legislatures for 
a long period of time refrained from empowering arbitrators to grant 
provisional measures. State courts too took prohibitive approach to the 
arbitral power. 
The approach of legislatures and courts was a reaction to empowering 
arbitrators under certain arbitration rules to grant provisional measures. 
The refusal of recognition of arbitral power in respect of provisional 
measures and the prohibitive approach of the courts had a negative 
effect on the express regulation of the arbitral powers for interim 
protection of rights. This effect gradually increased over the second, 
third, and a part of the fourth quarters of the 20th Century. Throughout 
these years, several attempts for improving regional and international 
commercial arbitration practice were made with some success. During 
these years, the business environment was changed due mainly to two 
World Wars. The trends restricting free movement of goods and 
business were generally adopted, particularly, after the Second World 
War. 6 
International legislatures in those days dealt with two main problems for 
the success of international arbitration: recognition and enforcement of 
arbitration agreements (for present and future disputes) and of awards. 
The Geneva Protocol of 1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927 
dealt with the recognition and enforcement issue. ' In 1958, the New 
York Convention perfected the system created then. 
International trade and business boomed again in the 1980s. In fact, 
the importance of international business in the world economy was 
6 See, e. g., generally, Jones, 46-52. 
See also the Treaty concerning the Union of South American States in respect of 
Procedural Law, signed at Montevideo, 11 January 1889, II Register of Texts 5 
(1973). 
;3 
revived and grown in the 1980s to the level of the 1920s. 8 Restrictions 
on free movement of trade and business were steadily released and the 
fall of the European Eastern Block (or of the Berlin Wall) 9 boosted 
trade and business not only between east and west but also in 
international (global) plane. These developments raised importance of 
mechanisms for resolution of disputes, particularly international 
commercial arbitration. The attention to arbitration contributed 
positively already existing attempts to resolve problems of international 
arbitration practice. The concept of interim protection of rights was 
identified as one of those problems of international arbitration in 195610 
and was dealt with under the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration" (the "European Convention"), the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (the "UNECE") Arbitration 
Rules, and the Rules for International Commercial Arbitration of the 
8 Jones, 59 (stating that "[b]etween 1880 and the 1920s international business 
reached a significance in the world economy which it was not to approach again 
until the 1980s. "). See also Sanders, Quo Vadis, 83. In support of this view, it 
could be added that the 1980s is the most active period in the history of ICC 
arbitration in which the ICC International Court doubled the requests it received 
until 1980 from the ICC Arbitration Rules first inception in 1923 within the period 
between 1980 and 1990. "A Survey of Ten Years of ICC Arbitration (1980-1990)", 
1(1) ICC Ct Arb Bull 7 (1990). In this regard, it is interesting to note what Ronald 
Reagan stated in 1986: 
Today, world trade has increased to a level requiring a more expansive and 
effective system for dispute resolution. In promoting and developing such a 
system, international arbitrators can help to lessen conflict, promote harmony, 
and bring world peace closer to fulfilment. (Emphasis added. ) 
Welcoming Letter to the VIIIth International Arbitration Congress of the International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration, in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ), Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 
(Deventer: Kluwer 1987), 1 ("Comparative Arbitration"). 
This event marked the era of globalisation. On globalisation see, e. g., Jarrod 
Weiner, Globalization and the Harmonization of Law (London/New York: Pinter 
1999); Loukas Mistelis, "Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal 
Transplants, and Law Reform - Some Fundamental Observations", 34(3) Int'l Law 
1055 (2000); Gordon Walker / Mark Fox, "Globalization: An Analytical Framework", 
3 Ind J Global Legal Stud 375 (1996); and Martin Shapiro, "The Globalization of 
Law", 1 Ind J Global Legal Stud 37 (1993). 
10 UN Doc Trade/WP1/12, paras. 41-42. 
Done at Geneva, 21 April 1961,484 UNTS 364, No. 7041 (1961-1964). 26 
countries signed and ratified the European Convention. For the list of those 
countries see <www. unece. org/trade/tips/comarbit/listpart. htm> last visited at 28 
October 2003. 
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United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East" (the 
"UNECAFE"). 13 These Arbitration Rules recognised the need to 
empower arbitrators to grant provisional measures. They also 
recognised the need for courts' assistance to arbitration for the grant of 
provisional measures. In the beginning of the 1980s, the number of 
national laws permitting arbitrators to grant provisional measures 
increased rapidly. This was related to the recognition of the 
commercial need by national legislatures through overcoming the 
historical prejudice towards arbitration. 14 The need for judicial 
assistance to arbitration too gained wide acceptance in international 
and national legislations as well as court decisions within the last part of 
the 2 0th century. 
12 Now the U. N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 13 The 1972 Nestor Report did not, however, identify the concept as one of the 
problems perhaps because the issue was dealt with under the above arbitration 
rules. For the Report of Ion Nestor on International Commercial Arbitration in 1972, 
see UN Doc A/CN. 9/64. 
14 In overcoming such prejudice, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Model 
Law, both of which reflect the evolution of the issue of provisional measures in 
arbitration played a vital role. Both the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Model 
Law have improved, internationalised, and harmonised international commercial 
arbitration. On the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Berger, International, 63 
(indicating that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have inspired many provisions 
contained in contemporary institutional arbitration rules. "); Sanders, Quo Vadis, 13 
(stating that "today it can be noted that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, to some 
extent, have had a harmonising effect. "). On the Model Law, see, e. g., Redfern / 
Hunter, 508; and Sanders, Quo Vadis, 83 (arguing that the wide adoption of the 
Model Law "throughout the world contributed greatly to the harmonisation of 
arbitration laws. "). Several experts from various parts of the World worked on the 
preparation of the Model Law and laws of 43 jurisdictions are based on it. 
Legislation based on the Model Law are enacted in Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Belarus, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Hungary, India, 
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Macau Special 
Administrative Region of China, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
Scotland; within the United States of America: California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Oregon and Texas; Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See generally UN Doc 
A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108/Add. 1 available at <www. uncitral. org> last visited at 28 
October 2003. 
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This Chapter studies the evolution of provisional measures in arbitration 
and its historical, commercial, and political causes. The study of the 
evolution and its causes will enlighten the roots of some of the 
problems and uncertainties on those measures. The roots, evolution 
and its causes enhance our understanding of today's trends and assist 
shaping of trends for the 21st century in respect of those measures. In 
this regard, two issues will mainly be studied. These issues are power 
of arbitrators to grant provisional measures and court assistance 
(concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators and of courts) for interim protection 
of rights. This Chapter examines the approach of (i) arbitration rules 
and (ii) international and national legislatures as well as courts to those 
issues. 
1 Arbitration Rules 
It was in the early years of the last century when a sophisticated set of 
rules15 dealing with international commercial arbitration recognised the 
need, to empower a party-appointed authority to grant interim 
protection of rights. Indeed, in 1915, at the First Pan-American 
Financial Congress, a plan (a dispute resolution mechanism) for 
settlement of disputes by arbitration in trade between business persons 
in the United States of America and the Argentine Republic was 
prepared (the "1915 Plan"). 16 
15 The sophistication of which is perhaps a reflection of the fact that commercial 
disputes in those days often settled by arbitration. See generally Arthur Nussbaum 
(ed. ), International Year Book on Civil and Commercial Arbitration, (New York: 
Oxford University Press 1928), v. 1,398. 
16 The Plan came into force in 1916. The Plan was reprinted in AAA (ed. ), Year Book 
on Commercial Arbitration in the United States (New York: Oxford University 
Press 
1927), 823. The Plan perhaps influenced by the Bryan Treaties as the U. S. was a 
party to them. On the Plan, see also Horacio Grigera Naön, "Latin 
American 
Arbitration Culture and the ICC Arbitration System", in: Stefan N. Frommel I Barry 
A. K. Rider (eds. ), Conflicting Legal Cultures in Commercial Arbitration - Old 
Issues and New Trends (Kluwer: London 1999), 117. 
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The rules contained in the 1915 Plan were dealing with trade between 
two trade institutions: the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the Bolsa de 
Commercio of Buenos Aires. In accordance with the 1915 Plan, an 
arbitration committee each established within the above chambers of 
commerce was empowered to deal with disposal of perishable or 
seasonal goods. This power was given as recognition of a commercial 
need to protect, on an interim basis, the rights of the arbitrating parties. 
Since arbitration emerged in the beginning of the last century as a 
dispute resolution mechanism for resolving disputes between business 
persons belonged to various trade institutions, it was logical to 
empower the administrative organ of a trade institution, which was 
indisputably neutral, and readily available and whose integrity was free 
from doubt for the grant of interim protection of rights. Also such 
institution had moral powers over its (businessmen) members, which 
powers eased the compliance with the institution's decision on the 
interim protection. 
The mechanism contained in the 1915 Plan was developed into two 
divergent systems for effectiveness of interim protection of rights. For 
nearly 40 years, an organ (a special committee) or a head of an 
arbitration institution was empowered to grant certain interim measures. 
This power, though it vanished in the 1950s for a period of time due to 
political and historical reasons, still survives. " Since the 1920s, along 
with that power or, solely, in general, arbitral tribunals have been 
empowered to grant interim measures under various arbitration rules. 18 
Commencing from the 1930s, a number of arbitration rules made 
references to the concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators and of courts. 
17 See infra Chapter III, Part I. 
18 Apparently, any such power entrusted to a party-appointed authority could/can only 
be used where applicable national laws were/are permissive. See generally 
Chapter I, infra Part 1.2. 
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This Part deals with evolution of power of an organ or the head of trade 
institution. It also studies arbitrators' competence to grant interim 
measures and the issue of concurrent jurisdiction under various 
arbitration rules. 
1.1 Power of Organ or Head of A Trade Institution 
Until the formation of an arbitral tribunal or even after its formation, 
there may be a need to urgently seek interim protection of rights. This 
need is commercial. It was commercially vital for business persons that 
their rights or the subject matter of a dispute were protected regardless 
of the fact that such protection was provided on an interim basis. The 
need for interim protection may require an established body or organ. 
The 1915 Plan recognised and remedied the need by referring interim 
measure applications to a permanent body. The 1915 Plan was taken 
as a basis by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce's "Plan for Commercial 
Arbitration" prepared in 1922 (the "1922 Plan") for promoting domestic 
arbitration within the U. S. Both Plans probably affected the ICC Rules 
of Arbitration 1931, which empowered the president of the ICC Court, 
along with arbitrators, to take conservatory measures. However, the 
concept of empowering an organ of a trade institution, e. g. a committee 
or its president faced with troubles and abandoned in 1955 to be 
revived in the 1990s. This Part examines the 1915 and 1922 Plans and 
the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
1.1.1 1915 Plan 
In accordance with the 1915 Plan, 
the Bolsa de Commercio of Buenos Aires and the United States 
Chamber of Commerce each established a Committee on 
arbitration and an official list of arbitrators, with bi-national 
participation in both, and they agree to urge the insertion of a 
standard arbitration clause in contracts between merchants of 
the Argentine Republic and the United States of America. Rules 
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for the conduct of arbitration[sic]s are provided in connection 
with the agreement. 19 (Emphasis added. ) 
It was no coincidence that such a sophisticated plan was agreed by two 
countries situated in the American Continent. Nor was it coincidence 
that, upon approval of the Inter-American High Commission, similar 
plans were negotiated between the United States Chamber of 
Commerce and various commercial organisations in Brazil, Ecuador, 
Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Columbia. 20 These 
developments owed to the fact that, in those days, trading environment 
in the Americas was favourable whereas Europe was at the brink of the 
First World War thus trade relations within or from Europe were 
hampered. 
Article XII of the 1915 Plan provided: 21 
If a controversy which is submitted to arbitration involves 
merchandise, the committee on arbitration which will have 
supervision of the case may, after communication with the 
parties, sell the merchandise or take such action as may, in their 
judgment, be advisable to avoid increased loss. The proceeds 
of such sales shall be deposited in bank to await the award of 
arbitrators. 
This Article responded the call for the commercial need to protect the 
merchandise22 in dispute on an interim basis. There are two issues to 
note on the Plan. The Plan entrusted the committee on arbitration, as a 
standing body available to provide interim protection of rights whenever 
19 AAA (ed. ), 823-824. 
20 Id., 824. It is interesting to note that a similar plan was signed between Chamber 
of Commerce at Buenos Aires (Argentina) and the Associacä Commercial of Rio 
de Janeiro (Brazil). See Nussbaum (ed. ), 291, note 8. 21 AAA (ed. ), 835. This Article was entitled "Disposal of Perishable or Seasonal 
Goods. " The procedure for the sale of goods explained in Articles 5 and 8-11 of 
the Rules for Dealing With Merchandise (an annex to the Plan). For the text of this 
annex see id., 840. 
22 The drafters of the Plan considered, particularly, the protection of the merchandise 
in dispute because, in those days, sale of goods contracts constituted a bulk of 
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necessary, with the power to grant provisional measures. 23 Further, 
Article XII of the 1915 Plan constituted the basis for interim protection 
of rights under international commercial arbitration. 
1.1.2 1922 Plan 
Apparently, the 1915 Plan inspired the 1922 Plan for promotion of 
arbitration by use of businessmen of various domestic chambers of 
commerce in the U. S. 24 Apparently, the inspiration was motivated with 
the recognition of the same commercial need to protect the 
merchandise in dispute. Article 14 of the Arbitration Rules of that Plan 
provides: 
If the circumstances of a case disclose that while the controversy 
is pending there may be aggravation of damages, as in a case 
involving rejection of perishable merchandise, the committee [on 
arbitration of the relevant association] shall forthwith propose to 
the parties that they assent, saving all of their rights, to such a 
disposal of the merchandise, or such a course with other subject 
matter, as will prevent further deterioration or aggravation of 
damages in any other form. In all such cases, the committee 
25 shall place the facts before the arbitrators. 
This Article differed from Article XII of the 1915 Plan in one important 
aspect. The latter gave power to direct sale, if necessary, the goods in 
question whereas the former gave power to make a mere proposal for 
sale. This author is unable to find any express stipulation as to why 
direct power to sell the disputed subject matter amended to make a 
proposal in that regard. Article 14 under the 1922 Plan was probably 
international transactions and also because the above institutions aimed to assist 
sale of goods transactions e. g., cotton. 
23 The drafters did not entrust that power to arbitrators. That is probably because 
they observed the difficulties that we still have today; namely, it takes some time to 
appoint arbitrators, even in those days when arbitration was not judicialised and 
internationalised or, in other words, comparatively simple and flexible and that until 
arbitrators' appointment no interim protection could be available. 
24 AAA (ed. ), 822,824. It seems that a similar mechanism was in operation under 
the Arbitration Rules of, then, the London Court of Arbitration. See Article 17 of the 
Rules of the London Court of Arbitration reprinted in: Nussbaum (ed. ), 270,273. 
25 AAA (ed. ), 829. This Article was entitled "Prevention of Aggravated Damages. " 
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based on the promise that arbitrating parties would voluntarily follow 
any such proposal as they wilfully submitted their dispute for resolution 
to the committee. 
1.1.3 ICC Arbitration Rules 1931 
The 1915 and 1922 Plans were mirrored and followed by the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1931. Article 11 of the Rules empowered the 
president (along with arbitrators) of the ICC Court of Arbitration with 
certain emergency powers. That Article was flexible for creating most 
effective means of interim protection. Article 11 left the power with 
arbitrators but recognised the shortcomings of such competence and 
also empowered the president26 of the then ICC Court of Arbitration for 
providing such protection. 27 
26 On the reason for empowering the president with such power, Robert stated: 
Experience has shown that urgent cases may arise which necessitate, outside 
the monthly meetings of the Executive Committee, a decision concerning 
conservatory measures to be taken in the interest of one or other of the parties. 
... 
[I]t was decided to insert a new Article [11 which empowered both the 
president and the tribunal to grant provisional measures] .... See Marx Robert, "The Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce - Revision of the Rules", 11 World Trade 301,302 (August 1931). This 
statement suggests that, prior to the amendment, the Executive Committee had a 
power in respect of conservatory measures. However, this author could not find 
any information to support that proposition. The statement might be related to the 
regulation of conservatory measures under the 1915 Plan upon which Article 11 
most probably was based. Article XII of the 1915 Plan empowered the Committee 
to grant certain conservatory measures. See Chapter I, supra Part 1.1.1. 
However, the ICC Rules, after various discussions, refrained from empowering the 
Executive Committee because the Executive Committee of the ICC was not really a 
standing body as it convened once in a month. The awkwardness of the above 
statement is probably because only a part of those discussions was referred to in 
the Max Robert's commentary. 
27 There were two important characteristics of the president's power: First, the 
president of the Court of Arbitration was given the power in urgent cases to appoint 
an expert, who was armed with power to adopt certain conservatory measures 
including sale of the goods in dispute. The pre-condition for the use of that power 
was the existence of an ICC arbitration clause. Second, the president's power 
might only be used in urgent cases and upon a request from a party (never ex 
officio). See Robert, 302. For the text of Article 11 and further characteristics 
under such power, see Chapter I, infra Part 1.2.1. 
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Certain amendments made to Article 11 in 1939 but the president's 
power retained only to be removed in 1955.28 Indeed, in this year, the 
power of arbitrators to grant a provisional measure was too removed 
from the ICC Arbitration Rules. The removal might be attributable to 
potential and actual problems caused by the existence or practice of 
that power due to the negative attitude of legislatures and courts 
towards arbitration. 29 This is conceivable as the president's (or the 
arbitrator's) power to grant conservatory measures made the institution 
itself open to a challenge. A potential challenge meant potential 
liability. In addition, arbitration was facing with hostility at the post war 
era (decolonisation period). 30 Further, the use of the power by the 
President or arbitrators for interim protection of rights could be 
considered sensitive, as such power perceived to belong to sovereign 
within the context of arbitration in those days. Indeed, national 
legislatures did not generally recognise the power in those days. 31 The 
concept of arbitral provisional measures from a standing body was 
reintroduced to international commercial arbitration world in the 
1990s. 32 
1.2 Recognition of Arbitrators' Power and of Concurrent 
Jurisdiction 
The 1915 Plan was also inspired the drafters of the first ICC Rules of 
Arbitration. In 1920, the Council of the ICC decided to undertake a 
study of international commercial arbitration. 
33 A special commission 
and, subsequently, a sub-committee were set up for this purpose. 
28 Frederic Eisemann, "The Court of Arbitration: Outline of Its Changes from 
Inception to the Present Day", in: ICC (ed. ), 60 Years on -A Look at the Future, 
ICC Publication No. 412 (Paris: ICC Publishing 1984), 391,395 ("A Look at the 
Future"). 
29 Id. 
30 See Chapter I, infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
31 See Chapter I, infra Parts 2.1 and 2.2. 
32 See infra Chapter III, Part 1. 
33 "Introduction", ICC Brochure No. 13,3 (1920). 
6ý 
Having studied various rules, 34 the sub-committee proposed a set of 
conciliation and arbitration rules, which were originally prepared by 
Owen D. Young. 35 Article 10 of the proposed arbitration rules dealt with 
36 provisional measures. This Article was inspired from the 1915 Plan. 37 
After lengthy discussions, the arbitration rules38 were adopted with 
minor amendments in 1922.39 These rules became the ICC Arbitration 
Rules 1923. 
Since 1923, the regulation under the ICC Arbitration Rules in their 
several revisions almost always contained a provision on provisional 
measures. To this end, it seems that, until the 1940s, the ICC 
Arbitration Rules was pioneering in international plane. Since then, 
several arbitration rules, following the ICC example, provided for interim 
protection of rights. 
This Part examines the approach of the ICC Arbitration Rules from their 
initial inception and of various other international (institutional and ad 
hoc) arbitration rules to the issue of provisional measures. 
34 These rules were the Arbitration Rules of the International Cotton Federation 
(1911), the Arbitration Rules of the Publisher's Congress (1912), the results of the 
inquiry conducted by the Berlin Chamber of Commerce, the rules proposed by the 
New York Chamber of Commerce, and the Arbitration Rules attached to the 1915 
Plan. See Pozzi, 6,14. 
35 "Proposed Plan For Conciliation and Arbitration Between Traders of Different 
Countries", ICC Brochure No. 13,23 (1920) (the "Proposed Plan"). Owen D. 
Young was the chairman of the committee on commercial arbitration of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. 
36 This Article provides: 
In all cases the arbitrators, at the request of either or both of the interested 
parties, shall have the right to make a provisional decision providing for such 
measures of preservation as may be necessary, in so far as concerns the goods 
in dispute. 
Proposed Plan, 28 
37 On Article XII of the 1915 Plan, see Chapter I, supra Part 1.1.1. It was no surprise 
that the 1915 Plan was affected the drafting of the rules as Young who prepared 
the draft was the chairman of the committee on commercial arbitration of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the U. S. 
38 These rules and the opinions of its author published in the ICC Digest No. 3. See 
George L. Ridgeway, Merchants of Piece - The History of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (Boston/Toronto 1959), 324. 
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1.2.1 ICC Arbitration Rules 1923,1927,1931, and 1939 
With the exception of the 1927 Rules, the 1923,1931, and 1939 ICC 
Arbitration Rules dealt with the issue of interim protection of rights. 
This is an apparent reflection of the importance given to the issue under 
the rules. Article XXXIX, Section C of the Arbitration Rules 1923 
provided: 
In all cases, the arbitrators, at the request of either of the 
interested parties, shall have the right to render a provisional 
decision, providing for such measures of preservation as may be 
indispensable and, when strictly necessary, disposing of the 
merchandise or objects in dispute; it being, however, understood 
and agreed that any such decision of the arbitrators shall not carry 
ao with it any personal responsibility on the part of such arbitrators. 
Perhaps, due to a trouble caused by the exercise of the tribunal's 
power or by the enforcement against a recalcitrant party of a provisional 
decision, a provision on interim protection of rights was removed from 
the ICC Arbitration Rules in 1927. However, a rule on interim protection 
was re-appeared in the 1931 amendments to the Rules. Article 11 of 
the ICC Arbitration Rules 1931, which was lengthier than Article XXXIX 
of the previous Rules provided: 
When the parties are bound by the arbitration clause of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, in urgent cases at the 
request of the parties or of one of them, the President of the Court 
of Arbitration at any time before the arbitrator has entered upon 
his duties, and the arbitrator himself after he has entered upon his 
duties, shall have power to appoint an expert41 and if necessary 
39 Id. 
40 Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Court 
of Arbitration Acceptance of Warrant 41 (19 January 1923). It is noteworthy that 
the Drafting Committee of the Rules further requested that "the [[CC] Headquarters 
[should] take into account the practice of arbitration, where necessary, the rights of 
owners of trade marks of the goods in dispute, when the arbitrators according to 
Article XXXIX might dispose of these goods. " See "Explanatory Commentary of 
the Rules of Conciliation (Good Offices) and Arbitration", Appendix to ICC 
Brochure No. 21,4 (1923). 
41 It is not clear why power as regards interim protection was entrusted to an expert. 
The drafters of the Rules probably thought that the handling of provisional measure 
applications was necessitated a special experience. In respect of a possible 
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several experts to make statements of facts, adopt all 
conservatory measures and if necessary to sell, after having 
stated the facts, the goods in dispute for the account of their lawful 
owner and in the form prescribed by local laws. 
The expert appointed shall present to the Court of Arbitration or to 
the arbitrator a detailed report on the accomplishment of his 
mission. 42 
In 1939, Article 11 was amended so as to: 
(1) modify the title as follows: "Provisional or Conservatory 
Measures". 
(2) in the first paragraph, substitute for the words "conservatory 
measures" the words "provisional or conservatory measures". 
(3) at the end of the article add: "and shall if necessary pay over 
the proceeds of sale to the International Chamber of Commerce 
(whose Secretary General shall have power to give a good receipt 
for the same) to be held for disposal in accordance with the 
Arbitration Award". 43 
A third paragraph was also added that Article: 
"Before or in the course of the proceedings anyone or more of the 
parties can, if they deem this preferable, apply to any competent 
judicial authority for provisional or conservatory measures, without 
this thereby violating the arbitration clause by which they are 
bound. Notice of such an application shall be given forthwith to 
the Court of Arbitration". 44 
negative effect of granting interim measures through an expert, the revision 
committee stated: 
This article [11] meets certain fears expressed in this connection; it had been 
felt that it would be difficult to set a limit to the measures to be taken by the 
expert as and when necessary and that such measures might prejudice the 
subsequent arbitration procedure. ... 
Further, the mission of the expert has 
been confined and limited as closely as possible, so that it ought now to be 
impossible for any action to be taken by the expert to have any undue influence 
on the subsequent arbitration or on the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 
Robert, 302. 
42 "Resolution No. 14 - Commercial Arbitration - Amendments to the Rules of 
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce", ICC 
Brochure No. 77,28 (1931). Article 11 was entitled as "conservatory measures. " 43 "Resolution 14 - Amendments to the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce", /CC Brochure No. 100,13 (1939). 
44 Id. According to Bagge, the amendment aims at 
confirming a right that already exists but about which there has been some 
uncertainty, viz., that parties bound by an arbitration clause can, without 
foregoing the benefit of the clause, apply to the courts for conservatory 
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Within twenty-five years from the 1915 Plan, two main issues were 
established, there was a commercial need for interim protection of 
rights45 and such protection could be sought from arbitrators. Also, the 
express acceptance of the court's role represented a remarkable step 
and influenced most of today's arbitration rules and laws. The 
acceptance recognised certain shortcomings of arbitral jurisdiction (e. g. 
arbitrators' lack of coercive powers) and more importantly constituted 
reflection of the negative approach of legislatures and courts to such 
46 jurisdiction. 
1.2.2 Further Developments in the 1940s and Onwards 
Institutional arbitration rules were generally silent in regard of interim 
measures of protection in the midst of the twentieth century . 
47 For 
example, in 1958, only twenty of 127 arbitration rules (including rules of 
all major arbitral institutions) surveyed dealt with interim measures of 
48 protection. Thirteen of those rules expressly empowered arbitral 
tribunals to take interim measures whereas seven of the rules referred 
measures such as attachment or distraint the application of which is reserved to 
the national judicial authorities. 
Algot Bagge, "Amendments to the ICC's Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration", 
World Trade 47 (August 1939). 
as These measures were initially referred to as "measures of preservation" or 
"conservatory measures. " The aim was to protect the merchandise or object in 
dispute. That was because their initial concern was the sale of goods transactions. 
Indeed, the examples to such measures, e. g., sale of goods confirm that analysis. 
However, the 1939 amendments made a reference to "provisional and 
conservatory measures. " The aim was to enlarge the scope of the provision on 
interim protection of rights (regardless of how a measure is referred to under the 
applicable local law) in order to suit the provision for any type of transaction (in 
addition to sale of goods transactions). See Bagge, 47. 
46 On such approach, see Chapter I, infra Part 2.1. 
47 But see, for instance, Article 24 of the (then) Arbitration Rules 1948 of the London 
Court of Arbitration. This Article provided: 
The arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire shall have power to make such order as he 
or they may think fit for the interim protection, warehousing, sale or disposal of 
the subject matter of arbitration. When the subject matter of the arbitration is 
sold in accordance with this Rule the price received shall be paid forthwith into a 
separate banking account in the name of the London Chamber of Commerce 
pending the result of the arbitration. 
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parties to courts for such measures. 49 What can be inferred from this 
statement is that the power of arbitrators to grant provisional measures 
was not widely recognised in the 1940s. Such little recognition is 
tenable. Once such powers were adopted under arbitration rules in a 
period between 1919 and 1940, the reaction of that adoption of national 
legislatures and courts was generally excessively reluctant due to the 
mistrust towards arbitrators and arbitration. 5° The reason for such 
mistrust was historical. In addition, interim measures were thought to 
be within exclusive jurisdiction of courts. 51 The reason for the 
exclusivity was both historical and political. Further, perhaps most 
importantly, business environment was changed following the Second 
World War. The trends restricting free movement of goods and 
52 business were adopted. 
Due to the above mistrust and exclusivity, the competence of an arbitral 
tribunal to grant provisional measures had a set back commencing, in 
international plane, with the ILA Arbitration Rules 1950 (the 
"Copenhagen Rules"). These Rules refrained from dealing with arbitral 
powers. This approach affected many arbitration rules and its effect 
lasted until the 1990s. The 1960s witnessed revival of that power in 
48 UN Doc Trade/WP. 1/15/Rev. 1,57. 
49 Id. 
50 See Chapter I, infra Part 2.2. 
51 See Chapter I, infra Parts 2.1 and 2.2, and infra Chapter II, Part 3. It is noteworthy 
that, in respect of security for costs, the attitude of the rules was different. The 
majority of those (102 in precise) 127 arbitration rules contained a "provision either 
for security for the costs of arbitration, or for the payment prior to the hearing of the 
fees, or part of the fees, payable to the arbitral institution. " See Peter Benjamin, 
New Arbitration Rules for Use in International Trade in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ), 
International Commercial Arbitration (Paris: Dalloz 1958), v. 1,323,377 
("International Commercial Arbitration I"). In some cases, the security could be 
granted for both costs and arbitral fees. Some of the rules, in addition, provided 
for security for claim provided either by the claimant or both of the parties. Id., 
377-378. 
52 See, generally, Jones, 46-52; and Loukas Mistelis, "Is Harmonisation a Necessary 
Evil? The Future of Harmonisation and New Sources of International Trade Law" 
in: Ian Flecther / Loukas Mistelis / Marise Cremona (eds. ), Foundations and 
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international level due to the recognition of the power's importance. 
The UNECE Arbitration Rules 1966, and the UNECAFE Arbitration 
Rules 1966 initiated the revival. 
The mistrust and exclusivity naturally affected approach of arbitration 
rules to the power of judicial authorities to grant provisional measures 
and the effect of such power on the arbitration agreement. The rules 
generally indicated that a request to a court for those measures is 
neither a waiver nor an infringement of that agreement. The concurrent 
jurisdiction of arbitrators and of courts for the grant of arbitral 
provisional measures was expressly adopted again under the UNECE 
Arbitration Rules. 53 The ICC Arbitration Rules 1975 with its 1988 
amendments followed this approach. 
This Part deals with how the approach to interim measures evolved 
from the midst towards the final quarter of the last century. For this 
purpose, the following rules are examined: the AAA Commercial 
Arbitration Rules from 1944 to 1997, the ILA Rules on Commercial 
Arbitration 1950, the ICC Arbitration Rules from 1955 to 1988, the 
UNECE Arbitration Rules 1966, and the UNECAFE Arbitration Rules 
1966. 
1.2.2.1 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (1944 to 1997) 
The AAA's first commercial arbitration rules were adopted in 1926.5a 
The 1944 rules contained a provision dealing with arbitral provisional 
measures and not with court assistance. This provision lasted until the 
Perspectives of International Trade Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2001), para. 1- 
002 ("Harmonisation"). 
53 The adoption of the concurrent jurisdiction arose from the reading the Rules along 
with the European Convention. On this Convention, see Chapter I, infra Part. 2.2. 
54 These rules were generally applicable to both national and international cases. 
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1997 with slight revisions in due course of time. 55 Article 35 of the 1944 
rules stated in its original version: 
The Arbitrator, with the consent of the parties, may issue such 
interim orders as may be deemed necessary to safeguard the 
subject matter of the arbitration without prejudice to the rights of 
56 the parties or to the final determination of the dispute. 
1.2.2.2 Copenhagen Rules 
The Copenhagen Rules reflected the negative attitude of national 
legislatures towards arbitral power to grant provisional measures. 57 
These Rules constituted an initiation of a shift under arbitration rules 
towards accepting exclusive power of courts in handling provisional 
measures. 58 Indeed, in accordance with Rule 1(2), the parties 
reserve the right to apply to the courts in the manner prescribed 
by local law, for protective or urgent measures such as inquiries, 
or investigations by or before experts, which do not pre-judge the 
issue [in dispute]. 
Rule 1(1) dealt with the interrelation between the merits of the case and 
a provisional measure request. It provided that parties to arbitration 
undertook not to apply to a court for the determination of dispute 
(substance) in question. In other words, the request was separated 
55 
56 
57 
The 1997 version of the rules and the 1991 version of the International Arbitration 
Rules along with their recent amendments closely follow Article 26 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
Article 35. In 1945, the term "interim" dropped from the text. Reflecting the 
attitude of those days, Article 35 aimed to preserve property in question. That is 
because international arbitration, in those days, concerned with sale of goods 
agreements. This is conceivable as most of the transactions and disputes were, in 
fact, related to sale of goods. For instance, between 1972 and 1974, total number 
of international cases administered by the AAA was 104 and 43 percent of those 
cases was related to sales contracts. Howard M. Holtzmann, A Guide to 
International Arbitration Under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
(New York, 1975), 8 (unpublished). Indeed, Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, which was adopted in 1976, too makes specific reference to sale of goods 
agreements. The scope of provisions on provisional measures was widened in 
Article 17 of the Model Law in 1985. In confirmation with this development, the title 
of the AAA rules amended from "conservation of property" to "interim measures" in 
1988. 
See Chapter I, infra Parts 2.1 and 2.2. 
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from and should not affect the scope of arbitral domain in respect of the 
merits. 
1.2.2.3 ICC Arbitration Rules (1955 to 1988) 
There was a dramatic change on the handling the power of an arbitral 
tribunal to grant provisional measures in the 1950s under the ICC 
Arbitration Rules. The ICC Arbitration Rules 1955 pursued the shift 
towards recognition of courts' exclusive jurisdiction for the grant of 
provisional measures as set forth under the Copenhagen Rules. 
Indeed, until 1998, the Rules refrained from expressly granting 
arbitrators the power to issue provisional measures. 59 
The ICC Arbitration Rules 1955, unlike their predecessors, did not 
expressly confer upon an arbitral tribunal the power to grant provisional 
measures. 60 The Rules dealt with the effect of the court intervention for 
providing interim protection on the agreement to arbitrate. Article 13(5) 
of the Rules provided: 
The parties may, in case of urgency, whether prior to or during the 
proceedings before the arbitrator, apply to any competent judicial 
authority for interim measures of protection, without thereby 
contravening the arbitration clause binding them. Any such 
application, and any measures taken by the judicial authority shall 
be brought without delay to the notice of the Court of Arbitration 
or, when necessary, of the arbitrator. 
It is noteworthy that a request to a court was optional under the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1939 whereas the ICC Arbitration Rules 1955 aimed 
58 This shift did not affect the approach to the arbitral powers under the AAA 
Arbitration Rules but had direct influence on the ICC Arbitration Rules. See 
Chapter I, infra Part 1.2.2.3. 
59 The ICC Arbitration Rules 1998 give such powers to arbitrators. On the detailed 
examination of these Rules, see infra Chapter IV. 
60 Indeed, as compared to the ICC Arbitration Rules 1939, the express power of the 
tribunal to grant provisional measures was completely dropped off because "[t]he 
conservatory measures and similar actions ... gave rise 
to more problems. " 
Eisemann, 395. 
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to introduce an important limitation 
where there is urgency. 
a request to a court is permitted 
Article 13(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1955 was, whilst mainly 
containing the basic theme, slightly amended in Article 8(5) of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1975.61 In the 1988 amendments to this last Rules, 
Article 8(5) was restated as: 
Before the file is transmitted to the arbitrator, and in exceptional 
circumstances even thereafter, the parties shall be at liberty to 
apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or 
conservatory measures, and they shall not by so doing be held to 
infringe the agreement to arbitrate or to affect the relevant powers 
reserved to the arbitrator. 
Any such application and any measures taken by the judicial 
authority must be notified without delay to the Secretariat of the 
Court of Arbitration. The Secretariat shall inform the arbitrator 
thereof. 
Article 8(5) brought two important changes. It made a very important 
reservation as to the need of courts' assistance. It initially differentiated 
between two stages of arbitration proceedings. Although the Rules 
made no reservation for the stage prior to transmittal of a file to 
arbitrators, they indicated that, after the transmittal of the file, a right to 
apply to a judicial authority should be exercised "in exceptional 
circumstances. " This restriction served to limit a request for provisional 
measures to a court in case where the tribunal was appointed. 62 
However, Article 8(5) was fallen short of express recognition of arbitral 
63 power to issue those measures. 
61 The text of these Rules reprinted in I YCA 157-166 (1976). 
62 This restriction seems to be a reflection of the view of complete autonomy of 
arbitration from court intervention. 
63 This Article recognises the relevant powers reserved to the arbitrator. The 
intention was "neither to mandate nor [to] exclude" the issuance of interim 
measures by arbitrators. Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 46. In arbitral practice, 
arbitrators were generally found themselves empowered to grant those measures 
basing generally on the language of Article 8(5). See, e. g., Ali Yesilirmak, "Interim 
and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitral Practice", 11(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb Bull 31, 
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1.2.2.4 UNECE Arbitration Rules 1966 
The tide towards arbitral powers to grant provisional measures turned 
again with the introduction of the UNECE Arbitration Rules. These 
Rules again re-recognised the commercial need for interim protection 
and perhaps influenced from the ICSID Convention, which expressly 
empowered an arbitrator to "recommend" a provisional measure. 64 The 
Rules adopted to complement the European Convention, which aimed 
to promote East-West trade. The Rules did not expressly deal with the 
court assistance to arbitration. 65 Article 27 of the Rules provided: 66 
Subject to any legal provision to the contrary, the arbitrators are 
authorized by the parties to take any measure of conservation of 
the goods forming the subject matter in dispute, such as the 
ordering of their deposit with a third party, the opening of a 
banker's credit or the sale of perishable goods. 
1.2.2.5 UNECAFE Arbitration Rules 1966 
These Rules were adopted for mainly promoting arbitration in the 
ECAFE 67 region. The Rules failed to address the judicial powers to 
grant provisional measures but indicated, in recognition of the 
64 
65 
66 
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32, note 13 and 14 (2000) ("Interim"). The change of attitude towards permission 
of arbitral powers to grant provisional measures was undoubtedly affected by the 
UNECE and UNECAFE Arbitration Rules. See Chapter I, infra Parts 1.2.2.4 and 
1.2.2.5, respectively. 
See Chapter I, infra Part 2.2. 
That is because the Rules were adopted for mainly complementing the European 
Convention, which contain a provision on the court assistance (Article VI(4)). 
The Rules gave further power to an arbitrator to grant security for costs. Article 28 
of the Rules stated that "[t]he arbitrators shall be entitled to require security for the 
costs of the arbitration proceedings. " The arbitrators' power is restricted to costs of 
arbitration but not to claim in dispute as that was the trend at the time of the Rules' 
adoption. Benjamin in: Sanders, International Commercial Arbitration, 345. As to 
which costs and their initial apportionment, Cohn states that only the costs of 
arbitration excluding costs of a party are counted and that they should equally be 
distributed as an initial measure between the parties should the tribunal decide to 
require security for costs. E. J. Cohn, "The Rules of Arbitration of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe", 16 ICLQ 946,966-967 (1967). 
See, generally, Pieter Sanders, "ECAFE Rules for International Commercial 
Arbitration", in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ) International Arbitration Liber Amicorum for 
Martin Domke (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1967), 252. 
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importance of arbitral powers to grant these measures, in Article VI(6) 
of the Rules: 68 
The arbitrator/s shall be entitled to take any interim measure of 
protection which he/they deems/deem necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. 
2 International and National Legislations and Court Decisions 
For a period between late 19th and early 20th century, arbitration awards 
were generally only morally binding; there were no legal sanctions 
under most national Iaws69 against non-compliance of arbitrators' 
decisions. When business persons commenced to recognise 
arbitration as a favourable dispute resolution mechanism alongside 
litigation, resistance from judiciary including lawyers was emerged. 
Courts, for example, at a time, did not accept the idea of their 
jurisdiction being ousted by private agreements in England 70 
Nussbaum explained the negative attitude towards arbitration: 
To a certain degree this unfavourable attitude may be ascribed to 
a subconscious jealousy of arbitration, which may be competing 
with the courts; but the actual basis of the opposition to arbitration 
should be sought elsewhere. It will be admitted that the increase 
of arbitration [practice] might endanger state jurisdiction and the 
high ideals of impartial justice, if legislative and juridical measures 
for the remedy of abuses were not provided. " 
68 Article VI(7) provided that "[t]he arbitrator/s shall be entitled to fees and shall be 
entitled to require security for the costs of the arbitration proceeding and his/their 
fees. " 
69 A notable exception is the English Act for Amending and Consolidating the 
Enactments Relating to Arbitration 1889 (the "EAA 1889"). See Section 12. 
70 See, e. g., Thompson v. Charnock (1799) 8 Term Reports 139-140; and Scott v. 
Avery [1843-1860] All ER 5. But see Derek Roebuck, The Myth of Judicial 
Jealousy", 10(4) Arb Intl 395-406 (1994) (arguing that there was no evidence of 
judicial antipathy towards arbitration before the 18"Century. ). 
Arthur Nussbaum, "Introduction", in: Nussbaum (ed. ), xi ("Introduction"). See also 
Arthur Nussbaum, "Problems of International Arbitration" in: Nussbaum (ed. ), 1,5 
("Problems"); Wesley A. Sturges, "Commercial Arbitration in the United States of 
America" in: Nussbaum (ed. ), 165,169-171. The negative attitude partly owed to 
the chaos erupted in France due to the law under which all disputes were subject 
to arbitration in 1790. On this chaos, see mainly Jean-Louis Devolve, "The 
Fundamental Right to Arbitration", in, Hunter / Marriot / Veeder (eds. ), 141,142. 
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A further reason for national legislatures and courts' negative attitude 
towards arbitration was related to an inherent problem of arbitration, 
namely, arbitrators' lack of power to coerce compliance with their 
decision. 72 
Following the enactment of some legislative remedies against possible 
abuses of ousting courts' jurisdiction through arbitration agreement'73 it 
was again in England where the negative attitude towards arbitration 
initially relaxed in the 1 9th century Several American States followed 
this trend soon afterwards. 74 
Once courts recognised and enforced arbitration agreements and 
awards, 75 there were further issues to overcome for improving the 
quality of arbitral justice. Dealing with such issues was also important 
for the success of international arbitration and, thus of international 
commerce. In the 1920s, a very important concept, which 
complemented the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, was emerged. The concept was court assistance to 
arbitration. 76 The court assistance was initially available to arbitration in 
respect of appointment and removal of an arbitrator and compelling 
witnesses to attend. " The concept accepted by English and American 
legislatures was also extended in time to grant of provisional remedies 
in support of arbitration in those countries. This approach was, 
however, not generally followed; laws of many countries were silent on 
the concept. Similarly, many laws were silent on arbitral competence to 
grant provisional measures. A small number of laws dealt with such 
72 On the issue of arbitrators' lack of coercive powers, see infra Chapter II. part 4.1 
and infra Chapter V, Parts 2 and 3. 
73 See the AA 1889, section 4. 
74 Nussbaum, Introduction, xi. See also Sturges, 169-171. 
75 See, e. g., R. Sutton, "Arbitration in English Law" in: Nussbaum (ed. ), 52-60. 
76 This concept was characterised as a positive effect of an arbitration agreement. 
Nussbaum, Problems, 6. 
Id. 
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competence. Those laws were generally restrictive. The silence and 
the negative attitude had both historical and/or political causes. 
Since the 1920s, the process of acceptance and recognition of the 
concepts of court assistance to arbitration in regard of provisional 
remedies and of arbitral competence to grant those remedies 
(particularly the latter concept) was, under international and national 
legislations, very slow. For a long period of time, a certain degree of 
mistrust towards arbitration was existed. In addition, courts considered 
arbitrators as their rivals or competitors. 78 The worldwide acceptance of 
the court assistance to arbitration and of the arbitral tribunals' power to 
grant interim measures of protection begun in the 1980s. 
The evolution of the concept of court assistance and of arbitral 
competence to grant interim measures under international and national 
legislations and court decisions will be studied by examining three 
periods: the 1920-30s, 1950-60s, and 1980s. 
2.1 1920-30s: Breaking of Judicial Mistrust Towards Arbitration - 
Emergence of the Concepts of Court Assistance (Decrease in 
Rivalry Towards Arbitration) and of Arbitral Power to Grant 
Provisional Measures 
Neither the Geneva Protocol nor the Geneva Convention did contain 
any provision on provisional measures. 79 It seems that only a handful 
of national laws dealt with court assistance to arbitration and arbitrators' 
power to issue provisional measures. The concept of court assistance 
to arbitration in regard of provisional remedies emerged in the U. S 
78 Indeed, it was the case in France until 1981 when the new French arbitration law 
adopted. See, e. g., Pluyette, 72,74. 
79 Apparently, interim measures were not considered one of the main issues of 
arbitration in those days. 
7S 
The statutes of Illinois (1921), 80 Nevada (1925), 81 North Carolina 
(1939), 82 Utah (1927), 83 Wyoming (1931), 84 and the U. S. AA 192185 
permitted the grant of certain provisional remedies by a court where 
substance of a dispute fell into arbitral domain. Out of those laws, 
Section 12 of the Nevada Act is remarkable: 
At any time before final determination of arbitration the court may 
upon application of a party to the submission make such order or 
decree or take such proceedings as it may deem necessary for 
the preservation of the property or for preserving satisfaction of 
the award. 
A similar but more extensive provision was contained in the EAA 
1934.86 Under the Act, where a dispute was to be arbitrated, a court 
had power to make orders on security for costs, preservation, interim 
custody or sale of any goods which were the subject-matter of 
arbitration, security for amount in dispute, detention, preservation or 
inspection of any property or thing which was the subject of arbitration, 
and interim injunctions or appointment of a receiver. 87 
However, most national arbitration laws did not deal with the issue of 
courts' assistance in regard of provisional measures to arbitration. That 
was because the availability of court assistance to arbitration as to 
88 provisional measures was implicitly assumed. 
80 Revised Statutes of the Illinois, chapter 10, sections 1-17. 
81 Statutes of Nevada (1925), chapter 7. 
82 North Carolina Code Annotated (Michie, 1939), section 898(1). 
83 Utah Laws, chapter 62, section 12. 
84 Wyoming Revise Statutes Annotated (1931), section 7-112. 
85 United States Statutes at Large, v. 43. (68 th Cong. 1923-25), Chapter 213, section 
8. 
86 Section 8, which was re-enacted in Section 12(6) of the EAA 1950. Section 44 of 
the EAA 1996 contains, in most respects, a similar provision. The EAA 1934 was 
enacted verbatim in Northern Ireland (AA 1937, c. 8, Schedule II), and New 
Zealand (AA 1938, Schedule I). 
87 See Article 8 of the EAA 1934, and the First Schedule to the Act. 
88 Bagge, 47. 
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In respect of power of a tribunal to grant interim measures of protection, 
laws were generally silent too in the 1920s. 89 Laws of, for instance, 
only three countries (out of eleven90) dealt with the issue. The Dutch 
law dictated compliance of all provisional orders of an arbitral tribunal91 
whereas, under the German law, arbitrators were not authorised "to 
issue temporary attachments or injunctions". 92 Like the German law, 
the Greek law stated that arbitral tribunal was not authorised to issue a 
provisional decision. 93 The silence and the negative attitude were 
related to historical prejudice against arbitration. They were also 
related to political reasons because no sovereign in those days would 
even consider leaving the issue of interim measures to a private 
person, an arbitrator. It was generally thought that those measures 
would require the use of coercive powers, which were exclusively 
reserved to the sovereign. 
2.2 1950-60s: Even Less Rivalry but Residue of Mistrust 
In 1956, when the problems of arbitration were discussed, the court 
intervention and assistance to arbitration was highlighted. It was 
thought that such intervention and assistance were necessary . 
94 This 
was despite the fact that jurisdiction of courts was completely ousted by 
an arbitration agreement in regard of the substance of a case in 
question. 95 The necessity arose in cases where arbitrators lacked 
jurisdiction in dealing with certain essential issues. One of the 
examples given was collection of evidence including compelling 
witnesses to take oath or appear. It was observed that assistance to 
89 See generally Nussbaum (ed. ), 193-235. 
90 The International Yearbook dealt with the arbitration laws of Germany, England, 
France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Palestine, Poland, Russia, and the 
U. S. Id., 193-235. 
91 See id., 212. 
92 Id., 44. 
93 Id., 50. 
94 UN Doc Trade/WP1/12, para. 40. 
95 Id. 
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arbitrators was essential and allowed by "nearly all legal systems". 96 
This was based on the promise that "when the arbitrators need the help 
of the courts they should be allowed to ask them to perform the acts 
which they themselves cannot perform. , 97 The same concept and its 
basis applied to interim and conservatory measures. 98 The theoretical 
grounds of the concept of court assistance to arbitration were 
explained: 
In all these cases [where court involves in arbitration] the question 
is no longer one of competition but of co-operation between the 
two types of jurisdiction. There can therefore be no objection in 
principle to this sort of intervention by the courts in arbitration 
proceedings. It should be remembered, however, that intervention 
by the courts may mean extra delay and expense. To safeguard 
the reputation for rapidity and cheapness which is one of the most 
important inducements to parties to decide to resort to 
international commercial arbitration, requests for the intervention 
of the courts might usefully be limited in the preliminary stages 
and in the adoption of provisional and conservatory measures. 
The extent to which that could be done would depend on the 
extent of the powers granted to arbitrators in this respect by the 
various national legal systems. 99 (Emphasis added. ) 
Courts' assistance to arbitration was also recognised by the UNIDROIT 
Draft Law on Arbitration in Respect of International Relations of Private 
Law 1957.100 Article 5(2) of the Draft Law provides that "[t]he fact of 
claiming in a court of justice interim measures of protection shall not 
prevent an arbitration agreement from being relied on. " This Article 
stated that a request to a court is not a waiver of agreement to arbitrate; 
accordingly, the substance of a case remains within arbitral domain. 101 
96 Id. See also UN Doc Trade/WP. 1 Add. 1, para. 11. It was indicated that interim 
measures or measures of conservation could be obtained from a court under all 
European legal systems even though the substantive issues fell into jurisdiction of 
an arbitral tribunal. UN Doc Trade/WP. 1/29, para. 53. 
97 UN Doc Trade/WPl/12, para. 40. 
98 Id., para. 41. 
99 Id., para. 42. 
100 Reprinted in (1957) UNIDROIT Yearbook 135. 
101 The Draft Law, in this respect, followed the approach initially set forth in the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1939. See Chapter I, supra Part 1.2.1. 
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The New York Convention does not expressly deal with interim 
measures. 102 However, the European Convention'03 took a similar view 
to the UNIDROIT Draft Law. The Convention itself did not expressly 
deal with the arbitral competence to grant provisional measures but 
there is no prohibition in this respect. 104 Article VI(4) of the Convention 
provides: 
A request for interim measures or measures of conservation 
addressed to a judicial authority shall not be deemed 
incompatible with the arbitration agreement, or regarded as a 
submission of the case to the court. 
Further, it is considered that the Convention permits court assistance to 
arbitration taking place in a country foreign to the place where the 
assistance is sought. 105 
102 But see infra Chapter II, Part 4.2. 
103 This Convention was adopted to satisfy a need to overcome certain problems in 
East-West trade in Europe for using arbitration as a dispute settlement 
mechanism. Para. 4 of the Preamble of the Convention. On the convention, see 
generally Pierre Jean Pointet, The Geneva Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration in: Pieter Sanders (ed. ) International Commercial 
Arbitration -A World Handbook (La Haye: Martinas Niihoff 1965), v. 111,263 
("International Commercial Arbitration III"); P. I. Benjamin, "The European 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration", 37 BYIL 478 (1961); and 
Dominique T. Hascher, "European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1961", XVII YCA 711 (1992) ("European Convention"). The 
Convention convened under the auspices of the Economic Committee for Europe 
of the United Nations. See para. 2 of the Preamble to the Convention. Although 
the Convention named European and signed and ratified by mainly European 
Countries, the accession to the Convention is open to any country, which is a 
member of the United Nations. See, mainly, Hascher, 711. In fact, the UNECE 
Rules adopted to complement the Convention, which provides for that power. See 
Chapter I, supra Part 1.2.2.4. 
104 Hascher, European Convention, 735. Recent amendment work on the Convention 
initially highlighted the importance of the above Article and suggested for 
enlargement of it. See UN Doc Trade/WP. 5/2000/8/Add. 1, para. 31. However, the 
work later focused on various other issues for improving effectiveness of the 
Convention. See UN Doc Trade/WP. 5/2000/linformal/1. 
105 It was observed that, at the time of drafting the Convention, in "practically" all 
European countries, arbitrations treated in the same way regardless of being held 
in a country in question or elsewhere. See UN Doc Trade/WP. 1/29,17-19. 
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Historically, the ICSID Convention followed the European Convention. 
Article 47 of the ICSID Convention provides that, unless otherwise 
agreed, arbitrators can recommend106 any measure aim to preserve 
parties' rights. 107 The Convention does not contain any express 
provision on the issue of court assistance but excludes any remedy 
other than ICSID arbitration itself in accordance with Article 26 of the 
Convention. It is, however, considered that Article 26 is, due to self- 
contained system created by the ICSID Convention and Arbitration 
Rules, excluded any court assistance. 108 
The European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration 1966 
closely followed the European Convention in regard of interim 
protection of rights. 109 Article 4(2) of the Convention states that "[a]n 
application to the judicial authority for preservation or interim measures 
shall not be incompatible with an arbitration agreement and shall not 
imply a renunciation of the agreement. " 
Within the 1950-60s, national arbitration laws were often silent on the 
court assistance and arbitral powers to grant provisional measures. "o 
106 It is recalled that the form of a measure was indicated as "proposal" under the 
1922 Plan, although the preparatory materials on the ICSID Convention made no 
reference to the Plan. 
107 See also Rule 47 of the Arbitration Rules. On arbitral provisional measures in 
ICSID arbitration, see generally infra Chapter IV. 
108 On this issue, see infra Chapter II, Part 2. 
109 European TS, No. 56 (1966). 
110 Indeed, the 1960s also witnessed a doctrinal argument that, mainly, arbitration 
should be detached from restraints and controls of laws of place of arbitration. 
See, generally, Berger, International, 40-89; Redfern / Hunter, paras. 2-16-2-19; 
Jan Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound: Award detached from the Law of Its Country 
of Origin", 30 ICLQ 358 (1981); and Jan Paulsson, "Delocalization of International 
Commercial Arbitration", 32 ICLQ 53 (1983). Under this doctrine, courts played the 
role of control at the stage of enforcement. The doctrine, although contributed 
freeing from national restraints over international commercial arbitration, seems to 
be ended up with failure of recognition. See, e. g., Redfern / Hunter, para. 2-17. It 
should, however, be noted that even some of the proponents of that doctrine 
accepted court assistance to arbitration during arbitral proceedings. See Goldman, 
275-282. The approach of both the ICC and the LCIA Arbitration Rules seemed to 
support, at least partially, the detachment doctrine for a period of time. Article 8 of 
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The court assistance to arbitration was generally assumed for the grant 
of provisional measures. The Swiss Intercantonal Arbitration 
Convention 1969 (the "Concordat") is an example on how provisional 
measures are regulated within that period. Article 26 of the Concordat 
initially sets the rule: "judicial authorities alone have jurisdiction to make 
provisional orders. " It then uniquely states that "the parties may 
voluntarily submit to provisional orders proposed by the arbitral 
tribunal". Although the approach of Article 26 towards interim 
protection of rights was very liberal for the late 1960s when it was 
enacted, it fell short of giving full powers to arbitral tribunals to issue 
interim measures of protection. However, they could "propose, " "offer, " 
or "recommend" provisional measures. The Concordat's approach to 
provisional measures contains a residue of mistrust towards arbitration. 
This approach reflects the perspective of many national laws. It also 
reflects the legislatures' reaction to power given to arbitrators for the 
grant of provisional measures during the process of enactment of many 
arbitration laws and the era of decolonisation and nationalisationof 
legal systems. 
2.3 1980s: The Tide Began to Turn - Trust to Integrity of 
Arbitrators and Arbitration 
This period marked the change of approach towards arbitration. It was 
observed, for example that until the enactment of the new French 
arbitration law in 1981, arbitration was considered a rival competitor to 
the ICC Arbitration Rules 1975 provided that courts' assistance would be sought 
under exceptional circumstances. See Chapter I, supra Part 1.2.2.3. Similarly, the 
LCIA Arbitration Rules 1985 kept power to grant certain interim remedies solely 
within the arbitral jurisdiction. Articles 13. The text of the Rules reprinted in X YCA 
157,162 (1985). Article 13 seems to aim at "eliminating a potential means for 
obstructing progress in arbitration. " See J. Martin H. Hunter / Jan Paulsson, "A 
Commentary on the 1985 Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration", X 
YCA 167,170 (1985). However, the approach of both Rules to provisional 
measures was changed due to the recognition of the need for court assistance for 
efficiency of arbitration. See infra Chapter II, Part 4.4. 
Mistelis, Harmonisation, para. 1-002. 
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courts in France. ' 12 However, growing importance and practice of 
international commercial arbitration and the effect of trustworthiness or 
integrity that arbitration and arbitrators gained over 65 years of 
arbitration practice caused the change of perception of arbitration as a 
rival dispute resolution mechanism to judiciary. In fact, this is the 
period when arbitrators' powers to grant provisional measures 
commenced to have wide recognition. McDonnell examined in a 
comparative study the availability of provisional measures within the 
1980s. 13 According to his study, twelve out of twenty-six jurisdictions 
surveyed provided for concurrent jurisdiction to judicial authorities and 
arbitral tribunals. Thirteen of those contained exclusive powers to 
courts, 114 One jurisdiction's approach could be interpreted as providing 
for exclusive jurisdiction to arbitrators. ' 15 
The allocation of the power under concurrent jurisdiction approach was, 
according to McDonell, generally related to types of measures, ' 16 and 
112 See, e. g., Pluyette, 74. 
113 Neil E. McDonell, "The Availability of Provisional Relief in International Commercial 
Arbitration", 22 Colum J Tran's L 272 (1984). For another publication that sheds 
light to laws of seventeen jurisdictions in a slightly later period, see David W. 
Shenton / Wolfgang Kuhn (eds. ), Interim Court Remedies in Support of Arbitration 
(International Bar Association 1987). It was noted in 1991 that the source and 
scope of arbitral powers were described as evolving "ill-defined area of the law". 
Higgins, 1521. 
114 These jurisdictions were Australia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Yugoslavia. McDonnell, 277-78. In these jurisdictions, an application to a 
court for interim measures was not considered as circumvention of agreement to 
arbitrate. The substance of a dispute would remain within the arbitral domain. 
See, for example, Sergei N. Lebedev, Handbook on Foreign Trade Arbitration in 
CMEA Countries (Moscow 1983), 66. 
115 That jurisdiction was the U. S. See McDonnell, 278-80. On this issue, see also 
infra Chapter II, Part 4.2. 
116 Only courts could order coercive measures whereas both courts and arbitral 
tribunals could grant non-coercive measures. The jurisdictions opting for the 
concurrent jurisdiction approach were Algeria, Belgium, Indonesia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Syria, and Zurich (Switzerland). McDonnell, 
275. On the coercive/non coercive measure distinction, see id., 276. 
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timing of a request for a measure' 17 . Alternatively, in certain 
jurisdictions, parties were free to make their applications any time to 
any forum. ' 18 
Nearly, the half of the jurisdictions surveyed by McDonnell empowered 
arbitrators to grant provisional measures. The increase in the number 
of jurisdictions recognising and remedying the commercial need for 
arbitral powers for the issuance of such measures and court assistance 
to arbitration reflects that the tide was begun to turn. The legislatures 
and courts entrusted to the integrity of arbitration and arbitrators. The 
political will to leave interim protection of rights within the domain of 
judiciary was creepingly faded away. The historical rivalry between 
arbitration and courts was begun to pave the way for cooperation for 
better distribution of justice. This transformation of the role of courts 
and arbitrators owed much to the re-boom of international business and 
trade in the 1980s. 
Conclusion 
Interim protection of adjudicating parties' rights has a long history. 
Roman law, for instance, provided for such protection. 119 In 
international plane, the idea of interim protection found its place in 
international treaties in the beginning of the last century. 120 This idea 
mirrored in arbitration rules. 121 Indeed, within the same period, the 
availability of interim protection of merchandise or rights was 
considered a commercial necessity, whilst modern international 
commercial arbitration rules were in the process of creation. The 
recognition of the need was related to the satisfaction of expectations, 
117 Prior to formation of an arbitral tribunal, a measure could be ordered by a court 
thereafter the tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. This approach was taken mainly 
by Luxembourg and Portugal and a part of the United States. See id., 276-77. 
118 The Federal Republic of Nigeria, France, and Israel. Id., 277. 
119 See Chapter I, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
120 See Chapter I, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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namely, interim protection of the rights of all users of arbitration at a 
time when the volume of international commercial transactions and 
business interactions were increased immensely in the first quarter of 
the 20th Century. 122 A provision on interim protection was found its 
place in the 1915 Plan aimed to resolve disputes between American 
and Argentinean business persons. 123 A special committee was 
established under the arbitration rules attached to such Plan. This 
committee was empowered to deal with, inter alia, a request for a 
provisional measure. The 1915 Plan constitutes the basis for interim 
protection of rights in arbitration. 
The dispute resolution system created by the 1915 Plan evolved, 
recognising the commercial need, into two distinct systems. Some 
rules empowered a head or a special committee itself or along with 
arbitrators to grant a provisional measure. 124 The aim was to create a 
system under which a request for a measure could, at any time, 
(without the need of elapse of time) be considered and, if appropriate, 
be remedied. This system recognised an inherent problem with 
arbitrators' jurisdiction that prior to their appointment, arbitrators could 
not issue any provisional measure. The system was, indeed, the initial 
response of the drafters of arbitration rules to the lack of availability of 
provisional measures from a party-determined authority at the pre- 
formation stage. Other arbitration rules, along with the above power or 
solely, empowered an arbitral tribunal to issue a provisional measure. 125 
The reaction of national legislatures and courts to empowering an 
arbitral tribunal to grant a provisional measure was, except for a couple 
121 See Chapter I, supra Part 1. 
122 See Chapter I, supra Part 1.1. 
123 See Chapter I, supra Part 1.1.1. 
124 See Chapter I, supra Parts 1.1.2 and 1.1.3. 
125 See Chapter I, supra Parts 1.1 and 1.2. 
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of national laws, excessively reluctant. 126 This reaction was mainly 
related to the historical prejudice towards arbitration. This prejudice 
found its roots in the perception by judiciary that arbitrators were their 
rivals. The prejudice was also related to the fact that the increase in 
arbitration practice (and decrease in judicial remedies) might endanger 
state jurisdiction and high ideals of impartial justice. Further, the 
reaction was related to another inherent problem with arbitrators' 
jurisdiction; namely, arbitrators' lack of powers to coerce the 
compliance with their decision. 
Due to the above reaction, the drafters of arbitration rules dropped from 
the contents of arbitral powers to grant provisional measures within the 
midst of the 20th Century. 127 Further, since the adoption of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1939, both arbitration rules and laws generally 
accepted that a request to a court for such measures was neither 
incompatible with nor violation of the arbitration agreement. 128 
It did not take too long for the arbitration rules to re-consider their 
position. Indeed, it was the UNECE Arbitration Rules that initially re- 
discovered the need for interim protection of rights by arbitrators. 129 
National laws too recognised such need in the 1980s. 13° Such 
recognition much owed to the re-boom of international commerce and 
business. The commercial need changed the political will by 
overcoming the historical prejudice. Thus, the negative attitude of 
national legislatures creepingly faded away. Many national laws, within 
the last quarter of the 20th Century, expressly adopted the concept of 
concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators and of courts. 
131 In this period of 
126 See Chapter 1, supra Part 2.1. 
127 See Chapter I, supra Part 1.2. 
128 See Chapter I, supra Parts 1.2,2.2, and 2.3. 
129 See Chapter I, supra Part 1.2.2.4. 
130 See Chapter I, supra Part 2.3. 
131 Id. 
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time, courts' involvement into arbitration was regarded of co-operative 
but not of competitive nature. 132 
The approach taken in the 1980s towards the issues of arbitral powers 
and of the court's role concerning interim protection of rights constitutes 
the basis for the approach taken today in respect of those issues by 
arbitration conventions, laws, rules, and commentators. 
132 Id. 
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CHAPTER II 
FORUM TO SEEK PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
There are traditionally two main fora to seek provisional measures: 
arbitral tribunals and courts. Contracting parties may also determine, 
by agreement, some other authorities (e. g. emergency arbitrators, pre- 
arbitral referees or indeed arbitration institutions) to remedy provisional 
measure requests. ' Provisional measures may be available and sought 
from any one or, in some cases, all of those fora at the same time. 
It is widely accepted today that an arbitrator is the "natural judge" for 
interim measures of protection where there is an agreement to arbitrate 
for a final remedy. 2 There are many reasons supporting this view. 3 
Perhaps the most important of those reasons is the principle of party 
autonomy: the agreement to arbitrate or refer a dispute to a party- 
determined authority. This principle should be respected for both final 
and provisional remedies. The ICSID Convention, for example, accepts 
this view. The Convention envisages for the exclusion of, unless 
otherwise agreed, all local remedies, including interim ones. 
See, generally, infra Chapter III. 
2 See, e. g., Kessedjian, Court Decisions, 7; Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts, 86; 
Julian D. M. Lew, "LCIA New Arbitration Rules 1998 - Jurisdiction, Interim Relief 
and Award", Kings College Conference (5 June 1998), 4 (unpublished) (indicating 
that "[t]here is an increasing view that if parties have chosen arbitration as the 
forum for settlement of their disputes, the arbitrators should also be the first source 
of interim relief. ") ("Jurisdiction"); and Lew / Mistelis / Kröll, para. 23-14 (stating that 
"[i]t is now widely recognised that the arbitration tribunal will often be the best 
forum to determine the appropriateness of specific interim measures for each 
case. "). This view reflects "the increasing acceptance of arbitration as a 
satisfactory mechanism for resolving complex international commercial disputes 
and increasing recognition by national courts that interlocutory judicial interference 
in the arbitral process is often counterproductive. " Born, International Arbitration, 
924. See also generally supra Chapter I. 
3 See Chapter II, infra Part 1.1. 
87 
In contrast, some legal systems and arbitration rules, mainly as a 
reflection or residue of the outdated concept of mistrust to arbitration, 
refrain from empowering arbitrators to grant provisional measures. 
4 
This, however, reflects a minority view, at least in connection with 
developed arbitration systems. 
Indeed, most modern legal systems and arbitration rules, in contrast, 
accept that court assistance to arbitration is essential and useful for 
effectiveness of arbitration. Thus these systems and rules adopt the 
concurrent jurisdiction approach. The acceptance and adoption is 
related to and stems from inherent problems and shortcomings of 
arbitration. Arbitration is generally considered very effective dispute 
resolution mechanism for final protection of arbitrating parties' rights-5 
However, the effectiveness of arbitration today is hampered by its 
nature and operation. 
There are three salient problems and certain other shortcomings' of 
arbitral jurisdiction concerning interim protection of rights. 7 These 
salient problems are: 
" an arbitral tribunal needs to be constituted before it can deal with 
any request for interim protection; 
° This view has generally faded away as explained in supra Chapter I, Part 2. 
5 Hence, the frustration of arbitration agreement is prevented. In other words, 
contracting parties cannot, by disregarding their agreement to arbitrate, seek to 
adjudicate the substance of their dispute in any other forum but arbitration. See, 
e. g., Article 11(3) of the New York Convention; Article 26 of the ICSID Convention; 
and Article 8(1) of the Model Law. 
6 See Chapter II, infra Part 4.1. 
These problems and shortcomings might perhaps have been overcome, at least to 
a certain extent, were an international arbitration court to be established. On the 
issue of international arbitration court see, e. g., Howard Holtzmann, "A Task for the 
21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving Disputes on the 
Enforceability of Arbitral Awards", in: Martin Hunter / Arthur Marriott / V. V. Veeder 
(eds. ) The Internationalisation of International Arbitration (London Dordrecht 
Boston: Graham Trotman / Martinus Nijhoff 1995), 109-113; and Stephen M. 
Schwebel, "The Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral 
Awards", in: Hunter / Marriott / Veeder (eds. ), 115-123. 
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9 the tribunal does not have imperium thus it could not coerce 
enforcement of any measure it granted nor could it grant certain 
measures which intrinsically require the use of imperium; and 
9 the tribunal could not grant provisional measures against third 
parties to arbitration due to the contractual nature of arbitration. 
There are efforts to minimise the negative effects of the above 
problems through introducing complementary mechanisms8 and making 
of arbitral provisional measures enforceable9. These efforts aim to 
make arbitration more effective. The efforts either provide parties 
alternatives to a judicial authority for interim protection or make 
competence of a party-determined authority more effective through 
enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. Although the efforts 
minimise, to a certain extent, the need for concurrent jurisdiction, they 
do not fully diminish such need yet. 
This Chapter examines (i) the general jurisdiction of arbitrators to grant 
provisional measures, and (ii) the exclusive arbitral jurisdiction for 
issuing these measures, (iii) the exclusive jurisdiction of courts in 
respect of such measures, and (iv) the concurrent jurisdiction approach 
for the grant of provisional measures. 
1 General Jurisdiction of Arbitrators to Grant Provisional 
Measures 
This Part discusses why arbitrators should be the natural forum for 
interim measures of protection. It then deals with the source of arbitral 
jurisdiction, its variation and exclusion, and the effect of mandatory 
rules of municipal laws on it. 
8 See generally infra Chapter III. 
9 See generally infra Chapter V. 
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1.1 Reasons In Support of Arbitral Jurisdiction 
There are several reasons supporting the view that arbitration should 
be the "natural forum" for interim protection of rights once parties 
submit their disputes to arbitration: -1° 
" Perhaps the most important reason is utmost respect to the 
sanctity of contract, the agreement to arbitrate. When parties 
chose arbitration to resolve a dispute their primary aim is 
simply to reach resolution of whatever disputes they may 
have before arbitrators and to avoid resorting to any other 
forum. The forum that parties seek to avoid is a court and 
such aim should normally be respected. " Respecting that 
aim is a reflection of the principle of party autonomy. The 
resort to a court may undermine the arbitration agreement. 12 
" Respecting the risk allocation agreed between the contracting 
parties at the time the contract was entered into also 
supports arbitral jurisdiction. 13 Indeed, the chosen arbitral 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The reasons that make contracting parties prefer arbitration over litigation and 
other dispute resolution mechanisms generally support arbitral jurisdiction as 
regards interim protection of rights. See, e. g., Sanders, Quo Vadis, 2-9; and Ziad 
Mody / T. T. Arvind, "Redeeming Sisyphus: The Need to Invigorate Interim Relief in 
International Commercial Arbitration" in: Albert J van den Berg (ed. ), International 
Arbitration and National Courts: The Never Ending Story, ICCA Congress Series 
No. 10 (The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer 2001), 126 ("The Never Ending 
Story"). 
Judicial assistance to arbitration is generally welcome in appropriate 
circumstances. See Chapter II, infra Part 4. 
Bösch (ed. ), 4. Bösch indicates that "the unrestricte-' availability of provisional 
relief from public courts despite the existence of an arbitration agreement could 
threaten to destroy completely the advantages of arbitration. " Id., 5. The 
examples to destruction of advantages are, for instance, an attachment of 
substantial assets to put pressure on the opponent or a threat of obtaining a 
judicial injunction to make the underlying dispute public. Indeed, although interim 
in nature, a judicial measure may have serious or irreparable consequences. Id., 
4. 
Such respect is also supported with the principle of neutrality in arbitration. See 
e. g., Jan Paulsson, "A Better Mousetrap: 1990 ICC Rules for a Pre-arbitral Referee 
Procedure", 19 Int'l Bus Law 214,215 (1990), reprinted in 5 Int'l Arb Rep Sec F 
(1990) ("Better Mousetrap"). In fact, contracting parties generally prefer a neutral 
place for resolution of their disputes. For the principle of neutrality, see, e. g., 
Pierre Lalive, "On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of Arbitration", in: 
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forum is an important element in allocation of risks between 
contracting parties. At the time of entering into a contract, a 
party may have the intention not to take the risk of dealing 
with "vagaries of laws" of a foreign country or of a foreign 
court practice. 14 Such intention should be respected. 
" If resolution of a final remedy in regard of a dispute is 
entrusted to arbitrators, the same trust should logically be 
shown to arbitral domain in determining a provisional remedy 
concerning the same dispute. 15 
0 Arbitrators are generally in a better position than judicial 
authorities to identify whether a request for a provisional 
remedy is used as a dilatory tactic16 or as an offensive / 
abusive weapon" or there is a genuine need. 18 This is 
because the arbitrators generally are far more "acquainted 
with the facts" than judicial authorities and the arbitrators 
Swiss Arbitration Association (ed. ), Swiss Essays on International Arbitration 
(Zurich: Schulthess 1984), 23-33. 
14 See, e. g., McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S. p. A., 501 F. 2d 1038 (3 Cir. 
1974). Martin Hunter / Jan Paulsson, "A Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in 
International Commercial Arbitration", 13 Arbitration 153 (1984) (arguing that the 
expectation of parties from their arbitrators is a decision unaffected from national 
legal constraints. ); and Higgings, 1520 (indicating that arbitration is a "de-politicized 
forum that does not harbor potential biases toward nationals of the domestic 
courts' jurisdiction. "). 
15 Broches indicated during the preparation of the ICSID Convention that "[i]f a 
dispute was properly before the arbitral tribunal, it would seem reasonable to 
empower it to order the parties not to take action which would make it impossible 
to comply with a later award. " History, 515. See also, e. g., Pierre A. Karrer, 
"Interim Measures Issued by Arbitral Tribunals and the Courts: Less Theory 
Please" in: Albert J van den Berg (ed. ), International Arbitration and National 
Courts: The Never Ending Story, ICCA Congress Series No. 10 (The Hague I 
London / New York: Kluwer 2001) ("The Never Ending Story"), 98 ("Less Theory"); 
and Berger, International, 348. 
16 E. g., MacDonnell, 273. A court should too refrain from issuing measures 
"conducive to dilatory tactics of the [arbitrating] parties. " See, e. g., CLOUT Case 
No. 68 (1993) (Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division). 
17 Rubino-Sammartano, 364 (arguing that provisional measures could be used 
"improperly to damage the other party. "); and Cremades, The Need, 226,227 
(indicating that "[a]buses in the request for or adoption of conservatory and 
preliminary measures must be controlled to the benefit of trade. "). 
1B Berger, International, 336. 
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follow the case "from start to finish". 19 There is always a 
possibility that a request for a measure aims at delaying 
arbitration proceedings. Indeed, the application to a court for 
interim measures may be used as a tactical-oppressive 
weapon to delay the proceedings. 2° It is true that dealing with 
that request, however little it may be, takes some time, 
although the arbitrators are generally equipped with the 
necessary powers and experience to assess such request 
and to take appropriate measures for minimizing the 
request's negative effect. 21 An underlying aim of a request 
could also be a distraction of the opponent party's attention, 
effort and finance. 22 Further, in many cases, the reference to 
a court is a tactical decision to gain advantage over the 
adversary. For instance, a party may apply to its own 
national court, which may be receptive of an interim measure 
request. The grant of the request may have an impact on the 
arbitral tribunal's decision, 23 on the responding party, or on 
both. To this end, such party may, because of, for instance, 
financial difficulties, have to cave in and settle the dispute in 
19 Christian Hausmaninger, "The ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure: A 
Step Towards Solving the Problem of Provisional Relief in International 
Arbitration? ", 7(1) ICSID Rev. - FILJ 82,85 (1992) ("Pre-Arbitral Referee"). See 
also Berger, International, 348. The preference of an arbitral tribunal over a court 
is sensible and advisable where the request for an interim measure is made after 
the tribunal is formed and accustomed with the case in dispute. Apparently, the 
arbitrators' knowledge of the case assists effective protection of rights and avoids 
the grant of unjustified measures. 
20 The Arbitration Rules of the American Film Marketing Association (the "AFMA") 
provides that "[t]hese [court] proceedings [in respect of an application for a 
provisional measure] shall not delay ... 
[the] arbitration proceedings. " Article 10. 
21 Also, the tribunal gets accustomed with the case and parties' positions through 
interim measure applications. Karrer, Less Theory, 110. If the measure turned out 
to be wrongly taken, the tribunal tend to speed up the arbitration proceedings to 
minimise the negative effect of the wrongly taken measure. Id. Apparently, in 
such case, damages could also be available. On the issue of damages, see 
Chapter II, infra Part 4.4.3. 
22 For instance, an interim measure application could be costly. But the tribunal 
could require the party who is abusing its right to request a measure to bear those 
costs. See, e. g., Karrer, Less Theory, 110. See also infra Chapter IV, Part 9. 
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unfavourable terms to it. 24 Arbitrators would generally be in a 
far better position than courts to determine whether or not a 
request is made for tactical purposes. 
0 It is arguable that arbitrators' expertise25 in regard of a given 
case makes them a more suitable forum in some 
circumstances to deal with the case and a request for interim 
protection of rights in a speedier manner than judicial 
26 authorities. 
0 Arbitration, generally, has a less disruptive effect (in 
comparison to litigation) on the parties' overall commercial 
relationship. 27 Carrying a dispute away from arbitral domain 
for an interim measure may have an inflammatory effect on 
the adjudication process and, consequently, on that 
relationship. 28 
" It is highly likely that, in proceedings for a provisional 
measure before arbitrators, parties' arguments, subject 
matter of arbitration (e. g. trade secrets), and, in some cases, 
mere existence of arbitration may remain confidential. 29 In 
23 Wirth, 44. 
24 See, e. g., Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84,96; and Francis Gurry, "The Need 
for Speed", Biennial IFCAI Conference (24 October 1997, Geneva, Switzerland), 3 
(unpublished). 
25 It is highly likely that arbitrators will be appointed among those who are experts on 
issues in question by either parties or the appointing authority. 
26 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 85. In this regard, see also Kevin J. Brody, 
"An Argument for Pre-Award Attachment in International Arbitration under the New 
York Convention", 18 Cornell Int'l LJ 99, n. 1 (1985); and Douglas Reichert, 
"Provisional Remedies in the Context of International Commercial Arbitration", 3 
Int'l Tax & Bus Law 369 (1986). 
27 See, e. g., Bösch (ed. ), 3. 
28 See, e. g., Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 86. 
29 See e. g., Berger, International, 349; and Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 85- 
86. The issue of confidentiality is highly debated. For court cases on the issue, 
see, e. g., Esso/BHP v. Plowman, reprinted in 11(3) Arb Int'l 235 (1995); United 
States v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 681 F. Supp. 229 (D. Del. 1988); Hassneh 
Insurance v. Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243; and A. I. Trade Finance Inc v. 
Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd, (Svea Court of Appeal), reprinted in 14(4) 
Mealey's IAR A-1 (1999). For views of commentators, see, e. g., Expert Reports in 
Esso/BHP v. Plowman of Stephan Bond, S. C. Boyd, Julian Lew, and Hans Smit, 
collectively published in 11(3) Arb Intl 213-283 (1995); Jan Paulsson / Nigel 
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regard of judicial measures, however, the confidentiality 
cannot (always) be assured. Most proceedings before courts 
in many countries are public; 30 consequently, decisions of 
courts on provisional relief are not confidential. 
" The type and form of arbitral measures are rarely fixed; 
consequently, arbitrators, unlike judicial authorities '31 may 
issue the most suitable type and form of the decision by 
taking into consideration various aspects of a case. 32 
" Finally, arbitral provisional measures are comparatively less 
costly than judicial measures. One reason for the 
comparatively little cost is that there is generally no appeal 
against a decision of arbitrators concerning interim 
measures33 though, under changed circumstances, 
reconsideration could in principle be sought. 34 Another 
important reason is that arbitrators, generally, have the 
freedom, by taking into consideration circumstances of each 
case (e. g. parties' likely motives, urgency, importance of the 
request, type and form of the measure sought, the right 
whose protection is sought), to make decisions on several 
issues that affect costs. Those issues may be whether or not 
Rawding, "The Trouble with Confidentiality", 5(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb Bul 48-60 (1994); 
and Patrick Neill, "Confidentiality in Arbitration", 12(3) Arb Int'l 287-318 (1996). 
30 See, e. g., Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 86, n. 12. 
31 Courts have no option but to apply the applicable law, which clearly defines the 
form and type of a measure that may be granted (forum regit processum). 
32 See arbitral provisional measures referred to in, e. g., Sperry International Trade, 
Inc. v. Government of Israel, 532 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y. 1982), aff'd. 689 F. 2d 
301 (2nd Cir. 1982); and Rochester City School District v. Rochester Teachers 
Association, 394 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (1977). 
33 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 86. It should, however, be noted that a 
second instance arbitral appeal is available under a small number of arbitration 
rules, mainly in commodities arbitration. See, e. g., the Grain and Feed Trade 
Association ("GAFTA"); and the Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations 
("FOSFA") arbitrations. It is also noteworthy that an arbitral decision on provisional 
measures is subject to appeal in India. See Lalit Bhasin, "The Grant of Interim 
Relief Under the Indian Arbitration Act of 1996" in: van den Berg (ed. ), The Never 
Ending Story, 93,96. 
34 See infra Chapter IV, Part 6. 
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to have a hearing, to have only written submissions, to hear 
witnesses or experts and so on. In many occasions, if 
arbitrators consider that, for instance, a request for a 
measure is used as a tactical weapon they simply deny it or 
refrain from, say, holding hearings, or appointing experts for 
simplifying the provisional remedy adjudication. Indeed, in 
this author's experience, arbitrators simply deny, for variety of 
reasons generally not apparent from their face, requests for 
interim measures in simple orders, which surely do not cost 
much to make. Nevertheless, it should be accepted that 
requests to arbitrators for interim protection of rights might 
occasionally cost as much as, if not more, requests to courts 
for the same. 
1.2 Sources of Arbitral Power 
The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to grant provisional measures 
stems from different sources. It is a common practice nowadays that 
arbitrating parties expressly empower the tribunal to grant provisional 
measures. 35 National laws may also provide for default / fall back 
powers for such purpose. Where neither the arbitration agreement nor 
the lex arbitri, the law governing the arbitration36 expressly provide for 
such power, it may be necessary to investigate whether the tribunal 
35 This trend partly owes its existence to the evolution of laws, rules and practice on 
the provisional measures within the 20th century. See supra Chapter I, Part 2. The 
trend is also reinforced by the wide recognition of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
and the Model Law. Both texts contain a provision on the power of an arbitrator to 
grant provisional measures. 
36 This is generally the law of the place of arbitration. On cases where the tribunal is 
referred to such law whilst making decision on an interim measure request, see, 
e. g., ICC Interim Award 8786, extracts published in 11(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb Bull 81 
(2000); and NAI Interim Award 1694 of 1996, extracts published in XXIII YCA 97 
(1998). For arbitrators' power to grant provisional measures such laws as the law 
governing the arbitration procedure, the law governing the arbitration agreement, 
the applicable substantive law as the case may be, or the law of the place of 
enforcement may further be relevant. 
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would have inherent, implied or other powers for interim protection of 
rights. 
In granting provisional measures, an arbitral tribunal observes 
variations or restrictions to their jurisdiction introduced by the arbitrating 
parties. The tribunal also abides mandatory rules of the applicable law 
on its jurisdiction. 
This Part deals with the effect of a party agreement and lex arbitri on 
the arbitral jurisdiction to grant provisional measures as well as 
arbitrators' inherent, implied and other powers to grant these measures. 
Further, it examines the variation and exclusion of such jurisdiction and 
the role of mandatory rules of the applicable law 
1.2.1 Parties' Agreement and Lex Arbitri 
Arbitral tribunals' power to grant provisional measures may be 
expressly included in the arbitration agreement itself. This inclusion is 
done either through express stipulation in the arbitration agreement or 
through incorporation, by a reference to ad hoc or institutional 
arbitration rules that permit arbitral provisional measures. It should be 
noted that the express stipulation in the agreement is hardly ever done 
in practice. 37 Arbitrators are almost always empowered to grant 
provisional measures through reference to arbitration rules. In other 
words, the most likely source of power is arbitration rules which 
constitute, through reference or incorporation, part of the parties' 
37 See Lew, Interim Measures, para. 15. However, a number of agreements make 
an express reference to provisional measures. See, e. g., Sperry International 
Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 532 F. Supp. 901,908-909 (S. D. N. Y. 1982), 
aff'd. 689 F. 2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1982) (where the agreement between the parties 
contained a reference to provisional measures). Also it should be noted that, for 
example, a standard European Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan 
agreement contain an arbitration clause dealing with provisional measures. For 
examples of clauses providing express stipulations concerning provisional 
measures, see, e. g., Paul D. Friedland, Arbitration Clauses for International 
Contracts (New York: Juris Publishing 2000), 56-59. 
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arbitration agreement, in ad hoc or administered arbitration. 38 For this 
reason, this thesis examines the approach of seventy-two sets of 
arbitration rules to provisional measures. Forty-three out of the 
seventy-two rules surveyed including the AAA, ICC, ICSID and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules empower an arbitral tribunal to grant 
provisional measures. 
The lex arbitri39 may also contain provisions empowering arbitrators to 
4° grant interim measures of protection. 
38 The power may also be contained in other documents. For instance, in ICC 
arbitration, the terms of reference may too contain that power. The terms of 
reference is one of the unique features of ICC arbitration. Apart from its historical 
purpose, the aim of the terms of reference is to set forth, basically, the parties' 
claims, counter claims, applicable laws, etc. in order for the smooth 
commencement of arbitration proceedings. See Article 18 of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules 1998. The concept of terms of reference is also adopted by such other 
arbitration institutions as Article 24 of the Belgian Centre for Arbitration and 
Mediation ("CEPANI") Arbitration Rules, Article 24 of the Italian Arbitration 
Association ("AIA"), Article 15 of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association 
("JCAA") Arbitration Rules, and Article 23(7) of the Euro-Arab Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Rules. 
39 In some cases, there is no law governing arbitration but it is subject to an 
international convention. See, e. g., Article 47 of the ICSID Convention 
(empowering arbitrators to "recommend" provisional measures. ). 
ao Default powers are given to arbitrators, for instance, in all Model Law countries. 
See supra Chapter I, note 14. See also, e. g., Algeria (Article 458bis 9(1) of the 
CCP 1966, as amended); (Article Belgium (Article 1696(1) of the Judicial Code 
1972, as amended); Bolivia (Article 35 of the Law on Arbitration and Conciliation 
1997); Colombia (Article 32 of the Decree No. 2279 of 1989); Costa Rica (Article 
52 (1) of the Law for Alternative Resolution of Disputes and the Promotion of 
Social Peace); Ecuador (Article 9 of the Law on Arbitration and Mediation 1997); 
Panama (Article 24(1) of the Decree Law 5 of 1999); Portugal (see Smit / Pechota, 
2350); Sweden (Section 25(4) of the AA 1999); Switzerland (Article 183(1) of the 
Private International Law Act 1987); Uruguay (Article 492 of the General CCP 
1990); and Venezuela (Article 26 of the Commercial Arbitration Law 1998). In 
addition, in such countries as Antigua & Barbuda (Article 13(6)(2) of the AA 1975); 
Commonwealth of Australia (Article 23 of the International AA 1974, as amended), 
France (Bösch (ed. ) 257); Hong Kong (Section 2(GB) of the AO), Netherlands 
(Articles 1022 and 1051 of the AA 1986); the Oman (Article 24(1) of the Law of 
Arbitration on Civil and Commercial Matters); Jordan (Article 23(1) of the Law No. 
31/2001 on Arbitration); Pakistan (Article 41(2) of the AA 1940, as amended); and 
the U. S. (see, e. g., Born, International Arbitration, 924-25, J. Stewart McClendon 
(ed. ), Survey of International Arbitration Sites, 3rd ed. (AAA 1993), 123), national 
laws provide for "opt in approach. " Under this approach, arbitrators' power to grant 
provisional measures arise from contracting parties' express agreement thus in the 
absence of such agreement no provisional measure is available. To this end, it 
should be noted that Section 38 of the EAA 1996 gives powers to arbitrators to 
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1.2.2 Inherent, Implied or Other Powers 
Where there is no explicit or default power given to arbitrators for 
interim measures, it is submitted that such measures may be granted 
on the basis of inherent or implicit powers of arbitrators, 41 or of their 
powers to conduct the arbitration proceedings. 
The source of an inherent power is neither an arbitration agreement nor 
a statute but the status of the arbitral tribunal as an organ entrusted 
with the resolution of a dispute. 42 Inherent powers are generally relied 
on by a small number of arbitral tribunals in international arena. 43 The 
concept of inherent powers is rightly criticised since inherent powers is 
order certain limited number of interim measures but Section 39 provides for opt in 
approach for all other kind of measures. It should also be noted that such national 
laws as Concordat (Article 26) provide for non-binding powers to arbitrators for 
interim protection of rights. 
41 Considering that arbitrators operate within a territorial boundary of which is marked 
by lex arbitri, it can be stated that arbitrators are generally empowered to grant 
provisional measures as laws of many states provide for arbitral competence to 
grant provisional measures. Thus, in practice, a party agreement and lex arbitri 
sufficiently provides for a basis today to grant an interim measure of protection. 
Consequently, there is little need to seek another basis for such protection. 
42 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 92. For arguments supporting inherent 
powers, see, e. g., David D. Caron, "Interim Measures of Protection: Theory and 
Practice in Light of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 46 RabelsZ 465,476 
etc. (1986) ("Interim Measures"). See also Michael F. Hoellering, "Interim 
Measures and Arbitration: The Situation in the United States", 46(2) Arb J 22 
(1991) ("Interim Measures"); Hoellering, "Interim Relief in Aid of International 
Commercial Arbitration", 1 Wisc Int'l LJ 1,2 (1984) reprinted in: Arbitration & the 
Law (1984), 123 ("Interim Relief'); Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000, 
460; Sigvard Jarvin, "Choosing the Place of Arbitration: Where Do We Stand? ", 16 
Int'l Bus L 417,422 (1988); Berger, International, 332; Schwartz, Provisional 
Measures in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 62; Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC 
Arbitration 2000,460; and Donald F. Donovan, "Powers of the Arbitrators to Issue 
Procedural Orders, Including Interim Measures of Protection, and the Obligation of 
Parties to Abide by Such Orders", 10(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 65-66 (1999). See 
also Charles Construction Company v. Derderian, 586 N. E. 2d 992 (Mass. 1992) 
(accepting that an arbitrator has inherent and implied authority to grant a security 
for claim. ); Konkar Maritime Enter., SA v. Compagnie Belge d'Affretement, 668 
F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1987); Southern Seas Navigation Ltd v. Petroleos 
Mexicanos of Mexico City, 606 F. Supp. 692 (S. D. N. Y. 1985); Island Creek Coal 
Sales Co. v. Gainsville, 729 F2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1984); and Sperry International 
Trade, Inc. v. Israel, 689 F2d. 301 (2d Cir. 1982). 
43 E. g., the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, and certain other arbitral tribunals. See 
Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 92-93. Inherent powers are mainly relied on 
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a common law concept "alien to the civil law tradition". 44 That is mainly 
because the concept infringes the principle of legality: it lacks statutory 
45 foundations 
. 
It is further submitted that arbitral jurisdiction to grant provisional 
measures derive from implied powers entrusted to arbitrators. 46 Implied 
powers are based on the argument that parties, by submitting to 
arbitrate a dispute, implicitly empower arbitrators to issue provisional 
measures. Implied powers are considered to be an implicit extension of 
the power to adjudicate the parties' dispute as envisaged in the 
arbitration agreement. 47 Such extension is justified by broad 
interpretation of the arbitration agreement. 48 The broad interpretation 
may be made where it is permitted under the applicable law. 
In addition, if it exists, 49 the eventual power of a tribunal to conduct 
arbitral proceedings may provide a basis for interim protection of 
by international tribunals (see, e. g., Caron, Interim Measures, 476 etc. ) and courts 
of common law jurisdictions (see, e. g., Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 92). 
44 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 93. 
45 Id. Hausmaninger also argues that the exercise of inherent powers not conferred 
upon the arbitrators contradicts with the contractual nature of arbitration. Id. 
46 In the absence of express stipulation, many argue that jurisdiction of an arbitrator 
to grant a provisional measure is based on party autonomy (voluntas partium facit 
arbitrum) or, in other words, "flows directly from the arbitration agreement itself. " 
See, e. g., Berger, International, 331; Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 530; and Higgins, 
1535-36. Parties, by conveying to an arbitral tribunal the power to adjudicate a 
dispute, confer the tribunal, by "implication" or "extensive interpretation" of the 
arbitration agreement a power to grant interim protection of rights. See, e. g., 
Karrer, Less Theory, 99. On the criticism concerning the use of implied powers in 
commercial arbitration, see, e. g., Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 94. 
47 This is a reflection of the principle of party autonomy. See, e. g., Karl-Heinz 
Bockstiegel, "The Role of Party Autonomy in International Arbitration", Dis Res J 24 
(Summer 1997); and Klaus Peter Berger, "Party Autonomy in International 
Economic Arbitration: A Reappraisal", 4(1) Am Rev Int'l Arb 1 (1993). It is 
submitted, for instance, that arbitrating parties are obligated "not to worsen the 
dispute nor to delay unduly the arbitration proceedings. " Bucher / Tschanz, para. 
169. This obligation arises from the arbitration agreement or can be "based on the 
principle of good faith. " See generally id. 
48 E. g., Karrer, Less Theory, 99. The principles of effectiveness and good faith assist 
in interpreting an arbitration agreement. See Caron, Interim Measures, 478. 
49 See, e. g., Article 16 of the International Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (the "AAA") International Center for Dispute Resolution 
99 
rights. 50 However, in such circumstances, it seems that only certain 
provisional measures that are considered as procedural in nature may 
5 be issued. 1 
1.3 Amendment and Exclusion of the Power 
Arbitrating parties are free to design the terms of their arbitration 
agreement as they see fit due to party autonomy 52 Consequently, the 
arbitrating parties are at freedom to exclude or amend the power of 
53 arbitrators to grant provisional measures. 
("ICDR"); Article 11 of the Arbitration Rules 1981 of the Copenhagen Court of the 
International Arbitration; Article 20 of the Rules of International Arbitration of the 
Croatian Chamber of Commerce; Article 15 of the Arbitration Rules of the ICC, 
Rule 6 of the Rules for the Conduct of Commercial Arbitration 1981 of the Institute 
of Arbitrators Australia, Article 23 of the Arbitration Rules of the Netherlands 
Arbitration Institution ("NAI"); Article 20 of the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce ("SCC"), Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; 
and Article 38 of the Arbitration Rules of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (the "WIPO"). 
50 The ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 did not expressly deal with the power to grant a 
provisional measure. This lack of clarity gave rise to, inter alia, an argument that 
the tribunals' power to grant those measures implicitly derives from the procedural 
powers granted to arbitrators to conduct arbitral proceedings in accordance with 
Article 11 of those Rules. For instance, in ICC case 7544, the tribunal partly relied 
on its power to conduct arbitration proceedings in granting an interim measure. 
ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts published in 11(1) ICC Int'l Ct 
Arb Bull 56 (2000). Similarly, in ICC case 6632, the arbitral tribunal, after stating 
that the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 provided a self-sufficient set of rules, noted that 
"[t]he arbitrators have to decide on all procedural, factual or legal aspects that 
appear necessary for the resolution of the dispute and, as such, they undoubtedly 
have the authority to issue interim orders/awards. " ICC Interim Award 6632 of 
1993 (unpublished. ). In cases where the procedural rules are determined by 
arbitral tribunal, it may make a reference to a national law or draw up its own rules. 
See ICC, Guide to Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 382 (1983), 39. The power to 
grant certain interim measures may also derive from some other principles of 
arbitration. For instance, the power to stop adverse aavertising campaign may be 
based on the principle of confidentiality, particularly where the campaigner is under 
the duty in accordance with applicable arbitration rules or laws. See Bucher / 
Tschanz, para. 169. 
51 If provisional measures are classified as procedural matters, as is normally the 
case, then the rules and laws applicable to procedure govern these measures. 
See Schwartz, Provisional Measures in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 58. 
On the procedural /substantive distinction, see Chapter II, infra note 91. 
52 A restriction on arbitrating parties may be imposed as to an amendment of 
arbitration rules by the administering authority. It should, however, be noted that 
arbitration rules generally contain no such restrictions. 
53 Articles 7(9) of the Arbitration Rules 2000 of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
(the "CIA"); Article 20 of the Arbitration Rules 1998 of the German Arbitration 
Institution ("DIS"); Article 23 of the Arbitration Rules 1998 of the ICC; Article 19(1) 
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1.4 Mandatory Rules of Applicable Law 
Mandatory rules of the applicable law (generally the law of place of 
arbitration), including the law of the place of enforcement54 may restrict 
or prohibit the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to grant provisional 
of the Rules for International Arbitration 1994 of the Italian Association for 
Arbitration (the "AIA"); Article 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1998 of the London Court 
of International Arbitration ("LCIA"); Rule 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (the "SIAC"); Article 31 of the Arbitration 
Rules 1999 of the Arbitration Institute of the SCC; Articles 1(1) and 26 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 28 of the International Arbitration Rules 1989 
of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce (the "ZCC"); and Article 17 of the Model Law. 
Further, it is accepted that the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal to recommend 
provisional measures may be amended or excluded by an express party 
agreement. See Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. See also Christoph H. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2001), Article 47,215, para. 8; Brower / Goodman, 434-435; C. F. 
Amerasinghe, "Submissions to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes", 5J Mar L& Com 211 (1974); and History, 
815. The amendment may be negative. That is to say it restricts arbitral power 
with respect to the circumstances under which they [provisional measures] are to 
be recommended or with respect to the types of measures which will be 
permissible. " Schreuer, Article 47,214, para. 7. Neither the recent model clause 
nor the earlier one deals with variations on or exclusions of Article 47. However, 
the first ICSID model clause did cover exclusion agreements. One of two versions 
of the recommended clause provides: 
XXVI. No arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to this agreement shall, without 
the special consent of the parties hereto, be empowered to recommend any 
provisional measures before rendering its award. 
See 7 ILM 1159,1179 (1968). The amendment may also be positive. That is to 
say parties may empower an ICSID tribunal to grant binding arbitral provisional 
measures. Schreuer, Article 47,214, para. 7. See also A. Masood, "Provisional 
Measures of Protection in Arbitration under the World Bank Convention", I Delhi 
Law Review 138,145 (1972). In this respect, the second version of the model 
clause provides: 
XXVII. The parties hereto agree to abide by and comply with any provisional 
measure [unanimously] recommended by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted 
pursuant to this agreement. 
See 7 ILM 1159,1179 (1968). The parties should be very cautious prior to entering 
into such exclusion agreement as courts of some states may deny granting an 
interim measure and refer parties to arbitration. See Chapter 11, infra Part 4.2. The 
exclusion of arbitrators' jurisdiction "rarely happens in practice. " Berger, 
54 
International, 333. But see Gaillard / Savage (eds. ), para. 1319. 
Apparently, the law of the place of enforcement is taken into account where such 
place is known to the arbitrators. However, it should be noted that, unless 
otherwise indicated during the proceedings, arbitrators are generally unaware 
where their decisions will be or will attempted to be enforced. 
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measures. 55 Arbitrators generally comply with such limitation or 
restriction in practice to the extent possible. 56 
There are several concerns behind compliance with the mandatory 
rules of the applicable law. A conflicting decision with the applicable 
law may be set aside where it is rendered57 or enforcement of such 
decision may be resisted. 58 
55 Indeed, five out of the forty-three rules surveyed indicate that the jurisdiction 
concerning interim measures of protection of an arbitral tribunal exists to the extent 
it is permissible under the applicable law. Article 14 of the International Arbitration 
Rules 1996 of the Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan; 
Article 21 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the European Court of Arbitration (the 
"ECA"); Articles 18 and 19 of the Rules for International Arbitration 1994 of the AIA; 
Rule 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the SIAC; and Article 27 of the UNECE 
Arbitration Rules 1966. It should also be noted that none of the rules surveyed do 
permit in express terms the tribunal to act contrary to the mandatory principles of 
the applicable law. 
56 See ICC Interim Award 9301 of 1997 (unpublished) (denying the request to impose 
a penalty for a failure to comply with a direction in an arbitration because of the fact 
that such imposition is prohibited under the law of the place of arbitration, Belgian 
law); ICC Interim Award 8786 of 1996, extracts published in 11(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb 
Bull 81 (2000); ICC Second Partial Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11(1) 
ICC Intl Ct Arb Bull 65 (2000); ICC Final Award 7895 of 1994, extracts published in 
11(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 81 (2000); ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, 
extracts published in 11(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb Bull 56 (2000); ICC Interim Award 6251 
of 1990 (unpublished); ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 
8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 67 (1997); ICC Second Interim Award 5835 of 1992 
(unpublished); and ICC Award 3540 of 1980, extracts published in (1981) Clunet 
914; and VII YCA 124,129-130 (1982). It is noteworthy, in this respect, that the 
restrictions imposed under the applicable law to the arbitral jurisdiction do not, 
however, prohibit arbitrators to render a decision in formally non-binding form (e. g., 
order, recommendation) concerning a request for a provisional measure. 
57 See, e. g., Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law; and ICC Interim Award 9301 of 
1997 (unpublished) (referring to the decision of a court setting aside an arbitral 
decision conflicting with the Belgian law on imposing a penalty payment. ). 
58 See, e. g., Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention. Further, no sanction could 
be imposed upon the failure to comply with the conflicting decision because of the 
above reasons. Accordingly, the decision would be toothless. Moreover, 
arbitrators are generally hesitant to be in conflict with the applicable law. It should 
be noted, in this respect, that practice of commercial arbitration evolved over the 
years by avoiding direct conflict with national laws. In addition, arbitrators may 
have a duty "to make every effort to make sure" that their decision is enforceable 
at law. Article 26 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988; and Article 35 of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1998. See also Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 62. Thus, the 
arbitrators may refrain from rendering unenforceable decisions. 
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2 Exclusive Arbitral Powers to Grant Provisional Measures 
It seems that out of the arbitration conventions, only the ICSID 
Convention provides for, unless otherwise agreed, the exclusive 
jurisdiction to arbitrators to grant provisional measures. 59 There is no 
national law that empowers arbitrators exclusively to grant provisional 
measures. 60 Parties may, however, oust courts' jurisdiction in regard of 
interim protection of rights to an extent permitted. 61 The main benefit of 
exclusive arbitral jurisdiction for interim protection of rights is the 
resolution of issues regarding both partial and final protection within 
one forum, which was agreed upon by the parties. 
The ICSID Convention has created, for the aim of depoliticisation62 of 
investment disputes, an "autonomous" and a "self-contained" arbitration 
59 See Articles 26 and 47 of the Convention; and Rule 39(5) of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules. The exclusivity is not only related to judicial proceedings but also other 
(non-ICSID) arbitral proceedings. 
60 It is noteworthy that, for instance, the power to grant security for costs is reserved, 
unless otherwise agreed by the arbitrating parties, to arbitrators under Section 
38(3) of the EAA 1996. This provision changed the pre-act law which set forth in 
the House of Lords' controversial decision in Coppee-Lavalin SA/NV v. Ken-Ren 
Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (In Liquidation), [1994] 2 All E. R. 449. On the 
criticism of this case, see, e. g., Jan Paulsson, "The Unwelcome Atavism of Ken 
Ren: The House of Lords shows its Meddle", (1994) ASA Bull 439; David Branson, 
"The Ken Ren Case: It is an Ado Where More Aid is Less Help", 10 Arb Int 303 
(1994). See also, e. g., section 2GB(1) of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance 
("AO"). 
61 Indeed, four out of the seventy-two rules surveyed provide for exclusive arbitral 
jurisdiction. One of those, the Arbitration Rules for the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (the "CAS") clearly exclude jurisdiction of courts in regard of provisional 
measures. Article R37. The ICSID Arbitration Rules also provide for, in line with 
the ICSID Convention, exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal subject to 
parties' contrary agreement. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention; and Rule 39 of 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules. The Arbitration Rules of the Court of Arbitration of 
Northern Europe (the "CANE") envisage a partial exclusivity. In accordance with 
Clause 28 of these Rules, once the subject matter is seized by an arbitral tribunal, 
the jurisdiction of a judicial authority is ousted in respect of interim payment. 
Further, Article 25(3) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules provides for partial exclusivity: 
arbitrators are solely empowered to deal with requests on security for costs. This 
is, indeed, in line with Section 38(3) of the EAA 1996. 
62 On the depoliticisation of investment disputes, see, e. g., Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, 
Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID 
and MICA (Washington D. C.: ICSID 1992). 
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system. 63 Article 26 of the ICSID Convention64 provides for the rule of 
"exclusive remedy" as part of its self-contained and autonomous 
characteristics. 65 That is to say no court of a contracting state should 
adjudicate, even for a provisional remedy, a dispute arising from an 
agreement under which a valid consent is given to the jurisdiction of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID 
Centre"). The rule of judicial exclusivity had been the subject of 
63 See, e. g., Aron Broches, "A Guide for Users of the ICSID Convention", 8(1) News 
from ICSID 5 (1991); and George R. Delaume, "Foreign Sovereign Immunity: 
Impact on Arbitration", 38(2) Arb J 34,35 (1983) ("Sovereign Immunity"). The 
arbitration system is autonomous and self-contained mainly because ICSID 
arbitration operates "in total independence from domestic laws, including the law 
prevailing at the seat of arbitration. " See George R. Delaume, Transnational 
Contracts Applicable Law and Settlement of Disputes (A Study in Conflict 
Avoidance) (New York: Oceana Publications, Dobbs & Ferry 1990), v. II, Booklet 
17,37 ("Transnational Contracts"). See also, e. g., Broches, 5; and Antonio R. 
Parra, "The Power of the Arbitrator and the Experience of the Arbitral Institutions - 
The Practices and the Experience of the ICSID" in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory 
Measures, 37,38 ("The Practices"). In this respect, see also Articles 27,44,53, 
and 54 of the ICSID Convention. But see S. J. Toope, Mixed International 
Arbitration - Studies in Arbitration Between States and Private Persons 
(Cambridge: Grotius 1990), 223-245. 
64 This Article provides that "[c]onsent of the parties to arbitration under this 
Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration 
to the exclusion of any other remedy. " 
65 This rule is also expressed as the "rule of judicial abstention. " See, e. g., George 
R. Delaume, "ICSID Arbitration Proceedings: Practical Aspects", 5 Pace L Rev 
563,565 (1985). 
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controversy66 until the 1984 amendment of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules. 67 Rule 39(5) of the Rules provides: 
Nothing in this Rule shall prevent the parties, provided that they have so stipulated in the agreement recording their consent, from 
requesting any judicial or other authority to order provisional 
measures, prior to the institution of the proceeding, or during the 
66 For the list of commentators' arguments for both in favour and against the rule of judicial exclusivity, see, e. g., Schreuer, Article 26, para. 81-83. For court decisions 
in favour of the rule of judicial exclusivity see, e. g., Maritime International 
Nominees Establishment v. Government of the Republic of Guinea (MINE v. Guinea), Decision of the Geneva Authorite de surveillance des offices de poursuite 
pour dettes et faillite, 7 October 1986, extracts of the English translation from the 
French original published in 4 ICSID Rep 45 (ruling that Article 26 meant, in the 
absence of any stipulation to the contrary, "renunciation of all other recourse". ); 
and Guinea and Soguipeche v. Atlantic Triton, (Decision of the Court of Cassation, 
18 November 1986), extracts of the English translation from the French original 
published in 26 ILM 373 (1986) (holding that "the power of the national judge to 
order conservatory measures is not excluded by the [ICSID] Convention of 
Washington and can only be excluded by the express agreement of the parties or 
by a tacit agreement arising from the adoption of arbitration rules including such a 
renunciation. "). For a recommendation of an ICSID tribunal confirming the rule of 
exclusivity, see, e. g., MINE v. Guinea, Decision of Tribunal, 4 December 1985, 
cited in 4 ICSID Rep 41. 
67 This amendment is in line with the French Court of Appeal decision in Atlantic 
Triton. See 26 ILM 373 (1986). The amendment was proposed "as an elaboration 
upon Article 26 of the Convention" (see, e. g., Parra, The Practices, 38) and 
unanimously adopted by the ICSID Administrative Council (see Res. 
AC(18)/RES/57, Annual Report, 14,18 (1985)). See, e. g., Gaillard / Savage 
(eds. ), para. 1309. However, Collins, for instance, rightly argues that national 
courts may disregard Rule 39(5) because they may find that this Rule "may be 
outside the scope of the rule-making power in Article 44 of the Convention, and 
that some national courts will on grounds of public policy regard the agreement to 
oust their jurisdiction ineffective. " Collins, Provisional, 105. This is, particularly, so 
where no arbitral tribunal is in existence at the time when the request is made. It 
should, however, be noted that no court yet found Article 39(5) ineffective on any 
ground since the Rules' amendment. If parties wish to empower local courts to 
grant provisional measures they should do so by an express agreement. In fact, a 
suggested text for such an agreement is provided in the recent ICSID model 
clauses: 
Without prejudice to the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to recommend provisional 
measures, either party hereto may request any judicial or other authority to order 
any provisional or conservatory measure, including attachment prior to the 
institution of the arbitration proceeding, or during the proceeding, for the 
preservation of its rights and interests. 
See ICSID Model Clauses, Doc. ICSID/5/rev., clause 14 (1993), reprinted in 4 
ICSID Rep 357,365. Although the above clause is fully effective against an 
investor, it may be "curtailed by considerations of sovereign immunity" against a 
state. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, 45. It was also stated that the examples 
of express agreements, which provide access to local courts for the grant of 
provisional measures may be found, in practice, in financial agreements between 
bankers and foreign governmental borrowers. See Delaume, Practical Aspects, 
582. 
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proceeding, for the preservation of their respective rights and 
interests. 
3 Exclusive Judicial Powers to Grant Provisional Measures 
A small number of national laws68 and arbitration rules69 empower 
judicial authorities exclusively to grant provisional measures. There are 
several arguments for the exclusive court jurisdiction. 70 Historically, 
judiciary disapproved the idea of arbitrators, private individuals 
adjudicating disputes. " The reasons were generally related to the 
arguments that arbitral jurisdiction "might endanger state jurisdiction 
68 Argentina (Article 753 of the National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure 
1982), Austria (Articles 588 and 589(l) of the Austrian CCP 1895, as amended), 
Brazil (see Matthew Heaphy, "The Intricacies of Commercial Arbitration in the 
United States and Brazil: A Comparison of Two National Arbitration Statute, " 37 
USFL Rev 441,455 (2003)), China (Articles 28 and 46 of the Arbitration Law), 
Czech Republic (Section 22 of the Law on Arbitral Proceedings and Enforcement 
of Arbitral Awards 1994), El Salvador (Smit / Pechota, 1558), Finland (Section 5(2) 
of the AA 1992), Italy (Article 818 of the CCP 1990), Japan (Smit / Pechota, 1942), 
Libya (Article 758 of the CCP), Liechtenstein (Article 605 of the CCP), Malaysia 
(McClendon, 73), Oman (Smit / Pechota, 2205), Panama (Article 1444 of the 
Judicial Code 1988), Philippines (Section 14 of the Arbitration Law 1953), Quebec 
(Article 940(4) of the Arbitration Law), Singapore (McClendon, 94), and, arguably, 
Spain. It seems that even the new Spanish Civil Procedure Code 2001 does not 
expressly empower arbitrators to grant provisional measures. To this end, 
opponents of arbitral provisional measures seem to boost their position with the 
new law's lack of regulation. This author wishes to thank to his colleague Rosa 
69 
Lapiedra for her insightful comments on the new Spanish legislation. 
Out of the arbitration rules surveyed only the Arbitration Rules of the Chinese 
International and Economic Trade Arbitration Commission (the "CIETAC") 
expressly oust the arbitral jurisdiction for the grant of provisional measures. Under 
the CIETAC Rules, the parties cannot directly make their application to the relevant 
judicial authority. This application can only be made through the Arbitration 
Commission of the CIETAC. The Court will then pass the application to the 
relevant judicial authority. It is stated that requests for provisional measures are 
rarely made before the CIETAC. See Jonathan Crook, ul-eading Arbitration Seats 
in the Far East: A Comparative Study" in: Frommel / Rider (eds. ), 63,71. It seems 
that the Arbitration Court has no discretion in regard of passing the application on 
to the relevant judicial authority. See Article 28 of the Chinese Arbitration Law. 
See also Cecilia Hbkansson, Commercial Arbitration Under Chinese Law 
(Uppsala: lustus 1999), 145. Whether or not a request for a measure can be 
made directly to a court prior to making application for arbitration with the 
commission is not clear. Some courts accepted such application whereas others 
denied them due to the fact that they were not made through the Commission. Id., 
146-147. 
70 Indeed, arguments made in favour of concurrent jurisdiction approach may, to a 
71 
certain extent, be used for supporting exclusive-court-jurisdiction approach. 
See supra Chapter 1, Part 2. 
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and the high ideals of impartial justice". 72 Although the jealousy and 
those fears are now redundant in majority of jurisdictions, their residue 
can still be found in a number of states, particularly in states where 
arbitration laws have not recently been reformed. Today, it seems that 
the choice of exclusivity is more political than philosophical. 
Hence, it is argued that since arbitrators have no coercive powers to 
enforce their decision on provisional measures they should not render 
such decisions in any case. 73 It is further indicated, perhaps because 
of arbitrators' lack of power concerning coercive measures, that "the 
grant of provisional relief is not to be subject of a legal dispute with 
respect to which parties may enter into a binding private settlement 
agreement .... 
"74 As a result, "[p]arties cannot refer to arbitration issues 
that they would not be entitled to settle. , 75 Moreover, it may be argued 
that the main benefit of exclusive judicial jurisdiction to issue a 
provisional measure today is the possibility of having enforceable 
measures at anytime and anyplace within the state where the measure 
granted. Further, in this regard, it is arguable, for a small number of 76 
72 Id. There were also "practical problems of one party only (ex parte) applications, 
the time inevitably taken to bring the tribunal together, and the need for 
enforcement powers on the part of the forum making the order. " See Lew / 
Mistelis / Kröll, para. 23-10. 
73 To this end, Bernardini states that empowering arbitrators to grant provisional 
measures is prevented by "[t]he traditional view that the coercive powers are 
vested only with State courts. " Piero Bernardini, The Italian Law on Arbitration - 
Text and Notes (The Hague: Kluwer 1998), 15, n. 30. This outdated view has long 
been abandoned by many states. To this end, arguments for distinguishing 
jurisdiction to grant interim measures and jurisdiction to enforce those measures 
were also very helpful. See, e. g., Robert Briner, "Special Considerations Which 
May Effect the Procedure (Interim Measures, Amiable Composition, Adaptation of 
Contracts, Agreed Settlement)", in: Albert Jan van den Berg (ed. ), Planning 
Efficient Arbitration Proceedings - The Law Applicable to International Arbitration, 
ICCA Congress Series No. 7 (The Hague: Kluwer 1996), 362 ("Planning Efficient 
Arbitration"). 
74 Bösch (ed. ), 52. 
's Id., 377. 
76 Karrer, Less Theory, 108. It should, however, be noted that the arbitrating parties 
or the subject matter of arbitration generally has no connection with that state. 
Thus enforceability within the state where the measure is granted would not be a 
great benefit. See infra Chapter V, Part 3.2. 
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cases, that judicial authorities may be a speedier and, thus, more 
efficient forum than arbitrators for the grant and execution of interim 
measures of protection. " 
None of the above reasons justify, in this author's view, the exclusive 
jurisdiction of courts for interim measures of protection due mainly to 
principle of party autonomy in arbitration and the other reasons in 
favour of arbitral jurisdiction to grant such measures. 78 
Where courts have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with provisional 
measures, an interesting question may arise: could arbitrators grant 
provisional measures regardless of courts' exclusive jurisdiction? An 
arbitral tribunal could in all circumstances "recommend" or "propose" to 
the parties certain measures for protection of rights, e. g. measures for 
non-aggravation of disputes. 79 Apparently, whether that 
77 It is interesting to note Article 753 of the National Code of Civil and Commercial 
Procedure 1982 of Argentina, which provides: "[a]rbitrators cannot issue orders of 
compulsion or enforcement. They must request compulsory measures from the 
court which shall lend its assistance in order to achieve speediest and most 
efficient conduct of arbitral proceedings. " (Emphasis added. ) However, one should 
be reminded of the arguments in favour of jurisdiction of arbitrators to grant 
provisional measures. See Chapter II, supra Part 1.1. 78 See Chapter II, Part 1.1. 
79 Some commentators argue that the tribunal has the power to issue orders or 
awards on interim measures despite the fact that the law of the place of arbitration 
reserves such power exclusively to national courts. See, e. g., Briner, 364; Bucher / 
Tschanz, para. 170; and Blessing, paras. 850-51. They state that the prohibitions 
of the lex arbitri on the arbitral power come into play where the arbitral measure 
granted necessitates court assistance at the seat of the tribunal. Briner, 364; and 
Blessing, para. 851. In this regard see also Warth Line, Ltd v. Merinda Marine Co., 
778 F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1991) (denying the claim that arbitrators do not have 
power to grant provisional measures due to foreign law exclusively empowering 
courts to order such measures. ). But see Born, International Arbitration, 922 
(arguing that an [a]rbitrator will seldom grant provisional measures unless he is 
satisfied that the national arbitration legislation applicable to the arbitral 
proceedings allows him to do so. "). Further, whether the form of the measure is a 
recommendation or not, arbitrator should not sanction the non-compliance where 
the lex arbitri prohibits arbitral provisional measures. 
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recommendation/proposition is complied with depends upon how co- 
operative the parties are. 80 
4 Concurrent Powers of Judicial Authorities and of Arbitrators 
It is undisputed that an arbitral tribunal is the "natural judge" for 
deciding provisional measures. 81 However, the tribunal's exercise of 
jurisdiction for such measures is, in some cases, impossible or 
`ineffective'82. This is because arbitration has certain inherent problems 
and shortcomings in respect of interim remedies. These problems and 
shortcomings are mainly related to nature and operation of arbitration. 
Because of the above problems and shortcomings of arbitral 
competence, most legal systems, 83 arbitration rules, 84 and 
commentators accept the benefit of concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators 
and of courts for the grant of provisional measures. 85 This concurrent 
jurisdiction aims to provide resolution to the problems and 
shortcomings. Court involvement makes arbitration an effective means 
of dispute resolution and thus assisting its survival as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. 86 
80 As indicated by Article 26(2) of the Concordat, the parties "may voluntarily submit 
to provisional orders proposed by the arbitral tribunal. " 
81 See Chapter II, supra Part 1. 
82 Id. 
83 There are two arbitration conventions dealing with provisional measures. The 
European Convention recognises the concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators and of 
courts. See Article VI(4). However, under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, the 
court involvement for assistance is, unless otherwise agreed, prohibited. See 
Chapter II, supra Part 2. For examples of national laws adopting concurrent 
jurisdiction approach, see Chapter II, infra Part 4.4. 
84 Annex. 
85 See, e. g., Kessedjian, Court Decisions 1 (stating that "[i)nternational commercial 
arbitration cannot entirely ignore national courts. Now, in the year 2001, this is a 
fact, not a matter for intellectual controversy. "). See also Chapter II, infra Part 4.4. 
86 To this end, it should be noted that without the assistance of a court, contracting 
parties would be extremely hesitant to choose arbitration as their dispute resolution 
mechanism due to the problems and shortcomings concerning arbitral jurisdiction 
for providing interim protection of rights. See, e. g., "Note - Arbitration - Availability 
of Provisional Remedies in Arbitration Proceedings", 17 NYULQ Rev 638 (1940). 
But see Peter S. Caldwell, "Contemporary Problems in Transnational Arbitration", 
in: APEC Symposium on Alternative Mechanism for the Settlement of 
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The concurrent jurisdiction approach naturally accepts that even if a 
request is made to a court for interim protection of rights, the substance 
of the case remains within the arbitral domain, and that such request is 
compatible with the agreement to arbitrate. 
The regulation of concurrent jurisdiction varies. It is necessary to 
examine the variations to propose "clear rules aimed at avoiding chaotic 
results" and at enhancing the effectiveness of arbitration. 87 The 
approach of the national laws, court decisions, arbitration rules to 
concurrent jurisdiction shapes the respective roles of arbitrators and of 
judges. This approach reflects both philosophical and political 
choices. 88 
The examination of the laws, rules and decisions demonstrate that 
most national laws and rules accept the freedom-of-choice approach. 
Under this approach, parties are free to make applications either to an 
arbitrator or a court. However, today the trend is that arbitral 
competence to grant provisional measures is primary to judicial 
competence. Thus some national laws provide for restrictions to the 
parties' freedom to chose the forum to seek interim measures. So do 
some arbitration rules. 89 Restrictions, be it contractual or statutory, 
generally aim to avoid abuse of access to courts for provisional 
measures. Consequently, the restrictions assist in making arbitration 
more efficient and fair. 
The concurrent jurisdiction approach inevitably invites positive and 
negative conflicts of jurisdictions. 
Transnational Commercial Disputes, 27-28 April 1998, Bangkok {Thailand: The 
Arbitration Office 1998), 6. 
87 Kessedjian, Court Decisions, 11. 
88 See, in this regard, Cremades, The Need, 226. 
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The concurrent jurisdiction approach raises certain other important 
issues. These issues are whether or not (i) exclusion of judicial or 
arbitral power is permissible, (ii) court assistance to foreign arbitration is 
allowed, and (iii) damages could be obtained for provisional measures 
and forum to seek them. 90 The law of the country where the court is 
89 It is generally considered that a party agreement may restrict that freedom. 90 There are many other issues, which are not examined in detail in this thesis. 
These issues are, inter alia, the initiation of application for judicial measures, types 
of and requirements for granting of the measures. There are mainly four means of 
referral of a petition for court assistance- Arbitrators may alone be allowed to make 
an application to a court for provisional measures (e. g., Article 183(2) of the SPIL). 
Alternatively, contracting parties can make such application only after the 
permission of the tribunal. Or the parties in some cases along with arbitrators may 
be free to apply to a court for provisional measures. Finally, the initiation may be 
left solely to parties. The initial two approaches are aimed to give the arbitrators an 
initial screening power for vexatious interim remedy applications to a court. The 
third and the fourth approaches are more in line with the principle of party 
autonomy than the first two approaches. Particularly, the last approach is 
recognised by many national laws. Those two approaches are not free from 
criticism. The main criticism is the lack of initial screening done by arbitrators 
(unlike the initial two approaches) for avoiding oppressive applications, However, 
the lack of such preventive measure may be overcome through screening by 
courts and arbitral tribunals of the application after it is made. To this end, there is 
a burden, under those approaches, on both judicial authorities and arbitrators to 
avoid vexatious applications. There is also a burden on the parties in choosing the 
rules applicable to arbitration and the place of arbitration. The parties are advised 
to act prudently in choosing the applicable rules and the place of arbitration, that 
allow courts or arbitrators to avoid vexatious applications for interim measures. 
The types of measures that could be granted by judicial authorities differ from one 
country to another. The types are generally left to the procedural law of the country 
where the court assistance is sought. Some national laws, for instance, provide for 
list of measures that could be granted for assisting arbitration. See, in this regard, 
e. g., California (Section 1297.93 of the CCP); England (Sections 43-44 of the AA 
1996); Hong Kong (Section 2GB of the Arbitration Ordinance), Hungary (Section 
37 of the Act LXXI on Arbitration 1994)- India (Article 9 of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Ordinance), Ireland (Section ý of the AA 1998), New Zealand (Article 
9(2) of the First Schedule to the AA 1996); Oregon (Section 36.470(3) of the 
International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act); Scotland, (Article 9 of 
Schedule 7 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990); 
Singapore (Section 27(l) of and the Second Schedule to the AA); Texas (Section 
172.053 of the Act Relating to Arbitration or Conciliation of International 
Commercial Disputes); and Zimbabwe (Article 9 of the AA 1996)). It is noteworthy, 
in regard of England that the courts' powers exercisable in assistance to arbitration 
include, for instance, an interim injunction restraining a party to remove its assets 
from the jurisdiction (freezing order (Mareva injunction)), and an order for 
preservation of evidence (search (Anton Piller) order). It is also noteworthy that 
Section 44(2)(a) of the EAA 1996 is related to the taking/collection of evidence but 
not preservation of evidence. See, in this regard, Viking Insurance Co v. Rossdale 
and Others, Commerce & Industry Insurance Co. of Canada and Another v. 
located91 would be applicable to those issues. Any application to a 
judicial authority should be notified to arbitrators for such applications 
may affect the substance of the case and may result in conflicting / 
overlapping decisions, and for as a matter of courtesy. 92 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds and Others, (2002] 1 WLR 1323, [2002] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 219. The drafters of the Model Law, in contrast, found it unnecessary to 
specifically list the various possible measures; instead, they found it more 
appropriate that Article 9 of the Model Law contain a general formula perhaps 
partly because the measures "were an integral part of the general procedural law 
applied by the court. " See UN Doc A/CN. 9/245, para. 188, reprinted in Holtzmann 
/ Neuhaus, 340; and UN Doc A/CN. 9/216, para. 69, reprinted in Holtzmann I 
Neuhaus, 336-37. It is, in respect of the types of measures, interesting to further 
note that a contractual limitation, if it is held valid, could restrict the types of judicial 
measures. See, e. g., Article 10(3) of the Arbitration Rules of the AFMA. On the 
requirements to grant provisional measures, it should be noted that they too differ 
from one legal system to another. In very broad terms, fumus boni juris and 
periculum in mora are required in various legal systems. On these requirements 
91 
see, generally, infra Chapter IV, Part 3. 
Even if the parties are agreed to arbitrate the issue under national law different 
from the law of the place of arbitration, the court at such place shall apply its own 
law as regards issues on a request for a provisional measure so long as the 
measure is considered as procedural but not substantive (forum regit processum). 
The distinction between procedural and substantive is by no means clear-cut (see, 
e. g., Lawrence Collins (gen. ed. ), Dicey and Morris on Conflict of Laws, 12 th ed. 
(London- Sweet & Maxwell 1993), 170) and should be examined, in accordance 
with the applicable laws in each case. For instance, under Swiss law, certain 
provisional measures concerning, e. g., intellectual property and competition law 
are considered substantive. See H. U. Freimuller, "Switzerland" in'. Shenton I Kuhn 
(eds. ), 245. On procedural/substantive distinction, see, e. g., Lew / Mistelis I Krbll, 
para. 23-9 (indicating that "[t]he power to order interim relief is generally classified 
as a matter of procedure and therefore governed primarily by the law governing the 
arbitration. "); Born, International Arbitration, 922; and Sigvard Jarvin, "To What 
Extent Are Procedural Decisions of Arbitrators Subject to Court Review? " 
("Procedural Decisions") in: Albert Jan van den Berg (ed. ), Improving the Efficiency 
of Arbitration Agreements and Awards., 40 Years of Application of the New York 
Convention, ICCA Congress Series No. 9, (The Hague- Kluwer 1999), 367 
("Improving the Efficiency") (referring arbitral provisional measures as procedural 
decisions). Further, Sanders states that an order regarding sale of perishable 
goods "contains a decision on a matter of substance. " Sanders, Quo Vadis, 270. 
But see Watkins-Johnson Company v. Iran, Case No. 370, Interim Award No. ITM 
19-370-2 (26 May 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 362-363; and Ford Aerospace 
and Communications Corporation, Auronatic Overseas Services v. The Air Force 
of Iran, Case No. 159, Interim Award No. ITM 28-159-3 (20 October 1983), 
reprinted in 3 Iran US CTR 384-389. For analysis of these cases and the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal's approach in this regard, see Caron, Interim Measures, 500-501. 
92 The applicant is generally required to make the notification either directly or 
through the arbitral tribunal (e. g., Section 12 of the Arbitration Rules 1996 of the 
Arbitration Court Attached to the Economic Chamber of Commerce of the Czech 
Republic; and Article 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1998 of the LCIA). The duty of 
notification, for instance, has been part of the ICC Arbitration Rules since 1939 
(Article 23(2) of the 1998 Rules, Article 8(5) of the 1975 and 1988 Rules, Article 
13(5) of the 1955 Rules, and Article 11(4) of the 1939 Rules). In fact, under the 
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This Part examines (i) reasons in support of concurrent jurisdictions of 
courts and of arbitrators, (ii) jurisdiction on the merits and principle of 
compatibility, (iii) court assistance to foreign arbitration, (iv) the manner 
in which the distribution of the jurisdiction between courts and 
arbitrators is done, (v) exclusion agreements, and (vi) conflict of 
jurisdictions. 
4.1 Reasons In Support of Concurrent Jurisdiction 
There are several reasons in support of concurrent jurisdiction of 
arbitrators and of courts for interim protection of rights. These reasons 
are related to nature and operation of arbitration. The reasons derive 
from arbitration's three salient problems and various shortcomings in 
responding to contracting parties' need for interim protection of rights. 
This Part examines these problems and shortcomings, respectively: 
0 Arbitrators, prior to their appointment, 93 are not in a position 
to grant any interim measure. It may take months to form an 
arbitral tribunal. 94 In order to overcome this first salient 
93 
94 
ICC Rules, any application for, and the grant of a provisional measure should be 
notified to the ICC Secretariat without delay. The consequence of failure to comply 
with the duty to inform arbitrators is not dealt with in any of the rules surveyed. 
Such failure should not affect the validity of the application or the measure in 
question. See ICC Award 2444 of 1976, extracts published in (1977) Clunet 932, 
and Sigvard Jarvin / Yves Derains, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 
(Deventer / Boston: ICC Publishing / Kluwer 1990), 285; ICC Award 4415 of 1984, 
extracts published in (1984) Clunet 952,957, and ICC Award 5103 of 1988, 
extracts published in (1988) Clunet 1206. See also Yves Derains, "Note", (1977) 
Clunet 932,935. In case the applicable rules or laws do not provide for it, informing 
the tribunal of the request is advisable as it demonstrates the relevant party's good 
will in its action. At least, it is a courtesy to the tribunal and to the relevant 
arbitration institution to make such a notification. 
Even if the tribunal is appointed it needs, in some cases, to await transmittal of the 
file to it prior to issuing any measure. See, e. g., Article 23(1) of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules. 
This statement is particularly true where the tribunal consists of more than one 
members. Also, a party might delay proceedings for provisional relief by simply not 
appointing an arbitrator. Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 89. Such delay may 
frustrate, at least to a certain degree, the proceedings for interim protection. 
Apparently, this is where the concept of interim measures is considered as a 
procedural matter. On the procedural / substantive distinction see Chapter II, 
11) 
problem, various complementary mechanisms are proposed. 
Under these mechanisms, a party-determined authority is 
empowered to issue emergency measures prior to 
appointment of arbitrators. 95 However, in any case, courts 
may grant those measures any time (generally, at a day or 
night) when a need arises. 
0 Arbitrators have no power (jurisdiction) over third parties to 
arbitration agreement due to contractual (consensual) nature 
of arbitration. 96 In international arbitrations, involvement of 
such third parties as banks (as issuers of letters of credit or 
bank guarantees) and persons (who, e. g. may legally hold 
goods in dispute; subcontractors) is sometimes unavoidable. 
However, since arbitrators' power derives from arbitration 
agreement, no arbitral power could be exercised over legal 
rights of third parties to arbitration. Indeed, an arbitral 
tribunal has "no power to give directions to third parties (e. g. 
to banks where funds of the opponent are placed) .,, 
97 For this 
reason, it was argued that "arbitrators' conservatory orders 
95 
96 
97 
supra note 91. In such cases, an aggrieved party may press for constitution of the 
tribunal despite the resistance from the opponent through a petition either to, 
where possible, party-determined authorities or, in general, to judicial authorities. 
See, e. g., Section 44 of the EAA 1996. 
See, generally, infra Chapter III. 
Indeed, the Model Law indicates that an arbitral tribunal operating under the law 
may order "any party" to take interim measures. Article 17. 
ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb 
Bull 67 (1997). See also ICC Final Award 9324 of 1998, extracts published in 
11(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 103 (where the arbitral tribunal refrained from extending 
an injunction for suspension of payment of a bank guarantee issued by a court 
against a bank due to the fact that the main dispute arose); ICC Final Award 10062 
of 2000 (unpublished) (where the arbitral tribunal refrained from making an order 
against a bank, in an arbitration arising from a sale/purchase agreement to which 
the bank was not a party); and Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii 
(indicating, in procedural order no. 3, that the tribunal has no jurisdiction over third 
parties to the arbitration agreement involved. ), available at <www. pca- 
cpa. org/PDF/LHKAward. pdf> last visited at 28 October 2003. 
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are under ... 
[certain] aspects less protective than attachment 
orders rendered by a state court. , 98 
Despite the unavailability of arbitral provisional measures 
against third parties, it should be noted that an interim 
measure may be extended to, as the case may be, 
arbitrating parties' "officers, agents, servants, employees, 
and attorneys" and those persons controlled by the parties or 
their officers. 99 Further, in some cases, an arbitral direction 
to an arbitrating party could have the intended result. For 
instance, an arbitral tribunal does not have the power to 
issue a freezing order towards a non-party bank but it can 
order the relevant party before it to refrain from moving the 
assets elsewhere. 100 It should also be noted that the 
tribunal's decision "reflects on the rights of third parties. "101 
For instance, despite the fact that an arbitral tribunal does 
not have any power, as indicated above, to issue a 
provisional measure over a guarantor who is not a party to 
the arbitration agreement, an arbitral decision on the main 
obligation unavoidably affects the guarantor. 102 
" Arbitrators' power, even over arbitrating parties, is restricted 
since arbitrators have no coercive powers (imperium) to 
enforce their decisions. Coercive powers are within the 
98 ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 
Bull 67 (1997). See also Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-24 (indicating that arbitral 
orders on provisional measures could be directed to "any persons or entities" 
within the parties' control. ). 
99 In Order of 1999 in AAA Case No. 52 153 00116 87, the tribunal expressly 
extended its order to the above persons (unpublished). On this case, see infra 
Chapter IV, note 115. 
, oo Such an order should not, in the view of this author, infringe the doctrine of comity 
due to the principle of party autonomy. See, in this regard, Chapter II, infra note 
272 and accompanying text. But see Karrer, Less Theory, 106. On the doctrine of 
comity, see, e. g., Joel R. Paul, "Comity in International Law", 32 Harv Int'l LJ 1 
(1991). 
101 Karrer, Less Theory, 105. 
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prerogative of a state and no state would delegate such 
powers to private individuals. An arbitrator is not "an 
emanation" of any state. 103 Hence, "[n]ot even the arbitrators' 
directions to the parties themselves are self-executing. "104 
Also, there is no "contempt to court" in arbitration. 105 
Accordingly, arbitrators generally refrain from ordering 
measures that intrinsically require the use of coercive 
powers. 106 However, as compared to arbitral measures, 
judicial provisional measures may provide relatively more 
legal protection. These considerations led to the view that 
arbitral measures are "often" ineffective as they lack "coercive 
elements". 107 However, it should be noted that effectiveness 
of arbitral provisional measures would not necessarily be 
harmed in each case. Arbitrators have certain other powers 
102 For further examples see, e. g., id. 
103 Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 14. See also Julian D. M. Lew, 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Dobbs Ferry / New York- 
Oceana 1978), 535 (arguing that "an international arbitration tribunal is a non- 
national institution; it owes no allegiance to any sovereign State-, it has no lex fori in 
the conventional sense"). On the last point see, e. g., A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, 
"International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context of State 
Contracts: An Overview", 7(3) J Int'l Arb 53-64 (1990); Klaus Peter Berger, "The 
International Arbitrators' Application of Precedents", 9(4) J Int'l Arb 5-22 (1992)1 
and Lew / Mistelis / Kr6lI, para. 6-33. For a view to the contrary, see David, 76-77. 
It is noteworthy in this regard that adjudication of a dispute by a private individual 
was allowed by the state under Roman law for a period of time. See Introduction, 
note 33. 
104 ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 
Bull 67 (1997). See also Stalev, 110. It should be noted that arbitral decisions on 
provisional measures are enforceable through the assistance of courts. See infra 
105 
Chapter V, Part 3. 
In re Arbitration Between Unione Stearinerie Lanza & Wiener, [1917] KB 558,559 
(holding that an arbitrator has no power to hold a party contempt to a court or to 
issue a writ of attachment. ). 
106 See, e. g., ICC Final Award 7828 of 1995 (unpublished) (holding that "it exceeds 
the arbitrator's competence to subject the Defendant to attachment if he fails to 
pay the ordered amount within the period of two weeks. "), and ICC Final Award 
7589 of 1994, extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 60 (2000) (holding 
that the arbitral tribunal does not have power to order measures "designed to 
ensure enforcement of a possible award such as attachment of assets at third- 
party debtors such as banks, or orders directed to third-party 
debtors to take or 
omit certain actions (e. g. Mareva Injunction)". ). 
107 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 87. 
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and means that may make their decision to carry some 
weight. 108 Indeed, arbitral provisional measures are often 
complied with. 109 Further, there is a growing tendency under 
national laws for making such measures enforceable. '10 
" The arbitrators may not always have the necessary powers to 
issue interim measures. "' Indeed, some national laws and 
arbitration rules, to a certain extent, prohibit or restrict arbitral 
provisional measures. To this end, it is noteworthy that some 
national laws12 and arbitration rules13 restrict the types of 
measures that could be granted by an arbitrator. 
" It was argued that arbitrators may hesitate granting 
provisional measures for various reasons and such hesitation 
'0" See infra Chapter V, Part 1. Also, arbitral decisions can be far more flexible than 
judicial provisional measures. See this Chapter 11, supra Part 1.1. Such flexibility 
enhances, in some cases, the effectiveness of the measures. 
109 See infra Chapter V, note 2. 
110 See infra Chapter V, Part 3. 
Arbitrators are not allowed to grant measures that intrinsically require use of 
coercive powers, e. g., attachments. 
112 See, e. g., Article 17 of the Model Law, and Article 38(4) of the EAA 1996 (both 
imposing restrictions as to the "subject-matter of the dispute" or "the subject of the 
arbitral proceedings", respectively. ). On the nature and extent of these restrictions, 
113 
see Chapter 11, infra note 113. 
For instance, the texts of Article 21 of the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules; Article 26 of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; and Article 17 of the Model Law appear to 
contain a restriction on subject matter of dispute. See, e. g., Redfern / Hunter, 
paras. 7-22 & 7-23; and Gr6goire Marchac, "Interim Measures in International 
Commercial Arbitration under the ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL Rules", 10 Am 
Rev Int'l Arb 123,128 (1999). If such interpretation is accepted, then an arbitral 
tribunal cannot grant such provisional measures as those aiming at preserving 
status quo or at prevention of flight of assets. Id., paras. 7-21, and 7-26. However, 
the texts of the above provisions should not be literarily read. The limitation as to 
the subject matter ought to be related to the rights regarding the subject matter. 
Indeed, it is an established rule that "interim measures are intended to protect 
rights relating to the subject-matter of the dispute. " Caron, Interim Measures, 485. 
See also, e. g., Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German 
Minority (Poland v. Germany), Order of 29 July 1933, PCIJ Judgments Orders and 
Advisory Opinions, Series A/B, No. 58; and RCA Globcom Communications and 
The Islamic Republic of Iran, Interim Award No. 30-160-1 (30 October 1983), 
reprinted in 4 Iran-US CTR 5-8. The limit of interim protection is, accordingly, 
11 actions prejudicial to rights not a part of the dispute. " Id. The practice of the Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal supports this view. Id. See further Otto Sandrock, "The 
Cautio Judicatum Solvi in Arbitration Proceedings or The Duty of an Alien Claimant 
to Provide Security for the Costs of the Defendant", 14(2) J Int'l Arb 17,35 (1997)-t 
and Lew / Mistelis / Kr6II, para. 23-41. 
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is a shortcoming of arbitration justifying concurrent 
jurisdiction. ' 14 The hesitation may be based on the fear that, 
by proving wrong, arbitrators might be held liable. 115 
However, the existence of that fear is theoretical as no 
arbitrator has, in practice, been held liable. ' 16 The hesitation 
may also be related to the arbitrators' desire not to be 
appearing to "favour one litigant at an early stage of the 
114 See, e. g., Lew, Jurisdiction, 6. It is, for instance, submitted that arbitrators from 
civil (continental) law countries are less likely to grant provisional measures than 
those from common law countries. It is argued that the difference in those 
countries is laid down on varying legal traditions- it is often more difficult to obtain 
an interim remedy in a civil law country than that in a common law country. See 
Cremades, The Need, 230. This author, however, disagrees with the above 
argument. Also, that argument does not reflect the arbitral practice today. There 
are several reasons for that. The main reason is perhaps the fact that arbitrators 
should not have prejudices towards the parties and the case in dispute. Further, 
many arbitrators today have theoretical and practical knowledge of both common 
and civil law. 
115 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 89. 
116 Sanders, as an academic and practitioner involved in arbitration over 60 years, 
states that "[c]ourt proceedings against arbitrators ... are 
highly exceptional and if 
instituted as far as I [he] know, unsuccessful. " Sanders, Quo Vadis, 236. See also 
Karrer, Less Theory, 109. Arbitrators are generally not held personally liable where 
their decisions rendered in good faith. Under the approach accepted by many 
laws, liability of arbitrators is restricted to very limited circumstances. For instance, 
arbitrators may be held liable for "deliberate wrongdoings" or their acts or omission 
of "bad faith. " See, e. g., Section 29 of the EAA 1996; and Article 7(E) of the 
Turkish International AA. See also, in this regard, Sanders, Quo Vadis, 234. On 
the issue of liability see, e. g., Julian D. M. Lew (ed. ), The Immunity of Arbitrators 
(London: Lloyd's of London Press 1990); Alan D. Redfern, "The Immunity of 
Arbitrators" in- ICC (ed. ), The Status of the Arbitrator (ICC Publishing, 1995), 121 -, 
Eric Robine, "The Liability of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions in International 
Arbitrations Under French Law", 5(4) Int'l Arb 323 (1989), - Christian Hausmaninger, 
"Civil Liability of Arbitrators-Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform", 7(4) 
J Int'l Arb 5 (1990); and Susan D. Franck, "The Liability of International Arbitrators: 
A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity", 20 NY Law School J 
Int'l And Comp Law 1 (2000). See also Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. v. 
International Chamber of Commerce, extracts from the French original published 
in XXIVa YCA 287 (1999) (15 September 1998, Court of Appeal, Paris) (holding 
that the ICC could only be held liable where its breach of duty is proved. ), and 
Corbin v. Washington Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 278 F. Supp. 393 (D. S. C. 
1968), app'd 398 F. 2d 543 (4 1h Cir. 1968). It is also noteworthy that, under the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1923, arbitrators were contractually immune from liability for 
damages arising from decisions as regards provisional measures. The immunity 
dropped forever from the Rules in 1927 along with the provision on interim 
measures. See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.2.1. Restricting arbitrators' liability aims to 
provide for the proper environment in which arbitrators can distribute justice free 
from considerations of being held liable. Any damages arising from wrongful 
measures could be compensated from, if obtained, the security for damages. 
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proceedings". 117 Generally, the court, which grants a 
provisional measure is generally not the same as the one that 
adjudicates the merits. This fact, however, should not be a 
basis for an argument that arbitrators giving a decision in 
regard of a request for a provisional measure not on the 
merits of a case appears favouring one side over the other. It 
may be considered that such appearance occurs where 
arbitrators take into account likelihood of success on the 
merits. Nonetheless, it is not always the case that arbitrators 
take into account likelihood of success on the merits. They 
rather take into account whether or not there is a prima facie 
case. 118 Even if a tribunal considers the likelihood of success 
on the merits and renders a provisional decision, it can 
change its decision after thoroughly examining the merits. 119 
It should further be noted that arbitrators' hesitation for the 
granting of provisional measures is in the sharp decrease. 120 
" In international arbitrations, decision making even after the 
appointment of arbitrators may be comparatively slow. This 
is because an arbitral tribunal usually consists of "several 
members in different, even in distant countries. 02 1 The 
members are generally from different countries due to the 
principle of neutrality. This fact, for some, "casts doubt on 
the tribunal's ability to take truly urgent measures. "122 Such 
doubt relies on inability of such tribunals to act with the 
necessary speed on a petition for those measures. 123 The 
117 Paulsson, Better Mousetrap, 215; and Marchac, 129. 
118 See infra Chapter IV, Part 3.1.2. 
19 See infra Chapter IV, Part 6. 
120 See arbitral cases generally referred to in infra Chapter IV. 
121 ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Intl Ct Arb 
Bull 67 (1997). 
122 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 88; and Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC 
Arbitration 2000,471. 
123 Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,471. 
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assumption that tribunals act slower because the members 
are from different and distant countries to each other is not 
entirely true. Arbitrators may communicate over a telephone, 
video-link or internet for a decision on the petition. Further, it 
should be kept in mind that the chairman of the tribunal may 
alone be empowered to deal with urgent situations or to 
decide on such procedural issues as interim measures. 124 
0 In cases where arbitrators have no legal background, it is 
contended that they "may often lack the proficiency required 
to handle adequately a provisional remedies procedure . 
025 
Parties and arbitration institutions as appointing authorities 
are randomly careless in appointing inexperienced 
arbitrators. Further, experience demonstrates that arbitrators 
who are appointed from outside the legal profession are 
generally very experienced in a particular field with a certain 
degree of knowledge on legal issues, and that non-legal 
arbitrators are generally appointed along with arbitrators with 
legal background. In fact, it is not a general practice in 
international commercial arbitration that the sole arbitrator or 
the chairman of arbitral tribunal is appointed from outside the 
legal profession. 
0 Finally, it is contended that because arbitration is "typically a 
one instance procedure, " such remedies available against 
typical judicial measures as "motion to appeal, vacate or 
modify" "will generally be absent in an arbitration proceeding 
[against arbitral orders]. "126 It is added that "since provisional 
measures cannot readily be issued as (interim) awards, the 
124 This is where the interim measure requested is considered as a procedural matter. 
See Chapter II, supra note 91. 
125 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 89 (Emphasis in the original). 
126 Id., 91. Certain commodity arbitrations constitute exceptions to arbitrations being 
one-instance procedure. See Chapter II, supra note 33. 
120 
responding party is practically left without means to have the 
arbitral order set aside. "127 Although these arguments are 
true to a certain extent, they underestimate the facts that an 
arbitral order could always be amended or revoked under 
new circumstances and that, in arbitral practice, provisional 
measures are, in some cases, granted in the form of 
128 award. 
4.2 Jurisdiction on the Merits and Compatibility of Request for 
Judicial Provisional Measure with Agreement to Arbitrate 
A request to a judicial authority for a provisional measure, either before 
or during the arbitral proceedings is compatible with the agreement to 
arbitrate. 129 One aspect of the doctrine of compatibility reflects dual 
principles, which are, in fact, a logical conclusion of acceptance of the 
concurrent jurisdiction approach: 130 (i) the request is not a waiver of the 
right to arbitrate, 131 (ii) nor does the existence of an arbitration 
agreement prevent a judicial authority from granting an interim 
132 measure. What naturally derives from the latter principle is that 
127 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 91. 
128 See infra Chapter IV, Part 4. 
129 The doctrine of compatibility sets forth that "the 'negative effect' of an arbitration 
agreement, which is to exclude court jurisdiction, does not operate with regard to 
such interim measures. " See LIN Doc A/CN. 9/264, para. 1, reprinted in Holtzmann 
/ Neuhaus, 343. 
130 See, e. g., Article 9 of the Model Law. These principles seem to be adopted in 
almost all of the Model Law jurisdictions and jurisdictions that accept arbitral 
powers to grant provisional measures (e. g., Belgium (Article 1679(2) of the Judicial 
Code 1972, as amended), and the U. S. (see Born, International Arbitration, 959)). 
Thirteen of the arbitration rules surveyed contain this principle. See Annex. 
Further, Article VI(4) of the European Convention accepts the principle of 
compatibility. In this regard, see also, e. g., Bahia Industrial, S. A. v. Eintacar-Eimar, 
13 
S. A., XVIII YCA 616 (1993) (Audencia provincial of Cadiz, 12 June 1991). 
For instance, under Article 9 of the Model Law, the principle of the non-waiver is 
applicable regardless of where the arbitration takes place. See Article 1(2) of the 
Model Law. See also, e. g., ICC Award 4156 of 1983, extracts published in (1984) 
Clunet 937, and Jarvin / Derains, 515; and ICC Award 4415 of 1984, extracts 
132 
published in (1984) Clunet 952. 
This principle is adopted in Article 9 the Model Law for clarifying the practice under 
the New York Convention. See, e. g., LIN Doc A/CN. 9/168, para. 29, reprinted in 
Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 333-34; and UN Doc A/CN. 9/207, para. 61, reprinted in 
121 
despite the initiation of the request, the merits of the case in question 
remains within the arbitral domain. In other words, so long as the 
request is for a provisional measure, 133 the arbitration agreement is not 
waived. 
As to the judicial grant of provisional measures, national laws, 
arbitration rules and scholars generally and rightly accept that an 
agreement to arbitrate does not and should not hinder the grant of the 
measures by courts. This is simply because the court intervention does 
not hinder but assists the effectiveness of arbitration. Indeed, the 
unavailability of judicial provisional measures in arbitration proceedings 
would normally be one of the most important reasons for not choosing 
Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 334-35. In other words, the negative effect of an arbitration 
agreement; namely, the exclusion of court's jurisdiction is not operable as regards 
provisional measures. That is mainly because of the fact that "the availability of 
such measures is not contrary to the intentions of the parties agreeing to submit a 
dispute to arbitration and that the measures themselves are conducive to making 
the arbitration efficient and to securing its expected results. " UN Doc A/CN. 9/26, 
para. 1, reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 343. On the principle of non-waiver, 
see also, e. g., ICC Award 2444 of 1976, extracts published in (1977) Clunet 932. 
Whether or not the measure granted is an interim measure is determined under 
the law of the country where the application for the measure is made for. For 
instance, Article 9 of the Model Law does not restrict the courts' grant of any 
particular kind of interim measures. See, e. g., UN Doc A/40/17, para. 96, reprinted 
in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 345. 
133 Whether or not a relief is qualified as 'provisional' is subject to the applicable law. 
The treatment under national laws may vary. In any case, the examples to 
measures that would probably be considered provisional are the issuance of 
11 payment of bond in summary proceedings" (e. g., ICC Partial Award 6566 of 1993, 
extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 48 (2000), application for garnishee 
order (e. g., ICC Interim Award 6023 of 1989 (unpublished. )), a request for a 
referee proceedings (e. g., ICC Interim Award 6709 of 1991, extracts published in 
(1992) Clunet 998; 5(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 69 (1994)- and Jean-Jacques Arnaldez 
/ Yves Derains / Dominique Hascher, Collection of IC6 Arbitral Awards 1991-1995 
(The Hague / London / Boston- ICC Publishing / Kluwer, 1997), 435. For further 
examples, see, e. g., Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 53. However, where the 
application to a court is not for an interim injunction but for a permanent injunction 
such application may constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate. See, e. g., ICC 
Interim Award 5896 of 1991, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 37 
(2000) (holding that a request for a permanent injunction on the issue that, by 
agreement, fell within the arbitral domain was a waiver of the right to arbitrate. ), 
and ICC Partial Award 10372 of 2000 (unpublished) (indicating, by implication, that 
a request to a court for a permanent injunction in regard of the dispute that was 
initially referred to arbitration would be considered as a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. ). 
122 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 134 However, some U. S. 
courts take the view that the courts' duty to refer the parties to 
arbitration under Article II of the New York Convention prevents the 
assistance of the courts to grant pre-judgment attachments. 
Neither the text nor the preparatory materials of the Convention deal 
with provisional measures. Where contracting parties agree to arbitrate 
their disputes and a party, regardless of that agreement initiates a court 
action, Article II of the Convention requires the courts to "refer the 
parties to arbitration, " unless it finds the arbitration agreement "null and 
void or incapable of being performed. " 
In almost all of the contracting states of the New York Convention, it is 
clear that Article II refers to the substance of a dispute and that it does 
not prevent a court to intervene, for effective protection of rights and 
execution of the arbitration agreement, with arbitration proceedings to 
assist. 135 Some U. S. federal and state courts, however, interpreted the 
language of that Article as a bar for court assistance to arbitration in 
respect to pre-award attachments. Those decisions and the 
unfortunate result of their interpretation are vigorously challenged by 
some other U. S. courts. There is at the moment an "unfortunate split of 
authority" within the U. S. concerning the availability of pre-award 
attachments where a case falls within the ambit of the New York 
Convention. '36 
134 See, e. g., Note - "Arbitration-Availability of Provisional Remedies 
in Arbitration 
Proceedings", 17 NYULQ Rev 638 (1940). 
135 The historical evolution also supports this conclusion. Indeed, Article II is 
originated from Article IV of the Geneva Protocol of 1923. Article IV aimed to 
prevent courts to adjudicate substance of a case where the parties were in 
agreement to arbitration. 
136 Howard M. Holtzmann / Donald Francis Donovan, "United States", in: Jan 
Paulsson (gen. ed. ), International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, 
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Article 11 of the Convention requires courts to stay adjudicating merits of 
a case that was previously agreed to be resolved through arbitration. 
According to some courts, the word "stay" means no court assistance 
available to arbitration. This line of interpretation was initially recorded 
in McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S. p. A. 137 The dispute in this 
case related to alleged breaches of an exclusive distributorship 
agreement entered into between McCreary, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, and CEAT, an Italian corporation. The agreement referred 
disputes to arbitration under the ICC Arbitration Rules in Brussels, 
Belgium. McCreary, in an attempt to frustrate the arbitration 
agreement, attached certain debts owed to CEAT and initiated a 
lawsuit. CEAT removed the case to a federal court. One of the 'issues 
before the Third Circuit was whether or not the pre-judgment 
attachment should be removed. The Court referred the parties to 
arbitration in accordance with Article 11 of the New York Convention and 
further held that the request for a pre-award attachment "seeks to 
038 bypass the agreed upon method of dispute resolution . 
The opposite view, which seems to be the prevailing one, was taken in, 
for instance, Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Uranex. 139 The dispute in 
Supplement 28 (January 1999), 37 (The Hague / London / New York- Kluwer) 
137 
("International Handbook"). 
138 
501 F. 2d 1032 (3 Cir. 1974). 
th Id. See also I. T. A. D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 6*16 F. 2d 75 (4 Cir. 1981) For 
a number of lower courts followed the McCreary line, see, e. g., Cooper v. Ateliers 
- and Metropolitan World de la Motobecane S. A., 442 N. S. 2d 1239 (S. D. N. Y. 1982), 
Tanker, Corp. v. P. N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas Bumi Nasional (P. M. 
Pertamina), 427 F. Supp 2 (S. D. N. Y. 1975). In this respect, it is noteworthy that, 
where the McCreary line is accepted, there is a risk of negative conflict of 
jurisdiction; both courts and arbitrators deny the issue of interim measures; e. g., 
where under the applicable rules or laws arbitrators are not empowered to grant 
provisional measures. Such negative conflict brings the risk of denial of justice. 
See Sigvard Jarvin, "Is the Exclusion of Concurrent Courts' Jurisdiction Over 
Conservatory Measures to be Introduced by a Revision of the Convention", 6(1) J 
139 
Int'l Arb 176 (1989). 
451 F. Supp. 1044 (N. D. Cal. 1977). See also, e. g., E. A. S. T., Inc. of Stanford, 
Conn. MN Alaia, 876 F. 2d 1168 (5 th Cir. 1989). This line of view supported by 
several commentators. See, e. g., Hoellering, Interim Relief, 12-13; Lawrence F. 
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this case arose from the contract between Carolina Power, a North 
Carolina public utility company and Uranex, a French company for sale 
of uranium concentrates. Upon the dramatic increase in the price of 
the uranium, Uranex ceased the delivery on the contract price and 
requested renegotiation. The parties agreed to submit their disputes to 
arbitration. Carolina Power attached a debt owed to Uranex for 
satisfaction of a future arbitral award in its favour. Uranex moved to lift 
the attachment. The Uranex court expressly refrained from following 
the reasoning and the outcome of the McCreary court by stating, inter 
alia, that "the availability of provisional remedies encourages rather 
than obstructs the use of agreements to arbitrate. "140 To this end, it 
should be noted that in Uranex, the parties had no intention to frustrate 
the agreement to arbitrate. 
Ebb, "Flight of Assets From the Jurisdiction 'In the Twinkling of a Telex': Pre-and 
Post Award Conservatory Relief in International Commercial Arbitration", 7(1) J Int'l 
Arb 9 (1990); Charles Brower & W. M. Tupman, "Court-Ordered Provisional 
Measures under the New York Convention", 80 Am J Int'l L 24 (1986); Joseph D. 
Becker, "Attachments in Aid of International Arbitration-The American Position", 
1(1) Arb Int'l 40 (1985); New York City Bar Report on the Advisability and 
Availability of Provisional Remedies in the Arbitration Process, The Record, 625, 
- Reichert, 368; P. Fitzpatrick, "Attachment Prior to the 629 (December 1984), 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention", 6 
Fordham Int'l LJ 556 (1983). It should also be noted that some courts, including 
the Second Circuit, distinguished McCreary. They held that interim measures 
other than attachments should be available under the New York Convention. See, 
e. g., Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F. 2d 348 (7 
1h Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1070; Rogers, Burgin, Shanine & Deschler, Inc. v. Dongsan, 
598 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. N. Y. 1984); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp v. Amgen Inc., 882 
F. 2d 806 (3 rd Cir 1989); Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co., 919 F. 2d 822 (2d 
Cir. 1990); and Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 910 F. 2d 
1049(2 nd Cir 1990). 
140 451 F. Supp. 1052. 
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The McCreary has found little support within the U. S. 141 and it is not 
followed in international arena. 142 The best display for the decline Is 
perhaps Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and Another v. Balfour Beatty 
Construction Ltd and Others. 143 In this case, twelve British and French 
companies acting as a joint venture entered into a construction contract 
with the Channel Tunnel Group Ltd to design and commission the 
Channel Tunnel. The construction contract contained a dispute 
resolution system, including arbitration in Brussels, Belgium. A dispute 
arose over a variation order on payments regarding the cooling system. 
Upon the contractors' threat that they would suspend to work until a 
decision has bees reached on the cooling system, the Channel Tunnel 
Group made a request in England for an interim injunction to prevent 
the contractors from suspending the work. The contractors resisted. 
The case went all the way to the House of Lords. On the issue of 
whether or not a court could order an interim measure when the case 
fell within the domain of arbitration and of the New York Convention, 
141 Indeed, several U. S. courts took the same line of interpretation with the Uranex 
court. See, e. g., Borden Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co., 919 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 500 U. S. 953 (1991). For lower court decisions adopting, the 
Uranex line, see, e. g., Daye Nonferrous Metals Co. v. Trafigura Beheer BV, 1997 
WL 375680 (S. D. N. Y. 1997); Alvenue Shipping v. Delta Petroleum (U. S. A. ), Ltd, 
876 F. Supp. 482,487 (S. D. N. Y. 1994); and Filantro SpA v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 
789 F. Supp. 1229 (S. D. N. Y. 1992). See also Section 7502(c) of the New York 
Civil Practice Law and Rules. In this regard, it should be noted that, under Section 
8 of the Federal AA, attachments are permitted for maritime matters regardless of 
the agreement to arbitrate the underlying dispute. See, e. g., Anaconda v. 
American Sugar Refining Co. 322 U. S. 42 (1944); Construction Exporting 
Enterprises v. Nikki Maritime, Ltd, 558 F. Supp. 1372 (S. D. N. Y. 1983); E. A. S. T., 
Inc. of Stamford v. MN Alaia, 876 F. 2d 1168 (5'h Cir. 1989); and Unitramp, Ltd. V. 
Mediterranean Brokerage & Agents, S. A. S., 1993 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 13304 (E. D. La. 
13 September 1993). Many commentators also support the availability of 
attachments in maritime industry see, e. g., Nicholas J. Healy, "Obtaining Security 
142 
in Aid of Arbitration", 3 LMCLQ 267 (1976); and Higgins, 1519. 
See, e. g., Scherk Enterprises AG v. Societe des Grandes Marques, No. 3989, IV 
YCA 286 (1979) (Corte di Cassazione, 12 May 1977); and Rena K, The [1978] 1 
Lloyd's Law Rep 545. See also van den Berg, The New York Arbitration 
Convention, 139-140. 
143 [1993] AC 334. As indicated above, many national laws and arbitration rules 
decline to follow the views of the McCreary court by expressly adopting the 
principle of compatibility. See Chapter 11, supra note 130. 
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Lord Mustill, with whom all the other Lords were in agreement, 
expressly disagreed with the McCreary and stated: 144 
The purpose of interim measures of protection [by courts] ... 
is not 
to encroach on the procedural powers of the arbitrators but to 
reinforce them, and to render more effective decision at which the 
arbitrators will ultimately arrive on the substance of the dispute. 
Provided that this and no more is what such measures aim to do, 
there is nothing in them contrary to the spirit of international 
arbitration. 
In sum, the principle of compatibility should be accepted even if a case 
falls within the ambit of the New York Convention. 145 In other words, 
courts should have the power to grant provisional measures but they 
should exercise utmost caution in exercising such power. 146 That is to 
say, courts should distinguish and deny oppressive and vexatious 
applications, e. g. a request to circumvent an arbitration agreement. 
4.3 Court Assistance to Foreign Arbitration 
Court assistance is generally available to arbitrations taking place in a 
country where the court is located. However, vital evidence or a party's 
assets from which an award would be satisfied might be in a country 
foreign to the place of arbitration. In such cases, convenience and 
efficiency requires availability of provisional measures in aid of 
arbitration whose seat is or is deemed to have been in a foreign country 
(or simply foreign arbitration). 
144 [1993] AC 365. The current EAA enacted in 1996 too contains an express 
145 
provision recognising court assistance whilst arbitration taking place. Section 44. 
For facilitating world-wide harmonisation, the principle is adopted in Article 9 of the 
Model Law. See, e. g., UN Doc A/CN. 9/264, paras. 1-3, reprinted in Holtzmann 
Neuhaus, 343. 
146 See, e. g., Hoellering, Interim Relief, 13 (indicating that courts should be guided 
with "minimal interference" and they "should exercise discretion in determining why 
parties seek protective measures. "). See also Born, International Arbitration, 948. 
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In most arbitration agreements, contracting parties specify the place of 
arbitration. 147 For such specification, parties usually opt for a neutral 
and geographically convenient place. 148 Such place is generally neutral 
to parties, dispute, performance of a contract, and ultimately the 
outcome of the arbitration. Nevertheless, a need may arise to obtain 
provisional measures in a place foreign to the place of arbitration. 149 In 
those circumstances, court assistance to foreign arbitration may be 
necessary for convenience, effectiveness of arbitration and protection 
of arbitrating parties' rights. The availability of such assistance is a 
relatively new issue. Indeed, most national laws are silent on this 
issue. 150 Under laws of some countries, court assistance to foreign 
arbitration seems to be unavailable. 15' On the contrary, under laws of 
some other countries, court assistance to foreign arbitration, in 
152 recognition of the need for such assistance, seems to be permitted. 
147 For instance, in 2001, contracting parties determined the place of arbitration in 
148 
84% of ICC cases. See 13(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 11 (2002). 
Arbitral institutions are generally authorised to determine, failing a party 
agreement, the place of arbitration. In exercising such authority, they consider, 
inter alia, neutrality and convenience. 
149 For preservation of evidence, status quo (see, e. g., Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and 
France Manche SA v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd and others, [1993] AC 334" 
[1993] WLR 262; [1993] 1 All ER 664, [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 291), or prevention of 
dissipation of assets. 
1,50 Even the new German arbitration law does not deal with the issue. See Article 
1025 of the German CCP. 
151 Brazil (Bbsch (ed. ), 112-13), China (Id. at 165), India (see, e. g., Mariott 
International Inc. v Ansal Hotels Limited, extracts published in XXVI YCA 788-806 
(2001) (Delhi High Court). But see cases referred to in, e. g., Prathiba M. Singh / 
Devashish Krishan, "The Indian 1996 Arbitration Act - Solutions for a Current 
Dilemma", 18(l) J Int'l Arb 41-58 (2001); and Lira Goswami, "Interim Reliefs- The 
Role of Courts" in: van den Berg (ed. ), The Never Ending Story, 111. ); and 
Panama (Bbsch (ed. ), 525). 
152 Austria (136sch (ed. ), 58-60); Belgium (id., 88); Canada (id., 140-141); Denmark 
(id., 179); England (see Sections 2(3) and 44 of the AA); Finland (136sch (ed. ), 234- 
235); France (id., 264); Hong Kong (see CLOUT Case No. 42 (1992) (High Court 
of Hong Kong) (stating that it is "at least open to argument" that in international 
cases a Model Law court might be "more ready to assist a party to an international 
arbitration agreement, notwithstanding the fact that the arbitration had its seat 
elsewhere. "), Italy (136sch (ed. ), 379); Korea (id., 394); Articles 1(2) and 9 of the 
Model Law; the Netherlands (Article 1074(2) of the Netherlands AA. See A. J. van 
den Berg / R. van Delden / H. J. Snijders, Netherlands Arbitration Law 
(Deventer/Boston- Kluwer 1993)); Norway (136sch (ed. ), 509,511); the Republic of 
South Africa (Id., 639); Sweden (Id., 680); Turkey (Articles 1(3) and 6 of the 
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It is clear that the assistance to foreign arbitration enhances the 
effectiveness of interim protection of rights in arbitration and, 
accordingly, of arbitration. For this reason, this author is of the belief 
that such assistance should be permitted. 
In order to grant a measure, a foreign court should initially examine, 
considering that there is a valid arbitration clause, whether it is 
appropriate for the court to be involved in a case referred to 
arbitration. 153 If the response is positive, since the necessity and 
convenience are the primary reasons supporting court assistance to 
foreign arbitration, the court, examining a request for such assistance, 
should broadly consider whether it is the most appropriate or 
convenient forum to grant a provisional measure. 154 If, for instance, 
International Arbitration Law); and the U. S. (see, e. g., Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk 
Products Co., Ltd, 919 F2d 822 (2d Cir. 1990); Tampinex Oil Ltd v. Latina Trading 
Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1201 (S. D. N. Y. 1983); Atlas Chartering Services v. World 
Trade Group, 453 F. Supp. 861,863 (S. D. N. Y. 1978); and Carolina Power & Light 
Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N. D. Calif. 1977). But see Contichern v Parsons 
Shipping Co., 229 F3d 426 (holding that a New York rule permitting attachment is 
restricted to domestic arbitration and does not allow attachment in assistance to 
maritime arbitration in London. )). However, it should be noted that some U. S. 
courts, e. g., the Third and the Fourth Circuits are generally against court 
intervention for interim protection of rights. Accordingly, no court assistance would 
be available from such courts to arbitration taking place outside the U. S. See 
153 
Wagoner, 71. 
154 
The response to this question is given in Chapter 11, infra Part 4.4. 
The test derived from combination of factors required by Channel Tunnel and 
Borden courts. On summary of these factors as well as some other proposed 
factors, see Born, International Arbitration, 970. Craig / Park / Paulsson indicate 
that, in intervening with arbitral process, courts should consider "whether justice 
requires their intervention, notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration clause. " 
Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,477. In this regard, it should be 
noted that, in each country, court assistance to foreign arbitration may be made 
under various grounds. For instance, for French courts' support to foreign 
arbitration, there has to be a link or a contact between any given case and the 
jurisdiction. This link could be established where the place of execution of a 
measure is in France (jurisdiction rationae /oc/) or a measure is sought against a 
French national Ouriscliction rationae personae). Pluyette, 76. Apparently, an 
application for a measure should not be "artificial or fraudulent". Id. The limitation 
to prevent undue interference in the affairs of a foreign court - the court may refuse 
to exercise these powers if the choice of seat outside England and Wales "makes 
it inappropriate to do so. " See Lord Mustill / Stewart C. Boyd, Commercial 
Arbitration - 2001 Companion, 2 nd ed. (Lonclon- Butterworths 2001), 324; and 
Kelda Groves, "Virtual Reality: Effective Injunctive Relief in Relation to International 
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there is another forum that is more appropriate for the grant of a 
provisional measure, the court should refrain from intervening. For 
instance, a court of a country A where the contractor's headquarters is 
located should, in principle, not issue an injunction against the 
Employer located in country B in a construction contract in respect of 
building a highway in the latter country. That is mainly due to fact that it 
is very difficult to establish the case against such Employer even on a 
prima facie basis as the work is performed in a foreign country and that 
such injunction could not be directly enforceable against the 
Employer. 155 The test of convenience or appropriateness aims to avoid 
conflict of jurisdictions between courts, e. g. court of a place of 
arbitration and a foreign court. 
Once the court establishes that it is the most appropriate forum to grant 
the judicial provisional measure requested, it should then apply, in 
principle, the standards and criteria under its own law to order such 
measure. 156 
Arbitrations", [1998] Int ALR 188,192. In this regard, see also Commerce & 
Industry Co. of Canada and Another v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 
[2002] 2 All ER (Comm. ) 204; and Viking Insurance Co v. Rossdale and Others, 
Commerce & Industry Insurance Co. of Canada and Another v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyds and Others, [2002] 1 WLR 1323, [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 219. 
Where there is little or no contact with the forum in which a provisional measure 
was sought, state courts are generally reluctant to grant such measure. See Bond, 
155 
12; and HSBC Bank USA v National Equity Corp, 719 NYS 2d 20 (2001). 
However, such kinds of injunctions are used in practice, in some countries, to stop 
156 
payment of letter of credits/bank guarantees. 
See, e. g., UN Doc A/CN. 9/524, para. 77. For a different view, see id. To this end, 
it is noteworthy that the harmonisation of standards for the grant of judicial 
provisional measures would be extremely difficult in an international document. 
For this reason, for instance, the current draft of the Judgments Convention 
prepared by the Hague Conference on Private International Law contains a very 
brief clause on interim measures, indicating that the (draft) Convention does not 
prohibit in any way the grant of judicial provisional measures. See Preliminary Doc 
No 8 (March 2003), Preliminary Result of the Work of the Informal Working Group 
on the Judgments Project available at < ftp. hcch. net/doc/genaff - 
pd08e. pdf> last 
visited at 28 October 2003. Thus, the issue of standards for judicial measures 
should be left with national procedural laws. 
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4.4 Relationship Between Arbitral Jurisdiction and Courts' 
Jurisdiction 
Judicial involvement in the arbitral process has been widely recognised, 
although "in almost every case"157 no such involvement is necessary 
158 once arbitrators are appointed. Professor Sanders commented, 
some twenty-five years ago'about that involvement, that "[i]nternational 
arbitration is like a young bird, trying to fly; it rises in the air but from 
time to time falls back upon its home nest. , 159 
In determining court involvement into arbitration, the principle of party 
autonomy has to be taken into account and is given utmost 
significance. 160 Foremost upholding party autonomy is a direct result of 
recognition of international arbitration as a mechanism for resolving 
international disputes. 161 However, the principle of party autonomy 
should not extend to total autonomy. 162 This is for mainly so for 
"ensuring that international commercial arbitration is effective"; 163 
157 Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-10. 
158 Id. 
159 Pieter Sanders, "Trends in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration", 
(1975-11) RCADI 207,288. Lord Mustill describes the involvement in a similar 
fashion: 
Ideally, the handling of arbitrable disputes should resemble a relay-race. In the 
initial stages, before the arbitrators are seized of the dispute, the baton is in the 
grasp of the court; for at that stage there is no other organisation which could 
take steps to prevent the arbitration agreement from being ineffectual. When 
the arbitrators take charge they take over the baton and retain it until they have 
made ar award. At this point, having no longer a function to fulfil, the arbitrators 
hand back the baton so that the court can in case of need lend its coercive 
powers to the enforcement of the award. But in real life the position is not so 
clear-cut. Very few commentators would now assert that the legitimate 
functions of the court entirely cease when the arbitrators receive the file, and 
conversely very few would doubt that there is a point at which the court takes on 
a purely subordinate role. 
Lord Mustill, 119. 
1 60 Pluyette, 75-76. 
161 Id., 74-75. 
162 See, e. g., Goldman, 259; and Gaillard / Savage (eds. ), para. 1302. For those 
163 
problems and shortcomings, see Chapter 11, supra Part 4.1. 
Goldman, 257. See also Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-10,345. It should be noted that 
arbitration "cannot survive, much less prosper, without the active and effective 
support of the national courts Jacques Werner, "Should the New York 
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consequently, contributing the aim of "effectiveness and good 
administration of [international] justice". 164 
The effectiveness and good administration of justice are the 
determinative balancing factors for reconciling the tension165 between 
involvement of courts into arbitral process and parties' will to keep 
courts out from involving in resolution of their disputes by opting for 
arbitration. 166 This reconciliation also satisfies the needs of 
international commerce-, namely, balancing certainty with flexibility in 
arbitration by avoiding any abuse of court involvement. 167 The 
reconciliation requires collaboration or co-operation of arbitrators and of 
courts. 168 The role allocated to courts under the concept of co- 
operation is "one of assistance and control. , 169 International and 
national legislatures generally indicate circumstances where a court 
intervenes or interferes with arbitral process to make international 
arbitration more effective. Two apparent examples for intervention to 
arbitration process are setting aside an award 170 and refusal of 
recognition and enforcementl7l. In addition, international and national 
legislations specify, in most cases, circumstances where assistance of 
Convention be Revised to Provide for Court Intervention in Arbitral Proceedings? ", 
164 
6 (3) JI nt'I Arb 113,115 (119 8 9). 
Pluyette, 73. Holtzmann indicates that judges and arbitrators are "associates in a 
system of international justice. " H. M. Holtzmann, "L'arbitrage et les Tribunaux des 
Associes clans un Systerne cle Justice Internationale", (1978) Revue de lArbitrage 
253,302. See also Goldman, 259. The effectiveness and good administration of 
justice require, inter alia, assistance for prope conduct of arbitration (e. g., 
165 
preservation of evidence). See Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-10. 
Redfern observes that "the tension ... 
inevitably exits between arbitration and the 
courts of law ...... 
Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts, 72. See also Channel 
166 
Tunnel Group Ltd v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd, [11993] AC 334,367-68. 
Pluyette, 73. See also Reichert, 370 (stating that court assistance "should be 
exercised with discretion. If appropriately administered, such judicial assistance 
would bolster the utility of international commercial arbitration, foster international 
167 
trade, and decrease the workload of courts. "). 
Cremades, Exclusion, 112. 
168 See Goldman, 257-58. 
169 Id, 275 (Emphasis in the original. ). 
170 See, e. g., Sections 67-68 of the EAA 1996, Article 1484 of French New CCP, 
Article 34 of the Model Law, and Article 190 of the SPIL. 
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courts could be lent to arbitration 
among those circumstances. 172 
The grant of provisional measures is 
Once judicial involvement in support of arbitration is accepted, a need 
to regulate co-existence of jurisdictions of judicial authorities and 
arbitrators arises. This is because both jurisdictions are generally 
t1similar or identical", and they sometimes overlap and may even be in 
conflict. 173 Due to such "overlapping and possibly conflicting" 174 nature 
of concurrent jurisdiction, the co-ordination of the powers of courts and 
arbitrators is felt necessary. The concept of co-ordination recognises 
the overwhelming need of cooperation and is in line with principles of 
legal protection and legal certainty. 175 The coordination contributes to 
the effectiveness of arbitration and to the effective distribution of justice. 
International conventions do not regulate the method of co-ordination 
between arbitrators and courts. 176 Most national arbitration laws 
including the Model Law are silent too. Similarly, arbitration rules do 
not generally deal with the issue of coordination. ' " 
Only a handful of national laws and a number of arbitration rules deal 
with methods of co-ordination. 178 Under some of those laws and rules, 
parties are free to apply to either fora; the choice is truly open. This 
freedom of choice approach is, however, against the principle of party 
171 See, e. g., Article V of the New York Convention. 
172 For examples of other circumstances, see, e. g., Goldman, 275-281. 
173 Cremades, Exclusion, 111; Rubino-Sammartano, 365; and Hausmaninger, Pre- 
Arbitral Referee, 96. 
174 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 96. 
175 1 d., 96. 
176 Under ICSID arbitration, involvement of courts is not, unless otherwise agreed, 
permitted. See Chapter 11, supra Part 2. Article VI(4) of the Geneva Convention, 
although expressly accepts the co-operation of courts and arbitral tribunals, does 
177 
not deal with the method of the co-operation. 
Thirty-nine out of seventy two sets of rules surveyed are silent on the issue. See 
Annex. 
178 See Chapter 11, infra Part 4.4.2. 
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autonomy and is free invitation for abuse. Thus such approach hinders 
the effectiveness of arbitration. So in order to make arbitration more 
effective and to avoid any such invitation, some other laws and rules 
envisaged for restricted access to courts. 179 Under the restricted- 
access approach, access to courts for interim measures of protection Is 
allowed under "appropriate" circumstances. The courts' role is 
described as complementary, prior to the appointment of the arbitral 
tribunal and subsidiary thereafter. In any case, the court, in assisting 
arbitration, should exercise "utmost caution and should be prepared to 
act when the balance of advantage plainly favour the grant of relief. " 180 
Further, the grant of security for costs and provisional payment should, 
in principle, be left to arbitrators as there is generally no immediate 
urgency in regard of such measures and assessment of likelihood of 
success on the merits and of the need for those measures are better 
made by arbitrators than courts. 181 
It should further be noted that courts should endeavour to do everything 
in their power to prevent abuse of either of the coordination methods. 
In this regard, any abuse can be the source of liability of the abuser. In 
addition, the arbitration rules' coordination of jurisdiction of arbitrators 
and of courts is subject to the parties' ability to restrict or exclude 
courts' jurisdiction. 182 
179 Apparently, the coordination of jurisdictions under arbitration rules is subject to 
180 
applicable law. 
See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd and France Manche SA v. Balfour Beatty 
Construction Ltd and others, [1993] AC 334,367; [1993] WLR 262; [1993] 1 All ER 
181 
664; [1993] 1 L'Ioyds Rep 291. 
See, e. g., Article 38(3) of the EAA 1996. A court in England has no power under 
the EAA 1996 to order security for costs in aid of arbitration. See, e. g., David St 
John Sutton / Judith Gill, Russell on Arbitration, 22 nd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell 2003), 
para. 7-142. On security for costs granted by arbitrators, see infra Chapter IV, Part 
7.4. 
182 See Chapter 11, infra Part 4.4.4. 
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This part examines the freedom of choice and restrIcted-access 
approaches. It further deals with the issues of damages in regard of 
abusive requests for court assistance and exclusion agreements. 
4.4.1 Freedom of Choice Approach 
The general approach in many states, which accept concurrent 
jurisdiction is that parties are, unless otherwise agreed, 183 given a free 
choice both prior to the appointment of arbitrators or during arbitration 
proceedings. 184 They are free to make applications to arbitrators or 
courts with no hindrance at any time. 185 A similar approach is adopted 
under most of the arbitration rules surveyed. 186 
The freedom of choice approach should be approached with great care. 
When a party is given a free choice to determine the forum to apply for 
a measure, such freedom is susceptible to abuse. 187 Indeed, such 
abuse, in some cases, is seen in practice. A request for a measure 
could be used as a procedural weapon. 188 Particularly, a court should 
be aware of the possibility of abuse and they, consequently, should not 
accept any request where the court finds that the request is not 
183 See Chapter 11, supra Part 1.3. 
184 One prominent example seems to be Switzerland. See Wirth, 42-43; Stephen V. 
Berti, (Commentary on) Article 183 in, Stephen V. Berti (ed. ), International 
Arbitration in Switzerland (London: Kluwer 2000), para. 5. The Swiss approach 
11 rests on the argument that an arbitral tribunal is not in a position to ultimately grant 
the same effective legal protection as a state court since the measures ordered by 
an arbitral tribunal are generally not directly enforceable by the tribunal itself but 
need almost always be enforced with the assistance of a state judge. " (Citation 
omitted. ) Wirth, 42-43. The freedom of choice approach is reflected in lack of 
185 
regulation of the manner of how concurrent jurisdiction would be exercised. 
186 
Apparently, conflicts, if any, need to be resolved. See Chapter 11, infra Part 4.5. 
A prominent example to the blank cheque approach is Article 26(3) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Perhaps because of that liberty, the number of 
requests from arbitral tribunals to grant provisional measures, for instance under 
the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal's practice, "appears to be relatively low. " See 
Pellonp6ti / Caron, 451; and Caron, Interim Measures, 467. ) It should, in this 
regard, be noted that if a party chooses to make a request to a court, generally no 
restrictions do apply to it. For instance, Article 26(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
187 
Rules seems to provide no restriction in that respect. 
See Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 
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genuine, that there is no urgency, and that it aims at gaining tactical 
advantage over a respondent. Further, the freedom of choice 
approach, if accepted in full, intervenes with the principle of party 
autonomy and parties' choice of arbitration over litigation. 
Party autonomy demands prejudice toward arbitral jurisdiction. When 
parties agree on arbitration to resolve their disputes, this agreement 
should be upheld if and where it is possible. Parties, apparently, can 
always opt in, by agreement, for assistance of judicial authorities in 
regard of interim protection. In fact, they are at liberty to exclude 
jurisdiction of arbitrators in full in that regard. 
189 Otherwise, the 
prejudice should be in favour of arbitral jurisdiction. In other words, the 
degree of equilibrium between party autonomy and court involvement 
should be on the side of the former. The outside intervention should 
only be accepted where the exercise of arbitral power to grant 
provisional measures Is, in general, ineffective or such power is not 
available at all. Such intervention is justified for maintaining effective 
legal protection thus effective distribution of justice. 
Parties are advised to follow a common sense approach in choosing 
the forum to make their interim relief applications. 190 They should not 
abuse the freedom of choice approach. 191 Otherwise they might be 
held liable for damages arising from such abuse. 192 
188 See Chapter 11, supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 189 See Chapter 11, supra Part 1.3. 
190 If the choice is "truly open", parties should examine the nature of the relief sought 
in making the choice of the forum to apply. See Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-17. 
191 Redfern / Hunter give the following practical advise, which would certainly be useful 
to follow in regard of cases where the applicable national law does not clearly deal 
with the co-ordination of arbitral and judicial jurisdiction* 
the answer to the question of whether to seek interim relief from the court or 
from the arbitral tribunal is likely to depend upon the particular circumstances of 
each case. If, for example, the arbitral tribunal is not yet in existence (or, in an 
ICC case, has not yet received the file), and the matter is one of urgency [or, 
alternatively arbitrators do not have necessary powers to grant the measure to 
be applied for], the only possibility is to apply to the relevant national court for 
136 
4.4.2 Restricted -Access Approach: Principles of Complementarity 
and Subsidiarity 
A small number of national laws delicately regulate the issue of 
concurrent jurisdiction. The same sensitivity in coordinating the 
concurrent jurisdiction is demonstrated by a few arbitration rules. 
Under these laws and rules, varying degree of equilibrium between 
party autonomy and court involvement is maintained. 
The national laws and arbitration rules generally accept that courts' role 
prior to constitution of arbitral tribunals Is complementary* where no 
party-appointed authority is in existence, courts step in and assist 
arbitration proceedings. 193 After appointment of arbitrators, courts' role 
is subsidiary. arbitrators have priority to deal with provisional measure 
requests and where circumstances are not appropriate for them to 
grant these measures then, only then, national courts step in and 
provide for their assistance. 194 The role of courts also remains 
subsidiary if arbitrating parties previously agreed for one of the 
emergency measure mechanisms. In such case, since a request for a 
interim measures, whilst at the same time taking steps to move the arbitration 
forward, so as to show that there is every intention of respecting the agreement 
to arbitrate. Where the arbitral tribunal is in existence, it is appropriate to apply 
first to that tribunal for interim measures, unless the measures sought are ones 
that the tribunal itself does not have the power to grant. (Emphasis in the 
original. ) (Citation omitted. ) 
192 
Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-18. 
193 
See Chapter 11, infra Part 4.4.3. 
Even prior to the formation of a party-appointed authority, a court should exercise a 
self-restraint. The court should lend its assistance where the moving party proves 
194 
a compelling need not to await the appointment of such authority. Wagoner, 69. 
Whether circumstances are appropriate or not is determined by the applicable law 
or the relevant arbitration rules. In determining whether a circumstance is 
appropriate, the nature of the relief may be taken into account. Redfern / Hunter, 
para. 7-17. For instance, measures for preservation of evidence (where there is 
urgency); coercive measures (e. g., attachments), certain injunctions (courts should 
be extremely careful in regard of injunctions, as in some cases, the grant of an 
injunction by a court would affect the case at hand thus jurisdiction of arbitrators). 
E. g., Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd, [1993] AC 334; 
and Patel v. Patel, [2002] Q. B. 551, [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 923, [1999] 3 WLR 
1 17 
measure could be made to a party-determined authority, there is 
generally no need for courts' complement. 195 
The validity of the restricted-access approach envisaged by arbitration 
rules largely depends upon the permission under the applicable law. 196 
This Part studies the approach of national laws and of arbitration rules 
concerning the restricted-access approach 
4.4.2.1 Approach of National Laws 
The approach of national laws in relation to the coordination of 
jurisdictions varies considerably. For instance, in Malaysia, interim 
measures are initially to be sought from arbitrators. 197 In Belgium, 198 
Ltlxemhourg, 199 and North Carolina 200 those measures are sought from 
courts until constitution of an arbitral tribunal and generally from the 
tribunal once it is constituted or seized of the matter in question. 
Similarly, under the 1986 Dutch AA, if a party seeks interim relief from a 
court notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, the court may decline 
to assert jurisdiction in regard of such relief by "taking into account all 
, j201 circumstances . 
322. The courts should not interfere with arbitration for security for costs 
195 
applications. Redfern / Hunter, paras. 7-29-7-32. 
196 
On the complementary mechanisms, see, generally, infra Chapter 111. 
197 
This issue is dealt with in Chapter 11, infra Part 4.4.4. 
P. G. Lim, "Malaysia" in- Paulsson (gen. ed. ), International Handbook (Supplement 
8 
32, December 2000), 21. 
19 Lambert Matray, "Belgium" in: Paulsson (gen. ed. ), International Handbook 
(Supplement 20, October 1995), 19. 
199 Ernest Arendt / Thiýa Harles-Walch, "Luxembourg" in: Paulsson (gen. ed. ), 
200 
International Handbook (Supplement 18, September 1994), 11. 
Section 1-567.39 of the International Commercial AA (providing that except for 
prior to an arbitral tribunal's appointment or unavailability of it, a party shall seek 
201 
provisional measures from arbitrators. ). 
Article 1051(2). In this regard, it is noteworthy that under Section 2712.36 of the 
Ohio Code on International Commercial Arbitration, a party may directly apply to a 
court for interim measures. However, the court should not grant the measure 
requested "[u]nless the party shows that an application to the arbitral tribunal for 
138 
In France, the role of courts in granting interim relief depends upon the 
constitution of tribunal. Prior to the tribunal's constitution, the role of 
courts is complementary and is justified with the considerations of 
urgency and risk. 202 After the formation of a tribunal, courts' role Is to 
assist the arbitrators under exceptional circumstances and is 
203 subsidiary . Their role is justified again where there is urgency, and 
risk. Further, 'in some cases, the justification arises from a situation in 
which inaction could be considered denial of justice. This last ground 
could be invoked "if the circumstances reveal a total paralysis of the 
arbitral tribunal and its powerlessness to fulfil its function, thus depriving 
,, 204 a party of the fundamental right of 'judgment' under fair conditions. 
Section 2GC(6) of the 1997 Hong Kong AO states that a court may 
decline to give its assistance to arbitration in regard of interim measures 
(1) where the case "is currently subject of arbitration proceedings"; and 
(ii) the court "considers it more appropriate for the matter to be dealt 
with by the relevant arbitral tribunal. " A commentator indicates that a 
case is most likely to be referred to a court where, Inter alia 
[i] the rights of a third party are involved, [Ii] an ex parte 
application is required, [iii] the arbitral tribunal does not have 
power to grant all the interim relief sought in a single application 
or [iv] the court's powers of enforcement are more effective than 
those of an arbitrator (for example, with regard to an 
injunction ). 205 (Citations omitted. ) (Emphasis added. ) 
Similarly, section 44 of the EAA 1996, after stating that parties can 
empower arbitrators to grant interim measures, sets forth the rules for 
the measure of protection would prejudice the party's rights and that an interim 
measure of protection from the court is necessary to protect their rights. " 202 Pluyette, 79-87. 
203 189. 
204 Id., 90. 
205 Neil Kaplan, "Hong Kong" in: Paulsson (gen. ed. ), International Handbook 
(Supplement 29, December 1999), 56. 
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court involvement to arbitration. Section 44 contains the most 
206 elaborate rule on the court assistance out of the laws surveyed . This 
rule should, in this author's view, be taken as example by other laws. 
Section 44(5) provides that court assistance will only be available 
where arbitrators have no power to act or are unable to act timely and 
effectively. A tribunal has no power nor can act, for instance, prior to its 
formation or where for some reason it is paralysed afterwards, against 
third parties, in regard of measures require use of coercive powers, e. g. 
freezing or search orders. 207 
Section 44 further distinguishes circumstances in which court 
assistance is available by taking into account the urgency of the matter. 
Section 44(3) deals with circumstances in which urgency exist. Under 
such circumstances, a party or a proposed party, generally prior to 
appointment of an arbitral tribunal can make application to preserve 
evidence or assets. This Section provides for a judicial power in 
assistance to arbitral proceedings to make, for instance, a search 
(Anton Pillar) order. 208 
Where there is no urgency, in accordance with Section 44(4), a party 
can apply to a court upon notice to other parties and the tribunal, with 
the agreement of those other parties or the permission of the tribunal. 
206 The philosophy behind Section 44 is: 
if a given power could possibly be exercised by a tribunal, then it should be, and 
parties should not be allowed to make unilateral applications to ... [a court]. If, 
however, a given power could be exercised by the tribunal, but not as effectively, 
in circumstances where, for example, speed is necessary, the ... [court] should 
be able to step in. 
Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996 Report on the 
207 
Arbitration Bill, para. 216 (the "1996 DAC Report"). 
See, e. g., Johnson, 15; and the 1996 DAC Report, para. 214. In this regard, see 
also In Re Q's Estate, [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 931, [1999] 1 All E. R. (Comm. ) 499. 
The principles set out in Section 44 of the EAA 1996 seems to be generally 
208 
accepted in India. Goswami, 116. 
Section 44 of the EAA 1996. 
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Apparently, that Section aims to prevent any suggestion that a court 
,, 209 "might be used to interfere with or usurp the arbitral process .... 
4.4.2.2 Approach of Arbitration Rules 
There are a few rules, which elaborate the circumstances where a 
request to a judicial authority is authorised. The prominent example of 
these rules is the ICC Arbitration Rules 1998 . 
21 0 These Rules accept 
the co-existence of the jurisdiction of the courts and tribunals in 
providing interim protection of rights. Under Article 23(2) of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1998, courts are entrusted with the power to grant 
provisional measures before the formation of the tribunal and, under 
appropriate circumstanceS, 21 1 even thereafter. The acceptance of the 
court assistance for interim protection of rights at the stage prior to the 
constitution of an arbitral tribuna 1212 is a reflection of the 
complementarity principle under arbitration rules. 213 The acceptance of 
courts' involvement under appropriate circumstances after the 
209 The 1996 DAC Report, para. 215. 210 See also Article 21 of the ECA Arbitration Rules 1997 ("[i]t is desirable that the 
decision whether to grant or not, upon a party's application, holding measures or 
interlocutory injunctions, be made by the arbitral tribunal rather than by state 
211 
courts. "). 
See Article 23 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. Alternatively, "under exceptional 
circumstances* under Article 8(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988. The 
exceptional circumstances are also required for courts' assistance under Clause 
28 of the CANE Arbitration Rules; and Article 25 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules 
1998. 
212 Or prior to transmittal of the file to it. Under the ICC Arbitration Rules, the file is 
transmitted to the tribunal as soon as it is constituted. However, the advance on 
costs requested by the Secretariat of the ICC International Court of Arbitration has 
to be paid before the transmission under Article 13 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
The advance on the costs is determined in accordance with Article 30 of the same 
Rules. 
213 Schwartz indicates that parties to an ICC arbitration are mclearly at liberty to apply 
to the courts form provisional measures at the pre-constitutional stage. Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 47. He further states that at the pre-constitutional stage, 
provisional measures "would not otherwise be available unless the parties had 
agreed to an alternative procedure [emergency measures] Id., 54-55. These 
alternative procedures may generally be called as emergency measure 
procedures. See, generally, infra Chapter 111. In this regard, see also ICC Partial 
Award 6566 of 1993, extracts published in I1 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 48 (2000); 
ICC Interim Award 6023 of 1989 (unpublished. ); and ICC Final Award 5650 of 
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appointment of arbitrators reflects the principle of subsidiarity under 
these arbitration rules. 214 
The ICC Rules contractually allocate the judicial and arbitral jurisdiction 
concerning provisional measures to the extent permitted under the 
applicable law. Thus, the arrangement is valid where exclusion or 
215 limitation to the courts' jurisdiction is allowed . The arranoement 
recognises a unique principle, which favours arbitrators over judicial 
authorities as a forum to seek provisional measures. "once the 
arbitrators have been seized of the file, applications for interim and 
conservatory measures should normally be addressed to them. , 216 
This principle may be referred to as the "principle of priority. " Under 
Article 23(2) of the ICC Arbitration Rules, court assistance is permitted 
where the circumstances are "appropriate". These Rules do not 
provide further guidance as what qualifies circumstances as 
appropriate. The views of the commentators and the ICC arbitration 
practice shed light to the uncertainty about the circumstances. 
This Part examines the principle of priority and appropriate 
circumstances. 
4.4.2.2.1 The Principle of Priority 
The ICC Arbitration Rules, since 1975, recognise arbitral tribunals' 
priority over the courts to deal with applications for provisional 
1989, extracts published in 16 YCA 85 (1991); and Arnaldez / Derains / Hascher, 
34. 
214 The ICC Arbitration Rules acknowledge this principle since 1975. It should be 
noted that the parties' right to apply to a court for provisional measures was first 
215 
recognised under the ICC Arbitration Rules 1939. See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.2.1. 
216 
See Chapter 11, infra Part 4.4.4. 
ICC Second Partial Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct 
Arb Bull 65 (2000) (citing Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 54-55). 
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measures. 217 his principle is expressed in a negative manner. The 
ICC Rules state that parties may apply to the courts for provisional 
measures where the circumstances are "exceptional" (under the 1975- 
1988 Rules) or "appropriate" (under the 1998 Rules). 218 The positive 
way of making such statement is that the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal to grant provisional measures, on one hand, is primary. 219 On 
the other hand, the jurisdiction of Judicial authorities in that respect 
remains subsidiary. In other words, unless there is a justified reason, 
e. g. an appropriate circumstance, to apply to a court, an application for 
a provisional measure should be addressed to an arbitral tribunal. 
4.4.2.2.2 Appropriate Circumstances 
Article 23(2) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1998 provides that a party is at 
liberty to apply to a judicial authority for a provisional measure in 
It appropriate circumstances. , 
220 
When the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 underwent an amendment in 
1998, the term "exceptional circumstances" replaced to "appropriate 
217 See Article 8(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988- and Article 23(2) of the ICC 
218 
Arbitration Rules 1998. On the former, see supra Ckapter 1, Part 1.2.2.3. 
This negative expression owes its existence to the negative attitude taken towards 
arbitral provisional measures since the beginning of the last century. See, 
219 
generally, supra Chapter 1. 
The principle of priority is supported by the fact that the Rules generally seem to 
regulate the jurisdiction of the tribunal prior to dealing with concurrent jurisdiction. 
See, e. g., Article 23 of the ICC Arbitration Rules; and Article 26 of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. This pattern of regulation is perhaps because of the fact that 
arbitration rules generally aim at regulating arbitral jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
drafters' primary concern is to deal with the issue of arbitral jurisdiction, rather than 
to regulate concurrent jurisdiction. An alternative interpretation of this may be that 
the rules are designed to remind the parties that their primary option for obtaining 
interim measures is their arbitral tribunal. If the tribunal is unable, for any reason, 
to assist the parties in regard of interim protection of their rights, the parties would 
have an option to refer their requests to courts. But see Article 23(l) of the 
Arbitration Rules 1992 of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Geneva (the 
"CCIG"). 
220 The ICC Arbitration Rules contain this Article without change in most part since 
1975 to create "a hierarchy in favour of applications being made to the arbitrators 
whenever possible. " As explained by Schwartz to the Working Party entrusted to 
prepare ICC Arbitration Rules 1998 (unpublished). 
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circumstances. " The latter term was particularly subject to criticism, as, 
for instance, arguably the tribunal's lack of power under the applicable 
221 law may not be construed as an exceptional circumstance . 
222 The term "appropriate circumstances" is not defined in the ICC Rules 
. 
Nor the 1988 Rules did define the term "exceptional circumstances. " 
The determination of the appropriate or exceptional circumstances, 
according to one view, is generally to be made by arbitral tribunals or 
"by the competent [local] authorities in accordance with their [own] 
law. j, 223 
Some commentators attempt to examine the meaning of the 
appropriate circumstances. Goldman states* 
[n]othing indicates, in the rules, of what may consist the 
exceptional situations to which the text refers [Article 8(5) of the 
1975 and 1988 Rules]; it will of course be for the state judge 
seized to decide this. One can, however, think that the exception 
should only be admitted in cases of extreme urgency and where 
there is manifestly a threat of imminent harm; for example, to avoid 
the rotting of perishable goods, or to ensure the conservation or 
recovery of documents or things exposed to possible destruction 
by a natural catastrophe in situations where the arbitral tribunal 
224 would not be in a position to intervene in due time . 
221 
222 
223 
224 
See, e. g., id. The LCIA Arbitration Rules still contain the use of the term 
11 exceptional circumstances. " See Article 25. Perhaps, the lack of such power may 
be construed as an exceptional so long as the term "exceptional circumstances" is 
construed broadly. 
Article 25 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules is also silent on the definition of the term 
.1 exceptional circumstances. " 
ICC Interim Award 8786 of 1996, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 81 
(2000) (citing Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,423). However, it 
should be noted that whether or not the circumstances were appropriate would be 
taken into account by an arbitral tribunal where a subsequent request for the same 
or a different measure is made to the tribunal or where the tribunal is asked to 
consider damages arising from a request to a court claimed to be made under 
inappropriate circumstances. See Chapter 11, infra Parts 4.5 and 4.4.3, 
respectively. 
Berthold Goldman, "Arbitrage Commercial International", Jurisclasseur Droit 
Intemational, Fascicule 586-5-2, No. 77 (1991) as translated by Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 55, note 35. 
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Further, Jarvin construes the term "appropriate circumstances" as 
it where the urgency of the matter so requires or where the party 
,, 225 considers this to be more effective . Calvo, within the same line, 
construes the same term as "a situation of urgency and/or the 
prevention of further damages, as well as circumstances recognized as 
,, 226 appropriate by any competent judicial authority .... Similarly, 
according to Craig / Park / Paulsson, urgent or binding and enforceable 
227 provisional measures can only be obtained from a court . Moreover, 
according to these authors, an interim measure against a third party or 
conservatory measure for the storage, preservation or sale of the 
perishable goods may also be examples to appropriate circumstances. 
The ICC practice demonstrates that a circumstance is "exceptional" or 
it appropriate" where 228 (i) there is urgency; (ii) the tribunal lacks the 
power to grant the measure requested; and (iii) the tribunal is paralysed 
or otherwise unable to act. 
4.4.2.2.2.1 Urgency 
Urgency is certainly one of the most important requirements for granting 
229 
provisional measures . 
Urgency should be considered along with the 
225 Jarvin, 43. 
226 M. A. Calvo, "The New ICC Rules of Arbitration - Substantial and Procedural 
227 
Changes", 14(4) J Int'l Arb 41,50 (1997). 
228 
Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,471. 
See, generally, Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 54-55. Moreover, there are 
various other circumstances that may not be construed as appropriate. See, e. g., 
ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 
Bull 67 (1997) (stating, inter alia, that "[ilt is in international commercial arbitration 
not all exceptional, but normal that one of the parties is, as seen from the other 
party's point of view, a "foreign" company. It is not exceptional either that the party, 
being a foreign party, does not hold any assets in the state of residence of a 
claimant party; therefore, the fact that such foreign company is liquidating its 
business in claimant's country and abandoning it, may not create an exceptional 
229 
situation. "). 
See also Clause 28 of the CANE Arbitration Rules. 
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requirement of serious or irreparable harm. 230 
may be observed in three folds. 
The degree of urgency 
First of all, the degree of urgency qualifies as extraordinary or, perhaps, 
exceptional where an instant action is required in order to avoid a 
231 
serious or irreparable harm . In such a case, it is appropriate to apply 
to a court for a provisional measure, 
Second, the degree of urgency may not always require an instant 
action. In this case, the tribunal, once constituted, may be able to avoid 
the harm by a measure, and accordingly a request to a court for that 
232 
measure is not appropriate . 
Finally there may be no urgency at all. That means no harm will, in 
principle, be done for the period up to the final award if the measure 
requested is not granted. In such cases, interim protection is not 
appropriate at all. 
230 See infra Chapter IV, Part 3.1.3. 
231 For instance, in ICC case 4156, the parties applied to a local court for an 
appointment of an expert in order to ascertain some facts regarding their dispute. 
The question before the tribunal was whether or not this application accounts to a 
waiver of the parties' right to arbitrate. The tribunal concluded that parties did not 
waive their rights in the application by holding that the parties resorted to the court 
because of the urgency of the matter in question, and that the court did not decide 
on the merits of the case. See (1984) Clunet 952. See also ICC Award 2444 of 
1976, extracts published in (1977) Clunet 932, and Sigvard Jarvin / Yves Derains, 
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (Deventer/Boston: ICC Publishing / 
Kluwer 1990), 285. Further, for instance, court assistance may be appropriate, in a 
construction contract, for determination of the contractor's performance or 
technique used prior to evidence being lost. Moreover, there is urgency in cases of 
232 
sale and disposition of perishable or seasonal goods. 
For instance, no instant action is, in principle, required for security for costs and 
provisional payment. Consequently, these measures should generally be 
requested from an arbitral tribunal. 
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4.4.2.2.2.2 Limits of the Tribunals' Power 
If a grant of a provisional measure is not within the limits of arbitrators' 
power, then the parties can apply for this measure to a CoUrt. 233 For 
instance, arbitrators do not have power against third parties to 
arbitration. Further, they cannot grant attachments or freezing orders 
that intrinsically require use of coercive powers. For instance, in ICC 
234 case 7589 , the tribunal was asked to determine whether or not the 
Respondent was entitled to damages allegedly related to an attachment 
obtained by the Claimant from a local court before the file is transmitted 
to the tribunal. The tribunal held- 
Article 8.5 of the [1988] Rules does state that in "exceptional 
circumstances", a party shall be at liberty to apply to a competent 
judicial authority for conservatory interim measures. One can 
argue that this "exceptional circumstances" limitation should not 
apply in this case, since the conservatory measure sought - an 
attachment - is one that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have the 
power to grant. (Emphasis added. ) 
In cases where the measure cannot be granted by an arbitral tribunal, 
its granting could be requested from a competent court. However, in 
those cases, prior to making such request, the applicant should 
consider whether or not (not the same one but) an effective alternative 
provisional measure may be obtained from a tribuna 1.235 
4.4.2.2.2.3 Paralysed Tribunal 
Provisional measures may be requested from a court where the tribunal 
is paralysed or otherwise unable to act because of resignation, death, 
challenge of an arbitrator(s), or any other reason. This is because the 
233 Apparently, limitations as regards jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal also fall into 
this category. On the extent of such limitation, see Chapter 11, supra notes 111- 
113. 
234 ICC Final Award 7589 of 1994, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 60 
(2000). 
235 For instance, rather than asking the tribunal to stop the withdrawal of a letter of 
credit, a party may request from its tribunal to prohibit the other party withdrawing 
such letter. 
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tribunal by being paralysed becomes unable to act upon any request for 
interim protection of rights. 
4.4.3 Damages as Compensation for Judicial Provisional 
Measures Incompatible with Arbitration Agreement or Found 
to be Unjustified 
The grant of a provisional measure brings itself with the risk of, however 
small it may be, unjustified interim decision. In such cases, damages 
suffered due to such decision, includin'g costs associated with 
proceedings regarding such measure may be recoverable. 236 Damages 
arising from arbitral provisional measures should normally be sought 
237 from an arbitral tribunal . 
Damages arising from judicial provisional 
measures, where the substance of the case is subject to arbitration, 
should too be recoverable from arbitrators and, alternatively, from 
CoUrtS. 
238 
The advantage of dealing with the issue of damages before arbitrators 
is adjudicating all remedies (be it interim or final) before one forum. 
This seems to be more in line with party autonomy and parties' desire 
to resolve their disputes before a party-determined forum. Thus, it 
enhances effectiveness of arbitration. Further, whether or not interim 
relief is justified in many occasions depends upon the decision of 
tribunal on the merits. Rather than making a fresh request to a court for 
damages, the tribunal can determine once --d for all issues relating to 
236 See, e. g., Section 6212 of the New York Civil Practice Law. 
237 See infra Chapter IV, Part 10. 
238 Only a handful of national laws seem to make reference to forum where to seek 
damages. In such countries as France and Germany, arbitrators are solely 
empowered to deal with the issue of compensation. See 136sch (ed. ), 271,298, 
respectively. In such other countries as Canada, China, Italy, and the U. S., both 
judicial authorities and arbitrators seem to be generally empowered to deal with 
that issue. Id., 152,170,383, respectively. In Norway and Scotland, parties seem 
to be able to make an agreement to refer any issue on damages to arbitrators. Id., 
515,608, respectively. See also, e. g., Warth Line, Ltd v. Merinda Marine Co., Ltd, 
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the underlying dispute including the damages regarding Judicial 
provisional measures. In sum, the tribunal Is better equipped to deal 
with such issue and it is more convenient forum than a court. 239 
A potential pitfall of seeking a claim for damages in regard of judicial 
provisional measures from arbitrators is that they may be hesitant to 
grant such cla iMS. 240 The hesitation may be based on the fact that the 
issue of damages is very closely connected to jurisdiction of courts. In 
order to minimise the denial of a claim for damages, parties are well- 
advised to include such claim in their statement of claims if a measure 
was already obtained. In any case, the parties are further advised to 
seek security for damages regardless of the issuing forum'. a court or 
an arbitrator. 
778, F. Supp. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1991) (confirming an arbitral decision on damages 
arising from foreign court proceedings. ). 
239 It seems that an arbitration clause covering all disputes connected to the underlying 
relationship is wide enough to permit any claim on damages arising from unjustified 
24 
interim remedies relating to such relationship. 
0 For instance, in ICC case 8445, the Claimant applied to a local court for an 
injunction. The local court granted the injunction; however, the appellate court 
vacated it. The Respondent made a claim for the costs of these local proceedings. 
The tribunal indicated that such proceedings were ostensibly for provisional 
measure only. It further noted that the application for such claim was specifically 
authorized under the relevant arbitration rules (Article 8(5) of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules 1988) and "cannot be considered, in and of itself, a breach" of the 
agreement to arbitrate. According to the tribunal, the appellate local court, 
1, presumably in accordance with that court's discretion and local rules of procedure, 
determined that no costs be assessed" in its vacation order. The tribunal came to 
the conclusion that "[i]t is not within the purview of this Arbitral Tribunal's authority 
to reconsider, or take other decisions with respect to, such court related costs. " 
(Emphasis added. ). ICC Final Award 8445 of 1996 (unpublished. ). On this case, 
see Yesilirmak, Interim Measures, 35-36. Similarly, in ICC case 7536, the tribunal 
was asked to decide whether or not the attachment granted by the local court has 
It raison d6tre" since evidence obtained in the hearings suggested that the invoices 
upon which the attachment based were paid. The tribunal initially found out that 
'lout of the total of these invoices, only an amount of ... was 
due by [the 
Respondent] to [the Claimant]. " The tribunal, however, held that it "has no 
jurisdiction to draw the consequences of that situation on the maintenance of the 
Attachment, a power which lies within the jurisdiction of the ... courts. 
" (Emphasis 
added. ). ICC Final Award 7536 of 1996, extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct 
Arb Bull 52 (2000). It should be noted that the applicable procedural law, in this 
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In examining recovery of damages, the difference between the 
damages relating to measures incompatible with arbitration agreement 
and the ones relating to measures compatible with arbitration 
agreement should be taken into account. 
4.4.3.1 Damages Arising From Judicial Provisional Measures 
Incompatible with Arbitration Agreement 
The damages arising from judicial provisional measures incompatible 
with arbitration agreement should be recoverable as they arise from a 
breach of such agreement. The agreement is breached where its terms 
are infringed or where an arbitral decision is not complied with. 
Where parties were validly agreed to restrict their access to a court for 
provisional measures then such restriction should be respected. For 
example, according to Article 23(2) of the ICC Arbitration Rules, an 
arbitrating party's access to a judicial authority for a provisional 
measure is restricted to "appropriate circumstances" after the 
arbitration file is transmitted to the arbitral tribunal. Article 23 would be 
breached where an application to a court is made under "inappropriate 
circumstances. , 24 1 The moving party may be ordered to compensate 
the damages arising from such application. 
For instance, in ICC case 5650, the dispute arose out of an agreement 
"to study and carry out the complete extension program for [a hotel] on 
the property set aside for this purpose and according to the program 
submitted for this project. , 242 The respondent requested an 
appointment of a referee from a local court and brought a suit in a court 
case, was the Italian law, under which arbitral tribunals are not allowed to grant 
conservatory measures. Article 818 of the Italian CCP- 
241 The meaning of the term "appropriate circumstances" is dealt with above. See 
242 
Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4.2.2.2. 
ICC Final Award 5650 of 1989, extracts published in XVI YCA 85 (1991); and 
Arnaldez / Derains / Hascher, 34. 
150 
on the merits of the case. The claimant filed a request for arbitration in 
order to cease, inter alia, the court action brought against him, and to 
recover costs of all court proceedings. The tribunal held that an 
appointment of a referee can be construed as a conservatory measure 
243 in the sense of Article 8(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 . 
The 
Tribunal also ruled that the filing of a suit was a clear violation of 
agreement to arbitrate and Article 8(5). This filing, according to the 
Tribunal, could "in no way be qualified as 'interim or conservatory 
measures'. " 244 As a result, the tribunal held that the respondent should 
bear the costs of arbitration entirely due to the above violation. 
An arbitral tribunal may order any of the parties to refrain from an act. 
Non-compliance with such order may also be held an infringement of 
arbitration agreement as by such agreement parties are considered to 
abide their tribunal's decision. Consequently, the infringing party may 
be asked to compensate damages arising from such non-compliance. 
245 For example, in ICC case 8887 , 
there was a contract providing for 
technical and engineering services in connection with liquid petro- 
chemical transhipment facility. The claimant asserted that the 
respondent breached the contract by failing to pay for the services 
rendered. In the course of arbitration, the sole arbitrator requested 
from the respondent not to take any further action in the local courts. 
243 The tribunal held that "the task of the group of experts [is] to 'provide all technical 
and other elements of fact likely to allow, should the case arise, the relevant 
jurisdiction, to determine the liabilities possibly incurred and to evaluate, if 
necessary, the sustained damages'. .. ." It also 
indicated that "new expertise 
would always have been possible in the framework of an ICC Arbitration. " 
244 The tribunal noted that "[flhis point was so self-evident that, during the oral hearing, 
the counsel of the defendant recognized that [Claimant] should not have been 
involved in the suit ... ." 
Similarly, the English Court of Appeal held that a request 
made to Italian courts for interim relief despite the parties' agreement to exclude 
court's jurisdiction for interim protection is considered a breach of such agreement. 
Such breach gave rise to damages. Mantovani v. Caparelli SpA, [1980] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 375. 
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However, the arbitrator later found out that such order was not abided 
with. Consequently, the arbitrator, upon the claimant's request, ruled 
that the respondent was in breach of Its binding agreement to arbitrate. 
According to the tribunal, due to such breach, the respondent made 
"itself liable for damages" that the claimant might suffer provided that 
,, 246 such damages were "in direct causation with the breach . 
In similar cases, an arbitral tribunal, in addition to costs of arbitration, 
may award compensation to cover damages arising from the 
infringemen t. 247 
4.4.3.2 Damages Arising From Judicial Provisional Measures 
Compatible With Arbitration Agreement 
Where a measure obtained from a court was compatible with the 
applicable rules, the damageS248 arising from such measure should still, 
in principle, be recoverable, upon a party request, provided that the 
measure is the result of abusing the right to apply to a court for interim 
protection and/or is eventually proved to be wrong . 
249 An abusive 
applicant runs the risk of paying damages. However, there needs to be 
causation between the damages and the measure, which proved to be 
wrong. 
For instance, in an AAA case, the arbitral tribunal held that the 
application to a court for a provisional measure was itself a breach of 
250 
the agreement to arbitrate and ordered the payment of expenses . 
In 
245 ICC Final Award 8887 of 1997, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 91 
246 
(2000). 
The tribunal, as a result, ordered the payment of the claimant's all estimated costs, 
which was not challenged by the respondent regarding local court proceedings. 
247 In this respect see cases cited by Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 53-54, note 29. 
248 The scope of damages should be wide and should cover costs of court 
249 
proceedings concerning the measure. 
250 
See Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 53-54. 
Award of 2000 in AAA Case No. 50 T 114 00321 99 (unpublished). See also ICC 
Final Award 7589 of 1994, extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 69 
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this case, a dispute arose concerning the termination of the 
Development Agent Agreement and, mainly, related to the payment of 
royalties. The respondent, prior to the request for arbitration, applied to 
a local court and obtained a pre-judgment attachment for guaranteeing 
the payment of his claimed salaries. The claimant sought in his request 
the payment of all costs it made in association with the pre-judgment 
attachment. The tribunal awarded the claimant's request concerning 
such costs. 
4.4.4 Exclusion Agreements 
Due to the contractual nature of arbitration, contracting parties can 
251 
exclude jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal . 
Whether or not arbitrating 
parties can agree to limit or exclude the jurisdiction of courts concerning 
interim measures is not clear-cut. Save for the ICSID Convention, 
international arbitration conventions do not deal with exclusion of 
252 national court's jurisdiction . 
The number of countries that do not 
allow parties to oust courts' jurisdiction 253 seems to be lower than those 
that do perm it254 . 
The arbitration rules rarely deal with the issue of 
(2000) (implying that had there been abuse, it could have ordered compensation 
for damages. ). 
251 See Chapter 11, supra Part 1.3. 
252 In ICSID arbitration, jurisdiction of courts is, unless otherwise agreed, excluded for 
provisional measures irrespective of whether or not an arbitral tribunal is formed. 
253 
See Chapter 11, supra Part 2. 
Brazil (136sch (ed. ), 123-124); Denmark (id., 187-188); Hong Kong (Schaefer, Part 
4.3.2.1); Italy (136sch (ed. ), 382 for arbitrato irrituale); Liechtenstein (id., 418); the 
Netherlands (id., 495-496. However, in accordance with Article 1022(2) of the AA, 
a judge may refuse to give its assistance to parties in regard of interim measure 
application. Id. ); Norway (id., 514); Philippines (id., 553-54); and South Africa (id., 
254 
643). 
Australia (Bbsch (ed. ), 38); Belgium (id., 98); Canada (id., 148-49)- England 
(Section 107 of the EAA 1996 specifies mandatory principles of thý Act and 
Section 44 on courts' jurisdiction in regard of interim relief is not contained therein. 
Consequently it seems that it is valid to exclude courts jurisdiction by an 
agreement. See also Sections 4 and 44(l) of the Act. See further Adam Johnson, 
"Interim Measures of Protection in Arbitration Proceedings" 14, Speech Given at 
the International Bar Association Conference in Barcelona on September 1999 
(unpublished. ). Johnson indicates that such exclusion agreements should be in 
express terms and a traditional Scott v. Avery clause does not prevent parties to 
request interim relief from a court. Id. ); Finland (Bbsch (ed. ), 243-44. However, 
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exclusion agreements in express terms. The rarity is related to the 
delicacy of dealing with jurisdiction of courts that is undoubtedly within 
sole discretion of legislatures. One example of the rarity is the ICC 
Arbitration Rules, which limit the courts' jurisdiction on provisional 
measures to appropriate circumstances. 255 
any exclusion agreement should be related to a specific right but not "a general 
unlimited waiver. " Id., 243); France (id., 269), Italy (id., 382 in regard of arbitrato irrituale); Korea (id., 397); Luxembourg (id., 434); Mexico (id, 448-49); Morocco 
(id., 464-65), Sweden (id., 686); Switzerland (id., 713. See also Wirth, 40-41. However, Wirth states that, in cases where arbitrating parties also exclude court 
assistance for enforcement of arbitral provisional measures, the answer would be different. This is due to the argument that such exclusion, in fact, waives the effect 
of any interim protection of rights; consequently, it may constitute an excessive 
self-restriction of a legal right. Such self-restriction may be denial of justice and 
may be prohibited under Swiss law. Id., 41); and the U. S. (see id., 754. See also 
William P. Mills, III, "State International Arbitration Statutes and the U. S. Arbitration 
Act: Unifying the Availability of Interim Relief", 13 Fordham Int'l LJ 604-648 (1989- 
1990). But see Anaconda v. American Sugar Refining Co., 322 U. S. 42 (1944) 
(holding that jurisdiction of courts could not be excluded as regards seizure of a 
vesoel. )). The German law is also suggested to allow restrictions on courts' 
jurisdiction. Schaefer, Part 4.2.3. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Model 
Law itself does not contain any provision on the issue of exclusion agreements. 
Indeed, the issue is left open in the Model Law. See, e. g., UN Doc 
A/CN. 9/SR. 312, paras. 43 and 46, reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 344-45. The 
French delegate indicated that "[s]uch a course was also in the interests of the 
parties themselves who could not foresee every eventuality in advance. " Id., para. 
46. But see the view of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators' observer (indicating 
that an exclusion agreement contained in the LCIA Arbitration Rules "had been 
found valuable and acceptable. "). Id., para. 42. It should be noted that none of the 
Model Law jurisdictions does expressly deal with the issue of exclusion 
agreements. See Binder, 69. It is, however, interesting to observe that in two 
Model Law jurisdictions, Canada, and Mexico those agreements are held valid. It 
was indicated that Article 9 of the Model Law should neither "preclude" nor 
"positively give effect to "exclusion agreements. See, e. g., UN Doc A/40/17, para. 
97, reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 345-46. It should be further noted that a 
general exclusion of courts jurisdiction in favour of arbitration is not "sufficient to 
exclude courts jurisdictions to grant provisional measures. " Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, 
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para. 23-117. See also In Re Q's Estate, [199911 Lloyd's Rep 931,935.1 
Article 26 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. Two cases, inter alia, deal wth such 
limitation. In ICC case 7895, the tribunal held that the "parties may, subject to 
requirements of ordre public, by contract agree not to present requests for 
provisional measures to court of competent jurisdiction .. - ." ICC Final 
Award 
7895 of 1994, extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 81 (2000). 
Moreover, in ICC case 7915, the tribunal upheld the parties' agreement not to seek 
any remedy, including provisional measures, from a municipal court for a period of 
30 days commencing from the termination of the agreement. ICC Final Award 
7915 of 1994, extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 64 (2000). The 
place of arbitration, in this case, was Florida, the U. S. The other examples for 
arbitration rules that contain rules for exclusion agreements are Clause 27 & 28 of 
the CANE Arbitration Rules; Article 25(3) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules; and Article 
39(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
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There are arguments both against and for exclusion agreements. 
Against the validity of exclusion agreements, it is argued that such 
agreements should not be held valid due to the fact "that the provisional 
remedies may be necessary to secure a party's legal position and that 
they are applied in situations the importance of which cannot be 
assessed in advance. , 256 
It was further argued that "effective and quick interim relief' as provided 
for by a court could not be derogated. 257 This is because the 
derogation may result in a circumstance where "effective interim relief is 
eliminated completely because interim proceedings before an arbitrator 
will not be as time efficient or as enforceable as proceedings in the 
state court. , 258 Accordingly, the derogation may cause denial of justice 
for a party. To this end, for instance, in France, a court's jurisdiction 
could not be completely excluded in regard of interim protection of 
rights as the complete exclusion disregards "conflictual situation that 
has been irremediably jeopardised culminating in a genuine 'denial of 
justice', provided there is a sufficient link giving it [a French court] 
jurisdiction to take measures justified by urgency or risk. , 259 
Arguments in favour of upholding exclusion agreements are mainly 
based on the principle of party autonomy, in other words upholding 
party agreement. Indeed, contracting parties should, in this author's 
view, be able to freely "take the risk" of empowering their arbitral 
2,56 E. g., 136sch (ed. ), 187-188. 257 E. g, id., 295. See also Berger, International, 351. 258 136sch (ed. ), 295. 
259 Pluyette, 75. See also Jean-Pierre Ancel, Comments in: ICC (ed. ) Conservatory 
Measures, 110,113; and Gaillard / Savage (eds. ), para. 1322 (arguing that 
measures for facilitating the enforcement of final award fall within the exclusive 
domain of courts). 
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tribunal to solely deal with interim relief. 260 The parties, in international 
commerce, are in a position to weigh the risks they are taking and are 
able to take counter measures, e, g. expedited arbitration procedures for 
minimizing the risk of unavailability of interim protection. In addition, 
like agreements excluding appeals (setting aside) from awards are 
valid, exclusion agreements concerning interim protection of rights 
should, by analogy, be held valid. 261 
The arbitration rules, such as the ICC Arbitration Rules, and the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules do not rightly envisage total exclusion. They merely 
accept the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity. 
Consequently, court assistance is permitted in "appropriate 
circumstances. j262 For this reason, such restrictions should, in this 
author's view, not be barred but complied with for partial exclusion 
should not be considered as denial of justice. That is due to the fact 
that effective protection of parties' rights would always be available 
even if a court's jurisdiction is restricted where the principles of 
complementarity and subsidiarity are adopted. As to total exclusion, it 
should be kept in mind that, in some legal systems, such exclusion may 
be considered a breach of the principle of due process (denial of 
justice) and thus is held invalid. 
Where contracting parties agree for complementary mechanisms, they 
waive their rights to request from a court m, "! ýasure that falls w&, in the 
260 B6sch (ed. ), 294. See also Wirth, 41 (indicating that international merchants are 
"sophisticated enough to comprehend" the legal consequences of an exclusion 
agreement; therefore, there is no need to extend, whatever the basis might be, a 
special protection to them. ) also Guinea and Soguipiýche v. Atlantic Triton, 26 ILM 
373-376 (1987) (Cour de Cassation, 18 November 1986) (the court hold that "the 
power of a State court to order conservatory measures, which power is not 
expressly excluded by the Washington [ICSID] Convention, can be excluded only 
by means of an express agreement of the parties or by an implicit agreement 
261 
resulting from the adoption of arbitration rules which contain such renunciation. "). 
See, e. g., Bbsch (ed. ), 324, and 397. 
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domain of an emergency arbitrator. 263 Still, no total exclusion is 
provided for under such mechanisms. Opting for expedited arbitration 
rules should not itself be considered an exclusion agreement as no 
264 such intention is contained in mere reference to these rules . However, the fact that arbitration takes place under the expedited 
arbitration rules should be taken into account in deciding whether there 
is urgency or not for the grant of provisional measures. 
An exclusion agreement is better to be made in writing with very clear 
terms indicating express exclusion of courts' jurisdiction in regard of 
265 
provisional remedies . 
4.5 Conflict of Jurisdictions 
In cases where concurrent jurisdiction is adopted, the possibility of 
positive and negative conflicts between jurisdiction of arbitrators and of 
266 
courts cannot be avoided .A negative conflict of jurisdiction occurs 
where both arbitrators and courts deny jurisdiction by asserting that the 
267 jurisdiction belongs to the other one . 
There is a positive conflict of 
jurisdiction where both arbitrators and courts assert jurisdiction in 
regard of provisional measures. In such a case, arbitrators and courts 
268 
may issue different and occasionally conflicting decisions . 
262 On what constitute appropriate circumstances, see Chapter 11, supra Part 
4.4.2.2.2. 
263 Gaillard / Savage (eds. ), para. 1321 (indicating that such agreement is "perfectly 
valid and can be inferred from parties intention to resort to" an emergency 
arbitrator for provisional measures. ). 264 See id., para. 1321. 265 See, e. g., id. 1319. 266 Rubino-Sammartano, 651. 
267 In fact, in cases where arbitrators have no jurisdiction to grant an interim measure, 
such negative conflict of jurisdiction could potentially occur in the U. S. where some 
courts refuse to grant provisional measures where a case falls under the New York 
Convention. See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.2. 
268 Rubino-Sammartano, 651. 
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international arbitration conventions do not regulate the issue of conflict 
of jurisdictions. Nor do most national laws. 269 
Some national IaWS270 provide for and commentatorS271 argue that, 
perhaps as a matter of convenience and speed, the forum first seized 
of has in principle priority to decide a provisional measure request. 
However, if party autonomy is extensively upheld, a court should refrain 
from interfering with arbitration unless the intervention is necessary for 
support. The court should play its complementary and subsidiary role 
and; consequently, it should give priority to arbitration, agreed method 
of settlement, and the arbitral tribunal is the natural adjudicator of the 
dispute in question. Thus any potential conflict should in principle be 
resolved in favour of arbitrators, and arbitration. 272 The exception to 
this principle is circumstances where the tribunal is incompetent to act 
or unable to act effectively. 273 
There could be some variations of potential or actual conflicts between 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal and of a court. If the tribunal issues a 
measure, the court should not intervene to modify or revoke it so long 
as the tribunal is able to act effectively. Where the court plays its 
complementary or subsidiary role no or little conflict would arise. In this 
regard, the court, where necessary, should give preclusive effect to the 
tribunal's findings of fa cts . 
274 
269 For instance, although the drafters of the Model Law accepted the possibility of a 
conflict of jurisdictions, they, nonetheless, refrained from dealing with this issue. 
See UN Doc, A/CN/. 9/264, para. 5, reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 343-44; and 
270 
UN Doc, A/CN. 9/SR. 312, paras. 49-50, reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 344-45. 
See, e. g., Art. 1041(2) of the German CCP (providing that a court should refuse to 
enforce an arbitral provisional measure if an application for the measure has 
271 
already been made to a court. ). 
See, e. g., Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 98 (arguing that "the forum first 
272 
called upon has [generally] prima facie jurisdiction. "). 
Rubino-Sammartano, 651. 
273 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.5. 
274 See, e. g., Section 1297.94 of the California CCP; Section 1-567-39 (d) and (e) of 
the North Carolina International Commercial AA; Section 2712.16 of the Ohio 
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In cases where a court orders an interim measure, a tribunal could be 
faced with a request to modify or terminate (asking a party to withdraw) 
275 it. The tribunal should, in principle , be able to issue, as the case may 
be, an independent and conflicting decision with the court order either 
directly, where permitted, or effectively amending or terminating i t. 276 
Revised Code Annotated; Section 36-470(4) and (5) of the Oregon International Commercial and Conciliation Act; Article 249.9, Section 4 of the Texas Act Relating 
to Arbitration or Conciliation of International Commercial Disputes; and Section 9(l) of the First Schedule to the New Zealand AA. Under these provisions, the 
preclusive effect is generally given where the arbitral decision on the facts is not 
contrary to public policy and the tribunal has jurisdiction. It should be noted, in this 
regard, that the Model Law left the determination of the issue of conflict of arbitral 
jurisdiction with competence of courts to national laws. UN Doc A/40/17, para. 169, extracts published in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 547. 
Subject, apparently, to the applicable laws. 
See, e. g., Section 44(6) of the EAA 1996: 
If the court so orders, an order made by it under this section shall cease to have 
effect in whole or in part on the order of the tribunal or of any such arbitral or 
other institution or person having power to act in relation to the subject-matter of 
the order. 
This "novel provision" is, in fact, in line with the underlying principle in regard of 
court assistance in England. arbitrators should, in principle, exercise jurisdiction 
over issues regarding interim measures of protection. The DAC Report 1996, para. 
216. See also Mustill / Boyd, 324. Accordingly, whilst a court makes an order in 
regard of a request for an interim relief, it can hand over to an arbitral tribunal "the 
task of deciding whether or not that order should cease to have effect. " Id. See 
also Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 910 F 2d 1049 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (arguing that arbitral tribunal may order the relevant party to refrain from 
enforcing the court order it obtained rather than directly vacating such order). The 
Amco tribunal, in this regard, indicated that 
an international Tribunal is not bound to follow the result of a national court. 
One of the reasons for instituting an international arbitration procedure is 
precisely that parties - rightly or wrongly - feel often more confident with a legal 
institution which is not entirely related to one of the parties. If a national 
judgment was binding on an international Tribunal such a procedure could be 
rendered meaningless. 
Accordingly, no matter how the legal position of a party is described in a national 
judgement, an International Arbitral Tribunal enjoys the right to evaluate and 
examine this position without accepting any res judicata effect of a national 
Court. In its evaluation, therefore, the judgements of a national court can be 
accepted as one of the many factors which have to be considered by the arbitral 
tribunal. 
Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award of 20 
November 1984,1 ICSID Rep 413 (1993). See also Bucher / Tschanz, para. 178, 
91 (arguing that a tribunal could vary or terminate, under the SPIL, a previous court 
order); Rubino-Sammartano, 651; Gaillard / John Savage (eds. ), para. 1330', and 
Lew / Mistelis / Kr611, para. 23-130. But see Berger, International, 347 (arguing that 
such review goes "beyond the authority of the tribunal and constitute an 
27E 
27E 
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That is because the court order is temporary in nature and does not 
deprive the tribunal of its jurisdiction to render a further interim or, 
277 indeed, a final remedy . It is also because the tribunal could apply its 
own requirements and could take into account the facts and 
circumstances of the case in question. A change in circumstances also 
justifies the review. The principle of comity should not be a bar to the 
278 tribunal's review . 
That is due to the principle of party autonomy. 
Giving priority to the arbitral decision is upholding the agreed means of 
settlement. 
In cases where the request to a court is denied, the tribunal should still, 
in principle, grant a similar or an identical measure . 
279 The reasons 
explained in the preceding paragraph, including the change in 
circumstances justify that. The obstructionist requests for aiming to 
delay arbitration proceedings, however, should not be allowed. 
In this context, it should be noted that tribunals may be hesitant "to take 
action contrary to, or inconsistent with, provisional measures already 
impermissible interference in the competence of the municipal courts. "); and ICC 
277 
Case No. 4998 of 1985, extracts published in (1986) Clunet 1139. 
See Emmanuel Gaillard, "Arbitrage Commercial International-Intervention du Juge 
Etatique", Jurisclasseur Droit International, Fascicule 586-8-2, No. 142 (1991), 
Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 54 (arguing that a tribunal may "direct the parties 
to take certain actions in respect of such [judicial] measures or require that they be 
replaced with others under the control of the ICC arbitral tribunal. "); and Gaillard / 
Savage (eds. ), para. 1330 (indicating that a tribunal's order should prevail over a 
court order due to the fact that "the only justification for applying to the courts lies in 
the presumption that they are equipped to take the protective measures required in 
278 
the circumstances more rapidly. "). 
However, it does not mean that the tribunal should make direct orders to courts. 
The tribunal has jurisdiction only over the parties to arbitration. See also Chapter 
27 
11, supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
9 But see ICC Award 4126 of 1984, extracts published in (1984) Clunet 934 (denying 
a request to a tribunal for an interim measure identical to the one previously 
submitted to a court and finding that although the principle of ne bis in idem is not 
applicable, for the sake of good procedural order, such re-submission would be 
prevented unless new circumstances arise. ). 
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ordered by a court. , 
280 The hesitance couid be associated with the 
arbitrators' reluctance of interfering with court's jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
281 Arbitration is the natural forum for interim measures of protection . 
The jurisdiction of a tribunal to grant provisional measures almost 
always derives from arbitration agreement, e. g. arbitration rules. 282 
National laws may also provide for default powers for the grant of 
arbitral provisional measures. In rare circumstances, where none of the 
above does deal with such measures, the power to grant them may 
arise from the tribunal's inherent, or implicit power or its power to 
conduct arbitration proceedings. 
However, the exercise of arbitral jurisdiction for provisional measures is, 
in some cases, impossible or ineffective, which is related to nature and 
283 
operation of arbitration . 
This is because arbitral jurisdiction has three 
salient problems and certain other shortcomings in regard of interim 
284 
protection of rights . 
For this reason, the concurrent jurisdiction 
approach is generally accepted. 
A logical conclusion of the concurrent jurisdiction approach is that a 
request for a provisional measure either before the formation of an 
280 Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 57. See, e. g., ICC Award 4998 of 1985, extracts 
published in (1986) Clunet 1139 (finding very serious to modify a judicial measure 
where it found itself out of jurisdiction under Article 26 of the Concordat to grant an 
interim measure. ). But see ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts 
published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 67 (1997) (holding that the waiver of 
attachments (for security) may be directed to a party provided that a replacement 
28 
security is submitted by the other party. ). 
For reasons supporting this view, see Chapter 11, supra Part 1.1. 
282 On the sources of a tribunal's jurisdiction, see, generally, Chapter 11, supra Part 
1.2. 
283 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4. 
284 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.1. 
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arbitral tribunal or during arbitration proceedings is compatible with 
285 
agreement to arbitrate. The principle of compatibility has two facets. 
0 The request is not a waiver of the right to arbitrate. 
Further, the existence of the arbitration agreement does not 
prevent a court to issue an interim measure. 
The convenience and efficiency require, although it is not yet fully 
accepted by all national laws, the grant of provisional measures in aid 
286 
of foreign arbitration . 
Since the seat of an arbitration is often 
determined as a geographically convenient and neutral place, a judicial 
provisional measure available from the courts at the seat would in most 
cases be meaningless. That is because the parties, their assets and, 
most importantly, the subject matter of arbitration would be foreign to 
such seat. Thus, the measure obtained at the seat would be 
ineffective. In granting a measure, the court of a foreign country should 
examine whether it is the most appropriate / convenient forum even if it 
has jurisdiction. Having established that it is, it then, in principle, 
applies the standards available under its own national law to grant the 
measure. 
In establishing the degree of judicial involvement into arbitral process, 
party autonomy should be taken into account and given utmost 
287 
significance . 
However, the party autonomy should not extend to total 
autonomy due to the above salient problems and shortcomings of 
arbitration. This is for ensuring that arbitration is effective. That is also 
for effectiveness and good administration of justice, which reconciles 
the tension between court involvement into arbitration and parties' will 
to keep courts out of arbitration process. That reconciliation satisfies 
the needs of international commerce. balancing security with flexibility 
285 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.2. 
286 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.3. 
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in arbitration by avoiding any abuse of court involvement. The 
reconciliation requires and results in collaboration or cooperation of 
arbitrators and of courts. The concept of cooperation necessitates, in 
regard of interim protection of rights, court assistance to arbitration, 
which is accepted by many national laws and arbitration rules. Such 
cooperation needs to be co-ordinated. On the method of coordination 
most national laws and arbitration rules are silent. The examination of 
the remaining (a small number of)i laws demonstrate that there are two 
methods of co-ordination. freedom of choice approach and restricted- 
access approach. The latter approach should, in this author's view, be 
adopted. 
Under the freedom of choice approach, the choice to make application 
to any forum is completely open regardless of the stage of 
288 
arbitration However, such freedom is an invitation for abuse of court 
289 involvement. Indeed, that freedom is, in some cases, abused . 
Courts should be aware of the possibility of abuse and deny a request 
made for tactical purposes. The full freedom also intervenes with the 
principle of party autonomy. Where arbitration is chosen for resolution 
of disputes, such choice should normally be respected. In case of 
abuse, the moving party may be held responsible for damages. Thus, 
for not being held liable, the moving party is advised to follow the 
common sense in choosing the forum to make an application. 
Under the restricted-access approach, the principles of 
complementarity and subsidiarity are accepted by taking into account 
two different stages of arbitration . 
290 At the stage prior to formation of 
an arbitral tribunal, the role of court is complementary to arbitral 
287 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4. 
2138 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4.1. 
289 See Chapter 11, supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
290 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4.2. 
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jurisdiction in regard of interim protection of rights. After that stage, the 
role of the court Is subsidiary. The court should only act where the 
tribunal or another party-determined authority is unable to act or its act 
would be ineffective. In order to avoid abuses, an access to a court 
should be subject to the tribunal's permission. 
The principles of complementarity and subsidiarity are reflected in a 
small number of arbitration rules . 
291 The ICC Arbitration Rules are the 
prominent example to those rules. Under the ICC Arbitration Rules, 
court assistance is permitted at the pre-formation stage. Following the 
formation of the tribunal, the Rules indicate that arbitrators should have 
priority in regard of interim protection of rights and that a court should 
assist where the circumstances are appropriate. In light of the ICC 
practice and scholarly opinions, which this author concurs with, the 
circumstances are appropriate where, again, the tribunal is unable to 
act or, for the time being, its act is ineffective; namely, 
where there is urgency for interim protection of rights, 
where the tribunal's power is limited, e. g. for attachments or 
measures against third parties to arbitration, or 
where the tribunal is paralysed or otherwise unable to act. 
The restriction or exclusion of a court's jurisdiction under arbitration 
rules is subject to applicable laws. In this regard, it should be noted 
that, by adoption of the principles of comple-mentarity and sub--idiarity 
(and by accepting court assistance under appropriate circumstances 
within the concept of subsidiarity), parties only restrict court assistance 
to arbitration but not fully exclude it. 
292 Such restriction should, in this 
author's view, be upheld due to the fact that partial exclusion should not 
be considered as denial of justice since, under the restrictive approach, 
291 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4.2.2. 
292 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4.4. 
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effective protection for interim protection of rights would always be 
available. Even total exclusion of court assistance, though it may not, 
under some laws, be permitted, should be upheld due to the principle of 
party autonomy. 
In all cases, deciding whether or not to assist arbitration, a judge should 
exercise utmost caution. He should only act where the circumstances 
of the case plainly favour assistance. '9' 
Where a request for a judicial measure is incompatible with the 
agreement to arbitrate or such measure proves to be wrong or abusive, 
damages arising from it should be recoverable from an arbitral tribunal 
as this choice of forum (arbitral tribunal) mainly enhances effectiveness 
294 of arbitration and is more in line with the principle of party autonomy . 
For effectiveness of arbitration and good distribution of justice, unless 
there is a reason for court assistance in accordance with the principles 
of complementarity and subsidiarity, an arbitral tribunal should be 
preferred over a court in case of conflict between these two fora. 295 To 
this end, where the arbitral tribunal issues a provisional measure, no 
court should, in principle, intervene to modify or revoke such measure. 
Further, where the court orders a provisional measure, the tribunal 
should, in principle, be able to issue conflicting decision, in effect, 
amending or terminating (asking a party not to comply with it) such 
measure. This is mainly because judicial measure is temporary in 
nature and does not deprive the tribunal of its jurisdiction to render an 
interim relief. 
293 See Chapter 11, supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
294 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.4.3. 
295 See Chapter 11, supra Part 4.5. 
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CHAPTER III 
EMERGENCY ARBITRAL PROVISIONAL MEASURES: 
COMPLEMENTARY MECHANISMS 
Arbitration is the natural forum to seek provisional measures. ' 
However, there are three salient problems and certain shortcomings 
concerning the tribunal's jurisdiction to grant provisional measure s-2 
One of those problems is that, at the pre-formation stage, prior to the 
appointment of a tribunal, provisional measures are not available from 
the tribunal as, at this stage, no tribunal is in existence. There exists a 
lacunae. The unavailability of arbitral provisional measures at the pre- 
formation stage, is detrimental. Unfortunately, it takes certain period of 
time to appoint an arbitral tribunal. This is related to the fact that due to 
the globalisation, complexity, bureaucratisation or institutionalisation of 
arbitration over the last 85 years, "[i]nstitutional arbitration can now be 
painfully slow in forming the arbitration tribunal In all but 'fast-track' 
A 
arbitrations The period between the appearance of a dispute and 
the formation of an arbitral tribunal "is now often measured in weeks or 
even months. A If a party awaits for constitution of the tribunal for 
interim protection of rights, in some cases, "the dispute would surely be 
academic (ie the damage done) ,, 
5 That period constitutes a very 
See supra Chapter 11, Part. 1.1. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.1. 
Johnny Veeder, "The View From London: The New 1996 Act and the New LCIA 
Rules", ("The View") in: Wymbo P. Heere (ed. ), Contemporary International Law 
Issues. - New Forms, New Applications, Proceedings of the ASIUNVIR Fourth 
Hague Joint Conference, (The Hague: TMC Asser Instituut 1998), 206,207. 
Id. See also supra Chapter 11, Part 4.1. 
Jan Paulsson, A Better Mousetrap, 215. In addition, for instance, 
the respondent's money needed to pay an award may flee, so that a claimant 
who is eventually awarded damages finds that there is no gold at the end of 
rainbow. Or evidence needed to prove a party's case may have been 
destroyed; or bananas in dispute may have rotted on a tropical wharf so that 
there is no possibility of knowing whether they had met the quality specifications 
when they first delivered. Or the respondent may engage in acts that are 
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important phase of arbitration: "[w]hat happens in that relatively short 
period in the early days of a case may have a crucial effect on the 
entire arbitration. ,6 Indeed, a survey conducted in the U. S. 
demonstrates that a majority of disputes settle prior to a trial .7 
It is this 
author's experience that, in majority of cases, a party either uses or 
considers using a request for provisional measure as a tool for 
settlemen t. 8 Where the party request is successful, then such party will 
generally be in a commending position to force the respondent party to 
a settlement under terms favourable to It. 9 
Where no arbitral provisional measures are available, a court is the only 
forum to seek provisional measures. However, channelling a party to a 
court is, inter alia, against the party's original intention of referring their 
disputes to arbitration; namely, resolution of the disputes by a neutral / 
party-determined authority. 10 In other words, a provisional measure 
from a court infringes the parties' initial will of neutrality. " To refer 
destroying the claimant's business so that an eventually favourable award in the 
arbitration would be, at best, a Pyrrhic victory. 
See Howard Holtzmann, "Remarks" in- Heere (ed. ), 202 ("Remarks"). 
6 Holtzmann, Remarks, 202. 
7 Over 60 percent in the U. S. See Herbert M. Kritzer, "Adjudication to Settlement- 
Shading in the Gray", 70(3) Judicature 161,163 (1986). Before the U. S. District 
Courts, more than 75 percent of the cases are settled prior to trial during the 
twelve-month period ended 30 September 1997. Heather Russell Koenig, "The 
Eastern District of Virginia. - A Working Solution For Civil Justice Reform", 32 U 
Rich LR 799,829 (1998). See also Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84,96. 
Further, many international disputes settle right after exchanges of statement of 
8 
claim and defence. See, in this respect, Schwartz Provisional Measures, 45,55. 
On the issue of abuse, see supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 
9 Id. It should, however, be noted that not all provisional measures could be subject 
to abuse. For instance, measures aimed at preserving evidence may hardly be a 
subject for abuse. 
10 Indeed, the reasons for preference of such mechanisms over litigation are 
generally similar to the reasons in support of arbitral jurisdiction to grant provisional 
measures. See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. Apparently, regardless of those 
reasons, parties may choose to refer their requests for provisional measures to a 
judicial authority. There is nothing wrong with such choice. In fact, in such cases 
as freezing of assets or provisional measures against third parties to arbitration, a 
request to a court may be the only effective means to pursue. These cases 
constitute justification for concurrent jurisdiction approach. See generally supra 
Chapter 11, Part 4.1. 
11 Paulsson, 215. 
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parties to a court for an interim measure means asking them to go back 
to the forum they just opted out. Experience demonstrates that thi's 
forum, if available, may perhaps be the home court of the requesting 
party or any other fora but the home court of the respondent. 
Regardless of the place of the forum, a party to an arbitration 
agreement expressed its will to resolve its dispute in a neutral party- 
determined forum. In addition, a request for a provisional measure 
from a court is an open invitation for abuse. 12 Also, such request may 
also infringe possibly intended confidential nature of arbitration 
proceedings. 13 Further, the request may be, though less frequently, 
considered as a waiver of the right to arbitrate. 14 This is "a relic of the 
outdated view that ordinary litigation is to be preferred over 
arbitration. 05 Moreover, assistance of judicial authorities 'in respect of 
provisional measures, in some cases, may not be effectively available, 
or not available at all. 16 To this end, it is submitted that it may take up 
to twelve months in some countries to obtain a provisional measure. 17 
The unavailability of a measure from a court may be due to the fact that 
some courts consider the existence of arbitration agreement as a bar to 
their jurisdiction. Certain U. S. courts interpret, as explained above, that 
agreement to arbitrate a dispute precludes their intervention even for 
providing assistance to international commercial arbitration. 18 
In order to overcome the above problems and after having considered 
the importance of the problem, the drafters of a small number of 
institutional arbitration rules offered complementary mechanisms to 
12 See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.1. 
13 Benjamin Davis, "The ICC Pre-arbitral Referee Procedure in Context with 
Technical Expertise, Conciliation and Arbitration", 9(2) ICLR 218,230 (1992). 
14 See, e. g., Hans Smit, "Provisional Relief in International Arbitration: The ICC and 
15 
Other Proposed Rules", 1(3) Am Rev Int'l Arb 388,389-390 (1990). 
Id., 390. 
16 For circumstances where judicial assistance to arbitration may not be available, 
see supra Chapter 11, Part 4.2. 17 Gurry, 2. 
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arbitration for making available interim protection of rights from a party- 
determined authority at the pre-formation stage. In addition to their 
importance, the availability of complementary mechanisms is also 
supported by the principle of party autonomy. Further, the availability of 
such mechanisms may, at least in some cases, deter any unnecessary 
(unreasonable) request for a provisional measure. 19 In other words, 
such availability may avoid the use of provisional measures as a tactical 
tool. To this end, these mechanisms assist greatly to the effectiveness 
of arbitration. 
The need 20 for a neutral but party determined authority, other than an 
arbitrator himself, offering interim protection of rights in an urgent 
manner is not novel. In fact, as early as 1915, the necessity was 
recognised and a neutral (party-determined) arbitral mechanism for 
granting provisional measures was proposed .21 
The mechanism 
created was taken as guidance by several arbitration institutions, most 
notably by the ICC. Interim measures were available from the president 
of the Court of Arbitration under the 1931 and 1939 editions of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules but the power of the president was abandoned in the 
1955 edition of the Rules. 22 
Today, in order to meet the need for a party-appointed neutral authority 
to grant provisional measures, parties who choose arbitration as their 
,8 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.2. 
,9 Humphrey Lloyd, "What is Pre-Arbitral Expertise and How Does it Differ from the 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure? ", Institute of Business Law and Practice, 
Conference on Arbitration and Expertise (Paris, 12 April 1991), 18-19 
2 
(unpublished); and Davis, 229. 
0 The need is expressed as "to more fully implement the parties' intent to arbitrate 
any future disputes". The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules Revision Committee, 
21 
ADR Currents, 6 (December 1998). 
22 
See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.1. 
See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.1.3. 
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dispute resolution mechanism have two options. . 23 They can expressly 
provide for a mechanism in their arbitration agreement to obtain an 
emergency provisional measure. Alternatively, the parties may agree to 
use the complementary mechanisms available from a few arbitration 
institutions. 
The parties are free to contractually create their own emergency arbitral 
provisional measure rules. " In practice, parties appoint one or three- 
member standing panel for duration of a contract to grant provisional 
measures if necessary . 
25 This can be done in theory at any time - prior 
to or after -a dispute has arisen. The practical experience 
demonstrates that it is highly unlikely to have such agreement where a 
26 dispute has already arisen . 
The major difficulty with the standing 
panel approach is the expense to retain the members of the panel. 27 In 
order to overcome this difficulty, parties may themselves create a 
mechanism under which an emergency arbitrator may be appointed by 
an appointing authority when a dispute emerges. Alternatively, the 
23 It should be noted that there are other mechanisms under which a certain type of 
provisional measures may be obtained. The best example to this is perhaps 
preservation of evidence by a pre-arbitral technical expert. This Chapter does not, 
however, deal with those mechanisms since the main objective of technical 
expertise is not of interim protection of rights. On the pre-arbitral technical expert, 
see, e. g., Yves Derains, "Technical Expertise and Refere Arbitral" in- Pieter 
Sanders (ed. ), New Trends in the Development of International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Role of Arbitral and Other Institutions, ICCA Congress Series 
No. 1 (Kluwer: Hamburg 1982), 183-184 ("New Trends"); and Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 64. On the expertise procedure see, e. g., the ICC Rules of 
Expertise. For the text, see ICC Publication No. 520. For more information on the 
ICC Rules for Expertise, see Herv6 Charrin, "The ICC International Centre for 
Expertise-Realities and Prospects", 6(2) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 33-46 (1995); Lloyd, 
1; Michael BOhler, "Technical Expertise", 6(1) J Int'l Arb 135 (1989); and Derains, 
Refere Arbitral, 183. 
24 In fact, they can adopt the emergency arbitral relief procedures offered by certain 
arbitration institutions to their specific needs. For these procedures, see Chapter 
I 11, supra Part 2. 
25 Derains, Refere Arbitral, 190. 
26 Lloyd, 14- and Smit, 391. At this stage, generally, one of the parties has certain 
incentiveý to delay or obstruct final or temporary resolution of any of the disputes. 
To this end, one should keep in mind that the general tendency in litigation or, 
perhaps less, in arbitration proceedings is that parties hardly ever agree on 
anything once a dispute is taken before a judicial or arbitral authority. 
170 
parties may adopt a complementary mechanism procedure available 
from some arbitration institutions. 
The complementary mechanisms mainly take two forms. Some 
28 arbitration institutions, following the [CC example , empower the 
president, the head or an organ of the relevant arbitration association or 
institution to grant provisional measures. This power generally ceases 
to have an effect as soon as an arbitral tribunal is formed. 
Some other institutions have created special rules that can be called as 
emergency provisional relief procedures. These procedures envisage 
for a mechanism under which a neutral person is empowered to grant 
certain provisional measures. This person is called a pre-arbitral 
referee, emergency arbitrator, or simply arbitrator, who is appointed 
either by parties or the relevant institution. The concept of providing 
emergency arbitral provisional relief procedure was resurrected and 
developed by the ICC. After 10 years of study, the ICC introduced the 
Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure in 1990.29 These innovative 
Rules are inspired from ref&6 procedure of French law. 30 
The ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, in turn, inspired certain other 
arbitration institutions. In 1997, the European Court of Arbitration (the 
"ECK) included the Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules in its Arbitration Rules 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Smith, 391. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1.3. 
For the text of the Rules, see ICC Publication No. 482, reprinted in 1 ICC Ct Arb 
Bull 18-23 (1990). For more information on the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure, see, e. g., Davis, 218; Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 82; Smit, 
388; Christine L6cuyer-Thieffry, "Examination of ICC's Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure- An Innovation in Dispute Resolution", 1 WAMR 13 (1991); and 
Paulsson, 214. 
On the ref6r6 procedure, see, e. g., Wallace R. Baker / Patrick de Fontbressin, 
"The French R&&6 Procedure -A Legal Miracle? ", 11 U Miami YB Int'l L1 (11992- 
1993); Jean de Hauteclocque, "French Judicial Expertise Procedure and 
International Arbitration", 4(2) J Int'I Arb 77-101 (1987); and Gaillard / Savage (ed. ), 
728-734. 
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as an optional mechanism .31 The Summary Arbitral Proceedings of the 
NAI Arbitration Rules in 1998, the Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection of the AAA in 199932 and the Draft Emergency 
Relief Rules of the W, p033 followed the ICC's initiative . 
34 The last 
Rules were never adopted. The Rules will, nevertheless, be examined 
in this Chapter as they constitute a complete and well-thought set of 
rules. 
The need for use of those mechanisms "may arise in any type of 
,, 35 dispute 
. 
Certain disputes, e. g. the disputes concerning trade secrets 
or intellectual property generally demand, however, speedier and more 
confidential resolution than other types of disputes. 36 
31 For the text of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, see 10 WTAM 237-243 (1998). 32 Although these Rules were designed for the AAA Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Procedures 2003, parties can opt to use them where arbitration is taken place 
under the International Arbitration Rules. It is interesting to note that one of the 
reasons for implementing these Rules was to remedy the deficiency that exists in 
the U. S. as regards interim protection of rights where parties agree to arbitrate. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.2. Indeed, the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules 
Revision Committee indicated that "[t]hese optional rules ... respond to the 
preference of courts to limit their involvement in matters where the parties have 
expressed an intention to arbitrate. " See The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules 
33 
Revision Committee, 6. See also supra Chapter 11, Part 4.2. 
For more information on these Rules, see V. '; PO Documents ARB/AC/11/95/3, 
WIPO/ARB/DR/5; and ARB/AC/111/96/3. See also Gurry, 1, and Richard A. 
Horning, "Interim Measures of Protection; Security for Claims and Costs; and 
Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (In Toto)" in: WIPO Arbitration 
Rules - Commentary and Analysis (New York: Juris Publishing 2000), 155,170- 
175, reprinted in 9 Am Rev Int'l Arb 155 (1998). 
34 It should be noted that the LCIA failed to adopt emergency relief procedure in 
1997. For the developments at the LCIA and the text of the Discarded New LCIA 
Rule on Interim Measures, see Veeder, The View, 206-211. The main reason for 
the failure, according to Veeder, is the perception that the emergency arbitrator is 
in fact a non-arbitrator and that "the concept of any 'Provisional Order' by a non- 
arbitrator" would be unacceptable. Id., 210-211. 35 Gurry, 2. 
36 Id. 
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It is further noteworthy that complementary mechanisms are available 
to an extent the applicable laW37 upholds the exclusion agreements 
38 
valid. 
In order to provide alternative solutions for overcoming the effect of the 
lacunae or, in other words, the effect of the unavailability of arbitral 
provisional measures at the pre-formation stage, a fast-track 
mechanism for appointment of arbitral tribunal could be adopted or a 
party can seek certain "self-help" measures for eliminating the necessity 
for complementary mechanisms. 
This Chapter examines (i) institutions' direct proposition to the solution 
of the problem: the empowering institution's head or organ with 
emergency powers to grant provisional measures; (ii) the emergency 
arbitral measure procedures; (iii) the effectiveness of the 
complementary mechanisms; and (iv) alternative solutions to the 
complementary mechanisms. 
1 Emergency Provisional Measures Available from Head or 
Organ of Institution 
It seems that four sets of arbitration rules currently provide for interim 
protection of rights from a head or an organ of the relevant institution 
prior to appointment of an arbitrator. These rules apparently 
resurrected the mechanism first employed in the 1915s and survived 
until the 1950S. 39 
The examination of the above rules mainly demonstrates that 
provisional measures could generally take the form of an "order" and 
37 For instance, law of the place of arbitration, law applicable to procedure, and law 
38 
applicable to arbitration agreement. 
39 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4.4. 
See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.1. 
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that two of those institutions provide for limited powers in respect of 
granting provisional measures whereas the other two have no 
restriction. The restrictions are mainly related to the types of measures 
that could be granted. 
In accordance with Article 12(l) of the Arbitration Rules 2002 of the 
Arbitration Court attached to the Economic Chamber of the Czech 
Republic and Agricultural Chamber of the Czech Republic, the 
president of the court is empowered to take "in urgent cases, acting 
upon application of one party or both of them, ... measures 
to conserve 
evidence. " This Article further states that, for conservation of evidence, 
the arbitrator "may appoint one or more expert witnesses or take other 
appropriate steps. " The president's power exits for the period prior to 
the formation of an arbitral tribunal but after the claimant's statement is 
filed. Under the Rules, a party has a choice to make its application to a 
40 court so the president's power is not exclusive , 
Similarly, Section 1(6) of the Arbitration Rules 1995 of the International 
Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of the Russian Federation seems to empower, upon a request 
from a party, the chairman of the International Commercial Arbitration 
Court (the "ICAV) to determine "the amount and the form of the 
security for a claim. " 
Article R37 of the Procedural Rules 1994 of the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport4l contains no restriction concerning the types of emergency 
provisional measures: 
The President of the relevant Division, prior to the transfer of 
the file to the [arbitral] Panel, or thereafter the Panel may, 
'0 Section 12(2). 
41 The Rules for the Resolution of Disputes Arising During the Olympic Games of the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport provide for a similar provision (Article 14). 
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upon application by one of the parties, make an order for 
provisional or conservatory measures. ... 
This Article further requires that the opponent shall be heard. However, 
in cases of utmost urgency, that requirement is waived provided that 
42 the opponent is heard subsequently . In accordance with Article 
R37(4), the grant of a measure may be conditioned upon posting of a 
security. It is noteworthy that, under the Rules, a right to apply to 
judicial authorities for provisional measures is expressly waived. 43 
Likewise, broad powers are given to a three-member permanent 
committee established to deal with provisional measures at the pre- 
formation stage under the Rules for International Arbitration 1994 of the 
44 Italian Association for Arbitration 
. 
The Association appoints members 
of the committee for a period of three years. Its chairman or one of its 
members on behalf of the chairman can carry out the committee's 
functions where the member is authorised by the Committee. A party 
to arbitration may apply for a provisional measure to the permanent 
45 committee before the formation of arbitral tribunal . 
The application 
46 
shall contain supportive arguments and documents . 
The Committee 
has the same powers as an arbitral tribunal established under the 
Rules in respect of provisional measures and the Committee's decision 
can take the form of an order. 47 
There are two issues that could be dealt with in regard of the power 
exercised by the head / organ of an arbitration institution for interim 
protection of rights. The decision given by the head / organ of the 
42 Article R37(3). 
43 Article R37(2). 
44 Article 2. 
45 Article 8. By virtue of Article 8(2), where the tribunal is formed, the application is to 
be made to it. 
46 Article 8(l), para. 2. 
47 Article 19(l). 
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institution seems to be morally binding on the parties. The failure to 
abide by the decision may lead to the non-complying parties' 
responsibility for damages and costs of those interim measure 
proceedings as a matter of breach of contract. In addition, where the 
measure issued is likely to cause damages to the opposing party, the 
head / organ may request security for damages from the moving party 
despite the fact that the power to issue such security is not expressly 
envisaged under the relevant rules. That is due to the fact that such 
security intrinsically related to and should be inseparable from the 
power to grant a provisional measure, 
2 Emergency Arbitral Provisional Measure Procedures 
The emergency arbitral provisional measure rules offer mechanisms 
complementary to arbitration for interim protection of rights. The NAI 
Summary Arbitral Proceeding S48 and the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
RuleS49are the most comprehensive sets of rules. 
All emergency arbitral relief rules aim at providing a speedy mechanism 
for obtaining arbitral provisional measures. The Jurisdiction of an 
emergency arbitrator is merely limited to grant of provisional measures 
and; consequently, the emergency arbitrator does not have jurisdiction 
over substance of a case. Each of the rules, apart from the ICC Pre- 
Arbitral Referee Procedure and the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, 
48 he rules on the Summary Arbitral Proceedings contain 15 articles. In addition, in 
accordance with Article 42a(3) of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings, Section 
One (General Provisions), and Section Five through Seven (Award, Costs, and 
Final Provisions) of the NAI Arbitration Rules are applicable along with certain 
other provisions to the Summary Arbitral Proceedings. The pre-requisite for the 
application of the Summary Arbitral Proceedings is that the place of arbitration was 
determined to be in the Netherlands in accordance with Article 42a(4) of the NAI 
Summary Arbitral Proceedings. If the place of arbitration was not determined by 
the parties, Rotterdam is the place of arbitration for the purpose of application of 
the Section Four (the Summary Arbitral Proceedings) of the NAI Arbitration Rules. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Netherlands' Code of Civil Procedure is 
permissive of summary arbitral proceedings. See Article 1051. 
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has a different approach in creating such mechanism. In other words, 
almost every one of them has more or less a different way of handling 
'legal' and 'mechanical' difficulties 50 in creating a speedy 
complementary procedure. It should be noted at the outset that the 
rules contain certain similarities in handling those difficulties and that 
the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure seems to be an inspiration to 
all. 51 
The legal and mechanical difficulties are mainly related to the speedy 
nature of emergency relief procedure. In handling those difficulties, 
there has been undoubtedly constant tension with aim to create a 
speedy procedure and two important principles of international 
commercial arbitration: party autonomy and due process. 52 The extent 
of one of these principles' acceptance over the others shapes the 
formation of various stages of emergency measure proceedings. Three 
main examples to those stages are appointment of emergency 
arbitrator, determination of time limits (for answer, hearing etc. ), and 
opportunity to present one's case. 
To that end, one of the most important characteristics of the emergency 
relief procedures is that all but the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules 
requires interpartes proceedings. 
This Part deals with the issue of (i) terminology, (ii) integration of arbitral 
relief procedure with arbitration rules of a given institution, (iii) 
jurisdictional relationship to arbitral and judicial proceedings, Ov) 
49 The Rules contain 16 articles and the WIPO Arbitration Rules were, as a whole, 
50 
with a few exceptions, applicable to emergency relief proceedings. Article 1. 
51 
See WIPO Document ARB/AC/11/95/3, para. 9. 
A further inspiration seems to stem from the Proposed Rules for Provisional Relief 
in Arbitration prepared by Professor Hans Smith and a group of his law students at 
52 
the Columbia University in 1991. For the text of these Rules, see SmIt, 409-410. 
See, in this respect, WIPO Document WIPO/ARB/DR/5, paras. 16-19. 
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request for measure and answer, (v) appointment and challenge of 
emergency arbitrator, (vi) emergency measure proceedings, (vii) 
powers of an emergency arbitrator, (viii) requirements to grant 
emergency measures, (ix) form of emergency arbitrator's decision, (x) 
modification and revocation of decision, (xi) effect of decision, (xii) 
appeal, (xiii) compliance with decision and effect of non-compliance, 
(xiv) confidentiality, (xv) costs of emergency measure proceedings, and 
(xvi) ex parte requests for emergency measures. 
2.1 Terminology 
The emergency rules examined employ different terms in referring to 
the procedure they propose. The ICC and the ECA refer to the 
procedure they propose as the "Pre-arbitral Referee 53 Procedure. " The 
AAA prefers the "Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of 
Protection". The NAI refers to its rules as the "Summary Arbitral 
Proceedings. " The WIPO uses the term "Emergency Relief Rules. " It 
seems that the term "emergency provisional (or interim) arbitral relief 
(or remedy or measure) procedure (or rules)" reflects main 
characteristics of the mechanism in question. 
The decision-maker under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure and 
the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules is called as "pre-arbitral referee. " 
The other rules refer to the same person as "arbitrator" (the NAI 
Summary Arbitral Proceedings) or "emergency arbitrator" (the AAA 
Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection and the WIPO 
Draft Emergency Relief Rules). The last term seems to be preferable. 
This is because an emergency arbitrator not only makes a decision 
judicially but also is different to an arbitrator since it does not finally 
resolve substance of a dispute. An emergency arbitrator, as a neutral 
53 This name was inspired from the French original W&6 arbitral. It was used 
because no other satisfactory English translation was found. 
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party-determined authority, merely complements, in urgent cases, to an 
arbitrator prior to his appointment for providing interim protection of 
arbitrating parties' rights. In regard of resolving issues on an interim 
basis the emergency arbitrator is, in one sense, an arbitrator as he 
resolves the request for an interim remedy in a judicial manner. 54 
2.2 Integration with Arbitration Rules 
There are mainly two means of handling the relationship between 
emergency relief procedure and arbitration rules. The emergency relief 
procedure can have its own separate existence and can only apply 
where there is a specific reference, either in arbitration clause or 
through a special agreement, to them. In other words, if arbitrating 
parties wish to make the procedure applicable they ought to opt for it. 
This approach demonstrates optional character of certain rules and can 
be referred to as "opt-in approach". Alternatively, the emergency 
measure rules may have automatic application where the parties made 
a reference to arbitration rules of a given institution. This is the 
9C automatic inclusion approach". 
Save for the NAl Summary Arbitral Proceedings, the emergency arbitral 
measure procedures do not become a part of an arbitration agreement 
by a mere reference to the arbitration rules of the arbitration institutions 
examined. There must be a specific agreement for the application of 
those procedures. That agreement may be made before the dispute is 
arisen or there can be a submission agreement. It should also be 
indicated that, like an agreement to arbitrate, an agreement to submit 
disputes to emergency provisional relief procedures is subject to the 
mandatory rules of place of arbitration. 55 That is to say that the 
54 It should be noted that one of the drafters of the Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure 
refers the r6f6rd arbitral as "arbitrator". See also Chapter III, infra notes 164-167 
and accompanying text. 
*55 See, para. 3 of the preamble to the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. 
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mandatory rules of applicable laws may restrict or prohibit grant of 
emergency arbitral provisional measures. In this regard, the law of 
place of arbitration, law applicable to arbitration, and law of place of 
enforcement, if known, should generally be taken into account. 
The NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings constitutes a part of the NAI 
Arbitration Rules and by a mere reference they become a part of an 
arbitration agreement. Apparently, arbitrating parties could refrain from 
employing the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings by express 
agreement. 
Making opt-in approach acceptable to arbitration community is perhaps 
the most difficult hurdle to tackle in process of success of emergency 
arbitral provisional relief procedures. It would be a lot easier to market 
the emergency measure rules as part of the overall institutional 
arbitration package. However, it is tenable that most arbitration 
institutions do not want to fully commit themselves by adopting the 
automatic inclusion approach to procedures that have not been tested. 
The concern is simple no arbitration institution wants to risk losing the 
confidence of arbitrating parties. Perhaps because of this reason, the 
WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules rightly took a cor-npror-nise sclution 
56 between the opt-in and the automatic inclusion approaches . 
The 
standard recommended WIPO arbitration clause was envisaged to 
include a specific reference to the Draft Emergency Relief Rules . 
57 If 
this reference was not stroke out at drafting stage then the Draft 
Emergency Relief Rules would become part of a contract. The use of 
56 See WIPO Document WIPO/ARB/AC/111/96/3, para. 5. 
57 In this regard, Article 46 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules was envisaged to be 
amended for further achieving the incorporation of the Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules to the Arbitration Rules. 
180 
inclusive language was aimed at facilitating greater use of the Draft 
Emergency Relief Rules. 58 
2.3 Jurisdictional Relationship with Arbitral and Judicial 
Proceedings 
There are logically two variations to examine in respect of the 
jurisdictional relationship between emergency arbitral relief procedures 
and judicial or other arbitral proceedings- (i) the relationship to other 
arbitral or judicial proceedings, and (ii) the relationship to arbitral 
proceedings initiated under the rules of the same arbitration institution. 
2.3.1 Relationship to Judicial or Other Arbitral Proceedings 
The emergency measure procedures examined generally accept the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction of emergency measure proceedings 
with judicial and other arbitral proceedings . 
59 The other arbitral 
proceedings are the ones that are held under arbitration institutions 
different to the arbitration institution, which administers relevant 
emergency arbitral relief procedure. 
2.3.1.1 Relationship with Judicial Proceedings 
None of the complementary mechanisms does provide for exclusive 
jurisdiction for emergency arbitral provisional relief. 60 
The regulation of the relationship between the complementary 
mechanisms and court proceedings varies. The approaches of the ICC 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, 
and the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules seem to differ depending 
58 Horning, 170. 
59 See, in this respect, Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 100. 
60 The drafters of these mechanisms seem to find the access to courts for interim 
protection at the pre-constitution stage too important to be set aside. In this 
regard, see Sigvard Jarvin, "Alternative Solutions to the Intervention of the 
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upon the timing of a request for a provisional measure to a judicial 
authority. If the request to a court is made prior to an application for an 
emergency provisional measure to the relevant arbitration institution, 
the court seizes the case. Under such circumstance, emergency 
arbitral proceedings cannot commence as, an emergency arbitrator 
does not have jurisdiction to deal with emergency relief requests. 61 
This approach seems to aim at giving freedom to a party prior to its 
decision to make its choice. Once a party exercises that freedom then 
its liberty to make a request in accordance with the emergency arbitral 
62 
relief procedure ceases . 
The logic is to avoid duplication of fora and 
unwanted contr,: )diction between the decisions of arbitral and judicial 
fora. This approach is criticised as the emergency arbitral provisional 
relief proceedings can be circumvented by simply launching an 
application for a provisional relief to a court. 63 
The compromise position is that when a request to a court is made after 
the commencement of emergency measure proceedings, an 
emergency arbitrator can, in principle, retain his emergency powers and 
64 
render a decision . 
This position is generally subject to a parties' 
agreement to contrary and mandatory rules of the applicable law. 65 
Article 42o of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings and Article 0-7 of 
the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection provide 
Engineer" ("Alternative Solutions") in: van den Berg (ed. ), Preventing Delay, 402- 
403. 
6, Article 1(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. It seems that this 
interpretation is implicitly accepted in Article 12(3) of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Rules and Article 111(a) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
62 It seems that this approach is adopted initially by the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee 
63 
Procedure and followed by the other Rules. 
Horning, 171. 
64 See Article 2(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 12(3) of the 
ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; and Article 111(a) of the WIPO Draft Emergency 
Relief Rules. 
65 See Article 2(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, and Article 12(3) of the 
ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. 
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that a request to a judicial authority is not incompatible with agreement 
to arbitrate nor is it a waiver of the right to arbitrate. The NAI Summary 
Arbitral Proceedings and the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection do not deal with any other aspect of their 
relationship with judicial proceedings on provisional measures. This 
approach is tenable as the relationship of emergency or summary 
arbitral proceedings with judicial proceedings is a delicate issue. The 
failure to regulate this issue enhances acceptability of the rules in 
question by judicial authorities though lessens their acceptability by 
users of arbitration. 
It seems necessary to deal with two further questions: First, what is the 
effect of the emergency arbitral provisional relief procedure's existence 
on the availability of judicial provisional measures? In such countries 
as England, the court assistance to arbitral process in respect of 
provisional measures is available under limited circumstances. 
According to Section 44(5) of the EAA 1996, a court shall grant interim 
relief "only if or to the extent that the arbitral tribunal and any arbitral or 
other institution or person vested by the parties with power in that 
regard, has no power or is unable for the time being to act effectively. " 
This provision and a reference to a complementary mechanism should 
be read as a change to courts' role at the pre-formation stage from 
66 subsidiary to complementary . 
To this end, the availability of 
emergency arbitral relief procedure does not fully obstruct court 
assistance to arbitration; it only further restricts such acce ss . 
67 
66 On these roles, see generally supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4. 
67 However, it was thought that Section 44(5) may be considered as obstructive of 
court assistance to arbitration. See, in this respect, Holtzmann, Remarks, 205-, 
and Veeder, The View, 209-211. Even if that is the case, that Section is not one of 
mandatory provisions of the EAA 1996 and parties may make agreements to 
contrary. In fact, Rule 4(5) of the Discarded New LCIA Rule on Interim Measures 
contains such agreement. See id., 211. 
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Second, what is the effect of the emergency procedures on jurisdiction 
of courts where the existence of arbitration agreement results in 
exclusion of courts' jurisdiction as to interim protection of rights? 
Certain U. S. courts refrain from granting provisional measures since 
they consider arbitration agreements preclude courts' assistance on 
interim measures of protection. 68 Smit suggests that, except for 
granting of the measures against third parties, the courts should "step 
back" and should not grant any measure. 69 It is right that an 
emergency arbitrator should benefit from the prejudice towards 
confining all disputes within arbitration once parties agree to arbitrate. 
However, such prejudice should not be so extensive to prevent courts' 
constructive assistance from which arbitration could only benefit. 70 In 
any case, to the extent permitted, parties can regulate the role of courts 
in such circumstances as such regulation is done by various emergency 
71 relief rules . 
2.3.1.2 Relationship with Other Arbitral Proceedings 
It seems that only the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules deal with 
this issue. Pursuant to Article 111(a) of the Rules, where a request to the 
WIPO is made for an emergency provisional measure prior to initiating 
another arbitration, the emergency arbitrator retains his powers "to 
make an award and to modify it. " That is probably for ensuring that the 
emergency arbitrator remains in power until, at least, the arbitrator 
decides on his jurisdiction. 
68 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.2. 
69 Smith, 394. 
'0 On the issue of court assistance to arbitration, see generally Chapter 
11, Part 4. 
71 See Chapter 111, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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2.3.2 Relationship with Arbitral Proceedings Initiated under 
Arbitration Rules of the same Arbitration Institution 
The relationship between an emergency arbitral provisional relief 
procedure administered by an arbitration institution and arbitration to be 
commenced under the same institution is generally dealt with under the 
emergency arbitral relief rules themselves. There can be two distinct 
circumstances. First, an application for an emergency measure may be 
made prior to filing a request for arbitration or constitution of arbitral 
tribunal. Indeed, this is the case, which the emergency relief rules are 
generally designed for. An emergency arbitrator shall under such 
circumstances have the power to ruie on the measure requested. 72 
What does it happen where an arbitral tribunal is seized of the case 
after the appointment of the emergency arbitrator? The solution offered 
to this question differs. Under the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
RuleS73 and the NAl Summary Arbitral Proceedings '74 emergency 
arbitrators' powers apparently cease upon the appointment of a 
tribunal. This is obviously for avoiding duplication of fora. However, the 
ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure 75 and the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee 
RuleS76 provide that, unless the parties agreed otherwise, the 
emergency arbitrator retains his emergency powers even after the 
tribunal is formed. A related question is the effect of a decision of the 
emergency arbitrator on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal formed. 
Under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, the decision (which 
takes the form of an order) of the emergency arbitrator "does not pre- 
judge the substance of the case nor shall it bind any competent 
jurisdiction which may hear any question, issue or dispute in respect of 
72 See Article 1(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 12(l) of the 
ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 0-1 of the AAA Optional Rules for 
Emergency Measures of Protection; Article 42a (2) of the NAI Summary Arbitral 
Proceedings; and Article 111(b)(i) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
73 Article 111(b)(1). 
74 Article 42a(2). 
75 Article 2(4). 
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which the order has been made. Y, 77 In fact, the decision remains in 
force until the emergency arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal modifies it. 78 
Under the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, the arbitral tribunal is 
empowered to review the decision of the emergency arbitrator. 79 
Second, where a request for arbitration is filed and an arbitral tribunal is 
formed prior to making an application for an emergency measure, the 
moving party should not be allowed to use emergency measure rules 
from the date of formation of the tribunal. Under the WIPO Draft 
Emergency Relief Rules, once a party made a request for arbitration 
that party is deemed to waive his right to emergency provisional 
measures. 80 The reason for this is obviously related to the 
complementary nature of the emergency measure rules. Once an 
arbitral tribunal is seized of a case, it alone should have, in principle, 
the competence to rule on provisional measures. The complementary 
role is, in fact, recognised by all five sets of rules for emergency arbitral 
measures. Under these rules, a request may only be made prior to the 
appointment of an arbitral tribunal or seizure of the case by it. 81 
2.4 Request for Measure and Answer 
2.4.1 Request 
In order to commence emergency arbitral relief proceedings, a request 
for a provisional measure has to be made to the secretariat of the 
76 Article 12(l). 
77 Article 6(3) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. 
78 Article 6(3). Under these Rules, an arbitral tribunal has, in principal, the same 
powers as a pre-arbitral referee (Article 2). Apparently, these powers are 
additional to those provided under the ICC Arbitration Rules (Article 23). It is 
interesting to note that the powers provided under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee 
7 
Procedure is far more detailed than the ones provided under Article 23. 
9 Article 12(l). 
80 See Article 111(b)(ii). 
81 See Article 1(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 12(2) of the 
ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 42a(2) of the NAI Summary Arbitral 
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relevant institution and, under some rules, directly to the respondent. 
The request for the measure under all of the rules shall contain certain 
elements. Perhaps the most detailed list is provided under the WIPO 
. JOC 
Draft Emergency Relief Rules. Article IV(c) of these Rules provides 
. 
82 that the request shall contain. 
(i) the names, addresses and telephone, telefax or other 
communication references of the parties and of the 
representative, if any of the Claimant, 
(i i) a copy of the Arbitration Agreement and of the relevant facts 
of any contract of which it forms part; 
(i i 1) a concise statement of relevant facts and a statement of the 
rights to be preserved; 
(iv) a statement of the interim relief sought, 
(v) a concise statement of the harm expected to the Claimant if 
the interim relief is not granted and an explanation of why 
such relief is required urgently-, 
(vi) evidence justifying the grant of the interim relief sought, 
including copies of documents and statementsý 
(vi i) any observations that the Claimant may wish to make on 
whether it wishes a hearing to be held, and, if so, the date, 
time and place thereof. 
The request may also include, where the parties have an option to 
choose their emergency arbitrator, the name of the arbitrator upon 
which the parties have reached agreement, or any other information in 
respect of such arbitrator, including " technical or professional 
qualifications, nationality and language requirements". 83 
Proceedings; Article 0-5 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of 
Protection; and Article 111(b)(i)-(ii) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
82 See also Article 3(2)(2)(a)-(f) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 3 
of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 42c of the NAI Summary Arbitral 
Proceedings; and Article 0-1 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures 
of Protection. 
83 Article 3(2)(2)(e) and (d) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. 
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As the time is of essence in emergency measure applications, It is 
advisable to accompany the request with confirmation that it has sent to 
the respondent. 84 
Further, for the same reason, the request may contain any such 
relevant information as the name of attorney(s) who will represent the 
85 
claimant, and experts and witnesses, if any . 
The request must be made in the language agreed upon by the parties. 
If there is no agreement, it is advisable that the request is made as 
some of the rules provide for, in the same language as the agreement 
86 
referring to emergency measure rules . 
If that language is different to 
the operating languages of the relevant institution, it is prudent to 
include a translation of the request into one of the operating languages. 
In all cases, the claimant should act in good faith and should disclose 
all facts, circumstances or documents that are either known to it or 
87 
within its possession in respect of the request for a measure . 
This is 
by far the most important duty imposed upon the claimant in respect of 
the request. The duty obviously resembles to a duty imposed on a 
person who wish to obtain a temporary restraining order fruin a court in 
the U. S. 88 A breach of this duty may cause damages, which might be 
remedied by compensation. The basis for compensation would be a 
contractual duty to co-operate or breach of the principle of good faith. 
84 See, e. g., Article 3(2)(2)(f) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure-, and 
Articles 
42d and 42e of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings. 
85 Article 3 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. 
86 See Article 3(2)(2) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, and 
Articles 3 and 
10 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. 
87 See Article IV(d) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
88 Horning, 173. 
188 
2.4.2 Answer 
In line with the urgent character of emergency provisional measures, 
response time to the request in emergency measure proceedings is 
also shorter than that commonly required in arbitration proceedings. 
The answer should be given within eight days under the ICC Pre- 
Arbitral Referee Procedure 89 and 10 days under the ECA Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Rules9o. The AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of 
Protection do not provide expressly for a specific time for response. It 
seems that the answer will be provided within a period to be determined 
by the emergency arbitrator. 91 Under the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules, the answer shall normally be given within 60 hours from the 
92 respondent's receipt of the claim . 
The answer, as usual, replies in writing to the particulars of the 
request. 93 Any evidence, e. g. documents or statements, the 
respondent relies on shall accompany it. The answer shall also contain 
any counterclaim, which is logically subject to the requirements of 
making a clai M. 94 
2.5 Appointment and Challenge of Emergency Arbitrator 
It seems that all of the rules envisage for appointment of a single 
emergency arbitrator. This is again self-explanatory and dictated by the 
urgent nature of the emergency measure procedure. 
89 Article 3(4). 
90 Article 5. 
9, Article 0-3 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection. 
92 Article V. 
93 See Article 3(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 5 of the ECA 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; and Article V(b)(i) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules. 
94 See, e. g., Article 42i of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings. 
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All but one of the rules further opts for party autonomy and envisages 
for two-tier mechanism for the appointment of the tribunal. 95 The 
parties may agree on the identity of the emergency arbitrator. In such 
case, the agreed person will be appointed as the arbitrator. 96 
Otherwise, a default appointment procedure is available. 
Under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, where the parties have 
not chosen or agreed on their pre-arbitral referee, the chairman of the 
ICC International Court of Arbitration or, in his absence, one of vice- 
chairmen as soon as possible appoints the referee. In the appointment 
process, he ta',,..; s into consideration, inter alia, parties' submissions, 
technical and professional requirements of the case, the referee's 
97 nationality and residence . 
Similarly, the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules provide that parties can 
nominate their pre-arbitral referee who then will be appointed by the 
executive committee of the court. Otherwise, the executive committee 
appoints a referee 
after having verified his independence and impartiality and after 
having taken into account any criteria proposed by the parties as a 
requirement for appointment, his possession of the experience 
required to deal [with] this matter, the possible proposals made by 
the parties and his time [ofl availability. 98 
95 See Article 4(l) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 7 of the ECA 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 42f of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings; 
96 
and Article VI I of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
After the confirmation of the prima facie existence of arbitration agreement, the 
appointment is to be approved by the chairman (Article 4(l) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Procedure) or the executive committee of the court (Article 7(2) of the 
97 
ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules). 
98 
Article 4(2). 
Article 7(3). 
190 
Under the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings, unless parties 
specifically agreed otherwise, 99 the Administrator appoints an 
emergency arbitrator. 100 According to these Rules, nationality of the 
emergency arbitrator does not bar him from appointment. 101 The 
Administrator confirms in writing the appointment of the emergency 
arbitrator. 102 
Article VII(b) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules provides for 
appointment of an emergency arbitrator from a standby panel 
established where there is no agreement on the identity of the 
referee. 103 
Unlike the other institutional procedures in which the appointment by 
institution is envisaged as a default procedure, the AAA Optional Rules 
for Emergency Measures of Protection provide for appointment of the 
emergency arbitrator only by the AAA. 104 This appointment is made 
005 from a standby panel that could be referred to as "visiting firemen . 
The AAA's approach seems to avoid a party's "dragging its feet to give 
itself sufficient time to render the relief requested moot or less 
effective. 006 
Whether expressly indicated in the applicable rules or not, the relevant 
appointing body determines the most suitable candidate for the 
appointment of an emergency arbitrator. By doing so, that body 
probably considers the technical requirements of the case, skills and 
99 An agreement on the appointment of an arbitral tribunal is not sufficient. The 
parties specifically agree on the appointment of an emergency arbitrator. Article 
42f(l). 
100 Article 42f(l). 
101 Article 42f(l). 
102 Article 42f(2). 
103 See also Article VI of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
104 Article 0-2. 
105 Lloyd, 15. 
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experience of the arbitrator and, above all, other reasonable 
requirements indicated by the parties. 107 It is needless to say that, in 
any case, the arbitrator should be asked if he accepts the office. 108 
The emergency arbitrator may be challenged and, if necessary, 
replaced by the appointing authority within a certaln period of time'09 in 
cases where there are certain circumstances that prevent a person 
from acting as an arbitrator. 110 The appointing authority has, in cases 
of challenge, sole discretion without disclosing reasons"' and its 
decision needs to be final (without an appeal) in order for facilitating 
speedy proceedings. 112 
Except for the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of 
Protection' 13 and the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings' 
14 
an 
emergency arbitrator is prevented from acting as a member of arbitral 
tribunal unless otherwise agreed by the parties or required by a 
106 See Smit, 395. 
107 See Article 4(2) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. 
108 See, e. g., Article 42f(3) of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings; and Article 15(2) 
of the NAI Arbitration Rules. 
109 For instance, seven days from the receipt of the notice of appointment under 
Article 8 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, whereas 24 hours from the receipt 
110 
under Article VIII of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
Those are probably events that affect independence and impartiality of arbitrators. 
See Article 4(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 8 of the ECA 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 0-2 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection; and Article VIII of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules. The replacement of an emergency arbitrator could be necessary, for 
instance, where he dies or becomes unable to act. See, in this respect, Article 4(5) 
of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. The replacement could also be 
necessary where the emergency arbitrator resigns from his duties. 
See, e. g., Article 4(6) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. This is probably 
for avoiding any further aggravation, which will preclude moving further in the 
112 
emergency measure proceedings. 
See Article 6 of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; and Article 8 of the ECA 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. 
113 Article 0-5. 
114 Article 421(3). An emergency arbitrator can act as arbitrator where a request for 
such role comes from both parties. 
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court. ' 15 The policy behind this prohibition is that the proceedings 
taken, the information obtained, and the decision rendered under 
emergency measure rules should remain confidential and hence should 
not affect the decision concerning the substance of the case where 
different fact finding and evidentiary procedures exist. ' 16 The counter- 
argument, which this author agrees with, perhaps is that the emergency 
arbitrator has already gotten acquainted with the case and if he to 
become an arbitrator it is likely that the case will resolve in a short 
period of time. ' 17 Further, it is highly unlikely that an experienced 
arbitrator let himself affected with emergency measure proceedings. 
2.6 Proceedings 
An emergency arbitrator is normally given broad powers in conducting 
proceedings in order to facilitate smooth and rapid resolution of a 
case. 118 This is because time is of the essence. 119 The WIPO Draft 
Emergency Relief Rules can be taken as a good example in order to 
demonstrate how various rules deal with the conduct of emergency 
provisional relief proceedings. Article X of the Rules provides- 120 
a) The Emergency Arbitrator shall conduct the Procedure in such 
manner as the Emergency Arbitrator considers appropriate. 
b) In particular, the Emergency Arbitrator may 
(i) proceed without a hearing and make an award where 
the Emergency Arbitrator considers that each party 
has had an opportunity to present its case, 121 
115 See Article 2(3) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, Article 19 of the ECA 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; and Article IX of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules. 
116 See Jarvin, Alternative Solutions, 402; Smit, 392, L6cuyer-Thieffry, 14, and 
Konstantin D. Magliveras, "The Arbitral Referee Procedure -A New Initiative of the 
International Chamber of Commerce", 35 J Law Soc Scotland 322-325 (1990). 
117 Smith, 392. 
18 See Article 5(3) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 9(2) of the ECA 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 0-3 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection; and Article X(a) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules. 
119 Derains, Refere Arbitral, 188. 
120 See also, generally, Articles 42j and 42g of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings. 
12 1 This is the due process requirement observation of which is a basic requirement in 
any kind of proceedings, arbitral or else. On this requirement, see Article 5(3) of 
1931 
convene, on the shortest possible notice, the parties for the purpose of a hearing, whether in person, by telephone or by teleconference, at a time, date and 
place fixed by the Emergency Arbitrator; 122 [and] 
hear one party, and proceed to make an award in the 
absence of the other party, if the Emergency Arbitrator 
is satisfied that the other party has been given notice 
of time, date and place of the hearing that was 
adequate, in view of the emergency nature of the Procedure, to enable that other party to be present; 
modify, in the event that a hearing is conducted and 
an award is made in the absence of a party, the time 
limit for the delivery or transmission of the Answer to 
the Request by that party, or convene a further hearinq 
for the purpose of receiving further submissions. 12! 
(Citations added. ) 
These broad powers are restricted mainly by the requirement of giving 
each party a fair opportunity to present its case. 124 
Under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, parties undertake, by 
acceding to the Rules, to assist in implementing the referee's term of 
reference particularly, "to make available to him [the referee] all 
documents which he may consider necessary and also to grant free 
access to any place for the purpose of any investigation or inquiry. , 125 
The theory of competence/competence 126 is a universally accepted 
principle of arbitration law adopted by all modern arbitration law and 
rules. Indeed, the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure 127 and the ECA 
the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 9(2) of the ECA Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Rules; and Article 0-3 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection. 
122 See also Article 5(5) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; and Article 0-3 of 
123 
the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection. 
See also Articles 5(l), 5(3), and 5(6) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, 
124 
and Article 9(4) of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. 
125 
See, in this respect, Lloyd, 15. 
Article 5(4). 
126 See, e. g., Gaillard / Savage (ed. ), para. 650. 
127 Article 5(2). 
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Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules' 28 expressly provide that the referee deals 
with challenges to its own jurisdiction. In addition, by agreeing to 
emergency arbitral relief procedure, parties undertake the duty to assist 
the emergency arbitrator in successfully resolving the dispute in 
question. This duty and the principle of competence/competence 
should be applicable to emergency relief procedures even if they are 
not expressly referred to. 129 The speedy nature of emergency 
provisional measure proceedings also justifies that suggestion. 
2.7 Requirements to Grant Emergency Measures 
It seems that the determination of requirements for the grant of 
emergency measures generally remains within an emergency 
arbitrator's discretion. 130 This is tenable. It is very difficult to pinpoint 
exactly what the requirements are for granting provisional measures. 
The requirements may usually change depending upon the 
circumstances of each case, nationality of the parties and the nature of 
the dispute. Similar discretion is afforded to arbitrators. 13 1 They 
generally tend to use this discretion quite successfully. There seems to 
be no reason to believe that emergency arbitrators will be less 
successful in using the discretion entrusted upon them. 
The examination of various rules demonstrates that grant of an 
emergency measure requires first and foremost urgency or 
emergency. 132 After all a request is being made to obtain a measure 
128 Article 9(1). 
129 For an express stipulation, see Article 42h of the NAI Summary Arbitral 
130 
Proceedings. 
See Articles 14 and, particularly, 15 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; and 
Article XI (a) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
131 See infra Chapter IV, Part 3. 
132 See Article 2(1)(a) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Articles 14 and, 
particularly, 15 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; Article 0-1 of the AAA 
Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection; Article 42k of the NAI 
Summary Arbitral Proceedings; and Article XI (a) of the WIPO Draft Emergency 
Relief Rules. 
195 
grant of which cannot await the appointment of an arbitral tribunal. A 
further requirement is the existence of "immediate damage or 
irreparable IOSS,, 133 or "irreparable loss or damage" 
134 
that will be 
caused where the request for emergency measure is not granted. 
Under certain rules, the emergency arbitrator, solely within his 
discretion, determines the conditions that may restrict or prevent the 
135 136 grant of emergency measures. The arbitrator may. 
require, having regard to any agreement between the 
parties, that a party commence arbitration proceedings 
on the merits of the dispute within a designated period of 
time; 137 or 
require that a party in whose favor an award is made 
provide adequate security. 138 (Citations added. ) 
It is interesting to note that, under the NAI Summary Arbitral 
Proceedings, where "the case is not sufficiently urgent or is too 
complicated to be decided by a provisional decision" an emergency 
arbitrator may deny the request for a provisional measure. 139 
133 Article 2(1)(a) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. 
134 Article 0-4 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection. The 
irreparable loss means a loss that cannot be adequately compensated with money. 
135 
See, in this respect, Lloyd, 13; and infra Chapter IV, Part 3.1.4. 
Article 6(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 15 of the ECA Pre- 
Arbitral Referee Rules; and Article XI(c) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief 
Rules. 
136 Article Xl(c) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. See also Article 6(4) of 
the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. 
137 See, in this respect, Principle 12 of the ILA Principles. 
138 See Article 6(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 421 (2) of the 
NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings; and Rule 0-6 of the AAA Optional Rules for 
139 
Emergency Measures of Protection. 
Article 42k of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings. The sole arbitrator applying 
the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings in a dispute arising from termination of a 
joint venture agreement issued an interim payment as an interim measure by 
applying the standards set forth under the Dutch law. The tribunal based its 
decision on the express choice of parties as regards substantive law in their 
agreement and Article 46 of the NAI Arbitration Rules. The standards applied by 
the arbitrator were urgency and balancing of the interests in this case. See Award 
in Summary Arbitral Proceedings in Case No. 2212 (28 July 1999), extracts 
published in XXVI YCA 198,204 (2001). 
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Where the relevant set of rules contain no explicit or insufficient legal 
procedures or standards that would Justify the grant of a provisional 
measure or the establishment of those standards or procedures are left 
to an arbitral tribunal without indicating any further guidance, the 
tribunal has two options. Although, each case should be / is treated 
differently, the tribunal can either take the guidance of standards and 
procedures applied by fellow arbitral tribunals in various other 
international cases or can apply the standards or procedures set forth 
under the applicable law. In any case, in making its decision, the 
tribunal should take into consideration particularities of dispute in 
question and nationality of disputing parties. 
Neither of the above approaches is wrong but both of them lead to 
certain problems. The first approach necessitates the existence of 
arbitral case law or other authoritative materials to rely on. The case 
law are difficult to obtain but is emerging . 
140 The main trouble with the 
second approach is the difficulty to determine applicable law. Is it the 
law applicable to substance or the one applicable to procedure, or is it 
the law of the place of arbitration ? 141 In addition, the role of the law of 
place of enforcement, if known, is to be considered. 
2.8 Form of Emergency Arbitrator's Decision 
The decision of an emergency arbitrator in inter partes proceedings can 
take two forms, an award or an order. 142 Under two of the Rules, the 
140 See infra Chapter IV, Part 3. 
141 See Holtzmann, Remarks, 205. 
142 In this regard, it is noteworthy that there is usually an extendable time limit within 
which an emergency arbitrator renders a decision. This limit reflects parties' will 
and design to put pressure on the emergency arbitrator to render his decision 
within that period. An emergency arbitrator gives his decision as soon as possible. 
For instance, under the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules, an emergency 
arbitrator is required to make its decision "within 24 hours of the termination of any 
hearing. " Article X11. In addition, Article 6(2) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure provides that the emergency arbitrator renders his decision within 30 
days from the transmittal of file to him. This time limit is extendable either upon the 
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ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure and the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Rules, a pre-arbitral referee may only take its decision in a form of an 
order. 
143 Under Article 0-4 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection, however, an emergency arbitrator has a power 
144 to grant an interim award . Similarly, Article XI of the WIPO Draft 
Emergency Relief Rules empowers the emergency arbitrator to grant its 
decision in a form of an award, though it does not indicate the type of 
the award. Under the last two Rules, it is not expressed whether the 
decision could also normally be given in a form of an order. It is safe to 
assume that, if it is requested, the emergency arbitrator who i's 
equipped with ý, ie power to grant an award can also grant an order, a 
less stringent form of a decision than an award. 
Article 421(l) of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings expressly states 
that a decision of an emergency arbitrator is an award and the 
provisions applicable to award in the NAI Arbitration Rules are also 
applicable to this decision. 
emergency arbitrator's request or the chairman's (of the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration) initiative. See also Article 13 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, 
Article 421(l) of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings; and Article 49(2)(e) of the 
NAI Arbitration Rules. The decision is in most cases required to contain reasons. 
Article 6(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 14 of the ECA Pre- 
Arbitral Referee Rules; and Article 0-4 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency 
Measures of Protection. The reasons may enhance acceptability of the decision 
and provide for guidance in avoiding a similar situation in the future. Lloyd, 17. It 
is interesting to note here that Article 11 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules 
deals with seat of arbitration (in Article 14) and provides that the decision is to be 
rendered at the seat of the proceedings. It is not clear, however, that whether or 
not Article 11 infers power for emergency arbitrator to render an award. In this 
respect, it should be noted that the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures 
of Protection does not contain a provision on the seat of arbitration although a 
decision rendered under these rules is an award. This uncertainty may be 
overcome by simply making the AAA International Arbitration Rules also applicable 
where there is a reference to the Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of 
Protection to the extent possible and desirable. 
143 Articles 6 and 14, respectively. 
144 It is noteworthy that an interim award is enforceable in the U. S. See infra Chapter 
V, Part 3.2.2. 
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The legal nature of a decision of the emergency arbitrator is important 
as it determines whether or not the decision is enforceable as an award 
under the New York Convention. 145 Apparently, if an emergency 
arbitrator is not considered as an arbitrator under a national IaW146 then 
his decision cannot be considered as award. 
2.9 Modification or Revocation of Decision 
Where the circumstances under which a decision is given by an 
emergency arbitrator are changed, it is logical that the changed 
circumstances should be re-evaluated and, if necessary, the decision 
should be modified or revoked. As a result, any application for 
modification or revocation of a decision of an emergency arbitrator 
should be based on changed circumstances and can be made until the 
end of the emergency arbitrator's term, generally until the constitution 
of an arbitral tribunal. 147 
2.10 Types of Emergency Measures 
The powers of an emergency arbitrator are generally specified in the 
relevant rules. To a large extent, the emergency arbitrator is 
empowered with wide discretion / authority subject to generally parties' 
agreement to contrary. 148 That is to say the parties are generally 
empowered to widen or restrict the powers provided for under 
emergency measure rules. 149 This approach is, in fact, supported by 
the paramount principle of party autonomy. The WIPO Draft 
Emergency Relief Rules provide that, an emergency arbitrator is 
empowered to grant any measure he "considers urgently necessary to 
145 On this issue, see Chapter 111, infra Part 2.13. 
146 See Chapter III, infra notes 164-167 and accompanying text. 
147 See Article 0-5 of the AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection. 
Having said that one should note that there will be no objection to revision or 
revocation of an order. However, revision or revocation of an award may pose 
148 
difficulty. On which see infra Chapter IV, Part 6. 
Apparently, the powers are also subject to mandatory rules of applicable laws. 
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preserve the rights of the parties. 050 However, in each case, it is wise 
to examine the applicable rules with great care as to whether or not the 
application falls within the ambit of the relevant rules. In accordance 
with the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure an emergency arbitrator is 
empowered 151 
"[t]o order any conservatory measures or any measures 
of restoration that are urgently necessary either to 
prevent immediate damage or irreparable loss and so to 
safeguard any of the rights or property of one of the 
parties, 052 
"[florder a party to make any other party or to another 
person any payment which ought to be made; " 
"[t]o order a party to take any step which ought to be 
taken according to the contract between the parties, 
including the signing or delivery of any document or the 
procuring by a party of the signature or delivery of a 
document" 
"[flo order any measures necessary to preserve or 
establish evidence. " 
An emergency arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed, does not generally 
have power to grant any measure other than the one requested due 
149 See, e. g., Article 2(l)(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedureý and Article 42j 
150 
of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings. See also Lloyd, 14. 
151 
Article Xl(a). 
Article 2(1). See also Article 14 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules; and Article 
XI of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. The subsection (b) of Article XI 
contains a detailed exemplary / non-exhaustive list of powers according to which 
an emergency arbitrator may 
(i) issue an interim injunction or restraining order prohibiting the commission or 
continued commission of an act or course of conduct by a party; (ii) order the 
performance of a legal obligation by a party; (iii) order the payment of an amount 
by one party to the other party or to another person; (iv) order any measure 
necessary to establish or preserve evidence or to ascertain the performance of 
a legal obligation by a party; (v) order any measure necessary for the 
conservation of any property; (vi) fix an amount of damages to be paid by a party 
for breach of the award under such conditions as the Emergency Arbitrator 
152 
considers appropriate. 
The language of this sub-paragraph covers conservatory measures aim at 
preserving a party's rights. This language seems to be inclusive of any provisional 
measure. But see Smit, 397. 
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probably to party autonomy. 153 He might, however, "suggest that the 
original order sought was inappropriate and by agreement make an 
order other than the one sought. , 
154 
2.11 Effect of Decision 
It is clear that a decision of an emergency arbitrator does not aim at 
pre-judging the substance of the case. 155 The decision is provisional. It 
is logical to assume that the decision stands until either an arbitral 
tribunal or a competent judicial body confirms, modifies, or terminates 
it. 
2.12 Appeal 
Permission to appeal or any other recourse against a decision of an 
emergency arbitrator does not suit the urgent nature of the emergency 
measure proceedings. 156 To this end, under the ICC Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Procedure, a "right to all means of appeal or recourse or 
opposition to" a judicial authority or any other authority against decision 
of the referee is waived "insofar as such waiver can validly be made. "' 57 
2.13 Compliance with Decision and Consequences of Non- 
compliance 
Under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure and the ECA Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Rules, parties expressly undertake to carry out without delay a 
decision of an emergency arbitrator. 158 Thus, the decision has by 
153 See Article 2(2) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, and Article 14 of the 
ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. The other rules are silent on this issue. For the 
contrary view, see Smit, 397. 
155 
Lloyd, 15. 
Article 6(4) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; Article 16 of the ECA Pre- 
Arbitral Referee Rules- and Article 42m of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings. 
156 Apparently, rnodificatiýn of a decision under certain circumstances is an exception 
to that rule. On the modification issue, see Chapter III, supra Part 2.10. 
157 Article 6(6). Hausmaninger indicates that several legal systems accept such 
waiver valid where it is made after the decision is rendered. 
Hausmaninger, Pre- 
Arbitral Referee, 104. 
158 Article 6(6) and Article 21, respectively. 
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contract a binding effect. 159 This effect, as well as the fact that an 
arbitration institution "lends its standing" to any emergency measure 
granted may enhance voluntary compliance. 160 In order to enhance the 
compliance, an order may be, where available, "backed by a sanction 
of liquidated damages in the event of its breach .,, 
16 1A failure to carry 
out the decision may further be remedied. In case of failure, an 
emergency arbitrator, an arbitral tribunal or the competent court can, 
where permitted, compensate any damage caused by that failure. 162 In 
regard of the issue of damages, it should also be noted that where the 
decision of an emergency arbitrator is proved to be wrong or otherwise 
caused damages, arbitral tribunal or the competent court might hold the 
applicant liable for such damage. 163 
In addition to contractual mechanisms for liability, where possible, the 
parties can obtain assistance from a judicial authority for enforcement 
of the emergency arbitral decision. 164 In this respect, there are a few 
issues to consider. The question as to whether or not the emergency 
arbitrator is considered an arbitrator has a crucial importance. This is 
because only then the decision may be categorised as an order and 
may be enforced. This author believes that the emergency arbitrator, 
159 Lloyd, 16- and Gurry, 3 (indicating that "only the most audacious, if not reckless, 
lawyer wýuld counsel a client not to abide by the order, even if it has merely a 
160 
contractual status 
161 
See, in this respect, Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 103-104. 
Id.; and Smit, 399. The availability of liquidated damages, fines, or penalties is 
162 
subject to applicable law. See infra Chapter IV, Part 7.2. 
See Article 6(8)(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. The emergency 
arbitrator himself can also provide for penalties for failure to comply with his 
163 
decision. See Article Xl(b)(vi) of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
164 
See Article 6(8)(2) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. 
See Article 21 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. As we noted above, 
Derains, one of the drafters of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, refers to 
the "W&6" arbitral as an "arbitrator. " Derains in: Sanders (ed. ), New Trends, 186- 
87. But see Societe Nationale des Petroles du Congo v. Republique du Congo, 
Arret of 29 April 2003 (Cour D'Appel de Paris) (holding that a pre-arbitral referee is 
not an arbitrator); and Jarvin, Procedural Decisions, 369. It should further be noted 
that, at the end, it is the competent law that would qualify a referee as an arbitrator. 
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whether it is referred to as referee or else is an arbitrator. 165 The 
emergency arbitrator who is a -neutral person determines, in a judicial 
manner, the issues before him in a binding decision, which by 
agreement may be an order or an award. This approach is also in 
conformity with the principle of party autonomy. 
Further, the similarities between the concept of arbitral provisional 
measures and that of emergency arbitral provisional measures are 
expected to cause the acceptance of the latter by legal systems "to the 
same extent that arbitral relief is recognized today as an alternative to 
provisional court relief. , 166 Indeed, if an emergency arbitrator is 
accepted as an arbitrator by a given legal system, his decision could be 
enforceable like a decision of an arbitrator. 167 
Also, decisions of an emergency arbitrator, like one of an arbitrator, 168 
may arguably be enforceable under the New York Convention. Gurry 
rightly states that 
"[w]hile it is not a question that is free from doubt, the better view 
seems to be that an award given by an emergency arbitrator in 
such a [emergency relief] procedure be enforceable under the 
New York Convention if the award is considered to be enforceable 
069 award in the jurisdiction in which it is granted . 
Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 104. It is also for the competent law to 
165 
qualify the decision as order or an award. 
In this respect, see, generally, Chapter 111, supra Part 2.1. But see Societe 
Nationale des Petroles du Congo v. Republique du Congo, Arret of 29 April 2003 
166 
(Cour D'Appel de Paris). 
167 
Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 110. 
For the enforcement of an arbitral decision, see infra Chapter V, Part 3.1. To 
support this view, it should be noted that Article 1051(3) of the Netherlands' CCP 
provides that an award rendered in summary arbitral proceedings is enforceable in 
accordance with the provisions of the Code applicable to enforcement of arbitral 
awards. 
168 For the enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention, see infra 
169 
Chapter V, Part 3.2. 
Gurry, 4. However, Jarvin states, in regard of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure, (which is generally applicable to other emergency measure rules) that 
the arbitral referee's "order is not an 'award' in all legal systems, because it iis not 
final, and the New York Convention only applies to final awards. " Jarvin, 
Alternative Solutions, 403. 
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The law of such jurisdiction may require that a decision is to be final 
and binding to be considered as an award. The decision is binding so 
long as parties agreed in advance to accept it as binding. 170 Is the 
decision final? It can be argued that the decision is final in respect of 
the issues it deals with . 
17 1 The enforcement regime of the decision 
could, in any case, be improved on both national and international 
level. 172 Apparently, the latter provides for a harmonised and more 
effective means than the former. 
However, there is a great danger that a given legal system would not 
accept an emergency arbitrator as an "arbitrator" and, as a result, the 
decision rendered in accordance with emergency relief procedure 
would be neither an award nor an order. Accordingly, that legal system 
might not lend its assistance for enforcement of that decision. 
However, this non-enforceability should not be exaggerated. This is 
because (i) "[t]he parties have agreed to the arbitral referee procedure' 
it may be supposed that they thereby have confidence in it", and (ii) 
"[t]he very existence of such a procedure is likely to instil discipline in 
both parties. " 173 
170 Derains, Refere Arbitral, 189. 
171 See, in this respect, infra Chapter V, Part 3.2. Derains argues that a decision of an 
arbitral referee is final in the context of "the appropriateness to take interim 
measures at a certain moment on the basis of a prima facie appraisal of a factual 
172 
situation. " Derains, Refere Arbitral, 189. 
Indeed, the UNCITRAL should take enforcement of emergency arbitrators' 
decisions into its calendar in considering the enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures. On this issue, see infra Chapter V, Part 3.3. 
173 Lloyd, 18. Further, he rightly indicates: 
Contrary to the view of some lawyers, businessmen do not go out of their way to 
seek disputes. If disputes occur resulting in arbitration, experience shows that 
awards are generally honoured without the need for enforcement 
by state 
courts. 
I d., 19. 
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2.14 Confidentiality 
Some of the rules indicate in express terms that the emergency arbitral 
measure proceedings are confidential. 174 The ICC Pre-ArbItral Referee 
Procedure, for instance, requires confidentiality of "any submissions, 
communications or documents (other than the order [a decision of an 
emergency arbitrator]) established or made solely for the purposes" of 
emergency arbitral measure proceedings. 175 
The confidentiality is subject to parties' agreement to contrary or a 
decision of an arbitral tribunal or a judicial authority that later seizes of 
the case. The aim of confidentiality is to protect the integrity of 
emergency measure proceedings and to avoid pre-judgment of the 
substance of a case. 
2.15 Liability 
Emergency arbitrators and arbitration institutions, which administer 
emergency arbitral relief procedure should be excluded from liability to 
the extent possible under relevant law. 176 The policy behind this 
approach is twofold. First, it aims at making sure that the emergency 
arbitrator conducts its duty and renders a decision without the fear of 
being held liable. Second, the relevant institution's administration of 
emergency measure procedure should not be hindered due to fears of 
being held liable. The emergency arbitrator should, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties and accepted by the arbitrator, logically be 
subject to liability regime applicable to arbitrators. Any private 
174 See Article 6(7) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure-, Article 5(4) of the ICC 
Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure* and Article 17 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Rules. Where there is no suýh stipulation, the confidentiality is subject to the 
principles applicable to arbitration under the relevant law. On the issue of 
confidentiality, see supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 175 Article 6(7). 
176 Smit, 400. On the issue of liability, see Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 105- 
108. See also supra Chapter 11, Part 4.1. 
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agreement on the liability is also subject to mandatory requirements of 
the competent law. 
It was argued that, due to its rapid and complex character, emergency 
arbitral relief procedure might result in "a greater number of wrongful 
decisions than other proceedings. 077 Such result may also occur 
where an emergency arbitrator does not have necessary 
qualifications. 178 Consequently, emergency arbitrator and/or arbitral 
institution may be subject to liability claims. 179 The issue of liability is 
ultimately determined in accordance with the applicable law. Any fear 
that the emergency arbitrator or the relevant institution may be held 
responsible because of the emergency measures granted is simply 
unfounded. Any measure that proved to be wrong would be modified or 
revoked. Further, any damage that may occur due to a wrongful 
decision can be remedied from a security, posted by the moving party, 
that is, in most cases, a pre-condition for grant of emergency measure. 
Even in cases where no security was required, the emergency arbitrator 
or an arbitral tribunal formed later is generally capable of remedying 
any damage suffered due to the issuance of the emergency arbitral 
measure. In any case, experience shows that parties are hesitant to 
sue arbitrators or arbitration institutions for the above reasons. 180 
It seems that out of all emergency relief rules only the ICC Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Procedure, the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings, and the 
WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules contain express provisions in 
respect of emergency arbitrator's liability. In accordance with Article 
6(8) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, both the ICC and the 
177 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 107. 
178 Id. However, it is logical to assume that the relevant arbitral institution examines 
179 
thoroughly the qualifications of a candidate prior to his appointment. 
Id.; UN Doc A/CN. 9/263, para. 31; and UN Doc A/CN. 9/SR. 316, para. 39. 
1,30 See, e. g., Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 105-108. See also supra Chapter 
11, Part 4.1. 
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pre-arbitral referee is, in principle, exempt from liability. The referee 
may be held liable, in accordance with that Article, " for the 
consequences of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing. " 
Under Article 66 of the NAI Arbitration Rules, which contains the NAI 
Summary Arbitral Proceedings, no liability could be asserted on any of 
the Institution, the Administrator or an arbitrator for any act or omission 
so long as the arbitration is governed by the Rules. 
In accordance with Article 77 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules, except for 
deliberate wrongdoing neither an emergency arbitrator nor the WIPO 
would be liable for any act or omission in respect of emergency arbitral 
proceedings. 181 
2.16 Costs of Emergency Measure Proceedings 
The costs associated with emergency measure proceedings are 
generally apportioned between parties. 182 What are the costs 
associated with the proceedings? The costs generally comprise of 
administrative charges of the relevant institution, fees and expenses of 
the emergency arbitrator, 183 and costs of any expert, if appointed. 184 In 
accordance with the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedings, generally the 
losing party bears the costs and they may contain the ones mentioned 
181 Article 77 to the WIPO Arbitration Rules envisaged to be applicable to the Draft 
182 
Emergency Relief Rules, see Article 1 of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
See Article 7(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure; and Article 0-8 of the 
AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection. Under Article 18 of 
the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, the executive committee deals with the costs. 
183 The fees and expenses of the arbitrator generally fixed by the relevant institution 
by taking into account mainly the time spent and complexity of the case, and 
urgency of the matter. See Appendix A. 2 to the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure; Article 18 of the ECA Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, and Article XVI of the 
184 
WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
Article 7(1) of the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure. See also Articles XV and 
XVI of the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules. 
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above as well as 
representation. 
185 
expenses incurred in respect of legal 
2.17 Ex Parte Requests for Emergency Measures 
Almost all of the emergency measure procedures anticipate for inter 
partes proceedings for the grant of an emergency measure. 186 The 
WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules, however, contain a provision 
dealing with ex parte requests in Article X111. This Article provides that 
where notice to the respondent involves a "real risk" that the purpose of 
emergency relief proceedings would be defeated, a claimant may 
transmit its request only to the WIPO Dispute Resolution Centre but not 
to a respondent. 
The emergency arbitrator appointed by the WIPO, in accordance with 
Article VII of the Rules, considers those requests. The emergency 
arbitrator may decide to hear only the claimant in the absence of the 
respondent where there is a real risk that the emergency relief 
proceedings would be defeated. The test of real risk may be defined as 
it evidence of bad faith on the part of the other party, or an indication 
that notice would entail the risk that vital evidence might be destroyed 
or other irreparable damage [is] done. "' 87 
The emergency arbitrator shall conduct the proceedings in accordance 
with the WIPO Draft Emergency Relief Rules and renders an order, 
which is contractually binding upon the parties. 188 The form of the 
185 Article 42n of the NAI Summary Arbitral Proceedingsý and Articles 57-61 of the NAI 
Arbitration Rules. See also Award in Summary Arbitral Proceedings in Case No. 
2212 (28 July 1999), extracts published in XXVI YCA 198,207-208 (2001) (ruling 
186 
that the losing party should bear the costs incurred in the arbitral proceedings. ). 
However, under these proceedings, a party who was given proper notice to attend 
the proceedings fails to attend them, the proceedings can continue and a decision 
can be reached in its absence. See, e. g., Article 10(b)(iii) of the WIPO Draft 
187 
Emergency Relief Rules. 
Gurry, 3. 
188 Article X111(c)-(d). 
"08 
decision is intentionally chosen as "order" rather than "award" as it was 
rightly thought that an award rendered ex parte is not enforceable 
under Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention. 189 The failure to 
comply with an ex parte order is a breach of contract, and damages 
arising from such breach can be claimed in arbitration proceedings to 
be taken place later. 
Article X111(c) also provides a safeguard in order to give an opportunity 
to the respondent to be heard. That Article states that the order "shall 
be made subject to the condition that the order, and such further 
documentation as the Emergency Arbitrator considers appropriate, be 
served on the Respondent in the manner and within the time ordered 
by the Emergency Arbitrator 
The ex parte measure procedure is obviously derived from the concept 
of temporary restraining measures. The difficulty with this concept is 
that it is known in some legal systems but unfamiliar to many. 
Consequently, the application of that procedure may be considered a 
violation of public policy in some countries. 190 
3 Complementary Mechanisms: Can They be Useful / Effective 
Anyway? 
The objective of the complementary mechanisms is to lessen the need 
of courts' involvement in arbitration. These mechanisms can potentially 
reach this aim and thus can certainly be effective. However, the 
drafters of the mechanisms accept courts' constructive assistance that 
may be necessary in certain circumstances, e. g. for avoiding dissipation 
of assets. Thus save for the Procedural Rules 1994 of the Court of 
189 WIPO Document ARB/AC/111/96/3, para. 10. Article V(1)(b) provides that where a 
party is not given proper notice of appointment of arbitrators or proceedings or 
190 
unable to present its case, enforcement of the award rendered may be denied. 
Holtzmann, Remarks, 204. 
'109 
Arbitration for Sport, 191 none of the mechanisms provide for exclusive 
jurisdiction concerning interim protection to either the head or organ of 
the arbitration institution or the emergency arbitrator at the pre- 
formation stage of arbitration. 
The degree of effectiveness of emergency provisional measures is 
likely to depend on 
* "the particular circumstances of a given case"? 
192 
the reception of emergency measure procedures by a given legal 
193 
system , and 
o usage by businessmen. 
194 
The discussion on usefulness of the complementary mechanisms is 
generally channelled to the emergency arbitral provisional measure 
procedures. Indeed, the reintroduction of the complementary 
mechanisms by the ICC in 1990 was welcomed with both cheer and 
195 96 
suspicion . 
It was, for instance, considered as an "innovative"' 
91 mousetrap" that obviates, to a certain extent, the need of court 
involvement in regard of interim protection of rights. 197 However, the 
ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules were referred to in only five cases 
following their inception. 198 Perhaps partly because of its initial failure 
'91 See Chapter 111, supra Part 1. 192 Paulsson, Better Mousetrap, 216. 
193 Hausmaninger, Pre-Arbitral Referee, 105. On this aspect, see Chapter III, supra 
Part 2.13. 
194 On this see, Chapter 111, supra Part 3. 
195 E. g., Lord Mustill, "Comment" in: ICC(ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 118,121 
(stating that he would "be a little surprised if it [the pre-arbitral referee procedure] 
196 
can react as quickly to an emergency as a court operating at its best. "). 
See "The ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure: An Innovation in Dispute 
197 
Resolution", 1 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 18 (1990). 
See Paulsson, Better Mousetrap, 214. 
198 See [CC Doc No. 420/473, para. 13. In this regard, it is noteworthy that for a long 
period of time, there was only one dispute that referred to the ICC Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Procedure. See Eric A. Schwartz, "Comment" in- ICC (ed. ), The New 
- Paris 1998 ICC Rules of Arbitration, ICC Publication No. 512 (ICC Publishing, 
210 
to attract arbitrating parties' attention, it is indicated that the emergency 
measure procedures contain "too many basic uncertainties. "' 99 It is 
argued that the procedures must be "swift, " the requirements to grant 
emergency measures need to be "predictable" and sanctions for non- 
compliance with the emergency measure must be "available". 200 It is 
further stated in explaining why those procedures are not widely 
accepted: 
The [arbitral] institutions knew that it is vital to fulfilling their public 
responsibilities and to maintaining their credibility that they not 
lead parties into a procedure unless the institution has a sound 
basis for confidence that doing so will not result in legal 
uncertainties and be a breeding ground for expensive litigation. 
Further there was the danger that a party might use the 
institutional procedure only to find, perhaps after it was too late, 
that it should have gone immediately to a national court. 201 
However, on the contrary, it is thought that the availability of emergency 
arbitral measure procedure "from arbitration institutions offers the best 
"202 way forward for arbitration. This author agrees with this proposition. 
This is because the availability of such procedure "would work in the 
interests of the promotion and development of arbitration as an 
effective and comprehensive means of dispute resolution for 
international commercial disputes. 403 
It seems that several arbitration institutions find it useful to make the 
emergency arbitral provisional measure procedures available. These 
procedures, as explained above, generally provide for a swift resolution 
of a dispute at the pre-formation stage and give certain discretion to 
1997), 70,72. In this regard, see also Schwartz in: ICC (ed. ) Conservatory 
Measures, 64. 
"'9 Holtzmann, Remarks, 206. 
200 Id., 204. In this regard, Jarvin questions the usefulness of the ICC Pre-Arbitral 
Referee Procedure since the order of a pre-arbitral referee is, according to his 
20 
view, not enforceable. Jarvin, Alternative Solutions, 403. 
' Holtzmann, Remarks, 206. 
202 Gurry, 4. 
203 Id. 
211 
emergency arbitrators to handle the emergency measure requests. "' 
Certain sanctions are also available for those parties that do not abide 
with a decision of an emergency arbitrator. 205 In this regard, it is 
noteworthy that the mere existence of such a dispute resolution 
procedure at the vital stage of arbitration (prior to the appointment of 
arbitrators) where concurrent jurisdiction approach is open for abuse 
may have deterrent effect on a bad-faithed party. 206 What can make 
the emergency arbitral provisional measure procedures more effective 
and hence more acceptable to arbitration community is perhaps their 
enforcement at the both national and cross-border level. 
The availability of these complementary mechanisms and the test of 
their effectiveness bring into mind the question of their usage. The 
evidence demonstrates that there is a growing body of usage. Two 
references were made under the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules in 
2001.207 The AAA Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of 
Protection were used once, through submission, and several arbitrating 
parties referred to these rules in both domestic and international 
cases. 208 The NAI received 11 requests in 1999,20 requests in 2000, 
and 10 requests within the first eleven months of 2001 for interim 
protection of rights under the Summary Arbitral Proceedings . 
209 There 
were eight submissions to the Court of Arbitration for Sport for interim 
210 measures until December 2000 . 
204 See Chapter 111, supra Part 2.6. 205 See Chapter 111, supra Part 2.13. 206 See Lloyd, 18-19. 
207 See 13(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 14 (2002). 
208 As of 12 March 2001. The e-mail of Luis Fernandez, Vice President, AAA 
International Center for Dispute Resolution, to this author. 
209 As of 14 December 2000. The letter of F. D. von Hombracht-Brinkman, Managing 
Director, Netherlands Arbitration Institute, to this author. See also NAI Award in 
Summary Arbitral Proceedings in Case No. 2212 (28 July 1999), extracts 
21 
published in XXVI YCA 198 (2001). 
0 As of 11 December 2000. There were 59 cases registered with the Court as of 
that date according to the letter of Matthieu Reeb, Acting Secretary General, Court 
of Arbitration for Sport, to this author. 
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After all the complementary mechanisms are available and in use. 
Indeed, they are in the process of becoming trendy. 
4 Alternative Solutions to Complementary Mechanisms 
Holtzmann proposes two alternative methods to complementary 
mechanisms in filling up the lacunae where these mechanisms are 
unavailable . 
21 1 The first method is an obvious one: appointment of 
arbitral tribunal as soon as possible. This is possible in fast-track 
arbitration but parties may find, by agreement, other means for speedy 
appointment of their tribunal. 
The other method is taking certain self-help measures for eliminating 
the necessity for complementary mechanisms. The example given by 
. 
212 Holtzmann is on preservation of evidence. 
[I]f a party fears that the other side might destroy evidence, the 
party that has such fears could, simultaneously with commencing 
arbitration write a letter to the other side warning it against 
destroying particular evidence and warning that if such evidence 
becomes unavailable the arbitral tribunal would be asked to draw 
adverse inferences from its absence. That could be as effective 
as seeking an emergency interim measure - and far quicker. 
The above solutions are very creative and can be helpful in certain 
circumstances. However, these solutions could not always be as 
effective as the complementary mechanisms. 
Conclusion 
An arbitral tribunal, a party-determined authority is the natural judge for 
providing any relief even if the relief is sought on an interim basis. 
However, at the pre-formation stage, no relief can be obtained from the 
21 ' Holtzmann, Discussion, 215. 
212 Id. He continues by adding- "[t]hat is only one example; with little imagination, 
counsel could develop numerous other types of self-help measures along the 
same lines. " Id. 
1 
-3) 
tribunal as it is yet to be formed. That stage, however, constitutes a 
very important phase of arbitration and the fate of a dispute is generally 
213 determined at such stage . 
In the absence of the availability of provisional measures from a party- 
determined authority, courts are the only option for such measures. At 
the pre-arbitral stage, in fact, at all stages of arbitration, judicial support 
for obtaining provisional measures is, for certain circumstances, 
unavoidable and helpful for interim protection of arbitrating parties' 
rights. Indeed, complementary mechanisms do not generally provide 
214 
for or envisage to be exclusive means for the interim protection . 
However, there are several objections to referring a party who choose 
to arbitrate to a court for provisional measures: 
A request to a court at the pre-formation stage is against parties' 
choice of forum for resolution of their dispute and neutrality of 
that forum. 
0 It is an open invitation for abuse of court assistance. 
* Complementary mechanisms keep arbitration confidential. 
* The request to a court may, in some cases, be considered as a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate. 
Finally, assistance of judicial authorities may not always be 
(effectively) available thus complementary mechanisms may be 
the parties' only option at the pre-formation stage for provisional 
measures. 
By taking into account the above objections, the complementary 
mechanisms are proposed for remedying the lack of availability of 
provisional measures from a party determined authority. The 
complementary mechanisms envisage the grant of emergency 
213 See Chapter 111, supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
214 See Chapter 111, supra note 40 and supra Part 2.3.1.1. 
214 
provisional measures by a neutral / party-determined authority (an 
arbitrator, emergency arbitrator, pre-arbitral referee) at the pre- 
formation stage. The principle of party autonomy too supports the 
basis of the complementary mechanisms. The availability of these 
mechanisms has potentially deterrent effect on unnecessary requests 
for provisional measures to courts and thus may avoid forum shopping. 
The need for complementary mechanisms was recognised as early as 
1915.215 Nowadays, parties, in practice, can create a mechanism 
under which emergency provisional measures are available at the pre- 
216 formation stage . 
Arbitration institutions are also attempted to cure 
the lack of availability of arbitral provisional measures from a neutral 
party-appointed authority at that stage. For this purpose, 
complementary mechanisms to arbitration are introduced for preserving 
rights on an interim basis. At the outset, it should be noted that these 
mechanisms empower a neutral party-determined authority to grant 
provisional measures generally until the arbitral tribunal becomes 
operative. Further, these mechanisms do not create exclusive means 
of recourse. judicial involvement is not fully obviated. These 
mechanisms are twofold. First, arbitration rules of some arbitration 
institutions empower a person generally the head/president or an organ 
217 
of the institution to grant certain provisional measures . 
The measure 
taken by the relevant person / organ is morally binding upon the 
arbitrating parties. Failure of such measure could, however, be taken 
into account in calculation of damages or costs by the arbitral tribunal to 
be formed. This mechanism is resurrection of the mechanism created 
in the 1915. 
215 See Chapter 111, supra Part 1. 
216 See Chapter 111, supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
217 See Chapter III, supra Part 1. 
I 15 
Second, some other institutions, namely the ICC, the ECA, the NAI, 
and the AAA propose certain emergency arbitral provisional measure 
procedures under various nameS. 21 8 All of the above procedures aim at 
providing an effective mechanism for obtaining emergency arbitral 
relief. In order to reach that aim, an emergency arbitrator, under those 
procedures, is empowered, until the formation of arbitral tribunal to 
grant certain provisional measures. The. emergency arbitrator should 
be considered as an arbitrator as it judicially resolves an issue on an 
interim ba SiS. 219 
In shaping the above procedures, their drafters took into account three 
main principles . 
220 The first principle is the observance of the need to 
create a mechanism under which interim protection is provided for in a 
speedy manner. This need is, indeed, the reason for the creation of the 
emergency arbitral measure procedures. However, these procedures 
also observe the principles of party autonomy and of due process. 
The emergency arbitral provisional measure procedures are swift and 
effective. These procedures generally give wide discretion to the 
emergency arbitrator to deal with requests for emergency measure. A 
decision of the emergency arbitrator has certain weight and there are 
some remedies available against recalcitrant parties : 221 
An emergency arbitral measure has, by contract, binding 
effe Ct. 222 
* Such measure has also the backing of the relevant arbitration 
institution. 
218 See Chapter 111, supra Part 2. 
219 See Chapter I 11, supra Part 2.1. 
220 Id., Part 2. 
221 See Chapter III, supra Part 2.13. 222 Id. 
216 
e Damages may be ordered in case of failure to comply with 
the measure. 
The measure may, depending upon the applicable law 
(where an emergency arbitrator is considered as arbitrator), 
potentially be enforceable at the place where it is issued or 
elsewhere under the New York Convention. However, the 
possible clarity as to enforcement under national laws and 
the New York Convention would enhance the effectiveness of 
those measures. 
The emergency measure procedures assist facilitating effectiveness of 
arbitration in providing an effective means for interim protection of rights 
at the pre-formation stage. Indeed, there is a growing recognition and 
use of the emergency measure procedures. 
223 The existence and 
availability of these procedures 'offer best way forward for arbitration. ' 
For these procedures' further promotion and use, they should be made 
known to potential users. This author is of the opinion that, within the 
next decade or so, the complementary mechanisms' acceptance and 
usage will be dramatically increased. This is because of the 
importance of interim protection of rights at the pre-formation stage. 
223 Id. 
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CHAPTERIV 
ARBITRAL PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
Faced with a request for a provisional measure, an arbitral tribunal 
initially establishes whether it has the necessary power to grant such 
measure. Once the tribunal establishes its power, it then determines 
the standards of procedure and principles for the grant of such 
measure. The determination of these standards and principles is vital 
as it facilitates consistency and predictability of arbitration process, 
regardless of where arbitration takes place. ' Thus, such determination 
makes arbitration process more efficient. 
Arbitration rules and laws are generally silent concerning the standards 
and principles for the grant or an arbitral provisional measure. 
However, it should be noted, at the outset, that arbitrators are given 
broad powers and wide discretion in establishing such standards and 
principles. 2 In such establishment, it should be kept in mind that the 
Naimark I Keer, 23. 
Broad powers are generally given to arbitrators to supplement the applicable 
procedural rules at their discretion in order to avoid procedural particularities of 
national laws and local court procedure. See, e. g., Article 16 of the AAA-ICDR 
Arbitration Rules; Article 15(l) of the ICC Arbitration Rules; Article 14 of the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules; Article 20 of the Arbitration Rules 1999 of the Arbitration Institute 
of the SCC; Article 38 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules; Article 15(l) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 25(2) of the Egyptian Law 1994; Sections 
33(l) and 34 of the EAA 1996; Article 1494 of the French CCP; Article 19(2) of the 
Model Law; Article 1036 of the Netherlands AA-, Article 16 of the Portuguese 
Arbitration Law; Article 816 of the Italian CCP; Article 182 of the SPIL. The 
arbitrators' discretion to supplement the applicable procedural rules was initially 
provided under the Article 11 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1975. This Article was 
described as a "revolutionary innovation. " Eisemann, 398. This innovation was 
designed "to separate the arbitration, to the extent possible, from local procedural 
law. " Derains / Schwartz, 209. In this regard, see, e. g., Dominique Hascher, 'The 
Law Governing Procedure: Express or Implied Choice by the Parties - Contractual 
Practice, " ("Law Governing Procedure") in: van den Berg (ed. ), Planning Efficient 
Arbitration, 322. On the powers of arbitrators, see also supra Chapter 11, Part 1.2. 
It is noteworthy that UNCITRAL is currently undertaking a study on, inter alia, 
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standards and principles should be flexible for tailor-making the 
appropriate measure in accordance with circumstances of each 
3 individual case . In addition, the provisional nature of such measure 
and "the specific needs of international arbitral practiceA should, inter 
alia, be taken into account. 
In determining the standards of procedure and principles, arbitrators 
occasionally make reference to or inspire from various national laws, 
e. g. law of the place of arbitration or applicable substantive law, law of 
the place of enforcement. Nonetheless, where a national arbitration 
law is applicable as a default procedure or through a party agreement 
and such law makes reference to national procedural rules for the grant 
of provisional measures, these rules will apply to arbitral process. A 
reference to national procedural law is, however, hardly ever done in 
5 practice . 
In their establishment of the standards and principles, arbitration rules 
6 
or arbitral case law may provide guidance to arbitrators . 
arbitral provisional measures indicating applicable standards and principles. See 
A/C N. 9/WG. II PW P. 12 3. 
3 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 338. See also, e. g., Redfern / Hunter, 
para. 1-129 (indicating that "adaptability" is a principal advantage of arbitration). 
To this end, it is noteworthy that an arbitral tribunal has a duty to "adopt procedures 
suitable to the circumstances of the particular case" under Article 33(l) of the EAA 
1996. 
4 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 335. 
5 See, e. g., Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,299-300; and Marc 
Blessing, "The ICC Arbitral Procedure under the 1998 ICC Rules - What has 
Changed? ", 8(2) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 16,23 (1997) (stating that "the freeing of the 
international arbitral procedure from local procedural rules is one of the most 
significant milestones and achievements of international arbitration, and much of 
the worldwide success of arbitration and its recognition as the most reliable 
method for settling disputes ...... 
). 
In this regard, it should be noted that arbitrators would take into account and, if 
required, apply, the mandatory principles of the law of the place of arbitration 
and/or, if known, the law of place of enforcement. See, e. g., Bbsch, 7 (arguing that 
the arbitrator should take the law of the place of enforcement into account for 
serving the petitioner well by issuing enforceable interim measures. ). Otherwise, 
the arbitrator's decision would be set aside at the place of arbitration or refused to 
be enforced elsewhere. 
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Consequently, comparative appraisal of arbitration rules and in-debt 
analysis of arbitral case law are useful for providing guidelines to 
arbitrators for such determination. For the purpose of comparative 
analysis, seventy-two sets of arbitration rule S7 are examined .8 At the 
outset, it should be indicated that some of the forty-four sets of 
arbitration rules containing a provision on provisional measures deal 
with certain aspects of the standards of procedure and principles. 
Arbitral case law may provide guidance to arbitrators or "may be 
persuasive"9 of how an arbitral tribunal handles a request for an interim 
measure. 10 Apparently, one should accept that "there is little precedent 
in international commercial arbitration" and that each arbitral case is 
and should be considered individually. " Nevertheless, arbitral practice 
has been witnessing emergence of transnational procedural rules 
regarding arbitral provisional measures. 12 Such practice and rules 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
See Annex. For text of the rules, see, generally, Eric Bergsten (ed. ), International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer); and Jan Paulsson (gen. ed. ), International 
Handbook. 
The rules are chosen by taking into consideration the geographical location of the 
institutions, the size of their caseload and the type of disputes administered e. g., 
maritime, and intellectual property. 
Julian D. M. Lew, "Commentary on Interim Measures in ICC Arbitration Cases", 
11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 23 ("Commentary"). 
Yesilirmak, Interim Measures, 36. 
Lew, Commentary, 23. On the issue of precedential effect of arbitral decisions" 
see, e. g., Julian D. M. Lew, "The Case for the Publication of Arbitration Awards" in: 
Jan C. Schultsz / Albert J. van den Berg (eds. ), The Art of Arbitration (Deventer 
Kluwer 1982), 223-232; Horacio A. Grigera Na6n, "Editorial", 5(2) J Int'l Arb 5 
(1988); Berger, International International Economic Arbitration, 509-525; R. A. 
Schutze, "The Precedential Effect of Arbitration Decisions", 11(3) J Int'l Arb 69 
(1994); and Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,64 1, and Lew / Mistelis 
Kroll, paras. 2-31,2-43,1-44, and 2-46. 
See, e. g., Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,639-641; and Vratislav 
Pechota, "The Future of the Law Governing the International Arbitral Process. 
Unification and Beyond", 3 Am Rev Int'l Arb 17-29 (1992). Such transnational 
procedural rules undoubtedly affected from procedural principles common to many 
nations, and such works as the ILA Principles (see 67 ILA Rep 185 (1996))l- and 
the Draft European Model Law on Civil Procedure (see, e. g., Hakan Pekcanitez / 
Bilgehan Ye§ilova, "Avrupa Medeni Usul Kanunu Tasarisi ve Degerlendiriimesi" 
(European Draft Model Law on Civil Procedure and Its Examination) in- Dokuz 
EylOl University (ed. ), Prof Dr. Mahmut T. Birsel'e Armagan (Izmir 2001), 335. But 
see, e. g., Christoph W. 0. Stoecker, "The Lex Mercatoria- To What Extent Does it 
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owes much to the freedom given to arbitrators in regard of granting 
provisional measures, in particular, and of establishing rules of 
procedure in general. 13 In this regard, it is noteworthy that although 
most arbitral tribunals were very "cautious" about granting interim 
measures until the beginning of the 1990S, 14 the trend is in the process 
ofchange. 15 To this end, it should further be noted that the difficulty to 
shed a light to the practice is extreme. That difficulty is generally 
16 related to confidentiality in arbitration . However, there are a few 
Exist? ", 7(1) J Int'l Arb 101-126 (1990) (arguing that there is no room in arbitration 
13 
for lex mercatoria arbitralis. ). 
See, Chapter IV, supra note 2. Further, this Chapter IV examines from the 
beginning to the end, the arbitrators' freedom in regard of issuing provisional 
measures. 
14 Indeed, for instance, Broches stated, during the preparation of the ICSID 
Convention, that "experience indicated that arbitral tribunals were extremely loath 
to order provisional or interim measures and one should have some confidence in 
the self-restraint which tribunals would impose upon themselves. " History, 516. 
See also Sanders, Procedures, 453-454 (indicating that in the mid 1970s, "[t]he 
question of interim measures only occasionally present[ed] itself in an arbitration. "). 
Even in the 1980s, an arbitral tribunal stated that it "has anguished over the 
wisdom of granting interim relief ...... 
See Southern Seas Navigation Ltd v. 
Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico City, 606 F. Supp. 692,693 (S. D. N. Y. 1985). The 
approach taken today towards that issue described by an arbitral tribunal- "[t]he 
imposition of provisional measures is an extraordinary measure which should not 
be granted lightly by the Arbitral Tribunal. " Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, 
Procedural Order No. 2 (28 October 1999), extracts reprinted in XXVII YCA 13,18 
(2002). 
The success rate of interim measure requests is reported to be fifty percent 
(twenty five out of fifty cases). See Naimark / Keer, 25. See also, in this regard, 
M. I. M. Aboul-Enein, "Issuing Interim Relief Measures in International Arbitration in 
the Arab States", 3(1) J World Inv 77,81 (2002) (indicating that forty percent of the 
requests concerning provisional measures are accepted under the practice of the 
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration. ). This is due 
mainly to arbitrators' recognition of the importance of interim protection of 
arbitrating parties' rights. See Introduction, notes 57-76 and accompanying text. 
But see Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, para. 23-4 (stating that "[i]nterim measures are 
granted only in limited circumstances as they can be determinative of the dispute 
and may be hard or even impossible to repair. "); and Born, International Arbitration, 
933. The last author indicates that arbitrators' hesitance for granting provisional 
measures is based on the fact that their power arose from a private agreement, 
that there are many uncertainties surrounding arbitral provisional measures and 
that such measures are not self-executing. Id. In addition, according to Born, 
arbitrators may be concerned that, by issuing the provisional measure requested, 
they would pre-judge the merits of the case in dispute or would appear impartial. 
Id. Further, the grant of arbitral provisional measures is, according to him, "time- 
16 
consuming and distracting. " Id. But see supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 
On the issue of confidentiality and its effect concerning publication of arbitral 
decisions, see supra Chapter 11, Part 1-1- 
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exceptions. The practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 17 which 
operates under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 18 and of a number of 
ICSID tribunals are easily accessible. 19 Likewise, some ICC and AAA 
17 The Tribunal has established under serious of extraordinary events that took place 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran") and their reflection in the U. S. A crisis 
occurred as a result of various reasons between Iran and the U. S. in 1979, and this 
crisis led to seizure of the U. S. Embassy in Iran as a result of which a number of 
Americans were held hostage, and to freeze of Iranian assets worth over 8 billion 
dollars in the U. S. See, e. g., Aldrich, 2-6; Aida Avanessian, Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal in Action (London I Dordrecht I Boston: Graham & Trotman I 
Martinus Nijhoff 1993), 1-5; and, generally, W. Christopher / H. H. Saunders I G. 
Sick, R. Carswell I R. H. Davis I J. E. Hoffman, Jr. / R. B. Owen, American 
Hostages in Iran - The Conduct of a Crisis (London I New Haven. Yale University 
Press 1985) Iran and the U. S. eventually found a peaceful solution by agreement 
called the Algiers Accords. The Accords contain a number of declarations 
(Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 
19 January 1981 (the "General Declaration"), and the Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 January 1981 (the "Claims 
Settlement Declaration"), collectively reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 1-12), 
undertakings (Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration 
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 19 January 
1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 13-15), and some technical documents (e. g., 
Escrow Agreement, 20 January 1981, and the other technical documents 
collectively reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 16-54). The Accords provide for the 
release of Iranian assets frozen in the U. S. and the transfer of those assets to an 
escrow account held by the Central Bank of Algeria. Upon realisation of the 
transfer, as envisaged by the Accords, the hostages were released. The Accords 
also provide for the settlement of claims between a government and a national of 
the other State in a "binding arbitration. " See General Principle B of the General 
Declaration. See also, generally, Articles I and 11 of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration. For this purpose, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was established. The 
Tribunal composes of three chambers and nine arbitrators. See Article 111(l) of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration. "All decisions and the awards of the Tribunal shall 
be final and binding. " Article IV(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
The Rules have employed with slight modifications by the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal. See Article 111(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. The 
modified version of the Rules does not contain any material change concerning 
Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See Final Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure (3 May 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 405-442, and Provisionally 
Adopted Tribunal Rules (10 March 1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 57-94. 
19 Surely, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's practice is the most important source of 
information on the interpretation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. There is an 
abundant amount of publications on the Tribunal's practice. See, e. g., Charles N. 
Brower I Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal (The Hague I Boston 
/ London: Martinus Nijhoff 1998)' George H. Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal (6xford: Clarendon Press 1996), and J. J. van Hof, 
Commentary on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules - The Application by the Iran - 
U. S. Claims Tribunal, (Deventer / Boston: Kluwer 1991). ("Interim Measures"). 
Indeed, the case law of the Tribunal has already "lead to a better understanding 
7-)-, 
cases concerning provisional measures are also accessible because 
either their extracts are published or certain articles / notes touched 
upon / examined them. 20 Similarly, a small number of arbitral decisions 
issued in accordance with various other arbitration rules have been 
published. Apart from the above publications, this author has had the 
benefit of researching through some of the decisions of arbitral tribunals 
on provisional measures at the AAA and the ICC. The outcome of that 
research will also be dealt with below. 
The research at the AAA extends to a period between late 1997 and 
early 2000 but excludes then pending files . 
The research was done 
through 613 files in English of the AAA- lCDR. 
21 Out of the files 
examined, there were twenty-two cases where requests for provisional 
and growing confidence in the smooth functioning of the Rules Berger, 
International Economic Arbitration, 64. See also, e. g., Charles H. Brower, "The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 224 RCADI 123,170-174 (1990-V), and 
Caron, Interim Measures, 468. The Tribunal "consistently filled the gaps in its 
procedural rules by reference to customary international arbitration practice and 
not, for example, by reference to Dutch law [as it is the law of the place of 
arbitration]. " See Caron, Interim Measures, 472. See also, e. g., E-Systems, Inc. v. 
Iran, Bank Melli Iran, Case No. 388, Interim Award No. ITM 13-388-FT (4 February 
1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 51-57. The Tribunal's practice, due partly to 
many references to the customary rules, provides for guidance in regard of uniform 
interpretation of arbitration rules on interim protection. For ICSID tribunals' 
practice regarding provisional measures see, e. g., Parra, The Practices in. ICC 
(ed. ), Provisional Measures, 37. Some decisions of ICSID tribunals are available 
in the ICSID' s web page at <www. wb-icsid. org> and some others are published in 
ICSID Reports. 
0 For decisions of ICC tribunals on provisional measures, see, e. g., Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 45-69; and Yesilirmak, Interim Measures, 36. Further, 
various issues of the Clunet, YCA, and Swiss Arbitration Association Bulletin 
contain a quite number of decisions on the same issue of ICC tribunals and of 
some other tribunals. For decisions of AAA tribunals see, e. g., Michael F. 
Hoellering, "The Practices and Experience of the American Arbitration 
Association", in- ICC (ed. ), 1998 ICC Rules, 31-36. Aboul-Enein indicates in 
regard of the practice of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration that the Centre administered 50 cases in 2000. In the same year, ten 
requests were made for provisional measures. Six of those denied meanwhile four 
were granted. Aboul-Enein, 81. 
21 The Center deals mainly with, where there is an international element, cases held 
under the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules, the AAA Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Procedures, and the Arbitration Rules of the Inter-American Arbitration 
Commission. The Center administers disputes regarding variety of areas of law 
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measures were made. 22 In twelve of those cases, arbitral tribunals 
reached no decision because either the case was withdrawn or came to 
an end for another reason. In six cases, the requests were granted In 
the form of an order or a partial award. In the remaining four cases, the 
requests were denied. 
The researches at the ICC cover two periods. The first period is 
between the mid-eighties and 1998. Nearly 75 awards dealing with 
provisional measures were found. 23 The second period covers a year 
commencing from January 1999. The research on the second period 
was done through awards in English and thirty awards were found 
24 
concerning interim measures . 
As compared to the previous research, 
there is a clear increase in the requests for provisional measures in ICC 
arbitration. 
This Chapter examines the standards of procedure and principles for 
the grant of provisional measures. It deals with (i) initiation of arbitral 
and administers cases under several other arbitration rules. In this regard, see 
22 
<www. adr. org>. 
The cases examined were dealing with such issues as sales, employment, joint 
marketing, service, manufacturing, distribution, development agent, consulting, 
capital contribution, mining and exploitation, franchising, option, driver, purchase, 
operating, resale of software, construction, software distribution, non-disclosure, 
and representation agreements. The parties to those cases were from such 
countries as Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, England, France, 
Germany, India, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, and the U. S. Undoubtedly, 
the number of provisional measure requests made before AAA arbitral tribunals is 
a lot more than the number found by this author as the files of the cases then 
23 
pending could not be examined. 
Twenty-three of those awards published in the Spring 2000 issue of the ICC Int'l Ct 
Arb Bull. 
24 The cases examined were dealing with such agreements as agency, construction, 
delivery, distribution, joint venture, mining, print and supply, power purchase, 
procurement and co-operation, purchase, sale of goods and service, intellectual 
property licence, share purchase, software, and supply and service. The parties to 
those cases were, inter alia, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Bermuda, Brazil, the 
British Virgin Islands, China, Egypt, England, France, Germany, Hungary, Iran, 
Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the U. S. In this regard, see also 
Lew, Commentary, 23, note 3. It should be indicated that these are the decisions 
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proceedings for a provisional measure, (ii) priority of the proceedings, 
(iii) requirements for the grant of the measure, (iv) its form, (v) Its 
duration, (vi) its reconsideration, modification or revocation, (vii) types 
of provisional measures, (viii) ex parte provisional measures, (ix) costs 
in regard of those measures, and (x) the issue of damages. 
1 Initiation of Proceedings for Arbitral Provisional Measures 
There are mainly two issues to tackle with- who initiates the 
proceedings and what should the request contain? 
1.1 Who Initiates the Proceedings: A Party or the Tribunal 
A proceeding for an arbitral provisional measure is generally initiated 
through a party request. Indeed, "[a] situation in which interim 
measures would be required but where no party makes a request is 
,, 25 difficult to conceive . 
In conformity with this, the view that the request 
should be party-oriented is confirmed by twenty-seven sets of the rules 
26 
surveyed . 
However, arbitral tribunals are, occasionally, empowered, 
under some rules, to grant a provisional measure without a party 
requeSt. 
27 Many national laws too require a party request for interim 
28 
protection of rights . 
that the author was able to found and that there may be more decisions dealing 
with provisional measures than the cases found by this author. 
25 Caron, Interim Measures, 481. Indeed, a party request was essential under the 
ICC Arbitration Rules 1931. See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.1.3. But see for a case 
where the tribunal is granted sua sponte, without a request from any party, 
26 
Hoellering, The Practices, 33-34. 
Annex. 
27 Rule 7(9) of the Arbitration Rules 2000 of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; 
Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules of the ICSID; Article 47 of the Arbitration Rules of 
the ICSID Additional Facility; Article 1134 of the North American Free Trade Area 
Agreement ("NAFTA"); Rule 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the SIAC. See 
also Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 15 Documents of 
the United Nations Conference on International Organization 355 (San Fransisco, 
1945) ("ICJ Statute"); and Article 66 (4) of the Rules of the International Court of 
Justice, Acts and Documents concerning the Organization of the Court, No. 2,3 
(1972) and No. 3,93 (1977) ("ICJ Rules"). 
28 See, e. g., Article 17 of the Model Law; and Article 183(l) of the SPIL. 
Giving arbitrating parties an initiative to seek a provisional measure, if 
they need it, is a matter of party autonomy. 29 In contrast, the main 
purpose of empowering an arbitral tribunal to grant a measure upon its 
own initiative in international commercial arbitration is for perhaps to 
avoid aggravation of a dispute and; thus, enabling the tribunal to 
proceed with arbitration smooth ly. 30 
Some of the rules surveyed do not deal with the issue of who makes 
the request at all. Nonetheless, it should be safe to assume that it Is, in 
principle, a party who should apply for a measure since the principle of 
party autonomy is one of the paramount principles of international 
commercial arbitration. It should, in this regard, be noted that if both 
parties make a joint request for the same measure, then there is a 
strong incentive for a tribunal to comply with the request. 
1.2 What Should a Request Contain? 
A party request for a provisional measure should contain certain 
elements. Rule 39(l) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, for instance, 
describes these elements and may, in this author's view, be used as 
guidance where the applicable arbitration rules are silent. In 
accordance with that Rule, the request should "specify the rights to be 
preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested 
29 See, e. g., Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 335. 
30 It should be noted that none of the ICSID tribunals seem to have practised, in light 
of the published decisions, the power to recommend a provisional measure upon 
its own initiative. In Holiday Inns v. Morocco (see Lalive, 133), MINE v. Guinea 
(see 4 ICSID Rep 41), Amco Asia Corporation, Pan American Development 
Limited and P. T. Amco Indonesia v. Republic of Indonesia (see 1 ICSID Rep 410), 
and Vacuum Salt v. Ghana (see 4 ICSID Rep 423), Maffezini v. The Kingdom of 
Spain (see Procedural Order No. 2 (28 October 1999), extracts published in XXVII 
YCA 17 (2002)) the requests for provisional measures were made by one of the 
parties whereas in Atlantic Triton v. Guinea (see Friedland, Provisional Measures, 
344) both parties had requested certain provisional measures. To this end, it is 
noteworthy that, in Vacuum Salt v. Ghana, the tribunal reserved to act upon its own 
initiative to make a recommendation, should the need arise. See Decision 3 of the 
Tribunal, 14 June 1993,4 ICSID Rep 328. 
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and the circumstances that necessitate such measures .,, 
3 1 The last 
item is important as without a good cause no measure would probably 
be granted. The detailed analysis of the reasons further "enable 
comments by the other party and deliberations by the tribunal. , 32 
Where the request does not contain any of the above elements, the 
tribunal may undoubtedly require the relevant party to supply further 
information concerning the above elements prior to rendering its 
decision. 
It should further be noted that the request does not necessarily be in 
33 
writing . 
The request may also be made orally, for instance, during the 
hearings. 34 
2 Priority of Proceedings on Request for Provisional Measures 
Since the purpose of a provisional measure is interim protection of 
rights pending final award, priority should be given to a request for this 
measure. Also the request should be dealt with, as much as possible, 
in a short period of time. 
Giving priority to and handling with in a speedy manner of requests for 
provisional measures are expressly required only in a small number of 
31 See also Article 66(l) of the ICJ Rules. Apparently, the response to the request 
should too contain the same elements as the request. For example, 
Rule 23 of the 
Arbitration Rules of the CCIG states that "[t]he tribunal shall request the 
respondent party to state its position. " A list of elements that may 
be contained for 
a request for emergency arbitral measures may provide guidance 
for determining 
the list of elements for provisional measures. On what should a request contain 
for 
32 
emergency arbitral measures, see supra Chapter 111, Part 
2.4. 
Caron, Interim Measures, 480. 
33 But see id. 
34 See Pellonpj; j / Caron, 438. Further, Caron states in respect of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal's practice that "the Tribunal accepted initially, in at least one 
instance, an oral request by a party for interim measures. 
" Caron, Interim 
Measures, 480-481, note 45. 
-) 1 
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rules. 35 For instance, under the ICSID arbitration system, there seems 
to be an "assumption that to preserve the rights of a party [a] speedy 
action may be required". 36 By relying on this assumption, Rule 39(2) of 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that the consideration on a request 
for provisional measures shall have priority. It is, indeed, this author's 
experience that nearly all requests for interim measure are handled with 
a certain speed and generally priority is given to such requests . 
37 
Due to the priority given to a request for provisional measures, many 
commentators argue that the request tends to disrupt or delay 
arbitration proceedings . 
38 It is difficult to agree with this argument39 as 
it is very easy for an arbitral tribunal to distinguish whether or not the 
request is flagrant. Further, it should be kept in mind that "[t]he main 
rule will be that the arbitral process will continue undisturbed by the 
request. , 40 Furthermore, the request for an interim measure may have 
41 positive effect in resolution of the dispute . 
35 See, e. g., Rule 23 of the CCIG Arbitration Rules; Article R37 of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Rules; and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
Article 66(2) of the ECJ Rules is also noteworthy. "[a] request for the indication on 
interim measures of protection shall have priority over all other cases. The 
36 
decision thereon shall be treated as a matter of urgency. " 
37 
Note C to the ICSID Arbitration Rules 1968,1 ICSID Rep 99. 
ICSID arbitral tribunals, for example, not only gave priority to the requests for 
provisional measures but they also dealt with them in a "reasonable speed. " 
Schreuer, Article 47,228, para. 43. In fact, the requests before the ICSID tribunals 
were generally responded approximately within two to five months. Id., 229, para. 
43. Similarly, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal too gives priority to such requests. 
Indeed, the Tribunal uses temporary restraining measures for dealing with very 
urgent applications. On temporary restraining measures, see Chapter IV, infra 
Part 4. For such applications, the Tribunal generally renders its decision upon 
38 
hearing both parties within a reasonable time. 
See, e. g., History, 814; and Karrer, Less Theory, 110. See also Chapter IV, supra 
note 15. 39 Karrer, Less Theory, 110. 
40 Id. 
41 Karrer rightly states that 
a request may have an overall speeding up effect. A motion for interim 
measures may be used to "load up" a terms of reference hearing with matters 
which will become important on the merits of a main claim anyway and whose 
discussion may be significantly furthered by early attention. 
22 8 
3 Requirements to Grant a Measure 
For the grant of any provisional measure on an interim basis either by 
courts or arbitrators, there needs to be "a strong showing of an 
42 immediate and compelling need". Apparently, such showing is sought 
for minimizing "the risk of making an order which may turn out to be 
premature and erroneous after the facts and law have been fully 
developed at the hearing on the merits of the dispute. Y43 Apart from the 
above need, national arbitration IaWS44 and arbitration agreements, (by 
incorporation, arbitration ruleS45 ) do not generally deal, in detail, with 
46 the requirements to grant arbitral provisional measures . Arbitration 
rules generally contain a broad language, which leaves a quite-wide 
room for discretion. Twenty-seven out of forty-three sets of the rules 
(that permit arbitral provisional measures) surveyed deal with the 
By asking for urgent preliminary relief, a party can dramatize its request on the 
main point. If an interim relief was requested, but denied, or if interim measures 
are in place that may turn out to be wrongly taken, then arbitral tribunal will tend 
to speed up proceedings on the main point so that the impact of the interim 
measures or their absence is minimized. 
I d. 
42 Wagoner, 73. Indeed, "the more the requested measure affects the rights of the 
party concerned the more diligence is required from the arbitral tribunal in 
ascertaining" and adjudging the need. See Berger, International Economic 
Arbitration, 336. 
43 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 336. 
44 Karrer indicates that "[t]he lex arbitri says of course nothing about the matter. " 
Karrer, Less Theory, 104. It is needless to say that each legal system contains 
certain requirements for the grant judicial provisional measures. See Chapter IV, 
45 
infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that, for instance, even the drafting history of 
the ICSID Convention does not shed much light to the circumstances under which 
the grant of provisional measures is appropriate. See History, 337,422, and 515. 
Arbitrating parties may, nonetheless, set forth, in their arbitration agreement, the 
requirements to grant arbitral provisional measures, though such reference is, if 
46 
ever, rarely made in practice. 
However, there are a few exceptions. For instance, Article 32 of the Rules of 
Procedure 1993 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Attached to the Chamber of 
Economy of Slovenia provides for a well-detailed explanation of the requirements, 
Under these Rules, prior to granting a measure, the tribunal may require 
"demonstration of the probability of the existence of the claim and of the danger 
that obtaining of the relief or remedy sought would otherwise become impossible or 
considerably more difficult. " Further, it should be noted with interest that, in 
accordance with Note A to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, "the parties should not take 
steps that might aggravate or extend their dispute or prejudice the execution of 
award. " See 1 ICSID Rep 99. 
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requirements to grant arbitral provisional measures . 
47 Twenty-two sets 
of the rules refer the requirements as "where the tribunal deems 
necessa ry, 
48 
or under "appropriate circumstances. , 
49 In addition, the 
survey demonstrates that a circumstance may be appropriate where the 
purpose of a measure is related to securing a claim, which is tried by 
50 the tribunal , or the measure is aimed at preventing events, which 
could, otherwise, not be avoided . 
51 The requirement of "necessity" may 
also be, in many cases, paired with "urgency". 52 
The above explanations demonstrate that the texts of arbitration rules 
are not very clear and helpful as to the requirements for the grant of 
arbitral provisional measures. The clarity is obviously as important as 
the existence of the right for interim protection. That is because the 
lack of clarity may cause problems on the exercise of the right itself by 
arbitrating parties and thus may "affect the rights of the parties to a 
significant extent. ), 53 The lack of clarity is mainly based on the following 
issues: 
0 "[i]n international practice authority to prescribe provisional 
measures was left to the appreciation of the tribunal, presumably 
because it was difficult to foresee [in advance] the types of 
situations that might arise "1 54 
47 Annex. 
48 See, e. g., Article 21 of the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules; and Article 26 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In regard of the last Rules, Pellonp6; Ji & Caron 
suggest that "the Rules provide that [in order to be granted] interim measures 
should be necessary - not just "desirable" or "recommendable. 
" (Emphasis in the 
49 
original. ). Pellonptiýj / Caron, 441. 
See, e. g., Article 23 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
50 Article 31 of the Arbitration Rules 1999 of the Arbitration Institute of the SCC. 
51 See Article 14 of the International Arbitration Rules 1996 Chamber of National and 
International Arbitration of Milan. 
52 See, in this respect, Article 21 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the ECA. 
53 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 335. It should also be noted that "[i]t is 
in the interest of justice that certainty in the exercise of the arbitrators' 
discretion 
54 .... 
" Peter Bowsher, "Security for Costs", 63 Arbitration 36,38 (1997). 
See History, 515. 
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arbitral tribunals may apply procedural (or, rarely, substantive) 
laws on the determination of the requirements . 
55 
accordingly, 
there is no commonly agreed harmonised one set of principles 
56 that would provide guidance for parties and arbitrators, and 
in cases where the tribunal uses his own discretion, if permitted, 
for determination of the requirements, there is relatively little 
information on the actual practice of arbitrators on interim 
protection for rights. 
In establishing the requirements for the grant of provisional measures, 
an arbitral tribunal, in the absence of a party agreement, may, for 
instance, adopt the principles of the applicable procedural law. 57 
55 The parties or arbitrators are generally empowered to subject the arbitration 
proceedings to a national law. Apparently, that law is likely to be the law of the 
place of arbitration. Indeed, in the Interim Award 8786 of 1996 (extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 81-84 (2000)) the arbitral tribunal applied the local 
standards for the grant of an interim measure. In this respect, it should be noted 
that not for long ago, arbitrators usually applied the law of the place of arbitration to 
56 
the procedural issues, including (at least certain) interim measures. 
That is because the applicable procedural laws may differ depending mainly upon 
the place of arbitration. Also there is another reason why those laws should not be 
chosen as the applicable law- the place of arbitration 'is generally determined as a 
geographically convenient neutral venue; thus, there is "no good reason to rely on 
the law of civil procedure of the seat of arbitration to fill the gap. " Karrer, Less 
57 
Theory, 104. 
E. g., law of the place of arbitration or any other law applicable to arbitration. See, 
e. g., Yesilirmak, Interim Measures, 34; Cremades, The Need, 228; NAI Interim 
Award 1694 of 1996, extracts published in XXIII YCA 97-112 (1998). See also 
Chapter IV, supra notes 2 and 55 and accompanying text. Indeed, to the extent 
provisional measures considered as procedural issues, until a few decades ago, 
the law of the place of arbitration was applicable in the absence of a party 
agreement to contrary. See, e. g., Article 16 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1955; and 
Article 15 of the Draft Uniform Law on Inter-American Arbitration, Inter-American 
Juridical Yearbook (1955-1957) (Pan American Union, Washington, D. C. 1958), 
219. Article 11 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1975, for instance, changed the above 
practice. For the view that an arbitrator should disassociate himself from both the 
legal system to which he belongs and procedural law of the place of arbitration, 
see Rubino-Sammartano, 650. The requirements, under common law, for the 
grant of provisional measures generally are the existence of irreparable harm-, 
likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious question as regards the 
merits of the dispute in question, and a balance of hardship tipping towards the 
applicant. The requirements, in civil law countries, generally are fumus bonijuris 
(summary finding that the claim is founded) and periculurn in mora (danger that 
rights may be impaired by the lapse of time). Further, it is submitted that similar 
23) 1 
Alternatively, the tribunal may either rely on the past experience of its 
individual memberS58 or transnational arbitral procedural rules / 
customary rules for supplementing arbitration rules. 59 It is submitted, 
as an example to the former, that "arbitral tribunals should grant or 
deny interim measures on the basis of a comparative ,, 
60 law approach. 
According to this suggestion arbitral tribunals should consider the 
following criteria: "fumus boni iuris, periculum in mora, and 
proportionality. , 61 In addition, cases on interim protection of rights 
under public international IaW62 or growing number of arbitral decisions 
on provisional measures may provide guidance to the tribunal. 63 
This author suggests that in granting a provisional measure, an arbitral 
tribunal, can, in principle take guidance from arbitral case law, 
comparative analysis of arbitration rules and scholarly opinions. The 
examination of arbitral case law, the texts of arbitration rules and 
scholarly opinions demonstrates that there are positive and negative 
requirements that arbitrators generally apply for the issuance of a 
provisional measure. In addition, the grant of a measure may be 
requirements need to be satisfied for the grant of provisional measures by both 
courts and arbitrators in most of the Arab states. Aboul-Enein, 79. 
58 Caron, Interim Measures, 472 
59 In this regard, see Chapter IV, supra notes 2,12 and 13 and accompanying text. 
60 Karrer, Less Theory, 104. 
61 Id., 104. See also Article 17 of the Joint American Law Institute / UNIDROIT 
Working Group on Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, 
UNIDROIT 2002, Study LXXVI-Doc 7 (May 2002) ("UNIDROIT Principles"). 
Further, the condition "periculum in mora" may be applied by a tribunal operating 
under the SPIL. See Wirth, 37-38. Fumus boni iuris may be referred to prima 
facie establishment of a case or likelihood of success on the merits of the case 
whereas periculum in mora is similar to imminent danger, serious or substantial 
prejudice to a right if the measure sought is not granted. On which see Chapter IV, 
62 
Parts 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, respectively. 
For instance, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal referred, in many of its decisions, to the 
ICJ's case law. The Tribunal chooses to follow the practice of that court perhaps 
because many of the members of it were/are lawyers practicing public international 
law. Such approach may also be attributable to the mixed nature of the Tribunal. 
On the mixed nature of the Tribunal, see, e. g., David D. Caron, "The Nature of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International 
Dispute Resolution", 84 Am J Int'l L 104 (1990). 
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subject to a security for damages. Further, the request for a measure 
could be dismissed upon an undertaking of a party not to infringe the 
right that is subject of the interim protection. 
In case the tribunal refrains from granting the request because, for 
instance, the balance of arbitrating parties' interests does not fully 
justify the measure or any of the above requirements are not met, it 
may nonetheless believe that rights of one or both parties may actually 
or potentially be infringed. In such cases, the tribunal can expedite the 
64 arbitration proceedings to mitigate the possible harm . 
It is noteworthy for evidencing the satisfaction of the requirements that 
"the facts supporting the request for interim measures of protection 
63 Apparently, customary rules or case law has no binding effect on the tribunal. See 
64 
Chapter IV, supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
For instance, a dispute related to contracts regarding various infrastructure 
projects, the contractors brought a claim for, inter alia, termination of the contract 
and release of the performance guarantees given to the Employer. During the 
proceedings, the contractors requested from the tribunal, as an interim measure, 
to order the employer not to pursue the cashing of the guarantees. The 
respondent argued that the term of the guarantees would expire prior to the 
termination of arbitration proceedings therefore they should be encashed and put 
into an escrow account. The tribunal rejected this argument for, inter alia, that 
such solution "could potentially create considerable cash flow problems" to the 
claimants but suggested the claimants to extend the term of the guarantees to a 
certain period of time. The tribunal also considered [despite the possibility of 
having a lengthy arbitration proceedings] that, in its view, the best solution was to 
render an award as soon as possible Indeed, the tribunal rendered its final 
award within a year from its decision on the interim measure request. ICC Final 
Award 9928 of 1999 (unpublished). A similar result reached in an AAA case. The 
dispute, in this case, arose from an exclusive distributorship agreement. The 
claimant requested a preliminary injunctive relief preventing the respondent, as Its 
distributor, from selling any competitive products due to the distribution agreement. 
The respondent claimed that the agreement was invalid and unenforceable. The 
tribunal denied the preliminary relief request, adjudication of which, according to 
the tribunal went to the 'very heart of the case. ' However, the tribunal noted that 
the final adjudication in the case should be "conducted as expeditiously as 
possible. Indeed, the tribunal rendered its final award within six months from its 
order on the request. Order of 1999 in AAA Case No. 50-T-133-00112-99 
(unpublished). 
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65 have to be substantiated by prima facie evidence". Thus, an interim 
measure could be ordered where there is mere probability of "the 
relevant facts and rights. , 66 The probability requires a summary 
assessment of such facts and rights. This assessment is justified with 
the interim nature of provisional measures. 67 
This Part examines those positive and negative requirements, security 
for damages and the effect of an undertaking by a party. 
3.1 The Positive Requirements 
Arbitration rules commonly refer to "necessity" as a positive 
68 
requirement to grant a provisional measure . 
This reference implies 
that, for the grant of a provisional measure, there needs to be an 
imminent danger of prejudice to a right of an applicant should an urgent 
action not taken. In other words, the imminent danger should 
necessitate an urgent action. Accordingly, two positive requirements 
arise from the requirement of "necessity": urgency and prejudice . 
69 1n 
addition to the above two, in light of the arbitral case law, comparative 
analysis of arbitration rules and scholarly opinions, there are three more 
positive requirements. The requirements for the grant of a provisional 
. 70 measure collectively are. 
* prima facie establishment of jurisdiction', 
65 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 336. See also ICC Interlocutory Award 
10596 of 2000 (unpublished) (the tribunal applied "a prima facie standard of 
review. "). 66 Wirth, 38. 
67 Id. It is also noteworthy that the tribunal should give reasons where it grants the 
measure requested. If the reasons for interim protection of rights "are understood, 
there is a better chance that they will be obeyed in the right spirit. " Karrer, Less 
68 
Theory, 109. 
69 
See Chapter IV, supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
Caron, Interim Measures, 491. 
70 A similar list of requirements was suggested by, e. g., Blessing, Introduction, para. 
857. In this regard, this author agrees with Blessing that the availability of a 
concurrent power of a national judge to issue an interim measure has no relevance 
in the tribunals' decision on whether or not to issue an interim measure. Id., para. 
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* prima facie establishment of case; 
o urgency; 
0 Imminent danger, serious or substantial prejudice if the 
measure requested is not granted; and 
proportionality. 
3.1.1 Prima Facie Establishment of Jurisdiction 
It is not unusual in arbitration for an arbitral tribunal to face with a 
request for a provisional measure prior to submissions of arbitrating 
71 
parties . 
It is equally usual that the tribunal has to deal with such 
requests despite the fact that its jurisdiction has not yet been definitively 
established or, perhaps, is under challenge. However, the 
establishment of full jurisdiction would usually take certain or in some 
cases a lengthy period of time. Time is of the essence for interim 
protection of rights. Accordingly, in order to remedy the necessity for 
urgency, the existence of prima facie jurisdiction is generally considered 
72 
satisfactory for the grant of a provisional measure . 
For instance, the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal consistently applied the prima facie jurisdiction 
test by closely following the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America). 73 Judge Holtzmann, in his 
862. It should be noted that the second, third and fourth requirements have 
71 
applied in full or in part by ICC tribunals. See, Yesilirmak, Interim Measures, 34. 
See, in this regard, supra Chapter 111, note 7 and accompanying text. 
72 See Bond, 18; Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 335; Lew / Mistelis 
Kr6II, para. 23-68; and Pyoung-Keun Kang, The Relationship Between International 
Arbitration and National Courts with Specific Reference to Provisional Measures 
73 
(1996) (unpublished PhD thesis), 181-182. 
Provisional Measure Order (10 May 1984), 1984 ICJ Reports 169. It is noteworthy 
that the part of the Order on the prima facie jurisdiction test is adopted 
unanimously. See also Ford Aerospace v. The Air Force of Iran, Case No. 159, 
Interim Award No. ITM 39-159-3 (4 June 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 104, 
108. The Tribunal, in this case, made a specific reference to the Nicaragua 
decision. Prior to the Ford Aerospace decision, the Tribunal generally did not deal 
with jurisdictional questions or mainly used such statements as "it would appear 
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over ... 
[the] claim ...... 
See Rockwell International 
Systems, Inc. v. Iran, Case No. 430, Interim Award No. ITM 20-430-1 (6 June 
23 5 
concurrent opinion, further indicated in Bendone-Derossi that in 
deciding whether the tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction, "the benefit of 
74 doubt" should be given to the existence of jurisdiction . Moreover, for 
instance, ICSID tribunals seem to adopt the prima facie test. In Holiday 
Inns v. Morocco, following the continuous challenge to its jurisdiction, 
the arbitral tribunal held that "it has jurisdiction to recommend 
provisional measures ..., [however] the Parties [have] ... the right to 
express, in the rest of the procedure, any exception relating to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on any other aspects of the dispute. , 75 
3.1.2 Prima Facie Establishment of Case 
The prima facie establishment of a case in dispute may be necessary 
for the grant of a provisional measure. 76 This is apparently for the 
74 
75 
76 
1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 369-371. See also RCA Global 
Communications v. Iran, Case No. 160, Interim Award No. ITM 29-160-1 (30 
October 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-US CTR 5-8. Following Ford Aerospace, the 
Tribunal consistently apply the prima facie jurisdiction test. See, e. g., Bendone- 
Derossi International v. Iran, Case No. 375, Interim Award No. ITM 40-375-1 (7 
June 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 130,131-132- Iran v. United States, 
Decision No. DEC 116-A15(IV) & A24-FT (18 May 1199ý), extracts published in 
Pellonptiti / Caron, 462. The same line of practice followed by other tribunals 
acting under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules too. 
6 Iran-US CTR 134. 
Decision (2 July 1972). See Lalive, 136. See also Vacuum Salt v. Ghana where 
the decision embodied an undertaking in which the party assured the tribunal to 
comply with the terms of the claimant's request for a provisional measure. In this 
case, the jurisdiction was successfully challenged by Ghana. This challenge, 
which was made in the beginning of the proceedings, did not prevent the tribunal 
from embodying the undertaking into its decision. It should, however, be noted 
that the decision was not a recommendation, though the tribunal implied that it had 
the power to make a recommendation. See Decision No. 3 of the Tribunal, 14 
June 1993,4 ICSID Rep 328. In regard of ICSID arbitration, it needs to be noted 
that some commentators argue that the registration of a request for arbitration by 
the ICSID's Secretary General after his screening power is exercised in 
accordance with Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention provides a sufficient basis 
for a recommendation of a provisional measure. See Brower / Goodman, 451-456; 
G. R. Delaume, "ICSID Tribunals and Provisional Measures -A Review of the 
Cases", 1 ICSID Rev - FILJ 392,393 (1986); Friedland, Provisional 
Measures, 
34 1; and Masood, 145. It is difficult to agree with such argument as, inter alia, "the 
determination by the Secretary General, 'based only on the information contained 
in the request, ' should not exempt the tribunal from independently satisfying itself 
as to its authority to issue provisional measures. " Parra, The Practices, 42. 
The requirement for prima facie establishment of a case is similar to the 
requirement of fumus bonijuris or likelihood of success on the merits. On the last 
2 36 
satisfaction of tribunal that the moving party has, with reasonable 
probability, a case 77 or, alternatively, for determination that the claim or 
the request is not frivolous or vexatious. 78 In this regard, Caron rightly 
argues that the likelihood of success on the merits is sotto voce an 
element for issuing provisional measures . 
79 Caron continues. 
It certainly is appropriate that when a case manifestly lacks merit, 
necessarily costly and disruptive interim measures to protect such dubious rights should not be granted. A tribunal must determine 
prima facie not only whether it possesses jurisdiction but also 
whether the question presented by the case is frivolous. 80 
The examination of substance of a case for a prima facie test should be 
limited. An arbitral tribunal makes an "overall assessment of the merits 
of the case" in question in order to determine whether the moving 
party's case is "sufficiently strong to merit protection. ,81 However, the 
82 tribunal should refrain from prejudging the merits of the case . 
The prima facie test is gained some recognition. For instance, in ICC 
case 9301, there was a request for an injunction prohibiting the 
point, an ICC tribunal ruled that "the applicant [should] render plausible that it has a 
prima facie contractual or legal right to obtain the relief it seeks. " ICC Interlocutory 
Award 10596 of 2000 (unpublished). Apparently, the pre-requisite for such prima 
facie establishment of a case is the existing of a right whose protection is sought. 
Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Procedural Order No. 2 (28 October 1999), 
extracts reprinted in XXVII YCA 13,18 (2002). It is noteworthy that such right 
should fall within the ambit of the case in dispute and within the coverage of the 
77 
relevant arbitration agreement. 
It is not necessary to establish the whole case but it is sufficient to establish prima 
78 
facie the right, which the measure requested is aimed to protect. See, Wirth, 37. 
Arbitrators should consider whether or not the applicant has a legitimate interest in 
its request by limited examination of the merits of the case in dispute. See ICC 
Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 
Bull 56,59 (2000). It should be noted that the assessment of legitimate interest 
79 
carries weight for avoiding vexatious applications for a provisional measure. 
Caron, Interim Measures, 490. See also Pellonp66 / Caron, 442. Berger, in this 
regard, states that "[d]epending upon the degree to which the requested measure 
infringes the rights of the other party, success on the merits of the underlying claim 
by the requesting party has to be likely. " Berger, International Economic 
Arbitration, 337. But see, van Hof, 190. 
'30 Caron, Interim Measures, 491. 
8, Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-26. 
82 See Chapter IV, infra Part 3.2.1. 
3 
Respondent or any person under its authority to use no longer the 
Claimant's trademark logo. The arbitrator, after establishing its power 
to grant provisional measures, held: 
[S]ince [the Claimant] establishes that there is a prima facie right of 
action for illegitimate use of the letterhead in question, the 
Arbitrator accepts the request seeking an injunction prohibiting the 
use of the [the Claimant's] trademark, tradename and logo .... 
83 
(Emphasis added. ) 
83 ICC Interim Award 9301 of 1997 (unpublished). See also, e. g., ICC Final Award 
5804 of 1989, extracts published in 4(2) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 76 (1993) (denying a 
request for a provisional measure for, inter alia, the lack of prima facie 
establishment of the case); ICC Final Award 5804 of 1989, extracts published in 
4(2) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 76 (1993)- ICC First Interim Award 8894 of 1997, extracts 
published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct 
Xrb Bull 94 (2000) (the tribunal postponed its 
decision on the application for a provisional measure because of the fact that the 
evidence before the tribunal was confusing); ICC Second Interim Award 5835 of 
1992 (unpublished) (holding that "the Claimant filed his request for provisional 
measure almost one year after the signature of the Terms of Reference, in the 
absence of any sudden or unforeseeable events justifying the grant of such 
measure. ). 
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3.1.3 Urgency 
Urgency is an essential requirement to grant a provisional measure. 84 
Indeed, it is, in principle, the promise behind interim protection that 
there is urgency, which necessitates the grant of an interim measure. 85 
In other words, grant of a measure is justified where there is a necessity 
to safeguard the right in question before the final award is rendered. 
Otherwise, if the making of decision could await the final determination 
of the parties' case there is inherently no basis of seeking interim 
protection of rights. 86 
84 It is stated, in this regard, that "[i]n respect of all categories of provisional 
measures ... urgency is a sine qua non ...... 
Brower/ Goodman, 461. In ICC case 
8113, the arbitral tribunal denied the request for a provisional payment on the 
ground that "the Tribunal, after having examined all the facts of the case, is not 
convinced of the existence of urgency, the basic requirement for granting a 
provisional measure in the Claimant's favour. " (Emphasis added. ) ICC Second 
Partial Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 65-69 
(2000). See also ICC Interim Award 6632 of 1993 (unpublished) (holding inter alia 
that "the application lacks the urgency required to address the issue by way of an 
interim award. "); Panacaviar, S. A. v. Iran, Case No. 498, Interim Award No. ITM 
64-498-1 (4 December 1986), reprinted in 13 Iran-US CTR 193,197 (observing, 
whilst denying the request for a stay of the parallel court proceedings, that no 
request was made within six years from the commencement of such proceedings); 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Iran, Case No. 396, Interim Award No. ITM 50-396-1 (8 
May 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 179-182, on this case, see Pellonpki / 
Caron, 442, note 28; Concurring Opinion of Howard Holtzmann to Bendone- 
Derossi International v. Iran, reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 133,140 (upon the 
respondents' application to stay parallel court proceedings initiated in Germany to 
obtain a provisional measure, Judge Holtzmann concurred with the Tribunal by 
arguing, inter alia, that the "Respondent has made no showing of urgency justifying 
the issuance of interim relief: the court order was entered in June 1983, ten 
months before Respondent sought a stay. "); and Order of 1999 in AAA Case No. 
507181-0014299 (unpublished) (denying the motion for interim relief in an order 
because of the fact that the tribunal would render the final award within three 
months. ). However, in this last case, the tribunal reserved the parties' right to re- 
present the motion should the issuance of the final award be delayed. The tribunal 
apparently considered that urgency would be remedied as the matter in question 
would finally be resolved within a short period of time. 
85 See Baker / Davis, 139. The urgency is not required for interim payment on 
account. See Chapter IV, infra Part 7.5. 
86 The requirement of urgency plays little role or, mostly, no role for the grant of 
security (for costs, payment, and damages) and provisional payment. 
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The establishment of urgency may vary from one tribunal to another. 87 
For example, in ICC case 10596, the tribunal defined the requirement 
of urgency. The dispute in this case arose from termination of 
distribution agreements. As an interim measure, the respondent made 
a request for delivery of several documents. The tribunal required, inter 
alia, the existence of urgency to grant the relief sought. In regard of 
urgency, the tribunal held that 
the request relates to a matter of urgency, it being understood that 
(I urgency" is broadly interpreted; the fact that a party's potential 
losses are likely to increase with the mere passing of time and that 
it would be unreasonable to expect that a party to wait for the final 88 award suffices . 
3.1.4 Imminent Danger, Serious or Substantial Prejudice 
For the grant of a provisional measure, it needs to be an imminent 
danger of a prejudice to a right, if the measure requested is not granted 
before the final resolution of a dispute. 89 Interpretation of this 
87 The determination may vary "depending on the arbitral tribunal and the national 
procedural law, if any used by the tribunal as a reference. " Schwartz, Provisional 
Measures, 60. 
88 ICC Interlocutory Award 10596 of 2000 (unpublished). See also Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 60; and Bond, 18-19. Further, for instance, two tribunals 
whose seats were in Paris dealt with urgency. The first tribunal held that urgency 
arises when there is "a risk of serious and irreparable harm, present or future ... that would render indispensable the taking of an immediate decision such as to 
eliminate, avoid or reduce such harm. " The second tribunal held that "[a] situation 
has an urgent character when it requires that measures be taken in order to avoid 
that the legitimate rights of a party are not placed in peril. See Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 60. 
89 This requirement seems to be similar to the requirement of "periculum in mora. " It 
should be noted that there is a clear and inherent link between the requirements of 
urgency and grave harm. See Caron, Interim Measures, 497, and Baker / Davis, 
139. But see van Hof, 190. She argues that "[p]rejudice or preventing prejudice 
may be urgent and thus related to the concept, but this relationship need not 
necessarily exist. " Id. As regards the concept of "inherent link, " see, e. g., ICC 
Second Partial Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 
65-69 (2000); and ICC Final Award 5804 of 1989, extracts published in 4(2) ICC 
Int'l Ct Arb Bull 76 (1993). It should also be noted that an imminent danger may 
occur where there is a risk of aggravation of a dispute. For example, in ICC case 
3896, the arbitral tribunal held that 
in order to prevent the aggravation of the dispute submitted to arbitration, it was 
justified in proposing that one of the parties not call bank guaranties issued by a 
third party bank in connection with the matter in dispute, although the 
guarantees were otherwise callable on demand. 
240 
requirement varies from one legal system to another. Under common 
law, a provisional measure is generally granted where there is a risk of 
irreparable prejudice or harm if the measure requested is not granted. 
An irreparable harm usually refers to harm "that cannot readily be 
compensated by an award of monetary damages. "90 Under civil law, 
the principle of periculum in mora is generally considered satisfactory. 
In arbitration, the requirement of imminent danger or serious or 
substantial harm should be satisfactory where "the delay in the 
adjudication of the main claim caused by the arbitral proceedings [or, in 
other words, the delay in the rendering of the final award] would lead to 
a 'substantial' (but not necessarily 'irreparable' ... ) prejudice for the 
requesting party. "91 
90 
91 
ICC Partial Award 3896 of 1982, extracts published in (1983) Clunet 914; X YCA 47 
(1985); and Jarvin / Derains, 161. See also Second Interim Award 5835 of 1992 
(unpublished); ICC Award 3896 of 1982, extracts published in (1983) Clunet 914, 
and X YCA 47 (1985); and ICC Interlocutory Award 10596 of 2000 (unpublished). 
The tribunal held, in this last case, that under longstanding practice in ICC 
arbitration, "the parties must refrain from taking any action which may aggravate the 
dispute. " The tribunal further ruled that "any non marginal risk of aggravation of the 
dispute is sufficient to warrant an order for interim relief. Indeed, it would be foolish 
for the Tribunal to wait for a foreseeable, or at least plausibly foreseeable, loss to 
occur, to then provide for its compensation in the form of damages .... rather than 
to prevent the loss from occurring in the first place. " 
Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 61. However, "[w]hile the existence of mere 
financial harm is not usually the basis for exercising extraordinary power of 
granting interim relief, [it is clear from the case law that] the potential or a 
bankruptcy or extraordinary financial consequence [which could] not be repaired by 
a damage award is a valid reason for disturbing the status quo. " Southern 
Navigation Ltd v. Petroleos Mexicanos, Interim Award No. 2015 of 1985, extracts 
published in XI YCA 209,210 (1989). 
Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 336 (arguing that "an act prejudicial to 
the right of one of the parties should not be characterized as being acceptable 
simply because damages are available. "). He rightly argues for requiring a 
standard less than irreparable harm. He supports his argument with the example 
given under Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: the sale of perishable 
goods. Id. See also van Hof, 190; and Baker / Davis, 139-40. Further, "[flrom a 
commercial point of view - which is the position that a tribunal in international 
economic arbitration has to take - the disruption to business relations and the 
waste resulting from such acts cannot be truly compensated by damages. " 
Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 336; and Caron, Interim Measures, 
493-94. Moreover, according to Schwartz, "ICC tribunals have sometimes 
construed the risk of financial loss itself to constitute irreparable harm. Such loss 
may, of course, be truly 'irreparable' when its severity threatens the financial 
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3.1.5 Proportionality 
An arbitral tribunal ought to take into account the effect of any interim 
measure, for granting it, on arbitrating parties' rights to a certain extent. 
This is to say that "the possible injury caused by the requested Interim 
measure must not be out of proportion with the advantage which the 
claimant hopes to derive from it.,, 92 
existence of the applicant for relief. " Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 60. See 
also ICC Final Award 5804 of 1989, extracts published in 4(2) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 
76 (1993) (holding, in denial of the request for a provisional measure, that "[i]t has 
not been clearly shown that the damage, potential or actual, would be very serious 
for the applicant if the measure is not adopted. But see, e. g., ICC Second Partial 
Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 65-69 (2000) 
(holding that "the Claimant would not incur any grave and irreparable harm if not 
granted the sought measure before the Final Award expected to be issue in 
1995. "). (Emphasis added. ) . Similarly, in more than one occasion, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal ruled that "injury that can be made whole by monetary relief does 
not constitute irreparable harm. " See, e. g., Iran v. The United States of America, 
Decision No. Dec. 116-A 15(IV) & A24-FT (18 May 1993), extracts published in 
Pellonp6ti / Caron, 462-463. See also, e. g., Iran v. the United States of America, 
Case No. B1 (Claim 4), Partial Award No. 382-Bl-FT (31 Aug. 1988), reprinted in 
19 Iran-US CTR 273; Iran v. the United States of America, Cases Nos. A-4 and A- 
15, Order (18 January 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 112-114 (holding that 
"the circumstances as presented to the Tribunal at the time were not such as to 
require the exercise of its power to order the requested interim measure of 
protection, as these circumstances did not appear to create a risk of an irreparable 
prejudice, not capable of reparation by payment of damages. "). (Emphasis 
added. ) Id., 114. 
92 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 336-37. See also, Karrer, Less Theory, 
104; Cremades, The Need, 230; and Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, para. 23-65. The 
principle of proportionality may also be referred to as the principle of 
reasonableness. Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 337. On this 
principle, see also MAT Cie d'ýIectricit6 de Sofia et de Bulgarie (Belgium v. 
Bulgaria), (1922) 2 TAM 924,926-27 (arguing that "the possible injury that may be 
caused by the proposed interim measures of protection must not be out of 
proportion with the advantage which the claimant hopes to derive from them. "); and 
Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals (London: Stevens 1953), 273. In applying this principle, the tribunal 
should carefully examine the allocation of the risks between the parties at the 
signing of the contract or, if the risk allocation is changed over the life of the 
contract, at the time when a dispute arises. For determination of such risk 
allocation, the tribunal need to look into the terms of the contract, if they are silent, 
it "is likely to make an overall interpretation of the contract (Emphasis in the 
original. ) Blessing, Introduction, para. 859. According to Blessing 
such an overall interpretation may, for instance, show that the parties had 
assumed and accepted, in the underlying contract, very considerable and 
uncovered commercial risks - and if such were the conclusion, it would hardly 
be justified to direct far-reaching protective measures. By contrast, if the 
interpretation of the overall spirit of the contract shows that the parties had pain- 
stickingly endeavoured to confine the limits of their risks and had themselves 
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3.2 The Negative Requirements 
The existing of any of the six negative requirements set out below may 
lead to the denial of an application for a provisional measure: 
* the request should not necessitate examination of merits of the 
case in ques ion, 
0 the tribunal may refrain from granting final relief in the form of a 
provisional measure, 
9 the request may be denied where the moving party does not 
have clean hands, 
the request may be denied where such measure is not capable 
of being carried out; 
e when the measure requested is not capable of preventing the 
alleged harm; or 
o the request may be denied where it iS Moot. 
93 
Arbitrators may observe these requirements either collectively or 
individually. 
3.2.1 If an examination of the merits of the case is required, the 
tribunal may refrain from granting the measure requested 
An arbitral tribunal may refrain from examining the merits of the case in 
dispute as "[t]he taking of interim measures is without prejudice to the 
outcome of the case. A4 Further, the tribunal does not wish to prejudge 
93 
94 
provided for numerous protective tools etc., a Tribunal will probably find it 
appropriate to issue a protective interim order, if the circumstances have driven 
the accepted risk-sphere way out of the contractually accepted range. 
Id. In this regard, it is interesting to note that a tribunal refrained from restoring the 
status quo existed right before the dispute arose in an ICC case. The tribunal 
refrained from ordering, without posting a security, the party to lift attachments 
obtained from a local court. See ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts 
published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 67 (1997). 
Some of these requirements resemble to the requirements to grant provisional 
measures under English law. See, e. g., L. A. Sheridan, Injunctions and Similar 
Orders (Barry Rose: Chichester 1999), 119, etc. 
Sanders, Commentary, 196. Apparently, the tribunal has to take the substance of 
a case in dispute for establishment of prima facie jurisdiction. See Chapter IV, 
supra Part 3.1.2. 
24 ') 
the merits or to be accused of doing it. That is because the 
prejudgment may infringe or, at least, shadow the tribunal's 
impartia lity. 95 The merits of a case should be examined in a full trial. 
In many cases, arbitrators denied, in relation to a request for interim 
measures, to examine the merits of the case in dispute. For instance, 
in ICC case 6632, both parties applied for a security for costs, the 
arbitral tribunal denied the applications by holding- 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that, in the present stage of its 
information, it cannot, without pre-judging the issues relating to the 
merits of the case, determine whether the Contract was validly 
terminated or not and whether the property was legally or illegally 96 seized by Respondent .... (Emphasis added. ) 
95 Any such pre-judgment may cause setting aside or refusal of enforcement of an 
award. See, in this regard, e. g., Articles 34(2)(a)(iv), 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law, 
and Articles V(11)(d), V(2)(b) of the NY Convention. In any case, a provisional 
measure should not prejudice the decision on the substance. See Article 292 of 
the Netherlands AA. 
96 ICC Interim Award 6632 of 1993 (unpublished). In addition see, e. g., ICC Second 
Partial Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 65-69 
(2000) (the arbitral tribunal denied the request for an interim measure as "the grant 
of the measure requested by Claimant implies a pre-judgement of the dispute. .. ." (Emphasis added. ); ICC First Partial Award 8540 of 1999 (unput)lished) (the 
tribunal refrained from pre-judging the merits of the case in dispute concerning the 
request for certain injunctions. ); Holiday Inns v. Morocco (where, with respect to 
the tribunal's recommendation, Lalive states that "[n]othing is said or implied could 
touch the merits in litigation. " Lalive, 193); Atlantic Triton v. Guinea (denying the 
request on pre-judgment security on the ground, inter alia, that "the fact that both 
requests were directly linked to, and dependent on, resolution of the basic claims 
in the arbitration. This was particularly so with respect to Atlantic Triton's request, 
which virtually restated its principal claim. " (Emphasis added. )); Maffezini v. The 
Kingdom of Spain, Procedural Order No. 2 (28 October 1999), extracts reprinted in 
XXVII YCA 13,18 (2002) (indicating that "[i]t would be improper for the Tribunal to 
pre-judge the claimant's case ...... ). Further, 
in an AAA case, a dispute arose from 
a distribution agreement and the claimant requested from the tribunal to enjoin, on 
an interim basis, the respondent from selling competitive products. The 
respondent's objection to the preliminary injunctive relief was that it had never 
been a party to the agreement. Because of the fact that this claim was also the 
essence of the respondent's defence, the tribunal refrained from dealing with the 
substance of the case. Accordingly, the tribunal denied to issue the relief sought. 
Order of 1999 in AAA Case No. 507181-0014299 (unpublished). See also 
Friedland, Provisional Measures, 348. 
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3.2.2 No Grant of Final Relief 
An arbitral tribunal "will not (or, at any rate, should not) grant a decision 
on the merits under the guise of interim relief. " 97 An arbitral interim 
measure "may not operate to grant the final relief sought" for preserving 
"the provisional nature of the interim measures". 98 Arbitral case law 
generally confirms this view. For instance, in Behring International, 
Inc., v. Iranian Air Force, the dispute arose mainly over the storage 
charges for warehousing the respondent's property. The Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal held that 
the granting of the full interim relief requested by Respondents, in 
particular, the transfer to Respondents of possession, custody and 
control of the warehoused goods ..., would 
be tantamount to 
awarding Respondents the final relief sought in their 
counterclaim. 99 
However, as it could not convince the claimant to store the goods in a 
modern portion of its warehouse, in order to avoid further deterioration 
of the goods, the Tribunal later held: 
97 Bond, 18. Van Hof argues, on the contrary, that 
[t]he conclusion that a tribunal would not be able to order interim relief if this 
happened to constitute the principal relief sought appears unconvincing .... It is 
understandable that a certain safeguards might be required, for example, to 
prevent the Claimant from dismissing his suit, but it is hard to conceive of any 
fundamental objections apart from this. 
Van Hof, 191. 
98 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 337. See also Baker / Davis, 340. 
Perhaps another reason for not granting the final relief on an interim basis may be 
to avoid changing the status quo. For instance, in ICC case 9950, the arbitral 
tribunal denied changing the status quo that was existed at the date when the 
request for arbitration was filed on factual grounds. ICC Interim Award 9950 of 
2000 (unpublished). But see Lew/ Mistelis / Kr6II, para. 23-64. 
99 Case No. 382, Interim Award No. ITM 46-382-3 (22 February 1985), reprinted in 8 
Iran-US CTR 44,46. See also, e. g., United Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, Case 
No. 114, Decision No. Dec 53-114-3 (10 December 1986), reprinted in 13 Iran-US 
CTR 254,259. In this case, the dispute arose out of contracts "for servicing and 
overhaul of helicopter components owned by one of the respondents". Upon the 
claimant's request for reimbursement of the storage costs for preservation of the 
goods, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, by taking into account the fact that one of the 
claims submitted by the claimant is for storage charges, denied the request by 
ruling that "it appears that the request for interim measures is, in this respect, 
identical to one of the Claimant's claims on the merits. Under such circumstances, 
to grant this request would amount to a provisional judgment on one of the 
Claimant's claims. " 
'45 
Since a transfer within Claimant's own warehouse has not been 
made possible, the Tribunal sees no alternative to transferring the 
goods to a warehouse selected by Respondents. In the 
circumstances of this case, it would be impractical for this 
international Tribunal to maintain control of the goods through a 
warehouse selected by and subject to the discretion of the Tribunal. Certain of the goods may require repackaging, special 
maintenance or special handling, involving daily management 
decisions for which the Tribunal cannot assume responsibility. 
Moreover, the use of a third party conservator is unnecessary in 
this case as Respondents' title to the goods and eventual right to 
possession as between the Parties is undisputed. 100 (Citations 
omitted. ) 
3.2.3 The tribunal may not grant a provisional measure if the 
applicant does not have "clean hands" 
This principle is self-explanatory and was observed, for instance, in ICC 
case 7972.101 In this case, the claimant concluded a distribution 
contract with the respondent, whereby the respondent was granted the 
exclusive right to sell touch-screen computers. The parties also signed 
a non-competition clause, in which the respondent undertook not to 
compete or develop similar products. The claimant alleged that the 
respondent breached their contract, and, as a consequence, 
terminated the contract. The claimant then filed a request for 
arbitration. The claimant also applied for an injunctive relief stopping 
the respondent to manufacture, to distribute and to sell the claimant's 
products. The arbitral tribunal rejected the application on the ground 
that the claim upon which the relief based is time-barred. The tribunal 
further, interalia, held: 
The decision whether or not to grant an injunction lies in the 
discretion of the Tribunal from which it is sought. Generally, a 
100 Case No. 382, interim and interlocutory Award No. ITM/ITL 52-382-3 (21 June 
1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 238,278. In regard of this case, Caron rightly 
suggests that "[i]t may be possible by creative thinking on the part of the tribunal 
and parties to find measures that will not simultaneously grant the 
final relief 
101 
requested. " Caron, Interim Measures, 488. 
ICC Partial Award 7972 of 1997 (unpublished). 
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tribunal will not issue an injunction where it is found that the 
petitioner does not have clean hands. 
We have found that [the claimant] discovered ... manufacture and sale of [the products by the respondent] in 1991. [The claimant] 
It sat on this knowledge" for more than two years before, on 28 April 
1993, it invoked [the respondent's] breach and sent a notice of 
termination of the Distribution Agreement. In the meantime, [the 
claimant] actively sought and obtained, in May 1991, an additional 
investment of USD 5.000.000 by [the respondent] in [the 
claimant's business]. 
In such circumstances, we determine that [the claimant] cannot 
now be heard to say that it is entitled to an injunction to enjoin [the 
respondent] henceforth from manufacturing, distributing and 
selling [the claimant's] products. (Emphasis added. ) 
3.2.4 The tribunal may not grant a measure where such measure 
is not capable of being carried out 
It is submitted that "arbitrators will ... normally 
be concerned to ensure 
that interim measures ordered by them are capable of being carried 
OUt.,, 102 This concern partly relates to arbitrators' duty, according to 
certain arbitration rules, to take into account the enforceability of the 
award they render. 103 Further, arbitrators would not wish to waste 
valuable time and delay the arbitration proceedings where it Is not likely 
that the measure they would grant is not capable of being carried out. 
For instance, in ICC case 721 0,104 upon the revocation of licenses 
concerning mineral rights by the State X, the claimant applied 
for an 
injunction. The aim of the application was to prevent the State X from 
making any disposition of the mineral rights in any part of the 
territory 
covered by the relevant licences. The tribunal did not rule on 
the issue 
until its final award. In its final award, the tribunal 
held that one of the 
102 Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 62. 
103 See, e. g., Article 35 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
104 ICC Final Award 7210 of 1994, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l 
Ct Arb Bull 49- 
52 (2000). In this case, the place of arbitration was Paris and the applicable 
law 
was the law of the Country X. See, for a similar case, 
Schwartz, Provisional 
Measures, 62. 
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reasons why it did not rule on the application was "because [had it 
granted the application] it could not have monitored any order made. " 105 
(Emphasis added. ). Similarly, in ICC case 5835, the tribunal, in 
denying the request for a provisional measure indicated that it took the 
enforceability of the provisional measure requested into account. 106 
3.2.5 When the measure requested is not capable of preventing 
the alleged harm 
Inasmuch as provisional measures are designed to safeguard, on an 
interim basis, the right in question or, in other words, avoid any harm to 
that right, they should, at least on their face, capable of serving this 
purpose. 107 
3.2.6 Request Must not be Moot 
It is obvious that where the request is already moot, the measure 
requested would not be granted. For instance, in Iran v. Unded States, 
Case No. A/15, the claimant requested from the tribunal to prevent the 
public sale of nuclear fuel allegedly belonging to it. Due to the fact that 
the fuel was already sold before the tribunal was able to consider the 
issue, it was held that the request became moot. Accordingly, the 
tribunal refused to entertain i t. 108 
3.3 Security for Damages 
The grant of some provisional measures, particularly those ones aiming 
to preserve the status quo may likely, potentially or actually prejudice 
105 ICC Final Award 7210 of 1994, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 49-52 
(2000). 
106 ICC Second Interim Award 5835 of 1992 (unpublished). See also ICC Final Award 
7489 of 1993, extracts published in (1993) Clunet 1078; 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 
107 
68 (1997), and Hascher, Procedural Decisions, 48. 
Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 62. 
108 Iran v. The United States of America, Case A-15, Dec. No. Dec 52-A/15-FT (24 
November 1986), reprinted in 13 Iran-US CTR 173-175. 
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the counter-party's rights. 109 In such cases, an arbitral tribunal should, 
in this author's view, request from the applicant a security for 
damages. 110 Security for damages is an undertaking whereby the 
109 This is despite the fact that a request to a court for a provisional measure should 
not normally affect the outcome of arbitration proceedings. See, e. g., Article 37(l) 
of the Arbitration Rules 1993 of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute (the "NAl"). 
and Article 11 of the Arbitration Rules 1980 of the French Arbitration Associatioý 
(the "FAA"). 
110 In fact, the ECJ ruled that interim payment would not be considered within the 
meaning of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention unless, inter alia, the repayment 
is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of his claim. 
The repayment is guaranteed where a security for damages is obtained. See, e. g., 
Van Uden Maritime BV, Trading as Van Uden Africa Line V. 
Kom manditgeselIschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, Case C-391/95, (1998) 
ECR 1-7091,1-7131, para. 22; and Hans Hermann Mietz v. Intership Yatching 
Sneek BV, Case C-99/96, (1999) ECR 1-2277,1-2314, para. 42. Not many 
arbitration laws do contain express provision on security for damages. For 
instance, the Model Law refrains from mentioning security for damages. See, in 
this regard, UN Doc A/40/17, para. 166, reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 546-47. 
However, Article 17 does not exclude the possibility of a tribunal's granting of 
security for damages. See e. g., id. But see also, e. g., Article 28(3) of the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (stating that damages may be 
recoverable in case the application proved to be faulty. ); Article 9(l) of the 
Ecuadorian Law on Arbitration and Mediation 1997, Section 25(4) of the Swedish 
AA 1999; and Section 9-9-35 of the Arbitration Codý of Georgia. Twenty-nine sets 
of the arbitration rules surveyed contain a provision on the security. See Annex. 
According to these rules, the tribunal is generally empowered to ask for 
appropriate security. Further, only three of the rules surveyed contain a provision, 
which expressly empowers the tribunal to grant security for damages. See Article 
31 of the Arbitration Rules 1999 of the Arbitration Institute of the SCC; Article 28 of 
the Arbitration Rules 1993 of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce (providing for a 
submission of a counter-guarantee by the moving party for a provisional measure); 
and Article 14a of the Rules of Arbitration of the International Arbitration Centre of 
the Federal Economic Chamber of Vienna. However, in some cases, a tribunal's 
power is restricted in regard of the security for damages. See, e. g., Article 21(2) of 
the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules, and Article 26(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (empowering to grant security for the costs of provisional measures). 
Where there is no express power to grant security for damages, such power may 
derive from the broad interpretation of the arbitration agreement. Where a security 
is requested about an interim measure, it is apparent that the tribunal's jurisdiction 
extends to damages claims arising from such measure. See e. g., Wirth, 38, and 
Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 342 (stating that security for damages 
claim may be handled within the same arbitration since such claim arose "out of or 
in connection with the contract". ). It is also submitted that the obligation "to 
mitigate damages or not to worsen the dispute" could also be the basis for security 
for damages. Buscher / Tschanz, 88. It is, in this regard, noteworthy that security 
for damages could be granted, without the need for a specific request, as the 
purpose of it is to avoid unjust suffering of a party. See, e. g. Article 23(l) of the 
ICC Arbitration Rules- and Article 46 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules. See also, e g., 
Article 17 of the Mo'del Law; and Article 183(3) of the SPIL. That should be, 
however, subject to the existence of any risk of loss, which may arise out of the 
interim relief granted. 
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successful moving party undertakes to indemnify the adversary, should 
the measure prove to be unjustified. "' This is because a provisional 
measure is based on a summary review of the facts and law, which 
review would affect, prima facie establishment of jurisdiction and prima 
facie establishment of case. ' 12 It is likely that the outcome of such 
review would change during or at the end the adjudication. The amount 
of security should cover the actual costs and the potential damages to 
the adverse party. ' 13 In determining the amount, financial capability of 
the moving party should be taken into account. ' 14 
There are a few arbitral cases where a security for damages were dealt 
with. For instance, in ICC case 7544, upon application of the Claimant 
for a provisional payment, the tribunal ruled: 
The Arbitral Tribunal is 
... 
faced with a delicate task of weighing up 
the probability as to whether, after the claims and counterclaims 
have been fully argued before it, the net result will be in favour of 
Claimant, as the latter alleges, or in favour of Defendant; having 
decided it can ... 
[however, ] in order to cover the risk that the final 
decision might not be consistent with the decision reached in this 
award, and not to prejudice the right of set-off, the Tribunal 
considers that it is appropriate that the party in whose favour the 
decision on an interim payment is made provide a guarantee of 
like amount. Consequently, the order to Defendant to pay the 
amount of ... to 
Claimant is made subject to Claimant providing a 
guarantee of like amount in the form and subject to the conditions 
set forth in the decision section of this award. ' 15 (Emphasis 
added. ) (Citations omitted. ) 
"I On the issue of damages as compensation, see Chapter IV, Part 10. 
112 See Chapter IV, supra Parts 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. 
113 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 342. 
114 That is particularly important where the security for damages is a precondition for 
115 
the grant of the measure requested. 
ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct 
Arb Bull 56-60 (2000). See also, e. g., ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, 
extracts published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 67 (1997); and Order of 1999 in AAA 
Case No. 52 153 00116 87 (unpublished) (ordering, in a case concerning allegedly 
unjust termination of the Joint Marketing Service and Manufacturing Agreement, 
the respondent to comply with its injunction pending the final award and to subject 
the injunction's coming into effect posting of either cash or other kind of bond. ) 
(unpublished). In ordering of any measure of security, a tribunal should consider 
whether the type of security that will be issued is available from a bank. For 
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3.4 An Undertaking 
An arbitral tribunal may deny the request for a provisional measure if 
there is an undertaking or a declaration in good faith by the party 
against whom such measure is sought that it does not intend to infringe 
the right in question. Apparently, it is within the discretion of the tribunal 
to accept such undertaking or declaration. 116 Where there is an 
undertaking, arbitrators may decide on the request with or without 
considering the other requirements for granting the measure requested. 
For instance, in ICC case 7692,1 17 a dispute arose from the agreement 
according to which the claimant is entitled to the use of the 
respondent's "computer programs and technology, which relate to 
predicting movements in financial instruments. " The claimant 
requested, inter alia, an injunction to prevent the use or dissemination 
of its technology and data by the respondent, pending the final award. 
The respondent, contrary to the claimant's arguments, claimed that the 
claimant's technology is not in their possession. Furthermore, the 
respondent, in any case, "undertook not to use any of that technology 
during the course of arbitration. " The arbitral tribunal held, basing on 
instance, whether a bank is willing to provide a security until the tribunal renders its 
final award or whether it would be advisable to obtain a security in the form of 
blocking by a party of a certain amount of money in the bank account jointly held by 
116 
the parties. See, generally, Karrer, Less Theory, 104. 
In using such discretion, the circumstances of the case and previous actions of the 
117 
arbitrating parties may be taken into account. 
ICC Interim Award 7692 of 1995, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Ct Int'l Arb 62-63. 
There are several other published cases in which an undertaking given by a party, 
by itself or along with other causes, was held sufficient reason for denying interim 
measure applications. See, e. g., Fluor Corporation v. Iran, Case No. 333, Interim 
Award No. ITM 62-333-1 (6 August 1986), reprinted in 11 Iran-US CTR 292,298-, 
Avco Corporation v. Iran Aircraft Industries, Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal 
Company, National Iranian Oil Company and Iran, Case No. 261, Order of 27 
January 1984, cited in Case 261, Partial Award No. 377-261-3 (18 July 1988), 
reprinted in 19 Iran-US CTR 200,201-202; United Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. Iran 
etc., reprinted in 13 Iran-US CTR 254,258; and Vacuum Salt v. Ghana, Decision 
No. 3,14 June 1993, reprinted in 4 ICSID Rep 323-324. In this last case, upon the 
undertaking of Ghana that it would not deny Vacuum Salt's access to records, the 
tribunal refrained from recommending the preservation of evidence as requested 
by the Respondent but instead it embodied this undertaking into its decision by way 
of noting its existence. Perhaps, that was because such indication would later 
justify taking actions against the recalcitrant party. 
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the undertaking, that "there is no sufficient likelihood or danger" that 
respondent would use the claimant's technology. " Accordingly, the 
request was denied. 
4 Form of a Measure 
Arbitral provisional measures may generally take the form of an 
order. "' Such measures are also issued in the form of an award, "9 
decision, direction, "O request, proposal, recommendation, 121 or else. 122 
118 Eighteen out of the seventy-two sets of rules surveyed provide for order as the 
form of a decision concerning provisional measures. See Annex. It is not clear 
from the text of those rules whether a tribunal may grant the measure in any other 
form, including an award. In regard of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's practice, 
Pellonpa6 / Caron indicates that the number of orders concerning interim 
measures "seems at least double the number of awards. " See Pellonpaa / Caron, 
448, note 62. 
119 Fourteen of those rules expressly permit the tribunal to issue orders as well as 
awards in respect of interim measures. See Annex. The authority to grant 
provisional measures in the form of an award may also be found under the laws of 
some countries. See, e. g., England (Section 47(l) and 39 of the AA (permitting 
the grant of a "provisional award"); France (Pluyette in ICC (ed. ), Conservatory 
Measures, 88); India (Bhasin, 95); Scotland (Article 17(2) of Schedule 7 to the Law 
Reform Act 1990 (Miscellaneous Provisions)); Switzerland (see Blessing, 
Introduction, para. 867); and the U. S. (see infra Chapter V, Part 3.2.2). It is 
argued, in this respect, that due to the scrutiny of an ICC award, the presumption 
in ICC arbitration is to issue provisional measures in the form of an "order. " Final 
Report on Awards, paras. 6 and 37.6; and Bernardini, 28. However, this Chapter 
IV cites several ICC decisions on interim measures rendered in the form of award. 
See also, e. g., C. H. Brower, "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 224 RCADI 
120 
123,175 (1990-V). 
See, e. g., Section 17 of the Arbitration Rules 1995 of thc; Perrnanent Court of 
121 
Arbitration of the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
See, e. g., Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules; and Article 34 of the Rules of 
International Arbitration of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce. The term 
'recommendation' under these Rules should be read as 'order'. Indeed, an ICSID 
tribunal very recently held, in an order: 
While there is a semantic difference between the word 'recommend' as used in 
Rule 39 and the word 'order' as used elsewhere in the [ICSID] Rules to describe 
the Tribunal's ability to require a party to take a certain action, that difference is 
more apparent than real. It should be noted that the Spanish text of that Rule 
uses also the word 'dictacion'. The Tribunal does not believe that the parties to 
the Convention meant to create a substantial difference in the effect of these 
two words. The Tribunal's authority to rule on provisional measures is no less 
binding than that of a final award. Accordingly, for the purpose of this Order, the 
Tribunal deems the word 'recommend' to be of equivalent value as the word 
-order'. 
Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Procedural Order No. 2 (28 October 1999), 
extracts reprinted in XXVII YCA 13,18 (2002). But see Schreuer, Article 47, para. 
28. The Maffezini tribunal's view is more in line with the view taken by the ICJ and 
the European Court of Human Rights regarding provisional measures. In any 
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Provisional measures could further be granted in the form of temporary 
restraining orders. In this regard, it should be noted that the forms 
other than award and order (including temporary restraining order) 
generally have a moral force 
123 
although there may be some sanctions 
124 
applicable where they are ignored . It should also be noted that if the 
applicable national law prohibits the grant of provisional measures, 
such restriction is likely to prevent grant of an order or an award on 
interim measures. 
125 However, the restriction should not, in any way, 
prevent the grant of, for instance, a proposal regarding the measure 
126 
requested . 
This Part initially examines the traditional forms under which a 
provisional measure may be granted. an order or an award. It then 
deals with decision on the form of the measure and interim protection of 
rights in cases of extreme urgency after the appointment of arbitrators. 
case, possibility of an ICSID tribunal's drawing adverse inferences if its 
recommendation on an interim protection of rights is not complied with, and the 
backing of the World Bank of the ICSID and the potential economic pressure that 
may be exerted against a recalcitrant state may facilitate voluntary compliance 
122 
with such recommendation. See, e. g., Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, para. 23-29. 
See, e. g., Article 23 of the Arbitration Rules 1996 of the Commercial Arbitration 
and Mediation Centre for Americas (the "CAMCA"). This Article, however, does 
not define what the term "else" refers to. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the 
chairman, after consultation with its co -arbitrators may send a letter to the parties 
indicating its provisional views regarding protection of parties' rights. Such letter 
may facilitate interim protection of parties' rights. Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC 
Arbitration, 2000,463-64. In this regard, see also ICC Case No. 6445, extracts 
published in Hascher, Procedural Decisions, 80-92. For examples to all of the 
123 
above categories of decisions, see generally Brower, 175, notes 178-181. 
The exception to this is a "recommendation" that may be granted under the ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. See Chapter IV, supra note 121. 124 See infra Chapter V, Part 1. 
125 Indeed, a similar reference to applicable local law was made under the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1931. See infra Chapter 1, Part 1.2.1. The reference to local law 
conformed with the Geneva Convention. In accordance with Article 1(1) of the 
Convention, law of the place of arbitration, in the absence of a party agreement, 
126 
governed the procedure. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 3. 
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4.1 Award or Order? 
Although there are difficulties in defining the terms "award" and "order", 
it is nonetheless safe to accept that an award aims to finally resolve 
one or more of the issues in dispute and is binding whereas an order 
aims to deal with "technical and procedural matters" and is "rendered 
without any formality and j)l 
27 
reasoning . The advantages and 
disadvantages of one form to the other mainly are: 
9 An award is formal whereas an order is not. The preparation of 
an award takes longer than that of an order. To this end, in 
some cases, for instance, in ICC arbitration, an award, unlike an 
order, needs to be scrutinised by the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration. 128 The preparation time and, scrutiny of an award, 
as the case may be, naturally have a certain delaying effect in 
the issuance of the award. 
* An order does not have a res judicata effect and revised at any 
time whereas an award, in principle, has a resjudicata effect. 
e Both an award and an order on provisional measures may be 
enforceable under a state law generally where the place of 
arbitration is in such state. 
129 
s An award may potentially be enforceable under the New York 
Convention whereas an order is generally considered to be 
not. 
130 Indeed, the reason for requesting an award is to enhance 
the prospect of enforcement. 
13 1 However, it should be noted that 
it is not the tribunal's duty to evaluate, in case it decides to grant 
an interim measure requested, whether the relief is actually 
enforceable under the applicable laws or the New York 
127 Lew / Mistelis / Kr6ll, para. 24-5. On the form "award" and "order", see, e. g., 1d. 
paras. 24-3 - 24-34; Redfern / Hunter, paras. 8-01-8-03,8-32-8-42. 128 Article 27 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
129 See infra Chapter V, Part 3. 
130 On this issue, there are arguments both in favour and against. See infra Chapter 
V, Part 3.2.2. 
131 On the issue of enforcement, see infra Chapter V, Part 3.2.2. 
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Convention. 132 "It is thus the applicant's ultimate responsibility 
and risk to seek and obtain enforcement of an award granting 
interim relief. , 
133 
9 An order may be issued ex parte, whereas the grant of an ex 
parte award may be troublesome because of due process 
considerations on national and international levels, particularly 
under Article V(l)(b) of the New York Convention. 
The approach of national laws to the form under which a provisional 
measure may be granted differs. Some laws are permissive for the 
grant of the measure in the form of award whereas others are not. 134 
There are also conflicting views as to whether a provisional measure 
may be granted in the form of an award or an order. 135 One view is that 
interim measures are not intended to have res judicata effect and that 
they could be "revised at any time. " Thus, it is not appropriate to grant 
them in the form of an award. 136 This view may also be supported with 
the fact that, in some cases, the grant of an award takes some time due 
to, for instance, scrutiny of an award. Because of this delay, it is 
132 In this regard, the issue as to whether finality is a characteristic of an award needs 
to be examined. See infra Chapter V, Part 3.2.2. 
133 ICC Interlocutory Award 10596 of 2000 (unpublished). 
134 American law (see, e. g., Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 
532 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y. ), aff'd., 689 F. 2d 301 (2 Cir. 1982)) is an example to 
permissive laws whereas Australian law is an example to non-permissive laws (see 
Resort Condominiums International Inc. v. (1) Ray Bolwell and (2) Resort 
Condominiums (Australasia) Pty. Ltd., excerpts published in XX YCA, 628-650 
(1995) (Supreme Court of Queensland, 29 th October, 1993). Michael Pryles, 
"Interlocutory Orders and Convention Awards: the Case of Resort Condominiums 
v. Bolwelf', 10(4) Arb Int 385 (1994)). In this respect, see Chapter IV, supra note 
115. It should also be noted that it may not be up to the arbitral tribunal to freely 
determine the form. See, e. g., Braspetro Oil Services Company - Brasoil 
(Cayman Islands) v. The Management and Implementation Authority of the Great 
Man-Made River Project (Libya), extracts from the French original is published in 
XXIVa YCA 296 (1999) (1 July 1999, Court of Appeal, Paris); Final Report on 
Awards, para. 28. 
135 There i's generally no objection for the grant of provisional measures in the other 
forms. 
136 See, e. g., Karrer, Less Theory, 109. 
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argued that decisions on provisional measures should normally take the 
form of an order. 137 
The counter view, with which this author agrees, is that a tribunal 
should be able to grant provisional measures in the form of award, 
138 including partial or interim but not final award. Experience confirms 
this view. 139 However, this view does not exactly fit into the traditional 
approach to awards. This is because finality of an award on provisional 
measures has a temporal element and is, strictly speaking, not 
intended to have a res judicata effect like a final award. 140 The 
temporal element is that an award is final and binding for a certain 
period of time: until it is amended, revoked or confirmed in the final 
award. 14 1 The acceptability of this approach is an issue for national 
137 Final Report on Awards, para. 26. 
1313 This Chapter IV contains several partial, interim or interlocutory awards dealing 
with provisional measures. The form of an award is generally considered as 
interim (occasionally partial, preliminary, interim, interlocutory etc. ). It should be 
noted that "the terms 'interim' and 'partial' are virtually used interchangeably, 
without any particular meaning being attributed to either expression Final 
Report on Awards, para. 5. The statement was used to refer to ICC practice, 
which, in this author's belief and experience, also reflects international commercial 
arbitration practice. Even if the measure takes the form of an order it is suggested 
that it should contain reasons. See, e. g., Article 23 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 
1998. See Sigvard Jarvin, uAspects of the Arbitral Proceedings" in: ICC (ed. ), The 
New 1998 ICC Rules of Arbitration, (ICC Publication No. 586) (Paris: ICC 
Publishing 1997), 26,28 ('1998 ICC Rules"). This is mainly because if the reasons 
uare understood, there is a better chance that they will be obeyed in the right spirit. " 
Karrer, Less Theory, 109. Further. in some states, orders of an arbitrator may be 
enforceable. See infra Chapter V, Part 3.2.1. It may be useful to indicate the 
reasons for enhancing the enforceability in those states. 
139 See various awards cited in Chapter IV. This is despite the fact that most of 
arbitral decisions on interim protection of rights are rendered in the form of order In 
140 
practice. 
See Karrer, Less Theory, 109. Otherwise, an award is "generally final and binding 
and has res judicata effect between the (arbitrating) parties, i. e., no claim can be 
brought in respect of the same matter. " Lew / Mistelis / Kroll, para. 24-1. For more 
information on the concept of res judicata see, e. g., G. Richard Shell, "Res 
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration", 35 UCLA Law 
Rev 623-675 (1988). 
141 For this reason, certain U. S. courts take the view that an award on provisional 
measure deals with a separable issue (from the underlying issues) which is finally 
resolved for a certain period of time. Thus such courts find no illegality or 
impropriety regarding that award. See infra Chapter V, Part 3.2.2. This view is in 
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laws. 142 A provisional measure in the form of an award is useful in 
making arbitration more effective dispute resolution mechanism as such 
form facilitates, to a great extent, enforcement of arbitral decisions 
concerning interim protection of rights. Thus, an award concerning 
interim protection of rights should, in this author's view, be 
permissible. 143 
4.2 Decision on the Form 
It should be noted that parties are generally free to choose the form of 
a measure. They may specifically exclude or exclusively include any 
form in their arbitration agreement. Arbitrators, unless otherwise 
agreed, or specifically or exclusively requested by the parties, 144 
generally have discretion to determine the form of the measure 
145 requested . 
Such discretion, for instance, seems to be given to ICC 
line with the specific needs of arbitration world in regard of interim protection of 
rights. Indeed, according to Caron, 
[t]he substantive effect of an interim award may be cancelled by rendering of a 
further interim award superceding the earlier interim relief. In such a case the 
earlier relief is not revoked ab initio but rather the temporary period for which it 
was to exist is drawn to a close. (Citations omitted. ) 
Caron, Interim Measures, 515. It should be noted that "supercession implicitly 
recognizes that the earlier measures were binding for some time and that a failure 
to observe those measures for that time would be a breach of the agreement to 
142 
arbitrate. " (Citations omitted). Id. 
See Chapter IV, supra note 134. 
143 See, in this regard Chapter IV, supra note 119 and infra Chapter V, Part 3.2.2. But 
see, e. g., Karrer, Less Theory, 109. 
144 See, e. g., Final Report on Awards, paras. 33 and 37.2. Where only one of the 
parties requests an award on a provisional remedy, the Final Report on Awards 
recommended that 
the arbitrator must exercise his discretion, but bearing in mind that the 
presumption is in favour of a single final award. Potential savings of time and 
costs for the parties, the effective and efficient conduct of the arbitration and the 
need to make every effort to ensure that an award is enforceable are the 
primary factors to be taken into consideration by the arbitrator. 
Id., paras. 34 and 37-3. 
145 See Bernardini, 27; and Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 343 (arguing 
that for ensuring "the necessary procedural flexibility", the determination of the 
form should be left to the tribunal. ). But see Lew, Commentary, 28 (arguing that 
'where the request is made for a specific form, then the tribunal should not use any 
discretion. "). In order to avoid refusal of its request, a party may request both 
order and award as alternative forms. See, e. g., ICC Final Award No. 9154 of 
1998, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull. 98-103 (2000). Rather than 
refusal of its request, if it is made for a specific form, a party may prefer to have 
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arbitrators. 146 In ICC arbitration practice, for example, in ICC case 
5804, the Claimant sought a provisional measure in the form of an 
award. 147 However, the tribunal rendered the measure in the form of an 
order. Similarly, in ICC case 7489, the tribunal found "no legal or 
practical need to decide the issue by a formal award . 
048 Accordingly, 
the tribunal issued an order. In two other cases, requests were made 
either for an award or for an order but they are denied. Instead, the 
measure was granted in the form of a recommendation 149 or a 
proposal 150 . 
Even though neither a recommendation nor a proposal 
has a binding effect, the parties are likely to accept and implement such 
interim protection measure in any other form. That is confirmed with the fact that 
"[flrequently, parties are anxious to have the tribunal's order, whatever its form. " 
146 
Lew, Commentary, 28. 
Final Report on Awards, para. 37.3. Jarvin, Arbitral Proceedings, 43; and Yves 
Derains / Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration (The 
Hague / London / Boston- Kluwer 1998), 275. The last two authors indicate: 
The ICC was reluctant to specify in Article 23(l) [of the 1998 ICC Arbitration 
Rules] what form orders of interim or conservatory relief ought to take. Article 
23(l), thus, leaves it up to the arbitrators to determine whether such a decision 
should take the form of an order, with reasons, or an award, a matter that will 
often depend upon the nature of the measure and the laws of the place of 
arbitration or the country where the measure is to be carried out. (Citation 
omitted. ) 
Derains / Schwartz, 275. 
147 ICC Final Award 5804 of 1989, extracts published in 4(2) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 76 
148 
(1993). 
ICC Final Award 7489 of 1993, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 68 
(1997), (1993) Clunet 1078; and Hascher, Procedural Decisions, 48. 
149 In ICC case 5887, the claimant and the respondents entered into a contract for 
realisation of a brewery. A dispute arose on a payment of a contractual obligation. 
The claimant pleaded for a payment of the allegedly outstanding amount and the 
release of performance guarantee provided by the claimant in favour of the 
respondents. While arbitration proceedings had been continued, the respondents 
called the bank guarantee. Upon this event, the claimant., 
asked the Tribunal to order the defendants to abstain from any action which 
might de facto change unilaterally the Terms of Reference and the course of 
arbitration procedures and, in particular, to abstain from calling the bank 
guarantees pending the arbitration proceedings. 
In its reply ... the 
Tribunal recommended the defendants to formally renounce 
from calling the bank guarantee pending the arbitration proceedings. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
See ICC Final Award 5887 of 1991 (unpublished). See Yesilirmak, Interim 
Measures, 31, note 6. 
150 See ICC Partial Award 3896 of 1982, extracts published in (1983) Clunet 914; X 
YCA 47(1985), and Jarvin / Derains, 161. 
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decision. 15 1 These forms may particularly be useful where the tribunal 
is not authorised to grant provisional measures under applicable 
laws. 152 
What criteria should a tribunal consider in exercising its discretion as to 
the form? The criteria recommended for ICC arbitration could, in this 
author's view, provide useful guidance in this respect: "[p]otential 
savings of time and costs for the parties, the effective and efficient 
conduct of the arbitration and the need to make every effort to ensure 
that an award is enforceable.... 3153 Among all, apparently, the parties' 
wishes should be taken into account to a possible extent. In addition, in 
making the decision between award and order, the tribunal should take 
into account the advantages and disadvantages of one form to the 
other. 
154 In particular, the form of "award" may be preferred where 
enforcement of the decision (particularly, international enforcement) is 
necessary and the decision in this form can be awaited. 155 In any case, 
151 In this connection, see Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration, 418; and ICC 
Award No. 3896, extracts published in (1983) Clunet 914; X YCA 47 (1985), and 
Jarvin / Derains, 161. See also generally infra Chapter V, note 2. It should, in this 
regard, be noted that the ICC Court of International Arbitration "has regularly 
approved" awards that contain recommendations or proposals. Schwartz, 
Provisional Measures, 63. A decision in the form of "recommendation" in ICSID 
arbitration does indeed have a binding effect. See Chapter IV, supra note 121 and 
152 
accompanying text. 
153 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 3. 
154 
Final Report on Awards, para. 37.3 
See Chapter IV, supra Part 4.1. 
155 On the issue of enforcement, see Chapter IV, supra note 119 and infra Chapter V, 
Part 3. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules empowers an arbitrator to grant an "interim award". This provision was 
suggested in the discussion of the Preliminary Draft about the Rules in the Fifth 
International Arbitration Congress, New Delhi, India, in 1975. The Vth International 
Arbitration Congress - Proceedings (New Delhi- Printaid 1975), D-99. Upon such 
suggestion, the provision on interim measures (Article 22) was clarified so as to 
provide "[s]uch interim measures may be established in the form of an interim 
award. " See LIN Doc A/CN. 9/97/Add. 2, reprinted in VI UNCITRAL Yearbook, 182, 
184 (1975). This clarification contained in the revised draft (Article 23). See UN 
Doc A/CN. 9/112 reprinted in VII UNCITRAL Yearbook 157 (1976). The 
UNCITRAL Secretariat's comment on Article 23 is noteworthy: "In order to facilitate 
the enforcement of interim measures taken by the arbitrators ... 
[this Article] 
authorizes the arbitrators to establish these measures in the form of interim 
awards. " See Van Hof, 176. 
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the choice of an arbitral tribunal on the form is subject to the applicable 
law. 
4.3 Provisional Measures in Case of Extreme Urgency After the 
Appointment of Arbitrators 
After the appointment of arbitrators, in cases of urgency (e. g. where 
there is a need for an ex parte measure), an arbitrator may issue an 
order and then if necessary incorporate it into an award. 156 The 
benefits of this approach are the satisfaction of speed and 
enforceability concerns and its being "a strong reminder to the 
057 disobedient to comply with the tribunal's previous decision . 
Temporary restraining measures could also serve the similar purpose. 
The Iran US Claims Tribunal uses these measures. The Tribunal 
adopted the concept of "temporary restraining measures" as 
[a]nalogous to the temporary restraining order of American 
procedural law, ... 5 
pending further determination of a request for 
interim measures. ' 
The temporary restraining measures may be used either because a 
member of tribunal may not be reached in time 
or because the panel wished to reserve its final decision on the 
interim measures request until after it received comments from the 
party against whom interim measures were sought. In this way 
temporary restraining measures reduce the urgency of the 
tribunal's rendering its final decision on the interim measures 
156 See, e. g., ICC Interim Award 8879 of 1998, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct 
157 
Arb Bull 84 (2000). 
158 
Lew, Commentary, 28. 
Brower, 180. Brower further indicates- 
In various municipal systems "interlocutory relief is granted within weeks, days 
or even hours of the threatened detriment and this is anticipated in the 
procedure by which it is granted in most jurisdictions". ... 
Such speed of 
deliberation cannot be assumed in international claims litigation, however. 
Concurring Opinion of Charles N. Brower to Component Builders, Inc. et al. v. Iran, 
Case No. 395, Order (10 January 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 3,6 
("Concurrent Opinion of Charles Brower"). Judge Brower cited to Jerome Elkind, 
Interim Protection, A Functional Approach (The Hague. - The Martinus Nijhoff 1981), 
191. It is stated, in this respect, that "only where there is a specific and compelling 
need will the Tribunal grant a request for interim measures prior to receiving the 
views of the opposing party. " Brower / Brueschke, 224. 
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request, and the time necessary to fully and properly consider the 159 
request gained . (Citations omitted. ) 
On the source of the power to grant temporary restraining measures 
under the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, it is argued that such 
power is either "inherent" or that Article 26(l) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, 160 by implication, "encompasses a power to order 
temporary restraints. , 16 1 This approach should be taken as example for 
arbitrations taking place under other arbitration rules. The power to 
issue a temporary restraining measure may be given to or exercised by 
the chairman of an arbitral tribunal if the applicable laws and rules 
permit it or, indeed, do not prohibit it. 
The temporary restraining measures have, in the practice of the Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal, taken the form of either orders or interim 
awards. 162 However, such measures in arbitration should not be 
granted in the form of an award as such form may be used after 
hearing the opponent. The requirements to grant temporary restraining 
measures are more or less similar to those for granting any provisional 
measure. These requirements are the existence of prima facie 
jurisdiction, urgency, and threat to prejudice the rights in dispute. 163 On 
the determination of the prima facie jurisdiction, the claimant should 
159 Caron, Interim Measures, 482-483. See also Pellonp66 / Caron, 447, and The 
Government of the United States of America on behalf and for the benefit of 
Teledyne Industries Incorporated v. Iran, Case No. 10812, Order (8 September 
1983), reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 336-337 (holding that urgency is an essential 
element on the grant of the order to stay of the parallel court proceedings pending 
160 
the Tribunal's decision on the basis of the parties' views). 
161 
See, alternatively, Article 26 of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's Rules. 
Pellonp66 / Caron, 448; and Caron, Interim Measures, 484. 
162 For examples on each category, see, e. g., Caron, Interim Measures, 483, note 52. 
163 See in this respect, Brower, 181; and also Concurring Opinion of Charles Brower, 
7-8. See also Shipside Packing Co. v. Iran, Interim Award No. ITM 27-11875-1 (6 
September 1983), reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 331 (grant of a measure of 
temporary restraint upon threat to sell goods forming the subject matter). Although 
urgency is not expressly mentioned in any of the awards, it is, in principle, an 
essential element for granting any provisional measure. On the issue of urgency, 
see Chapter IV, supra Part 3.1.3. 
"() I 
take advantage of the benefit of doubt. 
164 
For the satisfaction of the 
other conditions, Caron suggests that the benefit of doubt should be 
used in favour of granting it; for instance, "temporary restraining 
measures may be granted unless there is a manifest lack of 
preju ice. 
065 
Both parties do not need to be heard for granting temporary restraining 
measures as interpartes proceedings would undermine the purpose of 
employing such measures. 166 However, the respondent needs to be 
heard in a subsequent hearing. 167 
5 Duration of Provisional Measure 
An arbitral jurisdiction has a temporal element. An arbitral tribunal is 
empowered to issue a measure, after its formation, upon the 
commencement of proceedings, , 
168 "during the course of 
proceedings, 
069 
or "at any stage of proceedings. 
070 The tribunal has 
no authority to issue a provisional measure once it becomes functus 
164 Pellonp66 / Caron, 448*1 and Caron, Interim Measures, 484. See also Brower 
Brueschke, 225-226. 
165 Caron, Interim Measures, 484. 
166 See id. 
167 See Chapter IV, infra Part 8. 
168 See, e. g., Section 21 of the Arbitration Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the 
Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
169 See, e. g., Article 31 of the Arbitration Rules 1999 of the Arbitration Institute of the 
SCC. 
170 See, e. g., Article 38 of the Arbitration Rules 1998 of the NAI. In fact, a request for 
a provisional measure could, in principle, be made at any time before the final 
award is rendered. That is true regardless of the fact that whether or not the 
resolution of that measure is contained in the terms of reference. At the post- 
award stage, a provisional measure may be obtained, if necessary, from the 
competent national court prior to the recognition or enforcement of the award. In 
this regard, it should be noted that Article VI of the New York Convention provides 
for stay of an arbitral award's execution. According to that Article, if a request for 
setting aside or suspension of an arbitral award is made to a judicial authority, this 
authority "may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of 
the award" and may also, upon application, order the party in whose favour the 
enforcement is stayed to provide "suitable security. " The stay of enforcement, at 
the post-award stage, may also be requested under Article 50(2) of the ICSID 
Convention where a request is made for interpretation, revision or annulment of an 
arbitral award. See Articles, 50(2), 51(4), and 52(5) of the ICSID Convention. 
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officio. The duration of a measure should normally be that of the 
arbitral proceedings. 171 The effect of an interim measure of protection 
could possibly extend further to cover uncertainty during the time when 
a deadline runs out for filing an action to set aside the final award. 172 
6 Revision Reconsideration Modification or Revocation 
Provisional measures, as the term suggests, are intended to have a 
provisional effect pending final resolution of the case in dispute. These 
measures are not, in principle, intended to have a resjudicata effect in 
the conventional sense. 17' The provisional effect of the measure may 
be finalised or revoked either prior to or in the final award. The final 
award could contain a ruling reiterating the earlier provisional measure 
or amending or revoking such measure. 174 However, even prior to the 
issuance of the final award, under changed circumstances or in 
accordance with new facts, a need may arise to amend, revise, 
reconsider, modify, or revoke the provisional measure previously 
granted. In such cases, the form of the measure becomes the focal 
point for determining whether such revision or revocation could be 
made. If the decision takes the form of an order or any other form but 
171 In this respect, see Rule 39(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Note D to the 1968 
ICSID Arbitration Rules also provided: "[tlhe measures recommended must be 
'provisional' in character and be appropriate in nature, extent and duration to the 
risk existing for the rights to be preserved. " See 1 ICSID Rep 100. These Notes 
accompany to the 1968 Rules and they aim at providing explanations with regard 
to the Rules but they, themselves, do not have a legally binding force. However, 
ICSID tribunals may take these Notes into account. See, e. g., Lalive, 133, note 2. 
See also Bucher / Tschanz, para. 178 (stating that a provisional measure *ceases 
172 
to be effective" upon the issuance of the final award). 
Karrer, Less Theory, 102. 
173 Id., 109. See also Chapter IV, supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
174 The submission that an arbitral tribunal could have a physiological difficulty in 
amending or revoking its earlier decision for an interim measure of protection is 
misconceived. See Karrer, Less Theory, 109. The tribunal, like a state court, 
should have and, indeed, has, no difficulty in recognising the fact that its earlier 
decision on the measure given without full examination on the merits (basing on 
limited facts and under time pressure) and, thus, such examination could result in 
a further decision or a final award substantially different from the earlier decision. 
Id. See also ICC Interim Conservatory Award 10021 of 1999 where the tribunal 
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an award, there is no objection for reconsideration or modification of the 
decision. However, if the measure issued in the form of an award, then 
modification or reconsideration becomes troublesome. 175 
As to the revision or revocation of orders or other forms of decisions 
(but awards) on provisional measures, certain arbitration rules give 
express permission for such revision or revocation. "" A number of 
tribunals exercised their authority to either revise or revoke their orders 
on interim measures of protection or accepted the possibility of such 
revision or revocation. For instance, in Iran v. United States, Cases A-4 
and A-15, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal denied, in an order, the request 
for preventing the auction of the goods, which constitute a part of the 
subject matter of the dispute. 177 In its order, the Tribunal stated : 178 
expressly indicated that the decision may be different in amended or revoked the 
175 
final award (unpublished). 
Caron, Interim Measures, 513-514. 
176 See Article 19 of the Rules for International Arbitration 1994 of the AIA, and Rule 
39 of the Arbitration Rules of the ICSID, and Article 47 of the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules. It is further worthwhile to note Rule 7(111) of the Arbitration Rules 
1997 of the SIAC. This Rule provides that 0[a]n order for provisional relief may be 
confirmed, varied or revoked in whole or in part by the arbitrator who made it or 
any other arbitrator who may subsequently have jurisdiction over the dispute to 
which it relates. " Similarly, decisions of the ICJ on provisional measures could be 
modified or revoked where "some changes in the situation justifies" so. Article 
76(l) of the ICJ Rules. In this regard, see also Sino-Belgian Treaty case (Belgium 
v. China), 1927 PCIJ Reports, Ser. A, No. 8,9 (Order of 15 February 1927) (where 
the tribunal revoked its earlier order). The revision and revocation were expressly 
177 
permitted under the ICC Arbitration Rules 1923. See supra Chapter 1, Part 1.2.1. 
Cases Nos. A-4 and A-15, Order (18 January 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 
112-114. See also Order of 1999 in AAA Case No. 507181-0014299 (preserving, 
where a request for interim measure is denied, the right to re-present the request 
in case "a substantial change of facts may cause irreparable harm to" the moving 
party's business. ) (unpublished). Similarly, in accordance with Rule 39(3) of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, an ICSID tribunal "may at any time modify or revoke its 
recommendation. " Such modification or revocation could generally be done where 
there are new circumstances justifying them. In this regard, Schreuer states that 
0[i]f the circumstances requiring the provisional measures no longer exist, the 
Tribunal is under obligation to revoke them". Schreuer, Article 47,231, para. 48. 
In this regard, see also supra Chapter 11, note 274. Apparently, the determination 
of the existence or non-existence of the circumstances is within the sole discretion 
of the Tribunal. 
1'8 Cases Nos. A-4 and A-15, Order (18 January 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 
114. However, one should keep in mind that this case was between two states. 
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The Tribunal holds that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the Tribunal, are not such as to require the exercise 
of its power to order the requested interim measure of protection. The Tribunal notes that this decision not to exercise its power does 
not prevent the Party which has made the request from making a fresh request in the same case based on new facts, 
Indeed, within thirteen days from the above decision, the claimant 
made another request based on the new facts. The Tribunal accepted 
that the items of the property are irreplaceable, as a result, granted the 
179 
measure requested . 
With respect to revision or revocation of an award on a provisional 
measure, it should be noted that an ordinary award normally has a res 
judicata effect. 180 Accordingly, its revocation and revision could only be 
done under very restricted circumstances. 18 1 However, an award for 
interim protection of rights may need to be revised or revoked under the 
changed circumstances, in accordance with new facts, or if the term of 
it is expired or perhaps in the final award. 182 As indicated above, 
although the reconciliation of such revision or revocation with res 
judicata effect of an award is a matter for the applicable law, it is 
beneficial to have the form of an award on interim protection of rights 
within armoury of an arbitral tribunal. 183 In such cases, where a 
provisional measure previously issued is revised or revoked due to, for 
179 Interlocutory Award No. ITL 33-A-4/A-15(111)-2, (1 February 1984), reprinted in 5 
Iran-US CTR 131-133. 
180 See Chapter IV, supra note 135-136 and accompanying text. 
18 1 An award is generally corrected in such limited circumstances, e. g. where there is 
clerical, typographical or computation errors or where there is a need to interpreted 
specific point or part of the award. On the issue of correction or interpretation, see, 
e. g., Article 30 of the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules; Article 29 of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules; Article 27 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, Articles 35-37 of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules; Article 66 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules; and Article 33 of the 
Model Law. 
182 See Caron, Interim Measures, 515. The circumstances that has already 
considered in full should not be a cause for reconsideration or revocation unless, 
for instance, the earlier measure is granted ex parte. Id. On ex parte measures, 
183 
see Chapter IV, infra Part 8. 
See Chapter IV, supra notes 142-143,134 and accompanying text. 
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example, changed circumstances, the effect of such measure, in part or 
in full, should cease to exist from the point of revision or revocation. 184 
To this end, it should be noted that the arbitral tribunal should, within 
the text of the new measure or perhaps, most probably, in the final 
award, take into consideration any adverse effect of the measure 
revised or revoked. That is to say damages could be granted possibly 
out of a security. 
185 
The possibility of revision or revocation of an award on provisional 
measures is confirmed in arbitral practice. For instance, in Behring 
International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
after issuing an award on security for costs of the measure issued, 
retained the jurisdiction to "revise or supplement" its decision. 186 
Similarly, in ICC case 10021, the tribunal ruled, in an interim 
conservatory award, that the award should stay in force for a certain 
period of time unless, inter alia, the final award was issued prior to the 
187 
end of that period . 
The interim conservatory award was based on 
the tribunal's assumption that the final award would be rendered within 
that period of time. However, the tribunal could not render its award 
within such period. Upon the claimant's request, the tribunal rendered 
a partial award in which it was held that the award on conservatory 
measures was remained to be in force for a further period of time. 188 
1134 See Chapter IV, supra note 141. 
185 This is, indeed, one of the reasons justifying the grant of a security for damages. 
186 Case No. 382, Interim Award No. ITM 46-382-3 (22 February 1985), reprinted in 8 
Iran-US CTR 44,48. Similarly, in Fluor Corporation, after denying the request for a 
provisional measure in an interim award, the Tribunal held that such denial "is 
without prejudice to the Respondent renewing its request ... in the event of change 
in the ... circumstances. 
" Fluor Corporation v. Iran, Case No. 333, Interim Award 
No. ITM 62-333-1 (6 August 1986), reprinted in 11 Iran-US CTR 296,298. See 
also Boeing Company v. Iran, Case No. 222, Interim Award No. ITM 38-222-1 (25 
May 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 43,46. 
187 Interim Conservatory Award 10021 of 1999 (unpublished). On this award, see 
188 
Chapter IV, infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
ICC Partial Award 10021 of 2000 (unpublished). 
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The tribunal facilitated this extension by specifically amending in the 
partial award the relevant terms of the interim conservatory award. 
7 Types of a Measure 
Unlike laws of a certain small number of states, 189 arbitration rules do 
not generally clarify the types of provisional measures that could be 
granted by arbitrators. 190 Indeed, eighteen out of the seventy-two rules 
surveyed empower tribunals to take "any" or "all" appropriate interim 
measures. 191 The reference to "any" or "all" provisional measures gives 
a wide discretion to arbitrators in determining the appropriate 
measure. 
192 The benefit of discretion is the ability of arbitrators to issue 
", 9 See, e. g., Sections 38 & 39 of the EAA 1996; and Section 2GB of the Hong Kong 
AO. 
190 For an exception, see, e. g., Rule 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the SIAC. For 
a long period of time, arbitration rules referred to measures aimed at protection of 
goods / merchandise in question. The reference was related to the fact that those 
rules were prepared for resolving disputes in relation to sale of goods transactions. 
See, generally, supra Chapter 1. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that arbitrating 
parties can determine the measures that would be granted by the arbitral tribunal in 
their tailor-made arbitration rules although such express determination rarely 
occurs. 
191 See Annex. Some of the examples given, in this respect, are preservation of 
goods or property (by ordering that the goods be deposited with a third person or 
that perishable goods be sold), preserving evidence, appointment of an expert for 
a survey, injunctive relief, preventing dissipation of assets, security for costs, and 
security for payment. See, e. g., Article 7(8) of the Arbitration Rules 2000 of the 
CIA; Article 28 of the Arbitration Rules 1993 of the Court of Arbitration at the 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce, and Article 8(2) of the Rules of Arbitration and 
Appeal of the GAFTA. Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules refers to the 
conservation of goods, ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of 
perishable goods, which are only examples. See, in this regard, e. g., Sanders, 
Commentary, 196; Baker / Davis, 133; and E-Systems, Inc. v Iran, Case No. 388, 
Interim Award No. ITM 13-388-FT (4 February 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 
51,60. Some more examples could be added: an arbitral tribunal 
may, instead of ordering the goods to be deposited with a third party, order them 
transferred to a more appropriate storing facility or even take temporary control 
over them itself. The possibility of utilizing third party depositories is not 
restricted to "goods; " funds (represented, e. g., by a letter of credit) may be 
placed to in escrow as an interim measure. (Citations omitted) 
Pellonp66 / Caron, 444. With respect to types of arbitral provisional measures 
granted, for instance, in ICC arbitration practice, see Lew, Commentary, 29. In 
addition, arbitral tribunals are generally empowered to collect evidence. See 
Chapter IV, infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
192 See, in this respect, Lew / Mistelis / Kr611, para. 23-3 (indicating that "[w]hat interim 
measures are appropriate in international commercial arbitration is determined 
according to the specific facts of each dispute and the arbitrators' subjective 
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flexible measures that could never be granted by a court operating 
under the constraints of a national law. 193 Having such wide discretion, 
the tribunal may order any measure available under lex arbitri, lex 
causae, or lex executionis (law of the forum where the measure is likely 
to be enforced). However, the tribunal is not generally restricted with 
the types of measures available to a judge. The tribunal may issue any 
measure that is usually granted in international arbitration practice. In 
sum, an arbitral tribunal's armoury includes variety of provisional 
measures and the tribunal is much more flexible in choosing the most 
appropriate kind of measure than a state judge. 
Certain restrictions may, however, be imposed on the tribunal's 
discretion in respect of types of measures. In this regard, mandatory 
rules of the applicable law may need to be observed. 194 To confirm 
perception of the risks involved. "). In using their wide discretion, arbitrators 
occasionally refer to procedural law of the seat of arbitration (as the law applicable 
to arbitration) in practice. See ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts 
published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 56-60 (2000); and ICC Interim Awards 8670 
of 1995 and 1996 (unpublished) (in both cases the arbitral tribunals mainly applied 
the principles of the law of the place of arbitration in reaching the conclusion that 
security for payment was available under the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 despite 
the fact that the Rules were thought not to regulate this kind of security). See also, 
for the extracts from the decision of the arbitral tribunal in Sperry International, 
Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Israel, 689 F2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982). It should be 
noted that arbitrators should not restrict themselves with the measures available at 
the seat of arbitration provided that the measure is intended to have effect at the 
seat. The seat is often a neutral place in international commercial arbitration. 
Arbitrating parties and the subject matter may have no connecting element with the 
seat. Karrer, Less Theory, 109. Further, even if the measure is intended to have 
effect at the seat and elsewhere, it should be kept in mind that measures not 
available in the form granted under the local law may still be enforceable in some 
countries, e. g., Germany with some adaptations. Id. See also infra Chapter V, 
Part 3.2.1; and Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 339 (stating that "the 
arbitrators are not limited to the remedies known in the procedural law of the 
193 
country of the seat. "). 
See, in this regard, Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,462-63 (stating 
that an arbitral tribunal has "an obligation to try to find an equitable and 
commercially practicable procedural solution to prevent irreparable and 
194 
unnecessary injury to the parties. "). 
See, Lew, Commentary, 29. The observation of, for instance, the lex arbitri is 
necessary for upholding the measures' validity (particularly if it is an award) 
whereas that of the lex executionis (if known) is important if the enforcement of the 
measure will be sought. 
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this, it should be noted that arbitral tribunals would not grant measures 
that are beyond their powers due mainly to consensual nature of 
arbitration. 
195 For instance, tribunals may deny requests for a Mareva- 
196 197 98 type injunction, an attachment, or a post award attachment' . 
Further restrictions may arise from the text of the rules incorporated in 
their agreement by contracting parties. For instance, Article 26 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules restricts the type of measures that may be 
granted to "the subject-matter in dispute. "199 The Model Law too 
195 Also because arbitrators do not wish to be in conflict with lex arbitri or law of place 
of enforcement. That is to say that where those laws empower arbitrators to grant, 
for instance, measures against third parties or measures that intrinsically require 
the use of coercive powers, arbitrators are likely to grant those measures. But see 
Karrer, Less Theory, 106. He argues that whether or not an arbitrator can grant, 
for instance a Mareva injunction is a matter of comity. Id. But see supra Chapter 
11, note 100. 
196 ICC Interim Award 6251 of 1990 (unpublished) (holding that the tribunal does not 
have the authority to issue a Mareva injunction. ). Indeed, it is stated that Mareva 
or Anton Piller relief requires the use of draconian powers which "are best left to be 
applied" by judiciary. 1996 DAC Report, para. 201. But see Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, 
paras. 23-47 - 23-51. Apparently, the reason for not equipping arbitrators with 
197 
such powers is more political than philosophical. See Karrer, Less Theory, 106. 
ICC Partial Award 10021 of 2000 (unpublished) (finding "it inappropriate to grant 
requests of attachment where the power of national courts would be a 
prerequisite. "). See, e. g., Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 341 
(attachment, as a coercive remedy, is reserved to jurisdiction of judicial 
authorities. ). See also Article 1696(l) of the Belgian Judicial Code. 
198 ICC Final Award 7828 of 1995 (unpublished) (holding that "[i]t exceeds the 
arbitrator's competence to subject the Defendant to attachment if he fails to pay 
the ordered amount within the period of two weeks. ") 
199 Further, several of the rules surveyed contain similar or other kind of restrictions. 
See, e. g., Article 21 of the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules ("including injunctive relief 
and measures for the protection or preservation of property. "); Article 35 of the 
Securities Arbitration Rules 1993 of the AAA ("including measures for conservation 
of property, without prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final 
determination of the dispute". ); Article 10(2) of the Arbitration Rules 1995 of the 
AFMA ("[s]uch interim measures may include but not need to be limited to 
measures for the conservation of the rights, funds, goods or materials forming the 
subject matter in dispute; ordering deposit of disputed rights, funds, goods or 
materials with a third person or organization; or the freezing of prints or other 
motion picture materials to prevent further exploitation or utilization of a picture or 
other materials during the pendency of the proceedings. "); Article 52 of the 
Arbitration Rules 1986 of the Center for Conciliation and Arbitration of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Panama ("including measures 
for the preservation of the goods forming the subject matter in dispute, such as 
ordering that the goods be deposited with a third person or that perishable goods 
be sold"); Article 34 of the Rules of International Arbitration 1992 the Croatian 
Chamber of Commerce ("including measures for the conservation of the goods 
forming the subject matter in dispute, such as ordering their deposit with a third 
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contains almost identical restriction: an interim measure needs to be 
related to the "subject matter of the dispute. " These limitations should 
generally be interpreted broadly: the restriction should be related to the 
subject matter of the rights in dispute. 200 In any case, the tribunal's 
jurisdiction is limited to the parties involved and the remedy that it could 
201 
grant in the final award . 
This part examines the types of measures regularly seen in arbitral 
practice: measures concerning preservation of evidence, injunctions, 
security for payment, security for costs, and provisional payment. 
person or the sale of perishable goods". ); Rule 13 of the Non-administered 
Arbitration of International Disputes 1992 of the CPR Institute for Dispute 
Resolution ("including measures for the preservation of assets, the conservation of 
goods or the sale of perishable goods". ); Article 27 of the Arbitration Rules of the 
European Development Fund ("including measures for the conservation, 
preservation or safe-custody of the goods forming the subject matter in dispute, 
such as ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of perishable good". ); 
Article 27 of the Arbitration Rules 1994 of the Geneva Chamber of Commerce (the 
"GCC") Commercial Arbitration Centre (including the measures for preservation of 
the contentious goods, such as ordering the deposit of the goods with third parties 
or the sale of the perishable goods with third parties or the sale of the perishable 
items thereof in compliance with the procedural rules in the country where the 
interim measure is adopted". ); and Article 46 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules 1994 
("including injunctions and measures for the conservation of goods which form part 
of the subject matter in dispute, such as order for their deposit with a third person 
or for the sale of perishable goods". ). See also Article 7(11) of the Arbitration 
Rules 2000 of the CIA; Articles 40 of the Arbitration Rules 1983 of the Korean 
Commercial Arbitration Board; Rule 25 of the Arbitration Rules 1997 of the SIAC; 
and Articles 27 of the UNECE Arbitration Rules 1966. 
200 See supra Chapter 11, note 113. However, It is submitted that whether a tribunal 
operating under the above rules or the Model Law could grant a measure aim at 
preserving the status quo is "doubtful", and security for claim. Redfern / Hunter, 
para. 7-26. Such argument could not be made in regard of the restriction 
contained, for example, under Article 25(l)(c) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules. The 
tribunal is, under these Rules, empowered to order "any relief which the [a]rbitral 
[t]ribunal would have power to grant in an award See also Charles 
Construction Company v. Derderian, 586 N. E. 2d 992 (Mass. 1992) (denying an 
argument that an arbitrator has the power to grant a security for claim where the 
arbitration agreement empowered arbitrators with the power to grant interim relief 
201 
to safeguard the property that is the subject matter of the arbitration. ). 
See, e. g., Section 39(l) of the EAA 1996. 
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7.1 Measures Concerning Preservation of Evidence 
Preservation of evidence on an interim basis is generally sought where 
there is a risk that the evidence will be harmed or perished, if an urgent 
measure is not taken. The aim for such preservation is to facilitate 
proper conduct of arbitration. The arbitral power to preserve evidence 
is recognised under nearly all arbitration rules and laws containing a 
provision on interim measures. 
202 Such power is exercised with no 
trouble in arbitral practice. 
203 
7.2 Injunctions 
The term "injunction" refers to asking a person to do or refrain from 
doing something. In a broad sense, many arbitral decisions are 
injunctions. Experience demonstrates that arbitrators grant variety of 
injunctions on, e. g. transfer of goods to another place, sale of goods or 
stay of the sale, supply of goods, establishing an escrow account to 
202 In addition, institutional or ad hoc arbitration rules or national laws generally deal 
with collection of evidence. For instance, under Article 20(l) of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules, an arbitral tribunal is empowered to establish the facts by all appropriate 
means. The similar powers are entrusted to an arbitral tribunal in accordance with, 
e. g., Article 19(3) of the AAA-ICDR Arbitration Rules; Article 23 of the Arbitration 
Rules 1994 of the CIETAC- Rule 4 of the Rules of Arbitration and Appeal 1997 of 
the FOSFA; Article 43 oi the ICSID Convention and Rule 34 of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules; Article 3 of the International Bar Association's 1999 Rules of 
Evidence; Article 20 of the ICC Arbitration Rules; Article 22(1)(d)-(e) of the LCIA 
Arbitration Rules; and Article 24(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The 
protection of evidence on an interim basis could be done either by the above 
provisions or through powers entrusted to arbitrators under the relevant rules or 
laws for interim protection of rights. The power regarding the collection of 
evidence is generally used - where there is no urgent need of protection of 
evidence - for simply establishment of the case in dispute. The benefit of relying 
on this power is that it is more likely than not that court assistance could be sought 
for collection of evidence. See, e. g., Article 38(4) of the EAA 1996; Article 27 of 
the Model Law; Articles 184(2) and 185 of the SPIL; and Section 7 of the U. S. 
Federal AA 1925. It should, however, be noted that an arbitral tribunal, in principle, 
ought to be free to rely on whatever power it thinks effective to protect the evidence 
in peril. 
203 See, e. g., Behring International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, Case No. 382, Decision 
(19 December 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-US CTR 89 (appointing an expert for 
determining the status of the goods that were deteriorating. ); and AGIP v. Congo, 
cited in Award, 30 November 1979,1 ICSID Rep 311 (recommending the 
collection of all books and documents that might be lost. ). But see, e. g., Vacuum 
27 1 
hold proceeds of a letter of credit, preserving or changing the status 
quo, 204 and anti suit injunctions. An injunction may be coupled with a 
fine. To illustrate the arbitral case law, for instance, in Behring 
International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, 
205 
upon the request of transfer of 
goods to another warehouse due to possibility of deterioration, the Iran 
US Claims Tribunal held, inter alia, that 
the Respondents' property must be removed from [the claimant's 
warehouse facility] ... 
in order to prevent unnecessary damage 
and/or deterioration. The conditions under which the goods are 
presently stored are inadequate to conserve and protect them and 
irreparable prejudice to Respondents' asserted rights may result if 
206 they are not transferred to a more appropriate facility (Citation 
omitted. ) 
In addition, in two cases, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal granted the 
request for sale of the goods in dispute , 
207 though, for example, in two 
other cases, it denied similar requests by mainly relying on the 
respondents' undertaki I ngs. 208 Similarly, with respect to the stay of sale 
Salt v. Ghana (denying the request for preservation of evidence because of the 
204 
respondent's undertaking. ). 
The preservation of status quo may sometimes be vital as in certain cases an 
award of damages cannot fully remedy the loss of a party. For instance, damage 
to reputation, loss of business opportunities and similar heads of claim, which are 
real enough but difficult to prove and to quantify ... " may be avoided through 
205 
provisional measures. Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-25. 
Case No. 382, Interim and Interlocutory Award No. ITM/ITL 52-382-3 (21 June 
1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 238. See also, e. g., Iran v. The United States of 
America, Case A-15, Dec. No. Dec 52-A/15-FT (24 November 1986), reprinted in 
13 Iran-US CTR 173-175. 
206 Case No. 382, Interim and Interlocutory Award No. ITM/ITL 52-382-3 (21 June 
1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 276. However, the Iran US-Claims Tribunal, by 
recognising the possibility that the claimant might have a warehouseman's lien 
over the goods in dispute, granted forty-five days to the claimant to apply to a court 
in the U. S. for establishing measures protecting its security interest. Id., 282. 
207 See Behring International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, Case No. 382, Award No. ITIVI 
25-382-3 (21 June 1985), reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 173-175 (holding that, under 
Article 26 of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal is authorised to grant the stay of sale 
of goods); and U. S. (Shipside Packing) v. Iran, Case No. 11875, Interim Award No. 
ITIVI 27-11875-1 (6 September 1983), reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 331 (ordering the 
claimant to halt the proposed sale of goods in dispute). 
208 See Avco Corporation v. Iran, Case No. 261, Partial Award No. 377-261-3 (18 July 
1988), reprinted in 19 Iran-US CTR 200,201-202; and United Technologies Int'l, 
Inc. v. Iran, Case No. 114, Dec. No. 53-114-3 (10 December 1986), reprinted in 13 
Iran-US CTR 254-260. See also, in this regard, Iran v. United States, Case A/15, 
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of goods, in Iran v. United States, Cases, A-4 and A- 15,209 the claimant 
made a request from the Tribunal to enjoin the respondent "from 
auctioning movable properties of Iran's Embassy and Consulates in the 
United States". The Tribunal ordered the respondent 
to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent the sale 
of Iran's diplomatic and consular properties in the United States 
which possess important historical, cultural, or other unique features, and which, by their nature, are irreplaceable. 210 
In regard of supply of goods, in an AAA case, 211 a dispute arose from 
various agreements and their amendments concerning exclusive 
consignment for the storage, marketing and sales of certain surplus 
parts. The issue in dispute was mainly whether those agreements were 
rescinded. The sole arbitrator was asked to rule on the destiny of the 
parts, which were in the possession of the respondents until the 
issuance of the final award. The arbitrator ordered, inter alia, that the 
respondent should not make or offer to make any sales of the parts 
without the express permission of the claimant. The respondent was 
permitted to submit proposals for the sales of goods and the claimant 
was ordered not to unreasonably withhold or delay its permission to the 
proposed sales. The aims of such order seem to be the continuation of 
the respondent's business until the final award is rendered and also the 
protection of the claimant's benefit by subjecting the sales of the parts 
to its permission, which could not be unreasonably withhold. The 
arbitrator also kept track of the sale mechanism created by him by 
Dec. No. 35-A/15(il)-FT (5 March 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 63-64 (holding 
that the denial was based on the fact that the request became moot. ) 
209 Case Nos. A-4 and A-15, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 33-A-4/A-15(ill)-2 (1 
February 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 131-133. See also ICC Interim 
Conservatory Award 10021 of 1999 (unpublished) (ordering a party to refrain from, 
on an interim basis, selling encumbering, leasing or otherwise disposing its 
210 
interests in shares of a company. ). 
Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A-4 and A-1 5, Interlocutory Award No. ITIL 33-A- 
211 
4/A-15(111)-2 (11 February 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 133. 
Order No. 5 of 1998 in AAA Case No. 13T153-00870197 (unpublished). 
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ordering the supply of information concerning the proposals and the 
permissions. 
As regards establishing an escrow account, in Sperry International 
Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, an AAA tribunal ordered, where 
Israel was trying to withdraw the letter of credit given in its favour, that 
the proceeds of the letter of credit was to be held in an escrow account 
in the joint names of Israel and Sperry. 
212 
213 With respect to preserving or changing status quo, it is noteworthy 
that an arbitral tribunal should carefully consider contractual and 
statutory rights of contracting parties; for instance, what risk allocation 
is envisaged 214 or what rights a party have under the applicable law. 215 
Further, an applicant should not be permitted to rely on arguments that 
are or should have known by it at the time of entering into arbitration 
216 . 217 agreement. For instance, in ICC case 5835, the tribunal ruled. 
The fact that the Defendant is a company with a relatively small 
capital and small assets, and that its balance sheet for the year [X] 
showed a deficit, should normally have been investigated by the 
Claimant when he signed the [agreement]. Likewise, the Claimant 
also should have known, that the Defendant's balance sheet for 
the [next year] showed a higher deficit. The Claimant also knew 
of the terms and dates of payment by [Claimant] to the Defendant. 
212 See Sperry International Trade Co. v. Government of Israel, 689 F 2d 301,303, 
213 
note 2 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
For instance, measures for prohibiting withdrawal of a bank guarantee, selling 
214 
shares of a company, changing its board of directors, etc. 
215 
On risk allocation, see Chapter IV, supra note 92. 
Apparently, as regards the contractual rights, generally, the balance existed 
between the parties under the agreement should be maintained whereas as 
regards the statutory rights and remedies, normally, the balance existed at the 
initiation of arbitration proceedings should be maintained. On the latter, see 
Cremades, The Need, 227. 
216 A party, for example, cannot argue, if it knew or should have known, that the other 
party is from or established under the laws of a country that is not a party to major 
treaties facilitating enforcement of arbitration awards. But see Cremades, The 
Need, 227. 
217 ICC Second Interim Award 5835 of 1992 (unpublished). On the facts regarding 
this case, see ICC First Interim Award 5835 of 1988, extracts published in 8(1) ICC 
Int'l Ct Arb Bull 67 (1997) 
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Whether or not an arbitrator could grant an anti-suit injunction 
218 is an 
interesting issue. That is because it, on the one hand, invites the clash 
219 
of two institutions. judiciary and arbitrators . On the other hand, 
it is highly doubtful whether an arbitral tribunal should be allowed 
to tell another arbitral tribunal or a state court what -to do, or 
whether it should be allowed to interfere indirectly with the 
workings of another arbitral tribunal by orderin one of the parties 
what to do in the other arbitration or litigation. 229 
In this regard, it is argued that a tribunal, be it arbitral or judicial, should, 
in principle, decide on only its own jurisdiction; hence refrain from 
interfering any other tribunal's decision on jurisdiction . 
22 ' However, in 
case, a party's act is vexatious, the tribunal should be able to order, 
propose or recommend that party to cease those acts for protection of 
the other party's rights or prevention of aggravation of the dispute. In 
other words, if permitted, the tribunal can take a flexible approach. 
That is because, by agreeing to arbitrate, contracting parties 
demonstrate their desire of the forum for resolving any possible 
disputes. Such desire should be upheld. For instance, the ICSID 
tribunal, in Holiday Inns v. Morocco, refrained from directly ordering 
Morocco to withdraw local court actions taking against the claimant. 
The tribunal, however, made three recommendations, one of which 
suggested the withdrawal of court actions. The other two, however, 
218 For a review of judicial anti-suit injunctions, see, e. g., Lew / Mistelis / Kroll, 
paras. 15-24 - 15-33. 219 The courts traditionally have hostility towards arbitrators. See supra Chapter 1, 
Part 2.1. The potential clash is generally resolved by Article 2(3) of the New York 
Convention. See also, e. g., Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. Domestic laws 
may too provide for provisions that cause courts or other arbitral tribunals to refer 
the case to the tribunal validly seized the case in dispute. See, e. g., Article 8 of the 
Model Law, Section 9 of the EAA 1996. In fact, if a dispute is agreed to be 
resolved through arbitration, judicial authorities should deny any request to 
them 
22 
for the resolution of the dispute and refer the parties to arbitration. 
Karrer, Less Theory, 106. 
221 1 d. 
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mainly aimed at 
actions. 
222 
remedying the respondent's concerns for court 
Injunctions may couple with a fine provided that such fine is permitted 
under the relevant arbitration agreemen t223 and is not prohibited under 
224 the applicable law. Such fine is a penalty payment to prevent 
disobedience. For instance, in an AAA case, the arbitral tribunal 
indicated that it could grant a penalty payment in case the injunction 
granted would not be obeyed . 
225 In this case, a dispute arose between 
the parties with respect to three agreements on assignment, 
employment and consulting. Upon the claimants' request, the tribunal 
enjoined, in a partial award, the respondents from, inter alia, the use of 
the claimant's trade name, trademark and know-how. The tribunal in its 
award refrained from imposing sanctions with the hope that the 
respondents comply with its directives without the "threat of sanctions". 
However, the tribunal reserved its jurisdiction to grant any Interim 
measure in case its directives were not complied with. The tribunal 
expressly indicated that it is within its armoury to sanction the failure to 
222 Decision of Tribunal (2 July 1972). See Lalive, 136-137. See also Wirth, 37 
(indicating that, in two unpublished cases, the tribunals granted anti-suit injunctions 
basing their decisions on the arguments that either by agreeing to arbitrate parties 
obliged not to seek any relief outside arbitration or cnnfidentiality clause contained 
in the substantive contract prevented such relief. Wirth, 37. On the issue of 
223 
comity, see supra Chapter 11, note 100. 
The power to issue such fine may expressly be contained in the arbitration 
agreement. Otherwise, the power arises from broad interpretation of the 
agreement. See, Karrer, Less Theory, 105. But see Berger, International 
Economic Arbitration, 341 (stating that the issuance of a penalty payment is" 
224 
beyond the authority and the mandate of an arbitral tribunal. "). 
ICC Final Award 7895 of 1994, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 64- 
65 (2000) (the tribunal found itself with the power to order an injunction coupled 
with a fine under the ICC Arbitration Rules 1988 in "the absence of (i) an 
agreement of the parties to the contrary, and (ii) a mandatory provision of French 
procedural law requiring otherwise See also ICC Interim Award 9301 of 1997 
(unpublished) and ICC Final Award 9154 of 1998, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC 
Int'l Ct Arb Bull 98-103 (2000). Laws of such countries as Belgium, France, and 
Netherlands (Article 1056 of the Netherlands AA) seem to recognise the adoption 
of such arbitral power. Karrer, Less Theory, 105. But, for instance, Swedish law 
too expressly prohibits imposition of fines. Section 25 of the Swedish AA 1999. 
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comply with its directives by payment of a specified amount for each 
time period the respondents fail to COMply. 226 
7.3 Security for Payment 
A security for payment or claim is a kind of advance payment 
guaranteeing for the enforcement of the final award where the applicant 
proves to be right on the merits of the case in dispute. The power to 
grant such security generally arises from the broad interpretation of 
either power given to the tribunal in regard of interim protection of rights 
or the arbitration agreemen t. 227 For the grant of security for payment, 
the moving party needs to demonstrate, inter alia, that it is highly likely 
that the award, if it is rendered in its favour, would not be enforced. For 
instance, in ICC case 8786, the respondent requested a security for 
claim by arguing that the claimant would not comply with the award that 
would be in its favour and the chances of such award's enforcement in 
State X "are less than SliM.,, 228 The claimant objected to these 
225 Partial Award of 1999 and Final Award of 2000 in AAA Case No. 81.153.002696 
226 
(unpublished). The place of arbitration was Nevada, the U. S. 
It is noteworthy that the respondents did not comply with the tribunal's directives. 
The tribunal sanctioned the non-compliance, in its final award; and accordingly, the 
sanction became a post-award relief. The tribunal ruled that if any of its injunctions 
as provided in its partial award was not complied with, the respondents were to pay 
227 
USD 1000 for each day of non-compliance for a period of twenty days. 
Tne arbitration rules surveyed, save for a few, do not generally empower an 
arbitrator to grant security for payment. For the exceptions, see Article 38(l) of the 
NAI Arbitration Rules; Article 25(l)(a) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules; and Article 
17(l) of the CEPANI Arbitration Rules. In this regard, see also NAI Interim Award 
No. 1694 (21 December 1996), extracts reprinted in XXIII YCA 97 (1998). For the 
concept of broad interpretation of arbitration agreement, see, e. g., ICC Second 
Partial Award 8113 of 1995, extracts published in 11(l) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 65 
(2000), and Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, para. 23-44. See also Charles Construction 
Company v. Derderian, 586 NE 2d 992 (Mass. 1992) (Massachusetts Supreme 
Court) (holding that where the arbitration agreement or the applicable law is silent 
on the power to take security for claim, "the arbitrator's authority to act would be 
reasonably implied from the agreement to arbitrate itself"). But see Swift Industries 
Inc. v. Botany Ind. Inc. 466 F 2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that "to award 
(security for claim] as an adjunct to declaratory relief a form of pre-judgement 
execution which the agreement by its lack of reference to security seems to 
exclude rather than to intend, is to eclipse the framework of the agreement and to 
venture on to unprotected grounds. "). 
228 ICC Interim Award 8786 of 1996, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 
81-84 (2000). A similar request was denied by another arbitral tribunal on the 
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arguments. The arbitral tribunal refused the request on the grounds 
that the applicant "has failed to sufficiently substantiate the existence of 
a not easily reparable prejudice" and that there was no urgency". 229 In 
ICC case 10021, however, the tribunal indirectly complied with the 
request for security payment. In this case, the claimant requested the 
tribunal to attach the assets of the respondents. The tribunal, rather 
than, accepting the request, ordered the respondents mainly to refrain 
from disposing of the assets in dispute since the power to attach assets 
would not be within the domain of arbitration . 
230 The dispute, in this 
case, arose from breach of certain agreements including a 
shareholders agreement concerning a cement company. The claimant 
made a request for security for claim by arguing that respondents were 
transferring their shares in the company. The respondents did not deny 
the claim and made no reasonable explanation about it. Further, the 
claimant also claimed that apart from its shares in the company, the 
respondents no longer had sufficient liquid assets enabling them to 
satisfy a possible award for damages. In fact, the tribunal observed 
that the respondents refrained from depositing their share of costs and 
stating real value of their shares or real estate. In addition, the claimant 
demonstrated to the tribunal that it had certain monetary claims. Under 
the above circumstances, the tribunal held that the value of the 
respondents' shares in the company did not seem to exceed the 
amount of security requested. Accordingly, the tribunal ordered, the 
respondents, in an award, not to transfer or in any way dispose of those 
shares (rather than attaching the respondents' assets). 
ground that the law of the place of arbitration did not provide for security for claim 
ICC Final Award 7560 of 1990 (unpublished). See Yesilirmak, Interim Measures, 
33, note 29. 
229 ICC Interim Award 8786 of 1996, extracts published in 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 
82-83 (2000). The tribunal relied mainly on the requirements set forth under the 
law of the place of arbitration for the grant of the measure requested. See also 
230 
NAI Interim Award 1694, extracts reprinted in XXIII YCA 97 (1998). 
ICC Interim Conservatory Award 10021 of 1999 (unpublished). 
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7.4 Security for Costs 
Security for costs may be defined as "[p]ayment into court in the form of 
cash, property or bond by a plaintiff or an appellant to secure the 
payment of costs if such person does not prevail. , 
231 
Under some 
national laws, security for costs is referred to as cautio judicatum solvi, 
the duty of an alien claimant to provide security for costs of its 
232 defendant 
. 
The issue of security for costs of arbitral proceedings (e. g. legal costs, 
tribunal's costs, travelling expenses, etc. ) or of arbitrating parties "very 
occasionally comes Up,, 233 and is highly debated. Such security for 
costs should not "normally" be required in international arbitration . 
234 It 
is rightly argued that a contracting party normally bears, whilst entering 
into a contract, the risk of having a dispute, which is agreed to be 
235 settled in an arbitration . 
That is because such risk is "the general 
236 
commercial risk of being engaged in business and trade" . 
Further, 
there is and should be no alien claimant in international arbitration. 
231 Black's Law Dictionary, 6 th ed., (St Paul, Minnesota- West Publishing 1990), 1357. 
232 See Sandrock, 17. The examples to those countries where a security for costs 
may be required in litigation see, e. g., Austria (Article 57 of the CCP); Germany 
(Article 110 of the CCP); Turkey (Article 32 of the International Private and 
Procedural Law); and the USA (see, e. g., Noah Rubins, "In God We Trust, All 
Others Pay Cashý Security for Costs in International Commercial Arbitration", 11(3) 
Am Rev Int'l Arb 307,327 (2000)). But see Article 17 of the Convention Relating to 
Civil Procedure, done at the Hague on 1 March 1954,286 UNTS 265, No. 4173-, 
and Article 9(l) of the European Convention on Establishment of 1955, signed at 
Paris on 13 December 1955,1955 UNTS 141, No. 7660. 
233 Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,467. 
234 See, e. g., Blessing, Introduction, para. 8K Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-32 
(indicating that arbitrators are unlikely to grant security for costs. ); V. V. Veeder, 
"England" in- Paulsson (gen. ed. ), International Handbook, Supplement 23 (March 
1997), 43 (indicating that an arbitrator's broad discretion to order security for costs 
under the EAA 1996 "is likely to be exercised most sparingly where the arbitration 
is truly international". ). Indeed, it is observed that ICC arbitrators "were extremely 
reluctant to grant" such measures. Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000, 
467. 
235 Apparently, where a party becomes successful at the end of arbitration 
proceedings, the costs would be apportioned in accordance with the applicable rule 
236 
or law (e. g., costs follow the event, or each party bears its own costs). 
Blessing, Introduction, para. 886. 
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That is because each and every claimant and counter-claimant should 
be equally distant to the law of the forum where arbitration takes place 
and indeed because there is no lex fori in arbitration. 237 However, in 
cases where an arbitral tribunal is empowered to grant security for 
costs, and, under appropriate circumstances, a security for costs may 
238 be granted . 
To this end, there are mainly two issues to examine (Ii) 
whether or not the tribunal has the power to grant such security, and (ii) 
what the appropriate circumstances are. 
The power to issue security for costs may derive from arbitration 
rule S239 or applicable laWS240. It is generally accepted that arbitrators 
should have the power to issue security for CoStS. 
241 Sixteen of the 
242 rules surveyed provide for security for costs of the measure granted . 
237 See supra Chapter 11, note 103. 238 See, e. g., Sandrock, 30-37. 239 Annex. 
240 See e. g., SPIL (see, e. g., Wirth, 36 (stating that under exceptional circumstances, 
e. g., where there is a "clear and present danger" or even where there is a "potential 
risk" of non-recovery of legal costs, an arbitral tribunal may order security for 
costs. )); Section 38(3) of the EAA 1996 (stating that, unless otherwise agreed, a 
tribunal may order security for costs though such order, under that Section, could 
not be based on the fact that a party is ordinarily resides out of England or that a 
company or association incorporated under the law of a foreign country or 
managed or controlled from such country. ); Section 2GB(l)(a) of the Hong Kong 
AO; Section 7(2) of the Ireland AA 1998; Section 12(l) of the Singapore 
International AA. However, it should be noted that the device of security for costs 
is unfamiliar to many legal systems. W. Laurence Craig / William W. Park / Jan 
Paulsson, Craig, Park & Paulsson's Annotated Guide to the 1998 ICC Arbitration 
Rules with Commentary (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1998), 139 ("Annotated 
241 
Guide"). 
242 
Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,467. 
See, e. g., Article 21 of the Arbitration Rules of the AAA-ICDR-, Article 35 of the 
Securities Arbitration 1993 of the AAA; Article 18 of the Arbitration Rules 1993 of 
the Board of Arbitration of the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland; 25(2) of 
the LCIA Arbitration Rules; Article 38 of the NAI Arbitration Rules; Article 46 (b) of 
the WIPO Arbitration Rules (under "exceptional circumstances"); and Article 26(2) 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that, under 
Article 25(2) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, an arbitral tribunal is exclusively (and not 
a court) empowered to grant security for costs (legal or otherwise), Further, the 
scope of the security, e. g., whether it covers legal expenses, costs of arbitration, 
attorney's fees, remuneration of the tribunal is not generally dealt with under the 
above rules. See, e. g., Article 7(8)(b) of the Arbitration Rules 2000 of the CIA 
(provides only for security for costs). But see Rule 11 of the Arbitration Rules 1981 
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For the remaining arbitration rules that do not contain express 
provisions on security for costs, the general power to grant a provisional 
measure should generally be sufficient for the grant of security for 
CoStS. 
243 
None of the rules do set forth what the appropriate circumstances are 
for the grant of security for costs. It should initially be kept in mind that, 
in dealing with a request for security for costs, an arbitrator should not 
hinder access to justice and should treat the parties with equality, e. g. 
require the moving to provide counter security too. 244 Arbitral case law 
of the Copenhagen Court of International Arbitration provides "[plarties to a dispute 
243 
shall provide security for all expenses of the arbitral proceedings. " 
It should be noted, in regard of the power to grant security for costs, that twenty- 
nine sets of the rules surveyed contain a general provision on the security. 
According to these rules, the tribunal is generally empowered to ask for 
appropriate security. The broad interpretation of such rules enables the grant of 
security for costs by arbitrators. See, e. g., Article 14 of the International Arbitration 
Rules 1996 of the Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan-, 
Article R37 of the Arbitration Rules 1994 of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
Arbitration; and Article 23 of the Arbitration Rules 1998 of the ICC. It should be 
noted, in this regard, that during the preparation of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1998, 
several suggestions were made to expressly deal with security for costs in the 
Rules as a result of the founding in the Ken Ren decision of the House of Lords. 
See Copp6e-Lavalin N. V. v. Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited, [1995] 1 
AC 38, [1994] 2 All ER 499, (1994) 2 WLR 63, [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 109. This 
decision reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision in Bank Mellat v. Helliniki 
Techniki, S. A. [1984] Q. B. 291. However, the ICC's "Working Party preferred not 
to make any specific reference in this respect, but the wording of Article 23 would 
seem broad enough to allow the making of an application for and the issuing of a 
ruling by the Tribunal on, the security for costs. " See Marc Blessing, "Keynotes on 
Arbitral Decision Making", in- ICC, 1998 ICC Rules, 44,44-45. See also, in this 
regard, Derains / Schwartz, 274, note 622 (stating that "[n]otwithstanding the 
experience of the Ken-Ren cases, those drafting the New Rules were reluctant to 
mention security for costs expressly because they did not wish to encourage the 
proliferation of such applications, which, apart from being rare, are generally 
disfavoured in ICC arbitrations. "); Sigvard Jarvin, "Aspects of the Arbitral 
Proceedings", in: 1998 ICC Rules, 38,43 (1997); and Craig / Park / Paulsson, 
Annotated Guide, 139; ICC Final Award No. 7047 of 1994, extracts published in 
8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 61 (1997); ICC Interim Award No. 6632 of 1993 
(unpublished); and ICC cases cited in the Craig / Park / Paulsson, Annotated 
Guide, 139. 
244 In this regard, see Wirth, 36. Since the moving party generally deposits advance 
on costs under institutional arbitration rules, an order to deposit 
further amount in 
the name of security for costs may have the effect of preventing a commercially 
weak party to pursue its claims. See Craig / Park Paulsson, 
ICC Arbitration 2000, 
para. 26.05; and Lew / Mistelis / Kr6II, para. 23-55. 
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is not generally very helpful in determining the appropriate 
circumstances. 245 It is submitted that, in practice, "arbitrators are 
unlikely to order security for costs where their eventual award is 
enforceable under the New York Convention or similar treaty, unless it 
is shown convincingly that the losing party will almost certainly be 
unable to meet an award of costs against it [due, for instance, to its 
insolvency]. , 246 Such unavailability should be a result of changed 
circumstances following the entry into force of the parties' agreemen t. 247 
Otherwise, basing on the unavailability to make a claim for security for 
248 costs would infringe the principle of good faith . 
7.5 Provisional Payment 
Provisional payment is aimed to restore, prior to final adjudication of the 
merits of the case, an obligation or a right existence of which is not 
seriously challenged. Provisional payment is not a very typical kind of 
interim measure of protection. It could even be argued that it is not an 
interim measure as, for the grant of it, an arbitral tribunal needs to- 
245 See, e. g., ICC Final Award No. 7489 of 1993, extracts published in (1993) Clunet 
1078; 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 68 (1997); and Hascher, Procedural Decisions, 48 
(denying the exercise of the power to grant security for costs by arguing that the 
application was not "irreconcilable with its ground. "); and ICC Final Award No. 7047 
of 1994, extracts published in 8(1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb Bull 61 (1997) (denying the 
request for security for costs mainly because the moving party based its reasoning 
on the ground that it knew or should have known at the time of entering into the 
arbitration agreement. ). Similarly, in ICC case 6632, upon the raise of the issue of 
liquidation of the Claimant, the Respondent requested security for costs. The 
Claimant too made the same request. The Respondent claimed that the 
Claimant's liquidation was for the purpose of being judgment proof. The 
Respondent did not object Claimant's request for security for costs. It, indeed, 
expressly offered to provide a security for costs. The Tribunal, under the 
circumstances of the case, requested from both parties to provide for security for 
costs. ICC Interim Award 6632 of 1993 (unpublished). 
246 Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-32. Whether or not the claimant resides or is 
incorporated in a place other than the place of arbitration should never be taken 
into account in granting a security for costs in international arbitration. Section 
38(3) of the EAA 1996. Further, contractual arrangement that each party bears its 
own costs or that each party deposits certain amount of money as an advance to 
cover the costs may prevent the grant of security for costs. See Craig / Park 
Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,467-68. 
247 Sandrock, 30. 
248 Id. 
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decide, prior to the full adjudication, that the moving party is entitled to 
a certain amount of money. 249 For the purpose of arbitration, 
provisional measures should be considered as interim remedies, which 
may be amended or revoked in the final award. For the grant of a 
provisional payment, it is necessary to establish that an arbitral tribunal 
is empowered to grant such measure. For instance, in ICC case 7544, 
an arbitral tribunal found that interim payment on account is not 
prohibited by the ICC Arbitration Rules where no mandatory provision 
to contrary existed under the applicable law. 250 It should be noted, in 
this regard, that in another ICC case, 251 the tribunal ruled that under the 
circumstances of the case, the grant of provisional payment would be 
"premature. " Apparently, in this case, the tribunal, by implication, 
upheld its jurisdiction to grant provisional payment. 
Once the jurisdiction is established it is necessary to determine on what 
grounds a provisional payment may be granted. An ICC tribunal, for 
example, found that the principles of procedure of the French law 
principle S252 on interim payment on account provide for a useful 
guidance as the law of the place of arbitration for granting provisional 
253 payment in the case before the tribunal . 
Further, an arbitral tribunal 
should be very careful for not prejudicing the merits of the case in 
granting provisional payment. If there is any serious challenge to the 
right in regard of the provisional payment, the tribunal should refrain 
249 See supra Introduction, note 54. 
250 ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts published 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 
Bull 56-60 (2000). To this end, it should be noted Section 39(2) of the EAA 1996 
expressly permits parties to empower their tribunal with the power to grant security 
for payment. Even if the lex arbitri prohibits the provisional payment such payment 
may be made in accordance with the lex causae or law of the place of 
enforcement. This approach seems to be adopted by, for example, Swiss law. 
See Wirth, 35. 
251 ICC Second Partial Award 5808 of 1994 (unpublished). 
252 The tribunal cited Article 809(2) of the French New CCP. This Article provides that 
where the existence of the obligation cannot seriously be denied, the court may 
order an interim payment on account. 
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from granting such payment. 254 Even if it grants the measure, the 
tribunal should seek security for damages in case such measure may 
prove to be wrong. 255 
8 Ex Parte Measures 
Provisional measures are usually granted through inter partes 
proceedings- both the applicant and the respondent are heard in 
adversarial proceedings. An arbitral tribunal may actually convene and 
hear parties on a request for a provisional measure. Alternatively, in 
cases where the convening of the tribunal cannot be awaited (because, 
e. g. arbitrating parties and arbitrators are from different countries), the 
parties may be heard, for instance, over a telephone conference 256 or a 
videoconference. Further, in such cases, the parties may, for example 
in the terms of reference, empower the chairman of the tribunal to grant 
257 arbitral provisional measures . 
However, whilst all of the above may 
facilitate the speedy adjudication of requests for interim protection of 
rights, there may sometimes be a need, in cases of urgency or where 
253 ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts published 11 (1) ICC Int'l Ct Arb 
254 
Bull 56-60 (2000). 
See, in this regard, id (after "weighing up the probability as to whether, after the 
claims and counterclaims have been fully argued before it, the net result will be in 
favour of" the moving party, the tribunal reached the positive conclusion). 
However, in ICC case 9984, the arbitral tribunal did not uphold the request for a 
provisional payment. In this case, the claimant made a request for interim 
payment of the certain amount of money that is, according to itself, not contested. 
But the tribunal ruled that the amount was, in fact, seriously contested and whether 
or not to grant the measure "is too closely linked with the solution of whole 
255 
dispute. " ICC Partial Award 9984 of 1999 (unpublished). 
ICC Second Interim Award 7544 of 1996, extracts published 11 (1) ICC I nt'l Ct Arb 
Bull 56-60 (2000) (requiring a security for damages "in order to cover the risk that 
the final decision might not be consistent with the decision reached ... 
[on an 
interim basis], and not to prejudice the right of set-off ... 
" in the amount of the 
provisional payment ordered. ). Indeed, the ECJ too held, in van Uden, that an 
interim payment does not constitute a provisional measure within the meaning of 
the Brussels Convention unless, inter alia, the repayment to the defendant of the 
sum awarded is guaranteed should the applicant proved to be unsuccessful. 
(1998) ECR 1-7136-37, paras. 45-47. 
256 See, e. g., Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. The City of Gainsville, Florida, 764 F2d 
257 
437,438-39 (2d Cir. 1985). 
Otherwise, such transfer of power may arise from the general arbitral procedural 
powers. See, e. g., Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 349. 
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element of surprise is required, 
258 for ex parte259 provisional 
measures. 
260 There is urgency or the element of surprise is necessary, 
for instance, where a trade secret is likely to be disclosed, or where 
there is likelihood of dissipation of assets, or where vital evidence is 
261 likely to be lost. National courts generally grant ex parte measures . 
Arbitral tribunals should too be empowered to issue ex parte provisional 
measures. The reasons justifying the grant of arbitral provisional 
measures also support the arbitral power to issue ex parte 
258 UN Doc A/CN. 9MG. IIMP. 1 10, para. 52. 259 A measure in the absence of the adverse party or without notification to it. 260 It is observed during the preparation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules that 
parties were to be given a right to be heard in regard of interim measures except 
for "urgent matters. " UN Doc A/CN. 9/97/Add. 3, reprinted in VI UNCITRAL 
261 
Yearbook 184,185 (1975). 
For instance, the German Constitutional Court upheld the validity of ex parte 
measures against the claim of a breach of a constitutional principle of auditur et 
altera pars for protecting party interests and; thus, effectiveness of adjudication. 
Schaefer, Part 4.2.2.2. Similarly, the U. S. Supreme Court found no infringement of 
the constitutional due process requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard 
with the issuance of ex parte measures. That is, however, subject to a subsequent 
opportunity to be given to the respondent for the challenge of the measure. See 
Reichert, 374; and 136sch (ed. ), 754-755. Likewise, for English law, see, e. g., 
Petroleum Investment Company Limited v. Kantupan Holdings Company Limited, 
[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 124 (indicating that "[u]nless giving notice would be 
impossible or impracticable e. g., because of the urgency of the situation, an 
application for an injunction should only be made without notice to the respondent 
in circumstances where it would be likely to defeat the purpose of seeking the 
inj . unction if forewarning were given. ). It is submitted that ex parte measures are 
available in certain Arab states provided that a right to be heard is subsequently 
given. Aboul-Enein, 82. In addition, although Section 684.16(l) of the Florida 
International AA, which, in principle, prohibits ex parte proceedings for an interim 
measure of protection, Section 684.16(3) of the Florida International AA permits ex 
parte measures provided that the tribunal immediately extends the right to modify 
or terminate such measure to all parties not notified. Further, laws of the following 
countries generally permit ex parte court-ordered provisional measures- Australia 
(Bbsch (ed. ), 39), Austria, (id., 68), Belgium (id, 98), Brazil (id., 124), Canada (id., 
149), China (id., 169), Denmark (id., 188), England (see, e. g., Section 44(3) of the 
EAA 1996. See also Groves, 190. ), Finland (Bbsch (ed. ), 244), France (id., 269), 
Greece (id., 325), Hong Kong (id. 345), Ireland (id., 365), Italy (id., 382), the 
Republic of Korea (id., 398), Liechtenstein (id., 418), Mexico (id., 449), Morocco 
(id., 465), Norway (id., 514-15), Panama (id., 530), Puerto Rico (id., 573), Scotland 
(id., 607-8), Singapore (id., 629), the Republic of South Africa (id., 643), Spain (id., 
666), Sweden (id., 686-87), Switzerland (id., 716), Turkey (Article 101 of the CCP). 
On examination of ex parte measures from the human rights perspective, see, 
e. g., Collins, 179-191 (indicating that ex parte measures are, under certain 
circumstances are permitted in various legal system and international bodies. ). 
See also Article 17.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
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measures. 262 The most important of these reasons is the parties'will to 
seek protection of their rights, including interim protection from an 
arbitral tribunal. Thus, an arbitral tribunal is the natural forum to seek 
ex parte provisional measures, although it may not be the most 
appropriate forum in every case. In fact, the need for ex parte arbitral 
measures is likely to be very low as such measures would normally be 
available from an arbitral tribunal once such tribunal is formed long after 
the time of a dispute's appearance. The need for ex parte measures 
generally arises at the time of or right after the dispute's appearance 
but long before submission of a case to an arbitral tribunal. Further, 
such ex parte measures generally require enforceability per se. In such 
cases, a court would be the most appropriate forum to apply for. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that the request for and the grant of ex parte 
measures occasionally occur in arbitration practice. For instance, a 
survey done by the AAA demonstrates that only one out of fifty cases 
on interim measures were held ex parte. 263 Further, this author has not 
come across any ex parte decision on an interim measure in his 
research at the AAA and the ICC. 
264 
Occasionally, when there is a need for ex parte measures, an arbitral 
tribunal should be empowered to grant such measure. However, the 
arbitral power to grant ex parte provisional measures faces with, among 
others, two main objections. These objections are generally related to 
265 266 the right to be heard and the principle of impartiality in arbitration . 
262 See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 
2 63 See Naimark / Keer, 25. 
264 Although it does not mean that there has not been any such decision. 
265 The right to be heard (audi alteram partem) is a facet of the principle of natural 
justice, or of due process. This right is a universally recognised fundamental right. 
See, e. g., V. S. Mani, "Audi Alteram Partern - Journey of a Principle From the 
Realms of Private Procedural Law to the Realms of International Procedural Law", 
9 Indian Journal of Int'l Law 381-411 (1969). This right's infringement may cause, 
in international arbitration, setting aside of the outcome of an award or refusal of 
the enforcement under, for instance, Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention, 
and Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention. 
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This Part examines objections to arbitral competence to grant ex parle 
provisional measures: (i) the right to be heard and (ii) the principle of 
impartiality. It also deals with certain other issues on the same 
measures. 
8.1 Right to be Heard As an Objection to Arbitral Power to Grant 
Ex Parte Provisional Measures 
The right to be heard should certainly be observed in the adjudication of 
substantive claims. Would this right fully extend to proceedings 
concerning provisional measures? Inter partes proceedings are 
generally required for the grant of interim measures of protection. 
Arbitration rules and practice too seem to confirm this view. 267 For 
instance, the ICSID Arbitration Rules specifically require that an arbitral 
tribunal "shall only recommend provisional measures, or modify or 
revoke its recommendation, after giving each party an opportunity of 
presenting its observation S. n268 This rule aims at avoiding 
ifunintentionally unfair dispositions". 269 It seems to be envisaged under 
the ICSID arbitration system that the arbitral tribunal "must decide how 
this opportunity will be given. 11270 The examination of published awards 
demonstrates that ICSID arbitral tribunals did not make a decision on 
interim protection without giving each party an opportunity of presenting 
266 For the other objections, see, e. g., UN Doc A/CN. 91487, para. 70; UN Doc 
A/CN. 9/523, para. 21; and Yves Derains, "Arbitral Ex Parte Interim Relief, Dis Res 
J 61 (August/October 2003) ("Ex Parte Relief). On a very convincing rebuttal of 
these objections, see, e. g., James E Castello, "Arbitrators Should Have the Power 
267 
to Grant Interim Relief Ex Parte", Dis Res J 60 (August/October 2003). 
Six out of seventy-two arbitration rules surveyed expressly require that adverse 
party shall be heard. See Article 7(11) of the CIA Arbitration Rules; Article 17(2) of 
the Copenhagen Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration Rules 1981; Article 
11 of the FAA Arbitration Rules 1980; Article 22 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules-, Rule 
25 of the SIAC Arbitration Rules; and Rule 39(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
See also Article 66(2) of the ICJ Rules. 268 Rule 39(4). 
269 Note E to the 1968 ICSID Arbitration Rules, reprinted in 1 ICSID Rep. 99. 
270 Id. 
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its case. 
271 
Similarly, with respect to the practice under the ICC 
Arbitration Rules, it is submitted that272 "[i]t would be inconsistent with 
the principles generally governing arbitration ... to permit ex parte 
relief. " It is further indicated that the ICC tribunals hear all of the parties 
before rendering any decision on provisional measures . 
273 
The Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal too, applying the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, has 
consistently given parties opportunity to comment in writing, whenever 
possible, when it dealt with requests for a provisional measure. 
274 
This 
practice seems to be based on the principle of the right to be heard 
which is envisaged under Article 15(l) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rule s. 
275 
However, in some cases, there is utmost urgency or element of surprise 
is necessary, e. g. where vital evidence would be lost due to starting of 
another phase of construction or to stop the sale of disputed securities. 
In such cases, ex parte measures are required. This is because the 
principle of fairness requires acting in a speedy manner without giving 
notice to the responding party. Indeed, the concept of granting ex parte 
measures is recognised by several legal system S. 276 Two of the 
arbitration rules surveyed too expressly recognise such possibility for a 
271 See Schreuer, Article 47,216, note 19. 
272 Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 59. 
273 See, e. g., ICC Final Award 8893 of 1997 (unpublished. ). The requirement to grant 
the right to a hearing for interim measures of protection, arguably, arises from 
Article 21(3) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1998. This argument was raised by 
Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 59. He referred to Article 15(4) of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules 1988, which corresponds Article 21(3) of the 1998 ICC Arbitration 
Rules. This last Article provides that "all parties shall be entitled to be present" at 
the hearings. Schwartz argues that this rule "arguably prevents an ICC arbitral 
tribunal from convening a hearing, even for interim or conservatory purposes, on 
274 
an ex parte basis. " Id. 
Caron, Interim Measures, 500; and Brower / Brueschke, 224-225. See also, e. g., 
Component Builders Inc. v. Iran, Case No. 395, Order (10 January 1985), reprinted 
in 8 Iran-US CTR 3,4. 
275 Article 15(2) provides that "at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a 
276 
full opportunity of presenting his case. " 
See Chapter IV, supra note 261. 
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certain period of time . The Iran-US Claims Tribunal used a similar 
vehicle for interim protection of rights in urgent cases. The Tribunal 
relied on temporary restraining measures. 278 When a temporary 
restraining measure or another ex parte measure is granted, the 
respondent ought to be heard in a subsequent hearing. 279 Some 
commentators support the possibility of ex parte arbitral measures. 
Berger, for instance, rightly states- 
Granting the parties the firm right to be heard would be hardly 
reconcilable with the function of provisional relief which often 
requires the surprise effect of ex-parte measures to be effective. 
Also, the arbitrators can later amend or even withdraw their 
decision at the request of the other party in a subsequent 
he anng. 280 
In sum, this author believes that arbitral tribunals should be given the 
power to grant ex parte provisional measures. Although, such power 
may be used scarcely in practice, it would provide a useful addition to 
the armoury of the tribunal. So the right to be heard should not be 
extended to provisional measures. 
277 These rules mainly require that "in utmost urgency an order may be given upon the 
presentation of a request provided that the other party shall be heard 
subsequently. " See Rule 23 of the CCIG Arbitration Rules 1992. In addition, 
Article R37 of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Rules 1994 provides for 
278 
a very similar provision. 
This practice seems to be accorded with the observation of a delegate, in the 
drafting process of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, "The parties should have a 
right to be heard before the arbitrators take interim measures .... except 
in urgent 
cases. " (Emphasis added. ) UN Doc A/CN. 9/97/Add. 3, Annex 1, reprinted in VI 
UNCITRAL Yearbook 185. 
279 For a detailed analysis of the Tribunal's practice concerning temporary measures, 
280 
see Chapter IV, supra Part 4.3. 
Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 337. See also, e. g., Blessing, 
Introduction, para. 879; Bucher / Tschanz, para. 175, and Wirth, 38. But see, e. g., 
Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 59; and Bernardini, 27. The last author suspects 
the legal validity of the above solution. His suspicion relies on the argument that, 
contrary to domestic court proceedings, there is no recourse against arbitrators' 
order issued on an ex parte basis. Bernardini, 27. However, this argument fails to 
take into account the fact that such an order could be amended or revoked by the 
same arbitrators following the hearing of both parties. See Jacques-Michel 
Grossen, "Comment" in ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 115,116ý and 
Blessing, Introduction, para. 866. 
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8.2 Observance of the Principle of Impartiality As an Objection to 
Arbitral Power to Grant Ex Parte Provisional Measures 
Impartiality of the fact finder is a fundamental principle of arbitration. 
This principle would normally prevent an arbitral tribunal to engage in 
ex parte communications with arbitrating parties . 
281 It is argued that 
such prevention extends to the tribunal's ex parte contacts even for ex 
282 
parte provisional measures . However, such restriction should, in this 
author's view, be related to the merits of the case and interim protection 
of rights should constitute an exception to the restriction. The principle 
of fairness justifies the exception, e. g. the need to safeguard a party 
right in cases of utmost urgency. In addition, in order to grant an ex 
parte measure, the tribunal needs to be satisfied, among others, that 
there is a grave danger, which would require the tribunal's immediate 
interference. As a result of which, it would grant an ex parte measure 
that would stand only for a limited period of time. The tribunal is aware 
of the fact that it heard only the applicant but not the respondent and 
that the respondent's side of story should and will need to be heard. In 
sum, an ex parte communication with a party for granting a provisional 
measure should not be considered as violation of the principle of 
impartiality. Indeed, in such countries as Turkey, a judge adjudicating 
the merits of a case is empowered to grant an ex parte provisional 
measure and that would not be considered as a breach of his 
impartiality. 
In granting provisional measures, the tribunal should make sure that 
any ex parte communication is recorded and communicated to the 
respondent later prior to the inter partes hearing. The tribunal should 
clearly indicate its reasoning for issuing the ex parte measure in the text 
of the measure. It should also indicate that such measure stands for 
281 See, e. g., Redfern / Hunter, para. 4-51. 
290 
until it is confirmed or revoked in an inter partes proceedings, which will 
take place upon the respondent's petition. 
The right to a hearin g283 should not, in principle, extend to applications 
284 for interim measures of protection . However, arbitrators, where 
necessary '285 can invite parties to present their case ora Ily. 
286 
282 Derains, 2. 
283 See, e. g., Gaillard / Savage (ed. ), paras. 1296-1299. 284 Indeed, oral hearings were held in four of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's initial 
twenty-nine cases on interim measures. Caron, Interim Measures, 500. In this 
regard, see, e. g., Component Builders, Inc. v. Iran, Case No. 395, Order (19 
February 1985) (unpublished) quoted in Interim and Interlocutory Award No. 
ITM/ITL 51-395-3, reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 216,219 (holding that "neither the 
Tribunal Rules nor the Tribunal practice requires that ... a Hearing be held on requests for interim measures Further, Judge Mosk, in his concurring 
opinion, argued- 
[T]he rule [Article 15(2) of the Tribunal Rules], although somewhat ambiguous, 
should not be read to provide a right to a hearing in connection with a request 
for interim measures. The request for interim measures here is for the purpose 
of preserving the rights of the Parties pending the Tribunal's award, and thus the 
issue raised by the request is arguably a procedural matter. Moreover, the 
purpose of the rule seems to be to guarantee a right to a hearing in connection 
with a decision on the merits of the case. 
Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk of 21 October 1983 to Ford Aerospace v. 
The Air Force of Iran, Case No. 159, Interim Award No. ITM 28-159-3 (20 October 
1983), reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 384,387. Caron further adds, 
It is Richard M. Mosk's substantive/procedural distinction that ultimately justifies 
the conclusion that there is no right under the UNCITRAL Rules to a hearing in 
the case of interim measures. A tribunal constantly makes decisions without 
hearings. The vast majority of these decisions are merely procedural and, 
although important, do not ordinarily dispose of the rights of the parties. 
Although the procedural/substantive distinction is not always easy to make, it is 
clear that if disposition of the rights of the parties is the test then interim 
measures more properly are regarded as procedural. Indeed, the doctrines 
relating to interim measures all aim at avoiding final adjudication of rights', 
alleged rights are affected for at most a limited time, and provision for security 
ameliorates even such temporary effects. 
Caron, Interim Measures, 502. On the substantive/procedural nature of interim 
285 
measures see supra Chapter 11, note 91.11 
On the exercise of the discretion to determine such necessity, Pe onp88 / Caron 
state'. 
As to decisions on interim measures (those which do not affect the final 
disposition of the rights of the parties nor terminate the whole proceedings), the 
decision whether or not to grant a requested hearing should be made in light of 
the particular circumstances. Sometimes the urgency of the matter may not 
allow a hearing; in other cases the very nature of the measure requested may 
recommend that oral hearing be heard. The principle of party autonomy 
suggests that a hearing be granted whenever requested by both parties. Even 
where requested by only one of the parties, the arbitral tribunal should keep in 
mind that Article 15(2) spells out the principle of right to a hearing. Should a 
291 
8.3 Certain Other Considerations on Ex Parte Arbitral Measures 
For the grant of an ex parte arbitral measure, all requirements sought 
for the grant of an inter partes measure should be satisfied. In addition, 
it is clear that the onus is on the applicant to prove that the tribunal has 
prima facie jurisdiction on the case, if the jurisdiction is yet to be 
established. It is further, imperative that the applicant should submit 
convincing evidence that would justify an ex parte measure. Moreover, 
the claimant should act in good faith and disclose all facts, 
circumstances and documents that are known to it. The absence of the 
respondent in the proceedings justifies the claimant's duty to act in 
287 
good faith . 
The fairness upon which the arbitral power to grant an ex parte 
provisional measure or a temporary restraining order is based on also 
requires taking certain measures for safeguarding the right of the 
respondent. In other words, an ex parte measure itself protects the 
right of the applicant if it is granted. However, since the respondent 
was not heard in granting such measure, its rights too need to be 
288 safeguarded . 
There are many safeguarding measures that can be 
taken 
. 
289 First, the grant of an ex parte measure should be subject to 
appropriate security. In addition, such measure, as indicated above, 
party request a hearing abusively, that party may be forced to bear the costs 
resulting from an unnecessary hearing. (Citation omitted. ) 
286 
PellonpýM / Caron, 39-40. 
See, Caron, Interim Measures, 502 
287 On such duty see also supra Chapter 111, Part 2.4.1. The breach of this duty may 
result in damages for which the moving party may be held responsible. See also 
id. 
288 However, an arbitral tribunal ought to carefully consider whether a measure 
requested is "so severe that the possible damage can hardly be covered by the 
payment of any security by the applicant" or "the amendment or withdrawal of the 
interim measure is not sufficient to restore the status quo ante. " In such cases, 
the tribunal should give the right to be heard to the other party. Berger, 
International Economic Arbitration, 338. Further, the tribunal may consider, for the 
protection of the respondent's rights, whether by granting an ex parte measure it 
infringes this party's confidence to the arbitration and whether they may face with 
its accusation of "trial by ambush". Id. 
292 
needs to be open for amendment or withdrawal following the 
respondent's subsequent hearing, which should be done as soon as 290 
possible . It is submitted, in this regard, that ex parte measures 
should be given in the form of an order whose revision or amendment is 
relatively easier than an award. 
Even if ex parte arbitral provisional measures are not available, an 
arbitral tribunal can still give priority to the request for Interim measures 
for safeguarding the petitioner's rights . 
29 1 This approach of giving 
priority relies on the assumption that the resolution of a request for a 
292 provisional measure may require a speedy action . 
9 Costs Regarding Provisional Measure Proceedings 
The costs associated with proceedings for provisional measures may 
be substantial despite the fact that such proceedings constitute only a 
part of arbitration proceedings. 
On who would bear such costs, national laws and arbitration rules are, 
with one exception, generally silent. Article 21(4) of the AAA-ICDR 
(International) Arbitration Rules 2003 provides that "[t]he tribunal may in 
289 For other safeguarding measures, see Castello, 9-10. 
290 Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 337. It is noteworthy that it would be a 
prudent practice to indicate within the text of the measure granted, for the sake of 
clarity and as an indication to the respondent, that the amendment or revocation of 
the measure is reserved. This prudent practice could even be followed for the 
measures granted in inter partes proceedings. It should also be noted that "under 
extreme circumstances" an ex parte measure should not be permitted. That is 
particularly where the security for costs would not cover the potential damage or 
where the "subsequent amendment or withdrawal would not be sufficient to restore 
the status quo. " Marchac, 131; and Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 
338. 
291 See Rule 39(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
292 Note C to the 1968 ICSID Arbitration Rules, reprinted in 1 ICSID Rep. 99. Based 
on this assumption, in ICSID arbitration, "the president of the Tribunal may, if he 
considers the request as urgent, propose a decision to be taken by 
correspondence (Rule 16(2)), or even convene the Tribunal for a special session. " 
Id. In compliance with the above. approach, the tribunal took its decision on a 
provisional measure by correspondence in AGIP v. Congo. Award, (8 January 
1988), reprinted in 4 ICSID Rep 311. 
-)g-, 
its discretion apportion costs associated with applications for interim 
relief in any interim award or in the final award. " The logic behind this 
provision is clear. Subject to the tribunal's full discretion, the losing 
party may have to bear the CoStS293 of provisional measure 
294 
proceedings . This logic should, in this author's view, be supported. 
This is mainly because liability as to costs may be used as a deterrent 
factor to avoid vexatious application S295 for provisional measures. 
There are, indeed, a few cases supporting the above logic . 
296 For 
instance, in ICC case 10062, the arbitral tribunal denied the application 
for a provisional measure. The tribunal expressly held that the costs 
are to bp born by the losing party in the provisional measure 
proceedings. 297 Similarly, another ICC tribunal expressly left the 
298 burden of costs to the losing party in those proceedings . 
Likewise, in Behring International, Inc. v. Iranian Airforce, the 
respondents claimed that property warehoused by the claimant needed 
to move in a more modern air-conditioned and humidity-controlled 
facility in order to avoid further deterioration. The respondents also 
293 Where the applicable rule or law contains no restriction, the scope of costs should 
include costs for proceedings, the arbitral tribunal, and party costs. However, such 
rules as Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules restrict the measure that 
could be granted to "subject matter" in dispute. Thus, it is argued that, under these 
Rules, the party's costs are not recoverable. See Baker / Davis, 143, and van Hof, 
177. In this regard, see also UN Doc A. CN. 9/SR 166,187. Nevertheless, Article 
26 should be read as providing interim protection in regard of rights related to 
subject matter in dispute. See supra Chapter 11, note 113. Accordingly, since the 
costs are concerning interim protection is related to rights regarding subject-matter 
294 
in dispute, they should too be recoverable. 
The apportionment of costs may be made in an interim (partial) or in final award. It 
should be noted that the costs initially borne by the moving party in the provisional 
measure proceedings. See, in this regard, Pellonp66 / Caron, 449; Baker / Davis, 
143; and Caron, Interim Measures, 504. 
295 These are the applications aimed, in part or in full, to disrupt or delay arbitrations. 
296 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 
However, it should also be noted that where there is no specific party agreement 
as to the costs of arbitral interim measures, it is arguable that the parties' 
agreement about the costs of arbitration proceedings should be applicable, for 
instance, each party bears its own costs or the costs follow the success. See, e. g., 
Redfern / Hunter, paras. 8-85 - 8-92. 
297 ICC Final Award 10062 of 2000 (unpublished). 
294 
requested appointment of an expert in order for mainly inventorying the 
goods warehoused. The Tribunal granted both of the measures. In 
regard of the goods, as both parties agreed that there was a necessity 
to avoid deterioration, the Tribunal asked the claimant if it could make 
available a modern part of its warehouse for the storage of the goods. 
In its interim award, 299 with respect to the costs of the measures 
concerned, the Tribunal ruled- 
The Tribunal orders that, in accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2 and Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal Rules, [which are identical to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] Respondents shall 
provide ... [a certain sum of money] toward the expenses of the 
expert and costs associated with his work, including the leasing of the full Behring warehouse, to be deposited within 30 days from 
the date of this Decision (and prior to actual commencement of 
inventorying and the other tasks assigned specifically to the 
expert). This amount shall be remitted to account number ... in the name of the Secretary General of the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal 
.... This account shall be administered by the Secretary-General of the Tribunal, who shall consult with the 
Tribunal. 
The Tribunal further retains jurisdiction to request from arbitrating 
parties such other amounts as may be required from time to time 
in connection with the expert's work, or to decide any disputes 
which may arise in connection with that work. The Tribunal shall 
298 ICC Partial Award 10704 of 2000 (unpublished). 
299 Case No. 382, Interim Award No. ITM 46-382-3 (22 February 1985), reprinted in 8 
Iran-US CTR 44-48. The Tribunal issued three different awards on this issue. It 
should, in this regard, be noted that the costs may be contained in an interim or 
partial award or may finally be distributed in a final award. That may be done, for 
instance, in accordance with Article 38 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
Pellonp, ýýj / Caron, 449- and Baker / Davis, 143. Further, this author is aware of an 
unpublished case arbitýated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules where the sole 
arbitrator ruled that the losing party born the costs of provisional measure 
proceedings, including costs of parties. It is interesting to note that the wining party 
in the provisional measure proceedings failed to convince the arbitrator on the 
merits of its case. See also The AAA Task Force on the International Rules, 
"Commentary on the Proposed Revisions to the International Arbitration Rules", 
ADR Currents, 6,7 (Winter 1996-97); and Final Report on Awards, para. 10 
(recommending that "[o]rders in relation to costs, including any proposed 
allocations of costs between the parties, should be left to the final award. "). 
Indeed, experience demonstrates that costs regarding provisional measures are 
generally distributed in the final award. 
"95 
later determine which party will bear the costs of the expert's 300 
work . 
The tribunals' power to apportion costs should, if not expressly given, 
arise from arbitration agreement or the power to grant provisional 
measures. 301 
10 Damages As Compensation for Arbitral Provisional Measures 
Found to be Unjustified or Disobeyed 
Where an arbitral provisional measure granted proves to be unjustified 
or where it is disobeyed, the damages caused by such measure or 
302 disobedience should, in principle, be recoverable . 
For the purpose of 
such recovery, costs regarding such measure may, in principle, be 
considered as part of damages. 303 The power to grant such damages, 
if not expressly given, should arise from the broad interpretation of 
arbitration agreement or may imply from the power to grant a 
304 provisional measure . 
Any such damages should be granted upon request and substantiated 
by the moving party. Damages arising from disobedience of an arbitral 
300 Behring International, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, Case No 382, Interim Award No. 
30 
ITM 46-382-3 (22 February 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 47-48. 
1 Karrer, Less Theory, 103. 
302 See Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 53. Any such recovery, particularly from a 
court, is, apparently, subject to the permission under applicable law. The recovery 
is available under laws of such countries as Australia (Bbsch (ed. ), 42-3), Austria 
(id., 71-2), Belgium (id., 99), Brazil (id., 125-26), Canada, (id., 15), China (id., 170), 
Denmark (id., 191-92), England (id., 222), Finland (id., 245-46), France (id., 271), 
Germany (id., 298-99), Italy (id., 383), Korea (id., 399-400), Liechtenstein (id., 419- 
20), Luxembourg, (id., 436), Mexico (id., 450), Morocco (id., 466), the Netherlands 
(id., 499-500), Norway (id., 515), Panama (id., 532), Philippines (id., 556-57), 
Scotland (id., 608), Sweden (id., 687), Switzerland (id., 719-20), and the U. S. (id., 
756-57). The scope and grant of compensation are naturally subject to 
requirements set forth under the laws of each country concerned. If the damages 
are recovered from a court, arbitrators' decision on the merits is likely to be taken 
into account in determination of damages as it is the case in Denmark. See id., 
191. On the issue of damages, see also infra Chapter V, Part 1.2. 
303 See Chapter IV, supra Part 9. Karrer indicates that whether costs are damages 
are not clear. Karrer, Less Theory, 103. See also, e. g., Redfern / Hunter, para. 7- 
24. 
304 Karrer, Less Theory, 103. 
'96 
305 provisiona measure are examined elsewhere . In assessing whether 
the measure is unjustified, the tribunal should use its discretion and 
consider whether or not 
9 there was, indeed, a real urgency, 
the request for the measure was aimed at delaying or obstructing 
the arbitration proceedings, and 
o the moving party claims were ultimately unsuccessful. 
306 
In the exercise of such discretion, arbitrating parties' behaviour 
throughout the arbitration should also be taken into account. The 
307 damages are generally paid out from the security, if taken . 
Conclusion 
The standards of procedure and principles for the grant of arbitral 
provisional measures are very important. The importance is related to 
the fact that the determination of such standards and principles assists 
in efficacy of arbitration process by making it consistent and 
308 
predictable . The consistency and predictability makes arbitration 
more effective dispute resolution mechanism. 
Arbitration laws and rules are generally silent in respect of such 
standards and principles. According to those laws and rules, arbitrators 
are generally given broad discretion . 
309 They could either apply or 
adopt the principles set out under the applicable law(s) (e. g. the law of 
place of arbitration) or may take the guidance from arbitral case law in 
establishing such standards and principles . 
31 0 The former is hardly 
305 See infra Chapter V, Part 1.2. 
306 Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 53. 
307 On the issue of security for damages, see this Chapter IV, supra Part 3.3. 
308 See Chapter IV, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
309 See Chapter IV, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
310 See Chapter IV, supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
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ever done in practice whereas the latter is often observed. 311 In any 
case, these standards and principles should be flexible to tailor-made 
the appropriate measure in each case. Further, provisional nature of 
such measure and specific needs of international commerce should, 
inter alia, be taken into account. 312 
This author suggests that the guidelines for the grant of arbitral 
provisional measures may derive from comparative analysis of 
arbitration rules, arbitral case law, and scholarly opinions. This analysis 
demonstrates that there is an emerging principles and standards 
regarding transnational procedural rules on arbitral provisional 
measures. 313 In this respect, it should be noted that although 
arbitrators were very cautious about granting provisional measures until 
the 1990s, the trend has been changin g. 314 
This author suggests the following principles and standards for the 
grant of arbitral provisional measures- It is the applicant who should 
315 
generally make a request for a measure . 
That is mainly because of 
the principle of party autonomy. In rare cases, an arbitral tribunal may 
too, in the absence of a request, grant such measure in order to avoid 
aggravation of a dispute. 
Such request should contain certain basic elements in order for 
316 
assisting the tribunal to render a decision . 
The request should at 
least include the relevant right whose protection is sought, kind of the 
311 Id. 
312 See Chapter IV, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
313 See Chapter IV, supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
314 See Chapter IV, supra notes 14-15 and 17-24 and accompanying text. 
315 On the initiation of proceedings for a provisional measure, see Chapter IV, supra 
Part 1.1. 
316 See Chapter IV, supra Part 1.2. 
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measure that is sought, and the circumstances that necessitate such 
measure. The request may be made orally or in writing. 
The request, as it is generally the case in practice, should be given 
priority and handled in a short period of time . 
317 
The requirements to grant a measure are not clearly defined under 
arbitration rules or laws, although many of them leave the determination 
318 
of the requirements to the discretion of the tribunal . 
The examination 
of arbitration rules, laws, arbitral practice and scholarly opinions 
demonstrates that there are positive and negative requirements. The 
positive requirements are: 
9 prima facie establishment of jurisdiction, 
4o prima facie establishment of case, 
o urgency, 
* imminent danger, serious or substantial prejudice to the moving 
party if the request for the measure is denied, and 
0 proportiona lity. 
319 
The negative requirements are- 
9 the request should not necessitate examination of merits of the 
case in question, 
0 the tribunal may refrain from granting final relief in the form of a 
provisional measure, 
0 the request may be denied where the moving party does not 
have clean hands, 
9 the request may be denied where such measure is not capable 
of being carried out; 
317 See Chapter IV, supra Part 2. 
318 See Chapter IV, supra Part 3. 
319 See Chapter IV, supra Part 3.1. 
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* when the measure requested is not capable of preventing the 
alleged harm; or 
* the request must not be Moot. 
320 
The tribunal may seek the satisfaction of any or all of the above 
requirements. The tribunal may further require from the applicant a 
security for damages. 321 Alternatively, the tribunal may deny the 
request upon receipt of an undertaking by the respondent that it will not 
infringe the right whose protection was sought with the reque St. 322 
Even if the tribunal refrains from granting the measure requested, it 
may nevertheless expedite the proceeding in order to avoid any 
potential or actual prejudice to the rights of the applican t. 323 The 
provisional nature of an interim measure justifies summary assessment 
in regard of the asserted facts and rights. 324 
An arbitral provisional measure traditionally takes the form of either an 
325 
order or an award . 
This measure may also be granted in the form of 
decision, direction, request, proposal, recommendation, temporary 
restraining order or else. The parties are at freedom to agree on the 
form of a decision on such measure. In the absence of such 
agreement, an arbitral tribunal generally has the discretion to determine 
the most appropriate form. In such determination, the tribunal should 
mainly take into account parties' will, potential savings of time and costs 
for arbitrating parties, and effective and efficient conduct of 
arbitration. 326 In any case, the tribunal ought to take into consideration 
320 See Chapter IV, supra Part 3.2. 
321 See Chapter IV, supra Part 3.3. 
322 See Chapter IV, supra Part 3.4. 
323 See Chapter IV, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
324 See Chapter IV, supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
325 See Chapter IV, supra Part 4. 
326 See Chapter IV, supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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327 
mandatory provisions of lex arbitri. The form of "award" is chosen 
where, among others, enforcement of the decision would be necessary. 
In cases of urgency, the tribunal initially issues an ex parte order and 
then, if necessary, incorporate it, into an award or a further order. The 
ex parte order may take the form of a temporary restraining order. 328 
Since the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal has a temporal element, the 
tribunal could issue a provisional measure in a period between its 
formation and its becoming functus OffiCio. 
329 
A provisional measure is aimed to have a provisional effect pending 
final resolution of the case in dispute . 
330 Accordingly, it is bound to be 
amended, revoked, or, otherwise, finalised in a final award. Such 
measure, after its issuance, may be amended or revoked under 
changed circumstances or in light of new facts or evidence. 
Arbitration laws and, particularly, arbitration rules generally, in the 
absence of party agreement, leave the discretion to determine types of 
measures to an arbitral tribunal . 
33 1 The laws and rules generally 
empower the tribunal to grant any and all types of provisional 
measures. This power gives wide discretion to the tribunal. Such 
discretion invites flexibility. The tribunal may generally grant any 
measure available under lex arbitri, lex causae, and lex execution1s. 
The tribunal may also grant the types of measures that are generally 
granted in arbitration practice. To this end, it should be noted that the 
tribunal is, in principle, not restricted with the types of measures 
327 See Chapter IV, supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
328 See Chapter IV, supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text. 
329 See Chapter IV, supra Part 5. 330 See Chapter IV, supra Part 6. 331 See Chapter IV, supra Part 7. 
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available to a judge. Experience demonstrates that arbitral tribunals 
generally granted on an interim basis* 
measures for preservation of evidence, 
injunctions, 
security for payment, 
security for costs, and 
provisional payment. 
Arbitral provisional measures are usually granted in inter partes 
proceedings. However, where there is utmost urgency or where the 
element of surprise is required, there is a need to have measures in ex 
332 
parte arbitration proceedings . 
Ex parte arbitral provisional measures 
should be allowed in arbitration provided that certain safeguards are 
ta ke n. 
Costs regarding provisional measure proceedings should generally be 
333 
borne by the losing party . 
The logic behind such trend is to deter or 
punish any vexatious applications. 
In cases where provisional measures granted prove to be unjustified or 
disobeyed, damages caused by such measures or disobedience may, 
334 
in principle, be recoverable . 
332 See Chapter IV, supra Part 8. 
333 See Chapter IV, supra Part 9. 
334 See Chapter IV, Part 10. 
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CHAPTER V 
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
The weight and enforceability of a provisional measure differ depending 
upon the issuing forum. Arbitral provisional measures are not self- 
executing whereas judicial provisional measures are directly or through 
execution offices enforceable at the state where they are ordered. ' 
Despite their non-coercive characteristic, arbitral provisional measures 
traditionally have a certain weight. An arbitral tribunal, which is entrusted 
by contracting parties with the power to resolve their disputes, has 
persuasive powers over such parties. Due to such powers, the tribunal's 
decision is often voluntarily complied with. 2 There may, however, be 
occasions where those decisions are not abided. For such occasions, the 
tribunal may have sanctions for the non-compliance. These sanctions are 
mainly drawing adverse inferences and holding the recalcitrant party liable 
for damages and costs. The weight and effect of these sanctions vary. 
Each national statute provides for enforcement of decisions on provisional measures 
of domestic judicial authorities. States back those decisions with coercive powers and 
non-compliance with the decisions constitutes contempt to court. Such decisions, 
however, is usually effective only within the borders of a state. In other words, they 
generally have a territorial effect. A court order may have an extraterritorial effect 
should the court be able to, under the competent law, threaten non-compliance of its 
order with detention or a fine. In such countries as Switzerland (see Wirth, 39), the 
U. S. (see, e. g., Gary Born, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts - 
Commentary and Materials, 3 rd ed. (The Hague / Boston. Kluwer 1996), 484-85), and 
the UK (see e. g., id. ), such extraterritorial orders may be made. However, 'in such 
cases, enforcement abroad "may be impossible. " Id., 935-36. 
2 For instance, according to Aboul-Enein, all four of the measures granted in 2000 were 
compiled with in arbitrations administered by the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration. Aboul-Enein, 81. Further, a survey done by the 
AAA reflects that, in 90 % of the international and national cases (45 out of 50 cases 
no, 
Drawing adverse inferences concerning preservation of evidence against 
the recalcitrant party could provide full protection. However, the threat of 
holding such party liable for damages or costs may not always be sufficient 
for measures related to conduct of arbitration and of relations between the 
parties during arbitration proceedings. Further, where there is a threat of 
dissipation of assets by one party, none of the above sanctions would be 
helpful to prevent the dissipation. Without assets against which to enforce 
the award rendered, being successful in arbitration is often meaningless. 
Accordingly, the need for enforceability of arbitral provisional measures 
differs depending upon the weight and effectiveness of the sanctions for 
disobedience. 
Due mainly to the varying weight and effectiveness of the sanctions for 
non-compliance and to the varying need for enforceability, it is felt that the 
issue of enforceability of arbitral provisional measures should be resolved 
for making arbitration more effective. 3 There are several reasons 
supporting enforceability of such measures- 
surveyed), arbitrating parties comply with their tribunal's decision on interim relief. 
Naimark / Keer, 26. 
3 For a long time, the issue of enforcing arbitral provisional measures was not even 
raised. There were some other important issues in promoting arbitration, e. g., 
enforcing arbitration agreements and awards, appointment of foreign arbitrators, 
competence-competence, etc. For instance, on the problems of arbitration in the 
1950s, see UN/ECE Doc Trade/WP1/12, paras. 41-42. These issues were resolved in 
due course of time and arbitration developed to become, commencing from the 
beginning of the 1980s and, particularly, with the boom of international trade in the 
beginning of the 1990s after the collapse of the Eastern Block (or of the Berlin Wall), 
the main dispute resolution mechanism of international commercial disputes. With 
this development, attention is turned to resolving other issues or problems that would 
assist promoting international commercial arbitration and would enhance its 
effectiveness. See, e. g., UN Doc A/CN. 9/460; and LIN Doc A/54/17. The issue of 
enforceability of arbitral provisional measures is thought to be one of those problems 
that need to be tackled. But see Sanders, Quo Vadis, 417 (stating that it is possible to 
live without making arbitral provisional measures enforceable. ). 
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The non-enforceability influences effectiveness of arbitral 
provisional measures. That is simply because, the sanctions for 
non-compliance with an arbitral provisional measure may not 
always, and is potentially not sufficient to protect arbitrating parties' 
rights on an interim basis. 4 That is also because parties are 
reluctant to rely on the other parties' good will (voluntary 
compliance) because of the concerns of predictability and hostility. 
In other words, the traditional view that parties comply with the 
decisions of arbitrators who are appointed by them does not find 
general acceptance nowadays. It Is not clear whether or not today 
5 arbitrating parties have less goodwill . What is clear, however, is 
that arbitrating parties want more predictability in regard of interim 
protection of their rights. 
It is also clear that the parties wish to avoid hostile tactics of the 
opponent once the relationship with it becomes sour. Indeed, in 
some cases, the parties do everything they can, including non- 
complying with arbitral decisions and even challenging the 
jurisdiction of arbitrators without justifiable grounds just to gain 
tactical advantage over the opponent throughout the arbitration 
(adjudication) process. 6 
4 See Chapter V, infra Part 1.3. In this regard, it was stated that if a "temporary 
equitable relief [a provisional relief] is to have any meaning, the relief must be 
enforceable at the time it is granted, not after an arbitrator's final decision on the 
merits. " See Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 
F2d. 1019,1023 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit further held that "[gliven the 
potential importance of temporary equitable awards [on provisional relief] in making 
the arbitration proceedings meaningful, court enforcement of them, when appropriate, 
is not an 'undue intrusion upon the arbitral process, ' but essential to preserve the 
5 
integrity of that process. " Id. (Citation omitted. ). 
6 
See, e. g., Chapter V, supra note 2. 
This is perhaps an unwelcome adoption of an American litigation tradition of hostility 
to international commercial arbitration. 
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e Arbitrating parties are nowadays more concerned with the ease of 
movement of assets from one country to another, generally to a 
safe heaven .7 The enforceability of arbitral provisional measures, 
particularly, their international enforceability, would, to a certain 
extent, overcome a party concern of a Pyrrhic victory, i. e. becoming 
successful in arbitration but finding no asset to enforce the award. 
9 Nowadays arbitrating "parties have higher expectations of their 
ability to enforce their rights. )8 The raise of this expectation9 may 
be related to the predictability and speed required in international 
commerce and to counselling provided by very able lawyerslo in the 
resolution of international commercial disputes. 
* Finally, a loss or damage that could be avoided with enforcement of 
arbitral provisional measures should not be allowed to happen. " In 
this regard, it is rightly 
[a]rgued that resources would be used more efficiently if parties 
were able to make their requests for interim measures directly to 
the arbitral tribunal rather than to the court and if measures 
would be enforceable by intervention of the court in an 
expedited fashion. Such a possibility is said to be desirable, in 
particular since the arbitral tribunal is already familiar with the 
7 Indeed, for aiming to prevent the movement of assets to a safe heaven in international 
8 
litigation, the ILA Principles were introduced. See Introduction, note 13. 
9UN 
Doc A/C N. 9MG. I IMP. 111, para. 7. 
The commercial life is today more fragile and is open to crisis, as we have been 
currently experiencing. In order to survive and to be a part of such commercial life, 
speed and predictability are of the essence. Otherwise, businesses may take, in 
some cases, a heavy burden that may cause its loss. Accordingly, it is tenable, under 
such circumstances, why businessmen are generally eager in regard of the immediate 
enforcement of their rights. 
10 That is the involvement of lawyers who generally have offices in different countries 
and familiar with all available tools for structuring a strategy for the resolution of a 
dispute that is most suitable to their client's benefit. 
11 UN Doc A/CN. 9ANG. IIMP. 108, para. 73, A "preventable loss or damage should not 
be allowed to happen (e. g., if a party refuses to take precautionary measures at the 
site or it fails to continue construction works while the dispute is being resolved). " Id. 
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case, is often technically appraised of the subject-matter and 
may make a decision in a shorter time than the court. 12 
Addressing the need for enforceability of arbitral provisional measures, 
laws of a number of states provide for enforcement of such measures. 
Further, under some of these laws such measures are enforceable even if 
the seat of arbitration is abroad. 13 Apparently, the approach of these laws 
to the enforcement issue varies. 
12 UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, para. 77. The reasons for making arbitral provisional 
measures enforceable is closely related to and derived from the reasons for 
empowering arbitrators to grant provisional measures. Perhaps, the most important 
two of those reasons are avoiding (1) vagaries of various national laws and judicial 
systems in respect of interim measures of protection, and (ii) abuse of requests for 
interim measures of protection by preventing, to a great extent, forum shopping. See 
UN Doc A/CN. 9ANG. IIANP. 108, para. 77. Also, 
[o]btaining a court measure may be a lengthy process, in particular, because the 
court may require arguments on the issue or because the court decision i's open to 
appeal. Furthermore, the courts of the place of arbitration may not have effective 
jurisdiction over the parties or the assets. Since arbitrations are often conducted in 
a State that has little or nothing to do with the subject-matter in dispute, a court in 
another State may have to be approached with a request to consider and issue a 
measure. Moreover, the law in some jurisdictions may not offer parties the option 
of requesting the court to issue interim measures of protection, on the ground that 
the parties, by agreeing to arbitrate, are deemed to have excluded the courts from 
intervening in the dispute; even if the courts would have the jurisdiction to order an 
interim measure, a court may be reluctant to order it on the ground that it is more 
appropriate for the arbitral tribunal to do so. 
See UN Doc A/CN. 9MG. IIA/VP. 108, para. 76. See alsn UN Doc A/CN. 9/460, para. 
119. On those reasons for empowering arbitrators to grant provisional measures, see 
13 
generally supra Chapter I. 1, Part 1.1. 
Court decisions on provisional measures may have a cross-border or extra-territorial 
effect through bilateral, regional or multilateral treaties or other instruments to that 
effect. A court order may have an extraterritorial effect should the court be able to, 
under the competent law, threaten non-compliance of its order with detention or a fine. 
In countries such as England, Switzerland, and the U. S. extraterritorial orders may be 
made. See Chapter V, supra note 1. There are a small number of bilateral treaties 
dealing with the enforcement of those decisions. See Cremades, Exclusion, 108-109. 
There is no multilateral treaty dealing with the enforcement issue. In this regard, it Is 
noteworthy that the current draft of the Judgments Convention prepared by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law is not applicable to arbitration (Article 1(5)). 
See Preliminary Doc No 8 (March 2003), Preliminary Result of the Work of the 
informal Working Group on the Judgments Project available at < 
ftp. hcch. net/doc/genaff - 
pd08e. pdf> last visited at 28 October 2003. On a regional 
level, for instance, neither the Conventions on the Enforcement of Judgments 
Between the States of the Arab League (approved by the Council of the League of 
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Could arbitral provisional measures be enforceable through bilateral or 
multilateral treaties? There seems to be a few bilateral treaties enforcing 
Arab States, Cairo, 14 September, 1952, entered into force 28 August 1953 published 
in French in Recuell dAccords Interarabes 19 (Bureau des documentation Libanaises 
et Arabes, Beyrouth 1966). For the English translation, see Saudi Arabia, Intl. 
Handbook on Comm. Arb. (Suppl. 17 January 1994) Annex 111,17-4) nor the similar 
conventions entered into in the Americas deal with such issue. See Treaty 
Concerning the Union of South American States in Respect of Procedural Law signed 
in Montevideo, 11 January 1889 published in 11 Register of Texts 5 (1973); and 
Bustamante Code (Convention on Private International Law) signed at Havana, 20 
February 1928 published in LNTS 246, no. 1950 (1929), and 11 Register of Texts 18 
(1973). It, however, seems that judicial provisional measures potentially have 
extraterritorial effect within the European Union ("E. U. ") and the European Free Trade 
Area ("E. F. T. A. ") countries under the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968 (done at Brussels 
on 27 September 1968, OJ 1972 L 299,32; as amended. The Convention is 
concluded between the E. U. member states. ), the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1988, (done at 
Lugano on 16 September 1988, reprinted in 28 ILM 620 (1989). This Convention is 
concluded between the member states of the E. U. and the E. F. T. A. countries and iis a 
parallel convention to the Brussels Convention. ), or the Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 of 22 December, 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the "Regulation") (see OJ 2001 L 12, 
1. ). The ECJ dealt with the issue of cross-border enforcement of a decision given in a 
member state in Mietz. The dispute in this case arose from non-fulfilment of payment 
obligations concerning a sale contract. One of the issues in question was whether 
decision of a Dutch court on interim payment obtained in adversarial interim 
proceedings (kort geding) is enforceable in Germany. The ECJ implied in Ml'etz that a 
decision concerning provisional measures within the scope of the Convention may be 
enforceable so long as the requirements set forth under the Brussels Convention's 
enforcement regime is satisfied. See, e. g., Hans Hermann Mietz v. Intership Yatching 
Sneek BV, Case C-99/96, (1999) ECR 1-2277,1-2318, paras. 54,56. See also, e. g., 
G. Maher / B. J. Rodger, "Provisional and Protective Remedies- The British 
Experience of the Brussels Convention", 48 ICLQ 302,316-318 (1999); and Trevor C. 
Hartley, "Interim Measures under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Convention", 24 EL Rev 674,675 (1999). See also Denilauer v. Couchet, Case No. 
125/79 (1980) ECR 1553, para. 17; Schlosser Report, 1979 OJ C59/71, para. 183', 
Bernardini, 28; Maher / Rodger, 316-318; and Ali Yesilirmak, "Provisional Measures 
under the Brussels Convention of 1968 and Arbitration", XX(4) BATIDER 215,226- 
227. However, there needs to be a real connecting link between the subject matter of 
the measure sought and the forum to which the request for the measure is made. See 
Van Uden Maritime BV, Trading as Van Uden Africa Line v. Kommanditgesellschaft in 
Firma Deco-Line and Another, Case C-391/95, (1998) ECR 1-7140. Where a measure 
need to be sought from a forum, which has the "real connecting link" then it is highly 
likely that the measure is to be enforceable in such forum. Thus, there would be no 
need for cross border enforcement. 
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arbitral provisional measures. 14 None of the multilateral conventions does 
expressly provide for arbitral provisional measures' enforcement. Whether 
or not such measures are enforceable under the New York Convention is 
unclear. There are arguments both in favour and against the application of 
the Convention's enforcement regime to provisional measures. 15 No firm 
court precedent is yet to clarify the enforcement issue. The need for the 
promotion and harmonisation of arbitral provisional measures' enforcement 
is clear. In order to promote the enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures and harmonise the approaches of laws that deal with the issue 
of enforcement, UNCITRAL is currently carrying out a study. 16 
This Chapter examines sanctions for non-compliance, varying need for 
enforceability, and enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. 
1 Sanctions for Non-Compliance 
Whilst the modern practice of arbitration was commencing in the beginning 
of the last century, it was thought that arbitrating parties, generally, by 
entrusting their disputes to arbitrators, comply with their decisions 
voluntarily. Perhaps, the following belief arose from that thought: decisions 
of arbitrators on provisional measures (or on other issues) have 
traditionally their own weight and parties in practice are likely to voluntarily 
abide with those decisions. 17 Indeed, it was stated in the 1960s, for 
instance, that an order on provisional measures would 
frequently not require any enforcement on the ground that the party 
applying for it is itself the one who has to carry out the order which, 
for its part, is required primarily for the purpose of removing any doubt 
that the party wishing to take the measure of conservation is legally 
14 See Chapter V, infra Part 3.2.2. 
15 1 d. 
16 See Chapter V, infra Part 3.3. 
17 See, e. g., Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 16. 
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entitled to do so. Nor must one forget that in [international 
commercial] arbitrations ... which may be expected to form bulk of those which these [international commercial arbitration] Rules apply a 
large measure of voluntary submission under the arbitrators' rulings 
may be expected. 18 (Citation ornitted. ) 
When the measure ordered is not complied with the issue of whether there 
is a sanction for non-compliance becomes relevant. That is because 
arbitrators lack imperium to coerce the recalcitrant party. 19 However, there 
are other sanctions for non-compliance. These sanctions fall into two 
categories. One of those is the possibility of drawing adverse inferences 
by arbitrators if a provisional measure they were ordered is not complied 
with . 
20 And the other one is that the recalcitrant party may be held liable 
21 for costs and/or damages. In addition, an arbitral tribunal may impose 
time limits for the compliance with its awards. 22 Such limits may have an 
effect of psychological coercion. Moreover, the tribunal may even impose 
a penalty for failure to comply with its decision if such penalty is permitted 
under the law of the place of arbitration. 23 
18 E. J. Cohn, "The Rules of Arbitration of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe", 16 ICLQ 946,966 (1967). Further, for instance, parties generally comply 
with arbitral decisions on interim protection of rights. See Chapter V, supra note 2. 
See also UN Doc. A/CN. 9/264, para. 5, extracts reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 
543. 
19 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.1. 
20 In this regard, see, e. g., Article 19 of the Rules for International Arbitration 1994 of the 
AIA; and Article 27(l) of the Arbitration Rules of the European Development Fund 
(stating that if an award is not complied with the tribunal may take such failure into 
account). See also UNCITRAL Doc A/CN. 9/264, para. 5; and Berger, International 
Economic Arbitration, 349. 
21 See, e. g., U. N. Doc A/CN. 9/264, para. 5, extracts reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 
543; and Karrer, Less Theory, 103. 
22 See Article 14(3) of the International Arbitration Rules 1996 of the Chamber of 
National and International Arbitration of Milan-, and Article 19 of the Rules for 
International Arbitration 1994 of the AIA. 
23 Article 19 of the Rules for International Arbitration 1994 of the AIA. For more 
information, see supra Chapter IV, Part 7.2. 
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This part examines, in detail, the issues of drawing adverse inferences and 
of holding the recalcitrant party liable for costs and/or damages 
1.1 Adverse Inference 
An arbitral tribunal may draw adverse inferences for not complying with its 
ruling on preservation of evidence. 24 This is to say the tribunal, for 
instance, considers that such evidence supports the case of the applicant 
for it. The evidence ought to be in the recalcitrant parties' possession or, 
at least, available to it. 
Could the tribunal draw adverse inferences for non-compliance with any 
other measure? The response should be negative. The tribunal could not 
hold a party liable on the substance of the case in question just because 
the party is uncooperative in regard of the tribunal's ruling on a provisional 
measure. 25 This is because "[t]he obligation of an arbitral tribunal to act 
fairly towards the parties extends even to parties that are 'difficu It' .,, 
26 
However, one should keep in mind that arbitrators have a quite wide 
leverage on adjudication of arbitration e. g., adjudging the evidence 
submitted to them . 
27 It is, perhaps for this reason, argued that parties 
24 Von Mehren states, in this regard, that a tribunal can "advise the parties that the 
tribunal will draw whatever inferences it deems appropriate from a failure to comply 
with an instruction to produce evidence. " Robert B. von Mehren, "Rules of Arbitral 
Bodies Considered from a Practical Point of View", 9(3) J Int'l Arb 105,111 (1992). 
See also, e. g., Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 16. See also Article 9(4)- 
25 
(5) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration. 
See UN Doc. A/CN. 9AA/G. IIMP. 108, para. 76. See also UN Doc A/CN. 9/460, para. 
119ý and Karrer, Less Theory, 103. The tribunal, for instance, cannot dismiss the 
recalcitrant party's claim. Stalev, 110. 
26 Karrer, Less Theory, 103. 
27 In this regard, see Ancel, 111 (arguing that an arbitral tribunal may take into account 
in its final award the arbitrating party' good faith or failure in complying with its 
decision on an interim measure). 
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generally refrain from "unnecessarily antagonising" their arbitrators. 28 That 
may be partly related to the fact that "parties are often concerned that 
arbitrators will, at least subconsciously, have in mind the conduct of the 
parties when deciding on the issues. ), 29 In some cases, the conduct of the 
parties may have a more direct effect. For instance, where there is an 
issue of evaluation of evidence before an arbitral tribunal, it may take into 
account the relevant party's previous behaviour e. g., whether or not such 
party is trustworthy. 
1.2 Damages and Costs 
An arbitral tribunal may hold a "recalcitrant party liable for costs and 
damages arising from [or related to] its non-com p lia nce" with the measure 
it ordered. 30 
The power to hold the recalcitrant party liable for costs and damages is 
based on "a broad interpretation of the arbitration agreement itself since 
the damages obligation arises in connection with the contract, more 
precisely, in connection with the dispute resolution [clause] provided for in 
the contract. Y, 31 It could also be argued that such power is implied "in the 
28 Bond, 16. See also Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 59 (stating that [p]arties seeking 
to appear before the arbitrators as good citizens who have been wronged by their 
adversary would generally not wish to defy instructions given to them by those whom 
they wished to convince of the justice of their claims. "); Redfern / Hunter, para. 7-23ý 
and Born, International Arbitration, 972. 
29 Bond in: ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 16. However, it is noteworthy that if the 
applicable law, in an arbitration, leaves no room for an arbitrator's discretion and 
"leads to a finding in favour of the party resisting the order [on a provisional measure], 
the arbitrators will have no option but to apply it. " Jacques-Michel Grossen, 
30 
"Comment" in ICC (ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 115,116. 
UN Doc A/CN. 9ANG. Il/WP. 108, para. 76. See also LIN Doc A/CN. 9/460, para. 119; 
and UN Doc A /CN. 9/264, para. 5, extracts reprinted in Holtzmann / Neuhaus, 543, 
and Stalev, 110. 31 Karrer, Less Theory, 103. 
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power to issue interim measures. 1132 This is because the security for costs 
or damages aims to remedy possible damages that may arise from a 
provisional measure granted. In this regard, there seems to be an intrinsic 
link between the power to grant a provisional measure and a security for 
costs or damages. 33 
The scope of costs would extend to those related to provisional measures. 
Indeed, the scope would cover the expenses made due to a party's 
disruptive behaviour that makes provisional measure proceedings lengthy 
and/or expensive. 34 
Multiple or punitive damages arising from disobedience with an arbitral 
provisional measure can, in principle, be sought from an arbitral tribunal. 
This is, however, subject to the scope of arbitration agreement and law 
governing arbitration or arbitration agreement. 35 
The amount of costs and damages that a party held liable could be 
deducted from the security for damages or from the security for costs as 
the case may be, if these securities were taken. 36 
Varying Need for Enforceability 
Despite the availability of the above sanctions for non-compliance, there 
may still be cases where a party disregarding the sanctions may refuse to 
32 Id. 
33 See supra Chapter IV, Parts 3.3 and 7.4. 
34 See Karrer, Less Theory, 103. See also supra Chapter IV, Part 10. 
35 Lew / Mistelis / Krbll, para. 24-75, Redfern / Hunter, para. 8-13. See also, e. g., E. 
Allan Farnsworth, "Punitive Damages in Arbitration", 7(1) Arb Int'l 3 (1991)1 M. Scott 
Donahey, "Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitration", 10(3) J Int'l Arb 
67 (1993); and Karen J. Tolson, "Conflicts Presented by Arbitral Awards of Punitive 
Damages", 4(3) Arb Int'l 255 (1988). The enforceability of any arbitral decision on 
punitive damages is subject to the law of place of enforcement. 
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comply with a provisional measure issued by its arbitral tribunal. 37 
Perhaps, one obvious example is the case of dissipation of assets. If a 
party is to dissipate all of its assets then it may have no fear of being 
unsuccessful in the arbitration or of the threat of being held liable for costs 
or damages. Another example is where a party, by non-complying, e. g., 
aggravating the dispute or cease to carrying out with the construction or 
selling the goods in dispute may put a heavy burden on the other party 
who may need to cave in or suffer heavily due to such burden prior to the 
arbitrators' resolution. In those cases, the enforceability of arbitral 
provisional measures becomes necessity for effective protection of rights 
or in other words, effective resolution of the dispute. 
However, the need for enforceability is not the same for all types of arbitral 
interim measures. 38 The need is absolute for measures aimed to facilitate 
later enforcement of an award (those measures that are aimed at 
preventing dissipation of assets). That is because if "a party is determined 
to attempt to thwart the enforcement of the award, the arbitral tribunal or 
the interested party may have no effective means to avoid the negative 
consequences of a party's failure to abide by the interim measure. " 39 In 
fact, today, dissipation of assets is a lot easier: "twinkling of a telex" was 
enough to dissipate assets ten years ago '40 a click of a mouse from 
anywhere in the world is sufficient today. An award would be meaningless 
if it is not satisfied due to dissipation of losing party's assets to jurisdiction, 
a safe heaven, where the award's enforcement is impossible. 
36 See UN Doc A/CN. 9/264, para. 5. 
37 UN Doc A/CN. 9/460, para. 118. 
38 See, generally, UN Doc A/CN. 9ANG. Il/WP. 108, paras. 78-80. 
39 Id., para. 79. 
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Further, there may also be a need for enforcing measures related to 
conduct of arbitration and to relations between arbitrating parties after a 
dispute has arisen. The threat of possible liability for costs or damages 
may assist with the compliance under which a party does not voluntarily 
abide with the 
41 
measure ordered. However, again there may be 
circumstances where those sanctions might not be sufficient for the 
protection of a party right. This is where, for instance, the loss of one party 
is so grave that it may put that party in financial difficulty. In other words, 
"the failure to comply with the measure may have severe and irreparable 
consequences, and it might be regarded as being in the interest of an 
orderly administration of justice ... to enforce an arbitral interim 
measure. 42 
In contrast, the degree of the necessity for enforcement of the measures 
for protection of evidence may perhaps be less than the degree of 
necessity for the other measures. This is because where an arbitrating 
party 
fails to comply with one of those measures, the arbitral tribunal may 
"draw adverse inferences" from the failure and make the award on the 
basis of information and evidence before it. In addition or 
alternatively, the arbitral tribunal may take the party's failure to 
comply with the measure into account in its final decision on costs of 
the proceedings. Thus, with respect to these kinds of measures, the 
arbitral tribunal may have considerable leverage over the parties, 
which may reduce the need for court intervention. 43 
40 Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohr GmbH v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. and 
41 
Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 769,772. 
42 
UN Doc A/CN. 9ANG. IIANP. 108, paras. 78-80. 
Id. 
43 Id., para. 78. 
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Enforcement of Arbitral Provisional Measures 
It is felt that the arbitrators' lack of coercive powers causes a proble M44 
and this problem may result in infringement of arbitrating parties' rights and 
thus it may ultimately hamper the effectiveness of international 
arbitratio n. 
45 The problem may, consequently, have adverse effect on the 
future of international commercial arbitration. 
In order to rectify the adverse effects of the above problem and foster 
international commercial arbitration by making it more effective, laws of a 
number of states offer various solutions, which, one way or other, make 
decisions of arbitrators on provisional measures enforceable, generally, 
through national courts. 46 In this regard, it is noteworthy that there is no 
harmonised solution to the problem of arbitrators' lack of coercive powers. 
The enforcement of arbitral provisional measures is allowed for either 
domestic measures (the measures that are issued and enforced at the seat 
of arbitration )47 or, under laws of a few states '48 
foreign measures (the 
measures that are to be enforced in a country other than the seat). In 
44 In fact, the need for enforceability of arbitral provisional measures is emphasized by 
several commentators. See, e. g., Otto Sandrock (see Blessing, Introduction, para. 
876); Lord Mustill, 120; von Mehren, 122; and Wagoner, 68-73. Further, such need is 
in the highest where "the losing party in arbitration has little to gain by obeying the 
arbitration award and continuing its relationship with the prevailing party. " Hoellering, 
Interim Relief, 4. 
45 In this regard, it is noteworthy that coercive powers are generally not a problem in 
litigation the sole competitor of arbitration for resolving international disputes and there 
are efforts to resolve the problem of enforcing judicial interim measures abroad. See 
Chapter V, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
46 It is noteworthy that laws of many states still do not deal with enforceability of arbitral 
provisional measures. It Is also noteworthy that parties cannot confer on, by 
agreement, their arbitrators with coercive powers as such powers are exclusive to 
sovereign and are not delegated to private individuals. See, e. g., Jarvin, Exclusion, 
180; Gaillard / Savage (ed. ), para. 1323ý and Cremades, The Need, 226. 
47 See Chapter V, infra Part 3.1. 
48 See Chapter V, infra Part 3.2. 
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addition, some bilateral treaties envisage enforcement of arbitral 
provisional measures. Further, since the issue of arbitral provisional 
measures' enforceability is not widely recognised and no harmonised 
approach is taken in countries that recognise and regulate the issue, 
UNCITRAL is currently undertaking and well-advanced on a study on the 
issue for a harmonised and widely-accepted solution. 49 
This Part examines enforcement of provisional measures at the seat of 
arbitration and abroad. It also deals with UNCITRAL's harmonisation 
efforts. 
3.1 Enforcement at the Seat of Arbitration 
Like any other decision of an arbitral tribunal, a decision on provisional 
measures is expected to be complied with . 
50 If a party does not abide with 
the measure granted, the assistance of a competent court may, if possible, 
be sought. 
Laws of a number of states provide for enforcement of the arbitral 
decisions on provisional measures where the seat of arbitration is within 
these states. Accordingly, these decisions could be enforced through the 
assistance of judicial authorities at the seat. National laws envisage four 
main approaches for providing this assistance. 
* The first approach is direct enforcement of an arbitral provisional 
measure as if it were a court decision 
* The second approach is national courts' executory assistance in 
regard of the enforcement of such measures. 
49 See Chapter V, infra Part 3.3. 
50 See Chapter V, supra note 2. 
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9 The third approach is recasting the decision of arbitrators, as the 
case may be, to transpose the arbitral decision into the legal system 
of the state in question. 
Finally, under the fourth approach, a court orders, by taking into 
consideration the arbitral provisional measure, an interim measure 
of protection of its own. 
This Part examines these four approaches. 
3.1.1 First Approach: Direct Enforcement of Arbitral Provisional 
Measure as if It Were a Decision of a Court 
The Ecuadorian Law on Arbitration and Mediation 1997 uniquely provides 
that interim measures are directly enforceable without the need for court 
intervention if parties so provide in their arbitration agreement. 51 
This approach eliminates the time that would be spent were a court review 
required for providing executory assistance to an arbitral decision on 
interim protection of rights. The approach reflects utmost trust to arbitrator 
as it equates an arbitral decision to a judgment. This author believes that 
this approach reflects ultimate goal for arbitration world to reach as a 
solution for resolving the issue of enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures. However, the pitfall of this approach is that there are no 
safeguards if anything went wrong in arbitration. This is particularly 
important in arbitration as there is no appeal against an arbitral decision 
51 Article 9(3). This Article provides- 
If the parties so provide in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrators may request 
the assistance of public and judicial officers, the police and administrative 
authorities if necessary to carry out the interim measures, without the need of 
resorting to the court of the place where the property is located or the measures 
are to be carried out. 
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although the decision may be reviewed under changed circumstances. 52 
So for instance, if, for some reason, due process is not observed, there 
would be no way of remedying this irregularity. This is, in practice, 
unacceptable to international community and to business persons. Even 
the enforcement of arbitral awards is subject to certain safeguards. These 
safeguards are expressed, for instance, under Article V of the New York 
Convention and Article 34-36 of the Model Law. The lack of safeguards 
protecting the interest of state and business persons makes this approach 
unacceptable. 
3.1.2 Second Approach: Executory Assistance from National 
Judicial Authorities 
Under this approach, the judicial authorities are given executory assistance 
for enforcement of arbitral decisions on provisional measures. In other 
words, the arbitral decisions (usually orders) are enforced through judicial 
authorities at the seat without any further (or at least with limited) 
examination. Alternatively, the decisions are enforced as if they were 
arbitral awards. This is to say that orders are effectively equated to 
award S. 53 
Prior to examining the examples regarding this approach, it is useful to 
note the UNCITRAL Secretariat's approach initially taken during the 
preparation process of the Model Law in 1985. The Secretariat proposed 
the following language in regard of enforcement of arbitral interim 
measures in the last sentence of Article XIV (Article 17 in the final text)- 
" See supra Chapter IV, Part 6. 
53 Sanders, Quo Vadis, 272. 
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If enforcement of any such interim measure becomes necessary, the 
arbitral tribunal may 
54 
request [a competent court] ... to render executory assistance. 
In the Fourth Working Group that discussed the issue of enforceability a 
divergent views were expressed but the above provision was not adopted 
since it dealt in an incomplete manner with a question of national 
procedural law and court competence and was unlikely to be 
accepted by many States. 55 
The Working Group further noted that the avoidance of the adoption 
should not be read as a preclusion of such executory assistance in 
those cases where a State was prepared to render such assistance 56 under its procedural law. 
There are several examples to the executory assistance from courts: 
(i) Article 36 of the Bolivian Law on Arbitration & Conciliation 
1997 states: 
For the enforcement of interim measures, the production of 
evidence or compliance with mandatory measures, the 
arbitral tribunal or any of the parties may request the 
assistance of the competent judicial authority of the place 
where the measure or course of action mandated by the 
arbitral tribunal is to take place. 
(ii) Section 1297(92) of the Californian CCP provides: 
Any party to an arbitration ... may request 
from the superior 
court enforcement of an award of an arbitral tribunal to take 
any interim measures of protection .... 
Enforcement shall be 
granted pursuant to the law applicable to the granting of the 
type of interim relief requested. 
54 UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. IIMP. 40, Article XIV of the Second Draft (Article 17 in the final 
55 
text). 
56 
UN Doc A/CN. 9/245, para. 72. 
Id. 
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(iii) In accordance with Article 24 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law, 
where an arbitrator's order on interim or conservatory measure is 
not complied with, the applicant for the measure has the right to 
apply to the president of the court for an execution order. 57 
(iv) In accordance with Article 22(2) of the Arbitration Law of 
Guatemala 1995, arbitral interim measures could be enforceable 
by a court. 
(v) The English AA 1996 provides for enforcement of 
cc peremptory orders" on interim measures of arbitrators upon 
request from either the arbitrators or from any of the parties. 58 
For the enforcement of such order, a party needs to exhaust any 
available arbitral process concerning the failure to comply with 
the order . 
59 Another condition is attached to the enforcement. 
The enforcing court needs to be satisfied that the order is not 
complied with within the period of time as prescribed in the 
arbitral decision, failing such prescription, within a reasonable 
time. 60 
57 
58 
59 
A similar provision is contained under Article 24(2) of the Law of Arbitration on Civil 
and Commercial Matters of Oman. 
Section 42. A peremptory order (concerning interim protection) may be given where 
arbitrating parties agreed to empower their arbitrators with powers to grant interim 
measures and where, upon the grant of an interim measure, such measure is not 
complied with. See Sections 41(l) and (5), and 42(2)(c) of the EAA 1996. The 
definition of the term "peremptory order" provided for in Section 82 of the Act- a 
. peremptory order' means an order made under Section 41(5) or made in exercise of 
any corresponding power conferred by the parties. " Article 42 is not mandatory- the 
parties can opt out from it. The decision on enforcement is open to appeal with the 
court's leave. Section 42(5). 
Section 42(3). 
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(vi) Section 2GG of the Hong Kong AO reads: 
An award, order or direction made or given in or in relation to 
arbitration proceedings by an arbitral tribunal is enforceable in the same way as a judgment, order or direction of the Court that has the same effect, but only with the leave of the Court 
or a judge of the Court. If that leave is given, the Court or judge may enter judgment in terms of the award, order or direction. 
(vii) The Act on International Commercial Arbitration 1999 
of Greece permits the enforcement of arbl*tral orders on interim 
measures. 61 If there is a previous application to a court for a 
similar measure, the enforcement of the arbitral order is not 
authorised. 
(Viii) Under the General Law of Arbitration 1995 of Peru, an 
arbitral tribunal may request, for the enforcement of its ruling 
concerning interim measures, 
62 
the assistance of the court of the place where the assets are 
located or of the place where the measures are to be 
adopted. The court shall proceed with the enforcement on 
the merits of a certified copy of the arbitration agreement 
and the arbitral ruling, without permitting any recourse or 
challenge whatsoever. 63 
(ix)According to Section 2712.14(B) of the Ohio International 
Commercial AA, 
[a]ny party to an arbitration ... may request the court of 
common pleas to enforce an award of an arbitral tribunal .... 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Section 42(4). It is noteworthy that the decision of the court as regards the 
enforcement of a peremptory order could be appealed with the leave of the court. See 
Section 42(5). 
Article 17(2). 
Interim measures that may be ordered are generally related to securing assets in 
dispute. 
Article 81(2). 
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which award orders a party to take any interim measure of protection. Enforcement shall be granted pursuant to the law 
applicable to the granting of the type of interim measure of 
protection requested. (Emphasis added. ) 
(x) Under Article 24(4) of the Decree Law No. 5 1999 of 
Panama, the carrying out of arbitral provisional or protective 
measures may be assisted by a judge. The judge shall carry out 
the measure within ten business days from the request. 
(xi) In accordance with the Singapore International AM 994,64 
[a]II orders or directions made or given by an arbitral tribunal 
in the course of an arbitration shall, by leave of the High 
Court or a Judge thereof, be enforceable in the same manner 
as if they were orders made by a court and, where leave is so 
given, judgment may be entered in terms of the order or 
direction. (Emphasis added. ) 
(Xii) The Sri Lanka AA 1995 provides that arbitrators' 
orders on interim measures may be enforced, upon a party 
request, by the court. 65 
(Xiii) Under the Switzerland PIL, unless otherwise agreed, 66 
arbitratorS67 may seek assistance of a court for enforcement of 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Section 12(5). 
Article 13. 
Through an agreement, the parties may too seek assistance of a court for the 
enforcement of an arbitral interim measure. See Bucher / Tschanz, para. 172. 
The benefit of taking the approach of empowering only arbitrators to seek 
enforcement of an arbitral provisional measures is perhaps ensuring that all arbitral 
recourse for making compliance with the measure is taken; thereby avoiding any bad- 
faith applications to a court for the enforcement. The down side of the approach is 
making arbitrators to pursue the enforcement proceedings before the court (e. g., 
preparing and making application to the relevant court, paying court charges, etc. ), 
which could be better done by a party representative. In order to avoid a bad-faithed 
application to a court for enforcement, taking into consideration the down side, a party 
representative may be empowered to make the application but he could act only 
_i' __ 
68 their decisions 
. Such assistance may be required where an 
arbitral order on provisional or protective measure is not 
voluntarily complied with . 
69 The court or arbitral tribunal may 
make granting of the measure subject to providing appropriate 
security. 70 
(Xiv) Under Section 2 of Article 249-9 of the Act Relating to 
Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial Disputes 
of Texas: 
A party to an arbitration ... may request from the district court 
enforcement of an order of an arbitral tribunal granting an 
interim measure of protection .... Enforcement shall be 
granted as provided by the law applicable to the type of 
interim relief requested. (Emphasis added. ) 
68 
69 
70 
where he is permitted by the arbitrators. In this regard, it should be noted that 
whether a party, in the absence of such permission, may apply for the enforcement is 
questionable. See Tijana Kojovic, "Court Enforcement of Arbitral Decisions on 
Provisional Relief - How Final is Provisional? ", 18(5) J Int'l Arb 511,514 (2001). 
Article 183(2). It is noteworthy that the parties could launch an appeal against a 
court's enforcement order. Bucher / Tschanz, para. 176. On how a Swiss court would 
apply this provision, Blessing state that the competent Swiss court "neither make a de 
novo examination, nor simply affix a rubber-stamp on the Tribunal's order [on a 
provisional measure] in the sense of exequatur. " He states that "the court will adopt a 
middle-way and, in essence check on a prima facie basis, whether certain formal 
prerequisites had been met and whether, on the merits, the urgency and/or the 
exposure to irreparable harm or damages is sufficiently explained, and whether the 
measures ordered by the Arbitral Tribunal are also available under the state court's 
own domestic procedural law. " Blessing, Introduction, para. 862. The court shall only 
enforce the measures available under Swiss law and it shall otherwise deny the 
enforcement. It is argued that the court can transpose the arbitral measure into an 
appropriate court order available under Swiss law. See, e. g., Wirth, 40. But see 
Olivier Merkt, Les Mesures Provisoires en Droit Intemational Prive (Zurich- Schulthess 
1993), 194-95. 
The tribunal need not have to await a party's non-compliance. If the circumstances of 
the case or the conduct of a party demonstrates the party's unwillingness to abide with 
the decision, the tribunal should apply directly to a court to prevent evasion from the 
measure. Bucher / Tschanz, para. 172. 
Article 183(3). 
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(XV) Article 62 of the Tunisian Arbitration Code 1993 
provides: 
If a party does not comply with an arbitral order than the tribunal may require the assistance of the court. 
(Xvi) In accordance with Article 28 of the Law on 
Commercial Arbitration 1998 of Venezuela: 
The arbitral tribunal, or any of the parties with the approval of 
the arbitral tribunal may request the assistance of the 
competent court of first instance for ... the enforcement of the required interim measures. The court shall entertain the 
remiest within the scope of its jurisdiction and in accordance 
with the applicable rules. 
(Xvii) Under Article 17(3) of the AA 1996 of Zimbabwe, the 
arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the tribunal may 
request "executory assistance" of a court for the enforcement of 
interim measures of protection. 
Laws of some states extend the regime for enforcement of arbitral awards 
to the enforcement of arbitral decisions on provisional measures. The 
examples to those 
7 72 
states are Australia, ' Bermuda , 
73 British Columbia, 
France '74 Ireland, 
75 Malta '76 New Zealand '77 Ontario '78 and Scotland '79and 
71 Article 23 of the International AA 1974 of Australia, as amended. In accordance with 
this Article, the enforcement regime envisaged by the Act is also applicable to arbitral 
orders for providing a security in relation to the measure ordered. Article 23 Is 
applicable only where parties opt for it. See Article 22. This Article too provides that 
the enforcement regime envisaged by the Act is also applicable to arbitral orders for 
72 
providing a security in relation to the measure ordered. 
Article 26 of the Bermuda International Conciliation and AA 1993. 
73 Section 2 of the International Commercial AA. The Act makes it possible to render 
74 
and interim award on preservation of property. 
Pluyette, 88 (indicating that an arbitral decision granted in the form of "an interim 
award or even a non-final one" may be enforced. ). Similarly, it is argued that awards 
on provisional measures are enforceable in Belgium. Herman Verbist, "Reform of the 
75 
Belgian Arbitration Law (The Law of 19 May 1998)", 7 RDAI/IBLJ 842,848 (1998). 
Sec. 14(3) of the Irish AA 1998. 
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the U. S. 80 Similarly, under the Dutch Arbitration Act 1986, arbitrating 
parties may empower their arbitral tribunal or only its chairman to grant 
provisional measures in summary arbitral proceedings .81 The decision 
given in summary arbitral proceedings is considered an arbitral award and 
enforced according ly. 82 
This approach reflects practically the most acceptable solution to the issue 
of enforcement of an arbitral provisional measure. Since the enforcement 
is permitted with the assistance of a court with certain safeguards, there is 
a possibility that the court can remedy any irregularity e. g., due process is 
not observed. The safeguards are clear for those laws that extend the 
regime for enforcement of an arbitral awards to arbitral provisional 
measures. The clearance of safeguards makes the process more 
predictable. The predictability makes arbitration more effective. The pitfall 
of this approach is the time spent for courts for giving permission for 
enforcement of an arbitral decision. 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Article 62 of the Malta AA 1996. The Act allows the enforcement of both interim 
measures and orders granting security concerning such measures. 
Section 17(2) of the First Schedule to the New Zealand AA 1996. 
Section 9 of the International Commercial AA. The Act treats orders on interim 
measures as if they were arbitral awards. 
Article 17(2) of Schedule 7 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) 
Act 1990. 
Although, the U. S. Federal AA (see 9 USC 1 (1925)) is silent on the issue, several 
courts have enforced arbitral provisional measures. See Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. 
Israel, 689 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. Gainsville, 729 
F. 2d 1046 (6 th Cir. 1984); Meta I Igese I Ischaft AG v. MN Capitan Constante, 790 F. 2d 
280 (2d Cir. 1986); Southern Seas Navigation Ltd v. Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico 
City, 606 F. Supp 692 (S. D. N. Y. 1985); and Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. V. 
Star Lines Ltd, 454 F. Supp. 368,375 (S. D. N. Y. 1978). On some of those cases, see 
Chapter V, infra note 108. See also Holtzmann / Donovan, 37 (indicating that an 
interim award on a provisional measure should be enforced in the U. S. just like any 
other arbitral award. ). 
Article 1051(l). 
Article 1051(3). The decision not given in summary proceedings are not considered 
awards. Thus they are not enforceable by a court. See C. C. A. Voskuil, "Provisional 
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This second approach, in this author's opinion, is the right way forward for 
international commercial arbitration and it is in line with the enforcement 
regime created by the New York Convention, which system has worldwide 
acceptance. It should be recalled that the enforcement of a final award 
needs to be done through courts in order for them to assess, either ipso 
iure or, upon a party request, that the tribunal has observed some basic 
safeguards. 83 Similar safeguards should be observed for enforcement of 
arbitral provisional measures. In establishment of the safeguards, the 
characteristics of arbitral provisional measures should be taken into 
account. 84 
3.1.3 Third Approach: Transposition of Arbitral Order Into Court 
Order 
This approach requires "exequatur or transposition of the arbitral tribunal's 
measure into a measure that could have been issued by a court and will be 
treated accordingly by the state court system. , 85 In accordance with Article 
1041(2) of the German CCP, upon a party request, the court may permit 
enforcement of an order on an arbitral provisional measure . 
86 The pre- 
requisite for the enforcement is, as indicated in the same Section, that no 
Measures in Arbitration", in: C. C. A. Voskuil (ed. ) Hague-Zagreb- Gent Essays on the 
Law of International Trade (1988), 108,124. 
83 These safeguards are set out, for instance, in Articles 34-36 of the Model Law and 
Article V of the New York Convention. 
84 See supra Introduction, notes 19-34 and accompanying text. On the principles in 
establishing such safeguards, see Chapter V, infra notes 132-142 and accompanying 
text. 
85 Karrer, Less Theory, 107. 
86 This permissive language gives German courts the discretion to deny applications 
where the measure applied is not enforceable in its form under German law. See 
Friedrich Niggemann, "The New German Arbitration Law", 6 RDAI/IBLJ 656 (1998), 
and Schaefer, Part 4.2.2.3. It should be noted that Article 1063(2) of the German 
CCP allows enforcement of ex parte arbitral provisional measures. 
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87 prior application to a court for the same measure is made . The court is 
empowered to recast the order concerning the measure for the aim of 
enforcement. 88 In addition, the court may, again upon a party request, 
repeal or amend the order. 89 If the measure ordered and then enforced is 
"unjustified from the outset, the damages incurred as a result of the 
enforcement may be recovered through arbitration or court proceedings-90 
This approach complements the second approach. It enhances court 
assistance to the enforcement of arbitral measures. It has the same pitfall 
as the second approach. Further, by allowing the recast of an arbitral 
decision to make it enforceable, it opens the way for further court review of 
such decision. As a result some safeguards should be taken to avoid court 
review of the substance of the arbitral measure ordered. 
3.1.4 Fourth Approach: Enforcing Separate Court Order Based on 
Arbitral Provisional Measure 
Under this approach, a court issues its own, separate order, which is 
inspired from, or which takes as conclusive the measure of an arbitral 
tribunal. 91 Laws of Kenya, New Zealand, North Carolina, and Oregon are 
some examples to this approach: 
(i) Article 7(2) of the Arbitration Act 1995 of Kenya states: 
If an arbitral tribunal has already ruled on an interim measure 
the court treat it as conclusive for the purpose of application 
[for an interim measure]. 
87 The other unwritten pre-conditions are whether or not the arbitration agreement is 
valid and the order is "wholly misbalanced. " Schaefer, Part 4.2.2.3. 
88 Article 1041(2). 
89 Article 1041(3). 
90 Article 1041(4). In accordance with the same Article, damages incurred in cases 
where a security provided for suspension of the enforcement may also be recovered. 
91 Karrer, Less Theory, 107. 
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(ii) Article 9(3) of the New Zealand AA provides: 
Where a party applies to a court for an interim injunction or 
other interim order and an arbitral tribunal has already ruled 
on any matter relevant to the application, the court shall treat 
the ruling or any findings of fact made in the course of the 
ruling as conclusive for the purposes of application. 
(iii) Under Section 1-567(39) of the North Carolina International 
Commercial AA, 
(b) 
... a party to an arbitration ... may request from the superior court enforcement of an order of an arbitral tribunal 
granting interim measures .... 
(d) In considering ... the enforcement of interim measure, the 
court shall give preclusive effect to any finding of fact of the 
arbitral tribunal in the proceeding, including the probable 
validity of the claim that is the subject of ... the interim 
measures granted. 
(e) Where the arbitral tribunal has not ruled on an objection to 
its jurisdiction, the court shall not grant preclusive effect to the 
tribunal's findings until the court has made an independent 
finding as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. If the court 
rules that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction, the 
application for interim relief or the enforcement of interim 
measures shall be denied. Such a ruling by the court that the 
arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction is not binding on the arbitral 
tribunal or subsequent judicial proceedings. 
(1v) In accordance with Section 36.470(2) of the Oregon 
International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 92 
92 Sec. 19.08.03 of the Florida International AA provides for a somewhat similar 
provision. Under this Section, the tribunal itself, or a party with its permission to seek 
the assistance of "a state court, tribunal or other governmental authority" for securing 
the objectives intended in the arbitral interim measure. 
. 3-9 
[a]ny party to an arbitration ... may request the circuit court to take any interim measure of protection of an arbitral tribunal 
Enforcement shall be granted pursuant to the law 
applicable to the granting of the type of interim relief 
requested. 
This fourth approach reflects the least trust of all approaches to arbitrators 
for interim protection of rights. This approach is also cumbersome and, in 
this author's view, less favourable of all. This is mainly because this 
approach requires double proceedings for obtaining a provisional measure; 
one before the tribunal, and then one before a court. Since the time is 
often the essence for interim protection of rights, this approach should 
have the least preference. 
3.2 Enforcement Abroad 
Due to the progress of "internationalisation" since the beginning of the last 
decade, "the problem has emerged of enforcing ... interim measures 
overseas outside the seat of arbitration. , 93 Indeed, it Is vitally important 
and necessary that an arbitral provisional measure is enforceable in a 
place other than the seat of arbitration. That is because the seat (or the 
place) of arbitration often has nothing to do with the parties or the dispute 
in question. 94 Indeed, arbitrations are generally held in, albeit carefully 
considered and chosen by arbitrating parties, a convenient place that is 
often neutral to the parties and subject matter of underlying legal 
relationsh ip. 95 For instance, in international arbitration, often, parties have 
no assets at the seat of arbitration, the construction contract involves work 
in a place other than the seat, or the distribution agreement has no 
connection with the seat. As a result, an arbitral provisional measure 
93 Veeder, The View, 207. 
94 See, e. g., Bond, 14. 
95 Lalive, 23-33. 
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should be enforceable outside the seat of arbitration. The enforcement 
outside the seat may be sought either under national law of a foreign state, 
or in accordance with a treaty. These two possibilities will be examined 
below. 
3.2.1 Enforcement Through National Laws 
Arbitral provisional measures may be enforced abroad where the law of the 
forum of enforcement allows their enforcement. In other words, courts of 
the enforcement forum lend their assistance to arbitrators seated in a 
foreign state. Laws of a few states e. g., Australia, 96 Hong Kong, 97 and 
Switzerland 98 permit the enforcement of arbitral provisional measures 
issued abroad. 99 
3.2.2 Enforcement Through Treaties 
An international treaty may permit enforcement of an arbitral provisional 
measure rendered by an arbitral tribunal whose seat is outside the place 
where the enforcement is sought. There are, indeed, a small number of 
bilateral treaties permitting enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. 100 
In contrast, there is no multilateral treaty under which the possibility of 
96 See Articles 22 and 23 of the International AA 1974 of Australia, as amended. 
97 Section 2GG of the Hong Kong AO. See also Robert Morgan, "Enforcement of 
Chinese Arbitral Awards Complete Once More - But with a Difference", 30 HKLJ 375, 
98 
379(2000). 
Karrer, Less Theory, 108. However, there are conflicting views as to whether or not 
arbitral decisions concerning provisional measures are enforceable in Switzerland. 
99 
See Kojovic, 516. 
For instance, Article 42 of the EAA, which provides for enforcement of arbitral 
peremptory orders is not applicable where the seat of arbitration is outside England, 
Wales or Northern Ireland. See Section 2(2) of the AA. See also Bocotra 
Construction Pte Ltd v. Attorney-General of Singapore [1995] 2 SLR 523. 
'00 See, e. g., SLsbastian Besson, Arbitrage Internatlonal et Measures Provisoires - Etude 
de Drolt Compar6 (Zurich: Schulthess 1998), 351-352. It is also interesting to note 
that arbitral provisional measures are made enforceable through an annex to a 
tripartite treaty (between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey). Article 18(11) of the Host 
fin 
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international/transnational/cross-border enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures is expressly dealt with. To this end, it should be noted that 
neither the text of the New York Convention nor the preparatory materials 
on it do explicitly deal with the Convention's application to enforcement of 
those measures. It is only an educated guess that the drafters of the 
Convention did not consider, nor was it in their mandate, to create a 
mechanism under which arbitral provisional measures might too be 
enforceable. 101 Further, it is noteworthy that there are only a few and 
contrasting court decisions on the issue of whether an interim measure of 
protection is enforceable under the Convention. The contradiction exists 
as to the views of commentators. 
The Supreme Court of Queensland denied the enforcement under the New 
York Convention of an arbitral provisional measure in Resort 
Condominiums International Inc. v. (1) Ray Bolwell and (2) Resort 
Condominiums (Australasia) Pty. Ltd. 102 In this case, parties enter into a 
licence agreement relating to time-sharing business in Australia, Fiji, New 
Zealand, and Tahiti. ' 03 The agreement made a reference to arbitration 
under the AAA Arbitration Rules in Indianapolis, U. S. Disputes on several 
issues arose between the parties. Resort Condominiums International 
("RCI") made a request for injunctive relief in Indiana State Court and filed 
a request for arbitration. The Court's temporary restraining order 
Government Agreement published in the Turkish Official Gazette, 10 September 
2000, No. 24166(bis). 
... The concept of arbitral provisional measures was not considered an important issue in 
102 
the 1950s and not even in the 1970s, See supra Introduction, note 54. 
Excerpts published in XX YCA 628-650 (1995) (Supreme Court of Queensland, 29'h 
October, 1993). See also Pryles, 385-394. 
103 This business "operates principally by way of exchange whereby a person agrees to 
utilise the time sharing facilities of a resident in another country, who in turn has the 
reciprocal right to utilise the time sharing facilities of the first person in that person's 
country. " XX YCA 629. 
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requested the respondents to supply and provide access to certain 
information. Resort Condominiums Australasia ("RCI Aust. ") removed the 
case to the federal district court and moved to vacate the order. A few 
months later, the district court granted, upon a request, a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the respondents from, inter alia, "directly or indirectly 
operating or entering into an agreement with any exchange entity other 
than RCI 13 and from, in broad terms breaching the licence agreement. 
Within two days, the sole arbitrator, after her appointment, granted an 
order broadening the terms of that injunction. 104 The order was tagged as 
"interim arbitratic, i order and award" for, probably, facilitating enforcement 
in either form. The Supreme Court of Queensland denied the enforcement 
of the arbitrator's decision on several grounds. The Supreme Court took 
the view that an award on an interim measure needs to deal with one or 
more of the differences or disputes referred to arbitration. 105 
In addition, according to the Queensland Court, an arbitral decision needs 
to be a final and binding award for its enforcement under the New York 
Convention. The Court held that the determination of the arbitrator of its 
decision as an "award" does not make such decision an award within the 
meaning of the Convention. The Court based its finding on the 
determination that the arbitrator's injunction is of "an interlocutory and 
procedural nature and in no way purport to finally resolve the disputes ... 
referred by RCI for decision or to finally resolve the legal rights of the 
parties. "' 06 The Court added that such injunction is "provisional only and 
liable to be rescinded, suspended, varied or reopened by the tribunal which 
104 Pryles, 387-390. 
105 XX YCA 640. In this regard, the Court held that the arbitral decision is not even an 
award as It is an interlocutory decision on a procedural point. To this end, the Court 
referred to Three Valleys Water Committee v. Binnie and Partners, (1990) 52 BLR 42, 
52. 
pronounced them .... 
007 In sum, according to the Court, the arbitrator's 
description of her decision as "award" does not make it an award within the 
scope of the Convention provided that the decision finally resolves the 
parties' legal rights. 108 The Queensland's Court further indicated that a 
decision that could be enforceable under Articles 8(1) and (2) of the 
Queensland AA (Articles 1(1) and (3) of the Convention) needs to be "final 
and binding )) on the parties. Although, according to the Court, an 
interlocutory order, in one sense, is binding until it is varied or discharged, 
such an order that may be rescinded, suspended, varied or reopened by 
the tribunal was not final and binding on the arbitrating parties. 109 Thus, 
the Court refused the enforcement of the arbitral decision. 
In contrast, some U. S. courts held that an award on provisional measures 
is, under certain circumstances, enforceable under the New York 
Convention. For instance, in Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. 
Government of Israel, 110 a contract requiring Sperry to design and 
construct a communication system for the Israeli Air Force. Under the 
contract, Sperry caused Citibank N. A. to open an irrevocable letter of credit 
in favour of Israel, which could be called upon Israel's certification that 
Sperry is in breach of the contract. Sperry initiated arbitration proceedings 
claiming breach of the contract and eventually requested from the 
arbitrators to enjoin Israel from calling the letter of credit. The arbitrators 
ordered, in an "award, " that the proceeds of the letter of credit was to be 
106 XX YCA 630. 
107 XX YCA 630. 
108 XX YCA 641. The Court based its decision on Articles l(l), 1(3), V(1)(c), V(1)(e), and 
VI of the Convention. XX YCA 636-640. The Court did not examine whether an 
interim award is enforceable under the New York Convention. It observed that "[1]t 
would appear to be unduly restrictive if the expression 'arbitral award' in the 
Convention was construed as excluding a valid interim award. " XX YCA 641. 
109 XX YCA 642. 
110 532 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y. ), aff'd., 689 F. 2d 301 (2 Cir. 1982). 
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held jointly by Israel and Sperry in an escrow account pending a decision 
on the merits. Israel argued that the award is not final and, therefore, 
could not be enforced. The court rejected this argument holding that the 
award was severable from the merits and because, by its nature, it 
required "affirmative action, " the award would be rendered a meaningless 
exercise of the arbitrators' powers if it were not enforced. "' Accordingly, 
the court confirmed the award. 
532 F. Supp. 909. See also Ministry of Finance and Planning v. Onyx Development 
Corp., 1989 U. S. Dist. Lexis 11995 (S. D. N. Y. 1989) (confirming a partial/final award 
on provisional measures. ); (1) Publicis Communication and (2) Publicis S. A. v. True 
North Communications, Inc., 206 F. 3d 725 (7 th Cir. 2000) (ruling that the arbitral 
provisional measure in the form of an 'order' on turning over tax records is final as it 
finally resolves a separable issue from the substance of the case in question. ) The 
Publicis court also cited several cases and ruled that arbitration between the parties 
"is controlled by the New York Convention, not the Federal AA. But the New York 
Convention supplements the Federal AA, and the logic of decisions applied to the 
latter may guide the interpretation of the former. " 206 F. 3d 729. Indeed, there are 
several cases that are considered under the Federal AA and that are in line with the 
rationale of Sperry and Publicis cases. In those cases, courts went "beyond a 
document's heading and delve into its substance and impact to determine whether the 
decision is final. " Id., 729. The resemblance of the Publicis court's approach with the 
Brasoif decision is noteworthy. See Braspetro Oil Services Company v. The 
Management and Implementation Authority of the Great Man-Made River Project 
extracts from the French original published in XXIVa YCA 296 (1999) (1 July 1999, 
Court of Appeal, Paris) (holding that the arbitral tribunal's qualification of its decision 
as "award" does not make the decision an award). In this regard, see also Southern 
Seas Navigation Limited of Monrovia v. Petroleos, Mexicanos of Mexico City, 606 F. 
Supp. 692 (SDNY 1985) (holding that an interim award on an interim measure *is, an 
end in itself, for its very purpose is to clarify the parties' rights in the 'interim' period 
pending a final decision on the merits. The only meaningful point at which such an 
award may be enforced is when it is made, rather than after the arbitrators have 
completely concluded consideration of all the parties' claims. "); Island Creek Coal 
Sales Co. v. City of Gainsville, Florida, 729 F. 2d 1046,1049 (6h Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 474 U. S. 948,106 S. Ct. 346,88 L. Ed. 2d 293 ("ruling that interim award on 
an interim measure "disposes of one self-contained issue, namely, whether [a party) is 
required to perform the contract during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. 
The issue is a separate, discrete, independent, severable issue. "); Pacific 
Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F. 2d 1019 (9", Cir. 
1991) (holding that "temporary equitable orders calculated to preserve assets or 
performance needed to make a potential final award meaningful ... are 
final orders 
and Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Europe, Ltd. v. Continental Casualty Co., 
37 F. 3d 345 (7 th Cir. 1994) (confirming an interim order directing Yasuda to post an 
interim letter of credit in the certain amount. ). 
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Some commentators argue that a decision on a provisional measure is not 
enforceable under the New York Convention. These commentators 
indicate that such decision should not/cannot be issued in the form of an 
interim/partial award. That is generally because, in their view, such 
decision is, unlike an award, not final but subject to review or revocation. 112 
Some other commentators take the view to contrary. These commentators 
rightly argue that an award is enforceable under the Convention so long as 
it is "an enforceable award in the jurisdiction in which it is granted. "' 13 The 
112 See, e. g., Bucher / Tschanz, para. 176; and Karrer, Less Theory, 109 (collectively 
arguing that interim measures cannot be issued in a form of an award); Berger, 
International Economic Arbitration, 345; Craig / Park / Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000, 
466; and Pryles, 394 (arguing that enforcement of provisional measures is probably 
not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention and that since an interim award is 
interlocutory in nature and thus could not be final and binding, it falls outside the 
scope of the Convention. ). Jarvin, too, seems to follow this view as he thinks that the 
New York Convention is only applicable to "final awards". Jarvin, Alternative 
Solutions, 403. See also UN Doc A/CN. 9/WG. II/WP. 108, n. 12. para. 83 (14 January 
113 
2000). 
These arguments derive from Article V(I)(e) of the Convention, which provides that the 
recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused where "[tlhe award has not 
yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made. " See Gurry, 4. See also Albert J. van den Berg, The 
New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 - Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer 1981), 337-346 ("New York Convention"); Albert J. van den Berg, "The 1958 
New York Arbitration Convention Revisited" ("Revisited") in- Pierre A. Karrer (ed. ), 
Arbitral Tribunals or State Courts: Who Must Defer to Whom?, ASA Special Series 
No. 15 (Basel 2001), 125,141 ("Arbitral Tribunals"); WIPO Document ARB/AC/111/96/3, 
para. 10, Holtzmann, Remarks, 205; von Mehren, 361-62; Bernardini, 28. Gerold 
Herrmann, "Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? ", 
15(3) Arb Int'l 211,230 (1999) (indicating that "an interim measure is not only 'binding' 
(on the parties) but also 'final' in the sense of 'definite' according to its terms, which 
typically include a time limitation or a revision possibility. "); Veeder, The View, 210 
(arguing that the New York Convention "could allow" the enforcement of provisional 
measures. "); Holtzmann / Donovan, 37 (indicating that an an award on arbitral 
provisional measures is enforceable in a court just like any other arbitral award. ); 
Schwartz, Discussion, 215 (indicating, in criticising Queensland Supreme Court's 
decision, that an award on provisional measure should have been enforceable under 
the New York Convention "even though by its nature an interim award is not final. ")-, 
Walter G. Semple, "The UNCITRAL Model Law and Provisional Measures in 
International Commercial Arbitration", 3 ADRLJ 269,271 (1994) (stating that the New 
York Convention applies to all types of awards, including interim awards)- and 
Marchac (stating that a provisional measures rendered in the form of an award 
ýhould 
normally be enforceable). Gurry seems to agree with the Schwartz's analysis. Id. In 
this respect, it is submitted that interim measures could be granted in a form of 
3 ') 6 
law of such jurisdiction may require that a decision is to be final and 
binding to be considered as an award. ' 14 Accordingly, although the New 
York Convention expressly refrained from using the term "final" for awards' 
enforceability, ' 15 an award on a provisional measure may be required to be 
"final and binding" for the enforcement under the Convention-' 16 
Alternatively, as the Queensland Court did, a court might misread the New 
York Convention by requiring that the award should not only be binding but 
also be final. In such cases, an award needs to satisfy two criteria: it 
needs to be both final and binding. ' 17 
As regards the "binding )7 nature of an interim or partial award on a 
provisional measure under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, an 
award (or an order) on an interim measure is "contractually binding upon 
parties" either because they explicitly accepted the binding nature of the 
summary awards that could also be enforceable under the Convention. Karrer, Less 
Theory, 99-100. Interim measures could be issued in the form of summary 
provisional awards in such countries as England (Section 39), France (see Karrer, 
114 
Less Theory, 100), and the Netherlands (Article 1051). 
Laws of a number of states expressly contain a provision on finality of an award. See, 
e. g., Article 1703 of the Belgium Judicial Code; Article 1476 of the France CCP; Article 
1055 of the German CCP; and Article 1059 of the Netherlands A. A. 
115 See, e. g., van den Berg, New York Convention, 333-337. 
116 See Blessing, Introduction, para. 874 (arguing that where the test for the enforceability 
under the Convention is its finality in a strict sense (with res judicata effect) then this 
117 
test would not meet for interim awards on provisional measures). 
It is noteworthy that an award on provisional measures should be considered within 
the scope of differences or disputes referred to arbitration. The Queensland Supreme 
Court's decision that an interim award should deal with one or more of the issues 
originally referred to arbitration i's wrong. See van den Berg, Revisited, 143. That is 
simply because an interim award aims to deal with interim protection of rights whose 
final protection is sought in arbitration. Hence, such issues could not be considered 
out of the scope of differences originally referred to arbitration. Also, such late issues 
regarding interim measures should be considered as sub-disputes attached to original 
disputes or differences. This argument was raised in Resort CondomIniums but 
denied by the Court. See XX YCA 636. 
3) 
awa rd 1 18 or because the authority to grant such measure is vested with the 
arbitral tribunal. 119 
As to the finality of an award on a provisional measure, an interim award or 
a partial award, in order to be final, needs to dispose of an issue in dispute. 
To this end, it is arguable that an interim award is final in respect of the 
issues it deals with so long as these issues are separable from the 
remaining issues. 120 The prevailing view in U. S. practice supports that 
argument. 121 It is rightly submitted that the "pragmatic approach" taken by 
118 See, e. g., Article 28(6) of the ICC Arbitration Rules 1998- and Article 32(l)-(2) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Indeed, the award shoulý be considered binding so 
long as parties agreed in advance to accept it as binding. Derains, Refere Arbitral, 
189. Further, van den Berg states'. 
An award will be enforced in accordance with its terms. If one of the terms is that 
the order contained in the award is for a limited period of time, the enforcement will 
correspondingly cover that period of time. If the interim [or partial] award is 
subsequently rescinded, suspended or varied by an arbitral tribunal, that will as a 
rule be laid down in a subsequent interim [or partial] award which can also be 
enforced. 
Van den Berg, Revisited, 143. He further argues that to be on the safe side, 
arbitrating parties may agree that interim or partial awards are binding as a number of 
courts interpreting the New York Convention accepts that the parties can agree on 
when an arbitral award becomes binding. On examples of such decisions, see id., 
note 36. Such agreement could be done in the arbitration clause itself. Alternatively 
and perhaps more conveniently, a stipulation to that effect could be made in 
arbitration rules. See id. But see Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 345 
(arguing that an award containing an interim measure is not binding under Article 
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention because it can be amended or revoked. ). In 
addition, it is noteworthy that on the issue of when an award becomes binding, the 
Model Law does not contain any clarification. Nor are the preparatory materials 
helpful. See, e. g., UN Doc A/40/17, paras. 256-258, reprinted in Holtzmann 
Neuhaus, 864-65. 
119 Blessing, Introduction, para. 869. See also id., para. 874. 
120 See cases cited in Chapter V, supra note 108. In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
according to some authors, finality is not a characteristic of an award. See, e. g., 
Gaillard / Savage (eds. ), para. 1316; Schwartz, Provisional Measures, 63, Albert Jan 
van den Berg, "The Application of the New York Convention by the Courts" lný van den 
Berg (ed. ), Improving the Efficiency, 25,29. It is further noteworthy that according to 
Derains, a decision of an arbitral referee is final in the context of "the appropriateness 
to take interim measures at a certain moment on the basis of a prima facie appraisal 
of a factual situation. " Derains, Refere Arbitral, 189. 
12 ' The tendency of U. S. courts is that "Interim awards are enforceable so long as they 
relate to issues that are separable from the issues that remain to be decided. " Van 
3,38 
some U. S. courts should preferably be followed in interpretation of the New 
York Convention. 122 It is also this author's view that such pragmatic 
approach should be taken. Such interpretation is, in this author's view, in 
line with the overall object and purpose of the Convention: enhancing 
effectiveness of arbitration through facilitating international enforcement of 
arbitral decisions. The above views, however, neither are free from 
criticism nor have wide acceptance. 123 
3.3 UNCITRAL's Endeavours 
The enforceability of provisional measures at the place of arbitration or 
abroad is, despite the growing trend, still sporadic and not harmonised. 124 
Indeed, only a few national laws clearly provide for, in a disharmonised 
manner, enforcement of an arbitral provisional measure regardless of 
where the measure was rendered. The disharmony and lack of regulation 
attracted UNCITRAL's attention, which caused a study resulting in the 
recommendation to consider whether any work on the enforcement issue is 
"desirable and feasible. " 125 
den Berg, Revisited, 141; and Robert B. von Mehren, "The Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards under the Conventions and United States Law", 9 Yale Journal of World 
Public Order 343,361-63 (1983). For the decisions of U. S. courts, see Chapter V, 
122 
supra note 112. 
123 
See, e. g., Van den Berg, Revisited, 141. 
Indeed, it is suggested that "it would not be prudent to rely on the enforceability by 
national courts of such decisions [on provisional measures] as awards. " Craig / Park 
Paulsson, ICC Arbitration 2000,466. 
124 See, e. g., V. V. Veeder, "Provisional and Conservatory Measures" ("Provisional 
Measures") in- Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention - 
Experience and Prospects (New York: United Nations 1999), 21 ("Enforcing 
Arbitration Awards"); Lebedev, 23; and Herrmann, 230. Apparently, the Model Law 
It would have greatly contributed to harmonisation" if it would have contained a 
provision providing the possibility of the issuing interim measures 'in the form of interim 
awards. See Sanders, Quo Vadis, 275-76. 
125 UN Doc A/CN. 9/460. The problem of non-enforceability of arbitral interim measures 
was raised in different platforms by various arbitration specialists. See, e. g., Enforcing 
Arbitration Awards; Sandrock, (proposing that a new subsection should be inserted 
into Article 35 of the Model Law permitting acceptance of arbitral decisions given 
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The UNCITRAL Secretariat has prepared several proposals regarding the 
enforcement of arbitral provisional measures. 126 The main criterion in 
drafting those proposals was a degree of discretion that would be given to 
the enforcing court. It should, however, be noted that a few proposals 
were prepared by taking Article 36 of the Model Law' 27 on enforcement of 
awards into account with adaptation of specific features of provisional 
measures as compared to final award S. 128 The wisdom of following that 
Article is clear. Article 36 and the model created by the New York 
Convention have been successfully tested for enforcement of arbitral 
awards. It was also decided that the enforcement of provisional measures 
should take the form of a provision added to the Model Law (an 
amendment to the Model Law) rather than a protocol to the New York 
129 Convention. 
Adopting variety of principles, there are several proposals before the 
UNCITRAL's Working Group, which is studying provisional measures in 
arbitration. ' 30 In analysing these proposals, this author recommends the 
following set of principles that, in his view, should be considered in 
preparing a draft for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures. 
under Article 17 as an "award" (see Blessing, para. 876,282); Lord Mustill in: ICC 
126 
(ed. ), Conservatory Measures, 120. 
127 
For the current proposals, see LIN Doc A/CN. 9/524. 
Which is almost identical to Article V of the New York Convention. 
128 UN Doc A/CN. 9/485, para. 80. 
129 LIN Doc A/CN. 9ANG. IIMP. 108, para. 81. 
130 See LIN Doc A/CN. 9/524. 
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The harmonisation may be achieved if the proposal takes the form 
of an additional protocol to the New York Convention . 
13 1 A Model 
Law provision is likely to fail the desired harmonisation as it is very 
difficult to reach any agreement on the issue interim protection of 
rights among states. 
132 
. Pro-enforcement bias should be contained whatever form is chosen. 
There needs to be some safeguards protecting the interests of the 
enforcing state and arbitrating parties. In this regard, the standards 
set out in Article V of the New York Convention or Articles 34-35 of 
the Model Law may provide guidance 133 as they constitute tested 
and accepted standards for enforcing awards. 
9 However, the above standards should be modified to reflect the 
characteristics of interim protection of rights. This is to say. 
The validity of arbitration agreement should not be fully 
examined. The test for an arbitral tribunal to grant a measure 
is generally the prima facie existing for jurisdiction. 
134 A 
court's review of the jurisdiction should not be more 
extensive. 
131 See, e. g., Lew / Mistelis / KrOll, para. 23-95- Veeder, Provisional Measures, 21-23, 
and William Wang, "International Arbitration: 
ýhe Need for Uniform Interim Measures 
of Relief", 28 Brook J Int'l L 1059 (2003). But see, e. g., Pieter Sanders, "The Making 
of the Convention" in- Enforcing Arbitral Awards, 3,4; and Albert Jan van den Berg, 
132 
"Striving for Uniform Interpretation" in- Enforcing Arbitral Awards, 41,43. 
This can be observed from the work of the Hague Conference. The current draft of 
the Convention fails to deal with cross border enforcement of arbitral provisional 
measures. See Preliminary Doc No 8 (March 2003), Preliminary Result of the Work of 
the Informal Working Group on the Judgments ProJect available at < 
133 
ftp. hcch. net/doc/genaff 
- 
pd08e. pdf> last visited at 28 October 2003. 
As this is the case under current proposals to the Working Party. See UN Doc 
A/CN. 9/524. 
134 See supra Chapter IV, Part 3.1.1. 
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A party should, unless otherwise agreed, be given notice of 
the appointment of an arbitrator. 
Due process should be observed either at the time the 
measure is granted or, for ex parte measures, subsequent to 
the issuance of it. 
The underlying dispute in question should be arbitrable in the 
state of enforcement. 
A state court will obviously enforce a measure that is 
compatible with the laws of such state. In case of 
incompatibility, the court should reformulate the measure, 
without touching its substance, and enforce it. Otherwise, it 
should refuse the enforcement. This is a natural extension of 
pro-enforcement bias. 
o The enforcement of a measure may be refused where it is 
against the public policy of the state. 
o Parties should not have obligation to request permission from 
their arbitral tribunal for enforcement of a measure. 135 
The measure enforced may be subject to the tribunal's later 
modification or revocation. 136 
The enforcement of the measure should extend to both 
arbitral orders and awards. As provisional measures are 
generally granted in the form of an order, 137 the enforcement 
should naturally be extended to this form. Further, the form 
of an award is preferred for facilitating enforcement of an 
135 But see UN Doc A/CN. 9/524, paras. 25-27. 
136 See supra Chapter IV, Part 6. 
137 See supra Chapter IV, Part 4. 
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arbitral decisions, such decisions should too be enforceable. 
In each case, the enforceability should be subject to the 
tribunal's decision in favour of non-enforcement. In such 
case, the decision on interim protection should be granted in 
the form of, for instance, a recommendation. 
Ex parte measures should, in principle, be enforceable. 138 
The court should not have the power to review the 
appropriateness of the ex parte measure but make sure that 
at some point either prior to or following the enforcement of 
such measure, the principle of due process is observed. 
An arbitral provisional measure should be given priority over 
a judicial provisional measure. This is due to the principle of 
party autonomy. 139 
A court should not request any security for enforcement of an 
arbitral decision. This issue should be left with the tribunal 
granted the measure. This is again for the principle of party 
autonomy. 
o Enforcement of an arbitral measure should be allowed 
regardless of the place of arbitration as the place of 
arbitration is generally chosen as a neutral and/or 
geographically convenient place. 140 
It should be kept in mind that any mistake made by the 
tribunal in exercising its powers to grant a provisional 
measure can be and should be corrected by it. If necessary, 
138 There are conflicting views as to enforcement of such measures. Derains, Ex Parte 
139 
Relief, 3, and Castello, 15-24. 
140 
See supra Chapter IV, Part 2. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.3. 
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damages may be granted in favour of the party against which 
a measure was enforced. 141 
Emergency arbitral provisional measures should too be 
enforceable. 142 
Conclusion 
Arbitral provisional measures are, unlike judicial provisional measures, not 
self-executing. However, such arbitral measures traditionally have a 
certain weight. 143 An arbitral tribunal has some persuasive powers over 
arbitrating parties. Thus, as a result, the tribunal's decision on interim 
protection of rights is often complied with. 144 There may, however, be 
occasions where that decision is not abided. For such occasions, the 
arbitral tribunal mainly have two sanctions for disobedience. The tribunal 
may draw adverse inference from the disobedience. 145 Such inferences 
may only be drawn where the tribunal's decision on preservation of 
evidence is disobeyed. For no other provisional measure, an adverse 
inference should be drawn. However, arbitrating parties should refrain 
from 'unnecessarily antagonising' their tribunal, which has a quite wide 
leverage in arbitration process e. g., adjudging evidence. In addition, the 
recalcitrant party may be held liable for costs and/or damages related to its 
non-compliance. 146 The power to hold the recalcitrant party liable for costs 
and damages generally derive from a broad interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement. Further, the tribunal may impose time limits for compliance, 
141 See supra Chapter IV, Part 10. 142 On these measures, see generally supra Chapter 111. 143 See Chapter V, supra Part 1. 144 1 d. 
145 See Chapter V, supra Parts 1.1 
146 See Chapter V, supra Part 1.2. 
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which has psychological coercion. 147 Moreover, the tribunal may, if 
permitted, impose a penalty for failure to comply with its decision. 148 
The weight and effectiveness of the above sanctions differ. Thus, the need 
for enforceability of an arbitral provisional measure is critical but varies. 149 
The need is absolute for measures aimed to facilitate later enforcement of 
awards. Further, there may also be a need for enforcement of measures 
related to conduct of arbitration and to relations between arbitrating parties 
after a dispute arisen. However, the need for enforcement of measures 
related to preservation of evidence is almost none. This is because 
drawing adverse inference for preservation of evidence against a 
recalcitrant party could provide for full protection. This is to say drawing 
adverse inferences from the failure and making the award on the basis of 
information and evidence before the tribunal. 
Due to the above need, it is generally felt that an arbitral tribunal's lack of 
power to enforce its decision on provisional measures causes a problem. 
This problem may result in infringement of parties' rights and it may 
hamper effectiveness of arbitration. 
In order to make arbitration more effective, a number of legislatures offer 
various solutions to the problem of an arbitral provisional measure's 
enforceability by, one way or another, lending coercive powers to an 
arbitral tribunal. 150 Laws of some states provide for enforcement of arbitral 
provisional measures where the tribunal has its seat in that state whereas 
147 See Chapter V, supra Part 1 
148 1 d. 
149 See Chapter V, supra Part 2. 
150 See Chapter V, supra Part 3. 
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laws of a small number of states envisage enforcement of such measures 
regardless of the seat of arbitration. 
On the enforcement of arbitral provisional measures at the seat of 
arbitration, the approach of national laws varies: 151 
Under the first approach, an arbitral provisional measure is directly 
enforceable as if it is a decision of the court. 
According to the second approach, a national court lends its 
executory assistance for the enforcement of an arbitral provisional 
measure. Under this approach, a court enforces, upon request of 
either an arbitral tribunal or a party, an arbitral provisional measure 
without any further (or at least limited) examination. Further, a court 
assistance may take the form of enforcing a decision on an arbitral 
provisional measure by equating and then enforcing such measure 
as if it were an arbitral award. 
In accordance with the third approach, an arbitral decision, in certain 
cases, is transposed into a court order where the original decision 
cannot be enforced as it stands. 
Under the fourth approach, a court issues, basing its decision on an 
arbitral provisional measure, a separate order for interim protection 
of rights. 
Out of which, the combined reading of the second and third approaches 
should be most preferable. Under these approaches, there is a pro- 
enforcement bias and court assistance for enforcement is given but some 
safeguards are taken for protecting the interests of the state and arbitrating 
parties. The first approach has no such safeguards whereas the fourth 
151 See Chapter V, supra Part 3.1. 
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approach requires a second court proceeding to give executory assistance 
to an arbitral provisional measure. 
The jurisdictions adopting any of the above approaches generally deal with 
enforcement at the seat of arbitration. However, the seat of arbitration is 
generally chosen as a geographically convenient and neutral place. The 
seat often has nothing to do with the parties or the dispute in question. 
Accordingly, cross border enforcement of an arbitral provisional measure 
has utmost significance. The cross border enforcement may be permitted 
under a national law or an international treaty. ' 52 Laws of a few states 
allow enforcement of a provisional measure rendered by an arbitral tribunal 
whose seat is in a foreign state. 153 Further, there are a few bilateral 
treaties, but no multilateral treaty, that enable cross-border enforcement of 
an arbitral provisional measure. 154 
Whether or not the New York Convention allows enforcement of an arbitral 
provisional measure is not clear. The text and preparatory materials on the 
Convention are silent on that issue. In addition, both courts and 
commentators have divergent views. The Convention requires that, inter 
alia, an award is to be binding for its enforcement in accordance with 
Article V(1)(e) under the law of the state where the award was rendered. 
That should be sufficient for the enforcement of an award on provisional 
measure. However, an arbitral decision may, under one interpretation, be 
required to be final or not subject to revision or revocation under the New 
York Convention. Further, the finality of an award may be required under 
the law where it was rendered. In such cases, for its enforcement under 
152 See Chapter V, supra Part 3.2. 
153 See Chapter V, supra Part 3.2.1. 
154 See Chapter V, supra Part 3.2.2. 
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the Convention, an award is required to be binding and final. Arbitrating 
parties either explicitly accepted binding nature of the award or the binding 
nature arises from the fact that the authority to grant provisional measures 
is vested with the tribunal. As to the finality, it should be accepted that an 
interim award on provisional measures is fi II in regard of the 
deals with so long as the issues separable from the other issues in dispute. 
This interpretation is in line with the purpose and objective of the 
Convention: enhancing arbitration's effectiveness. However, the above 
views have no wide acceptance. 
Having noted the lack of uniformity in regard of enforcing arbitral 
provisional measures, UNCITRAL is currently studying the enforcement 
issue. 155 In this author's view, the enforcement issue may be resolved and 
harmonisation may be achieved where an additional protocol to the New 
York Convention is adopted . 
156 Further, pro-enforcement bias should be 
contained whatever form is chosen for adoption. However, certain 
safeguards should be taken for the enforcement for protecting the interests 
of a state and of arbitrating parties. 157 In establishing these safeguards, 
Article V of the New York Convention and Articles 34-36 of the Model Law 
may provide guidance. Nonetheless, the characteristics of provisional 
measures should be considered. 158 
l 55 See Chapter V, supra Part 3.3. 
156 See Chapter V, supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
157 See Chapter V, supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
158 See Chapter V, supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of arbitration, to meet the 
expectations of business persons, and, ultimately, to ensure the success of 
arbitration, the problems and uncertainties regarding the interim protection 
of rights' should be resolved. This is because, generally, interim protection 
of rights in arbitration is as important as their final protection. 2 
The identification )f the above problems and uncertainties as well as their 
suggested solutions and clarifications affected by business needS3 are set 
out below: 
Forum to Request Provisional Measures: Arbitrators or Courts 
The main problem concerning interim protection is which forum to apply to 
for a provisional measure when a need arises. 
Provisional measures should be sought from arbitrators or any other party- 
determined authority. Several reasons support this proposition. 4 The 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in regard of interim protection almost 
always derives from arbitration rules5 by reference to such rules in 
arbitration clauses or agreements. 6 National arbitration laws (lex arbitri) 
For this concept and its definition, see generally supra Introduction, notes 12-18 and 
accompanying text. On the characteristics and types of provisional measures in 
arbitration, see id., notes 19-34,45-56 and accompanying text, 
See supra Introduction, notes 57-76 and accompanying text. 
Like the effect of business needs that had shaped the evolution of interim protection of 
rights throughout the last century. See supra Chapter 1. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.1. 
On the evolution of arbitral jurisdiction to grant provisional measures under various 
arbitration rules, see supra Chapter 1, Part 1. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.2, 
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also may provide for default powers for interim protection .7 On rare 
occasions, where none of the above deals with arbitral interim protection, 
then the power to issue arbitral provisional measures may derive from 
inherent or implicit powers of the tribunal or its power to conduct arbitration 
proceedings. 8 The tribunal should comply with contractual9 or legal'o 
restrictions and prohibitions as to its jurisdiction to grant provisional 
measures. 
In spite of the fact that an arbitral tribunal is the natural forum to seek 
interim protection of rights, the exercise of arbitral jurisdiction is, in some 
cases, impossible or ineffective. This relates to the nature and operation of 
arbitration. There are three salient problems, and certain other 
shortcomings, surrounding an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to grant 
provisional measures. " Due to these problems and shortcomings, to 
enhance the efficiency of arbitration and for better distribution of justice, 
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction of arbitrators and of courts should, in 
12 
principle, be accepted. The concept of concurrent jurisdiction regulates 
and sheds light on the grey area, sometimes considered to be a "no man's 
land": the area of interaction between arbitral and judicial jurisdictions for 
interim protection of rights. 
A logical conclusion that stems from the concept of concurrent jurisdiction 
is the acceptance of the principle of compatability. 13 This principle has two 
facets: 
7 See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.2.1. 
8 See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.2.2. 
9 See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.3. 
'o See supra Chapter 11, Part 1.4. 
See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.1. 12 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4. 13 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4. 
n 
-3-50 
a request for a provisional measure is not a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate; and 
the existence of the arbitration agreement does not prevent a court 
from issuing an interim measure. 14 
Convenience and efficiency require, in this author's view, the grant of 
15 provisional measures in aid of foreign arbitration. This Is because the 
seat of arbitration is generally chosen as a geographically convenient and 
neutral place. As a result, a provisional measure granted at the seat of 
arbitration is often meaningless. It should however be noted that not all 
national laws adopt assistance to foreign arbitration for interim protection of 
rights. Further, in case the assistance is given, the foreign court should, 
provided that it has jurisdiction, ask itself whether it is the most appropriate 
/ convenient forum to grant the measure sought. If it decides that it is, then 
it will, in principle, apply the standards available under the forum where the 
court is located to decide whether it should grant such measure. 
In determining the degree of court involvement in the arbitral process 
under the concurrent jurisdiction concept, party autonomy should be taken 
into account. 16 However, such autonomy should not extend to total 
autonomy. This is to ensure that arbitration is effective. This is also to 
preserve the effective and good administration of justice, which reconciles 
the tension between court involvement in arbitration and parties' will to 
keep courts out of the arbitration process. This reconciliation results in the 
satisfaction of the needs of international commerce. balancing security with 
flexibility in arbitration by preventing abuse of the court's involvement. The 
14 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.2. 
"' See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.3. 
16 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4. 
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reconciliation requires the cooperation of arbitrators and of courts. Such 
cooperation must be coordinated. Most national laws and arbitration rules 
are silent on the method of coordination. Examination of the remaining 
(few) national laws and arbitration rules demonstrates that there are two 
methods of coordination: 
the freedom of choice approach; and 
the restricted -access approach. 
Under the freedom of choice approach, parties are free to choose the 
forum to seek interim protection of rights regardless of the stage of 
arbitration. 17 Such freedom is, however, an open invitation for abuse and 
against the principle of party autonomy. Thus, the freedom of choice 
approach should not be adopted. 
Under the restricted -access approach, the principles of complementarity 
and subsidiarity are accepted. 18 At the stage prior to the formation of an 
arbitral tribunal, the role of the courts is complementary to arbitral 
jurisdiction for interim protection of rights. After that stage, the role is 
subsidiary. The court should only act where the tribunal or another party- 
determined authority is unable to act or where its action would be 
ineffective. 
The principles of complementarity and subsidiarity are also accepted by a 
small number of arbitration rules. 19 The ICC Arbitration Rules is a 
prominent example. Under the ICC Arbitration Rules, court assistance is 
permitted at the pre-formation stage. Following the formation of an arbitral 
17 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4.1. 
18 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4.2. 
19 See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4.2.2. 
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tribunal, the Rules indicate that the tribunal should have priority In regard of 
interim protection of rights and that courts should assist an arbitration 
where the circumstances are appropriate. The circumstances are 
appropriate, under the ICC arbitral practice, where: 
9 there is urgency for Interim protection of rights; 
9 the tribunal's power is limited; or 
* the tribunal is paralysed or otherwise unable to act. 
The contractual restriction or exclusion of a court's jurisdiction in arbitration 
rules, e. g. the ICC Arbitration Rules, is subject to applicable laws. 20 The 
restriction envisaged under such rules as the ICC Arbitration Rules should, 
in this author's view, be permitted as it does not constitute denial of justice 
since effective interim protection of rights would, under the contractual 
restriction approach, always be available .21 
Total contractual exclusion 
should, in this author's view, also be permitted due to the principle of party 
autonomy, although one should keep in mind that some national laws 
would not permit such exclusion. 22 
This author suggests that the restricted -access approach should be 
accepted as it preserves the principle of party autonomy in arbitration and 
permits court assistance to arbitration where it is necessary. Thus, the 
court assistance to arbitration, under this approach, enhances the 
effectiveness of arbitration and facilitates better distribution of justice. 
'o See supra Chapter 11, Part 4.4.4. 
21 Id. 
22 1 d. 
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Emerqency Provisional Measures: Complementary Mechanisms 
Another problem is how court involvement prior to the appointment of 
arbitrators is restricted, as there are certain objections to such involvement 
at this stage. 23 These objections are: 
court involvement prior to the appointment of arbitrators undermines 
both the parties' choice of forum for the resolution of disputes as 
well as the neutrality of that forum; 
9 such involvement is an open invitation for abuse-, 
e court involvement may infringe the principle of confidentiality in 
arbitration; 
ea request to a court may, on rare occasions, be considered a waiver 
of the right to arbitrate; and 
* court assistance may not always be available. 
The involvement of courts may, to a certain extent, be avoided through the 
use of complementary mechanisms. Such mechanisms envisage the grant 
of emergency provisional measures by a neutral / party-determined 
authority at the pre-formation stage. 
The need for complementary mechanisms is not new. Indeed, the 1915 
Plan provided for such a mechan iSM. 
24 Nowadays, business persons may 
create their own complementary mechanisms . 
25 Arbitration institutions 
also provide for such mechanisms. Some of the institutions empower their 
head or organ to grant emergency measures. 26 Some other institutions, 
e. g. the ICC, the ECA, the NAI, and the AAA propose certain emergency 
23 See supra Chapter 111, notes 10-18 and accompanying text. 
24 See supra Chapter 111, Part 1. 
25 See supra Chapter III, notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
26 See supra Chapter 111, Part 1. 
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arbitral provisional measure procedures. 27 These procedures aim to 
provide effective mechanisms for obtaining emergency arbitral relief. 
These mechanisms are not exclusive: they do not fully obviate judicial 
assistance. In shaping the above procedures, three main principles are 
taken into account: 
e the need to create a speedy mechanism; 
9 the principle of party autonomy; and 
9 the principle of due process. 
A decision of an emergency arbitrator has certain weight and there are 
. 28 some remedies available against the recalcitrant party. 
* an emergency measure has, by contract, binding effect; 
9 such measure has also the backing of the relevant arbitration 
institution-, 
e damages may be ordered in case of failure with the measure; and 
* such measure is potentially enforceable at the place where it is 
rendered and under the New York Convention. 
-edures In this regard, it should be noted that the availability of slich prof. 
potentially has a deterrent effect on vexatious requests to a court for 
interim protection and on forum shopping. 
The emergency measure procedures facilitate the effectiveness of 
arbitration by remedying one of the salient problems regarding arbitral 
jurisdiction to grant provisional measures. There is a growing recognition 
27 See supra Chapter 111, Part 2. 
28 See supra Chapter 111, Part 2.13. 
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and use of such procedures . 
29 This author predicts that these procedures 
will be widely used in the next ten to twenty years. 
Arbitral Provisional Measures 
The establishment of standards or procedures and principles for the grant 
of arbitral provisional measures constitutes another problem / uncertainty 
issue. The establishment of such standards and principles enhances the 
efficacy of arbitration by making it consistent and predictable. 30 
Arbitral tribunals are generally given broad powers in regard of the above 
standards and procedures under most national laws and arbitration rules. 31 
Tribunals rarely turn to applicable laws for the establishment of such 
standards and principles. Experience demonstrates that arbitral case law 
often provides guidance to the tribunals in this regard, notwithstanding that 
in each case they probably consider all applicable laws and scholarly 
opinions in order to grant the most appropriate measure, i. e. one that suits 
the characteristics of the case at hand. 32 The arbitral practice also 
demonstrates that there are emerging transnational standards and 
33 
principles on arbitral interim protection. 
This author suggests the following standards or procedures and principles, 
where arbitrators are given wide discretion to establish them, for the grant 
of arbitral provisional measures, which standards and procedures, in his 
belief, are of transnational character and which are subject to parties' 
agreement to contrary: 
29 See supra Chapter 111, Part 3. 
30 See supra Chapter IV, note 1. 
31 See supra Chapter IV, note 2 and accompanying text. 
32 See supra Chapter IV, notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
33 See supra Chapter IV, notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
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Due mainly to the principle of party autonomy, a provisional measure 
should be given upon request by a party. 34 The request and response to it 
should, at least, contain certain main elements; namely, 
9 the relevant rights which are sought to be protected, 
e kind of measure that is sought; and 
9 the circumstances that necessitate such measure. 35 
Arbitral tribunals should give priority to such request and handle it in a 
short period Of tirylu. 
36 
Tribunals should, in principle, consider the positive and negative 
requirements set out below for granting provisional measures. 37 The 
positive requirements are: 
e prima facie establishment of jurisdiction; 
* prima facie establishment of case; 
o urgency-, 
o imminent danger, serious or substantial prejudice, and 
0 proportionality. 
The negative requirements are: 
* the request should not necessitate examination of the merits of 
the 
case in question; 
0 the tribunal may refrain from granting the final relief 
in the form of an 
interim relief, 
34 See supra Chapter IV, Part 1.1. 35 See supra Chapter IV, Part 1.2. 36 See supra Chapter IV, Part 2. 31 See supra Chapter IV, Part 3. 
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e the request may be denied where the moving party does not have 
clean hands, 
o the request may be denied where the measure requested is 
incapable of being carried out; 
e the request may be denied where the measure is incapable of 
preventing the alleged harm; or 
a the request may be denied where the request is moot. 
Tribunals may further require security for damages and for costs. 
Alternatively, they may deny the request where there is an undertaking 
from the adverse party that it would not infringe upon the right sought to be 
protected. 
In any case, even if the tribunals refrain from granting the measure sought, 
they may, nevertheless, expedite the arbitration proceedings in order to 
avoid any potential or actual prejudice towards the rights of the moving 
party. 
An arbitral provisional measure may be granted in the form of an order, 
award, decision, direction, request, proposal, recommendation, or 
temporary restraining order. 38 In determining the form of a decision, the 
tribunal should mainly take into account parties' will, potential time saved, 
the cost and effective conduct of arbitration, and mandatory provisions of 
the applicable laws. 
38 See supra Chapter IV, Part 4. 
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An arbitral tribunal could order a measure upon its formation until it 
becomes functus OffiCio . 
39 
Due to its interim nature, a provisional measure, whatever its form is, may 
be amended or revoked under changed circumstances or in light of new 
facts or evidence. 
40 
On the types of arbitral provisional measures, arbitral tribunals are 
generally given broad powers. 41 In exercising these broad powers, this 
author suggests that the tribunals should be able to grant: 
measures for preservation of evidence; 
injunctions, 
security for payment; 
security for costs; and 
provisional payment. 
Arbitral provisional measures are usually granted in Inter partes 
proceedings. In urgent cases, where it is permitted under applicable rules 
and laws, tribunals should be able to grant ex parte provisional measures 
provided that the right to respond is subsequently given to the adverse 
party. 42 
As to who bears costs of arbitral provisional measure proceedings, this 
author suggests that the losing party should be liable for such CoStS. 
43 
39 See supra Chapter IV, Part 5. 
40 See supra Chapter IV, Part 6. 
41 See supra Chapter IV, Part 7. 
42 See supra Chapter IV, Part 8. 
43 See supra Chapter IV, Part 9. 
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Where an arbitral provisional measure is disobeyed or proves to be 
unjustified, damages arising from such disobedience or lack of justification 
should be recoverable. 44 
Enforcement of Arbitral Provisional Measures 
The last issue is the how effective arbitral provisional measures are and 
how their effectiveness can be enhanced. 
Although an arbitral provisional measure is not self-executing, it has certain 
weight, 
45 
and is thus often compiled with. There may, however, be 
occasions where the provisional measure granted is disobeyed. For such 
occasions, an arbitral tribunal has certain sanctions: 
* it may draw adverse inference from the disobedience regarding 
measures related to the preservation of evidence-, 
e the recalcitrant party may be held liable for costs and/or damages 
related to disobedience; 
e the tribunal may impose time limits for compliance, which has a 
psychological effect; and 
e the tribunal, if permitted, may impose a penalty for failure to comply 
with its decision. 
The weight and effectiveness of the above sanctions differ. Thus, the need 
for enforceability of an arbitral provisional measure varies. 46 The need is 
firm for measures aimed to facilitate later enforcement of awards. There 
may, in many instances, be a need for enforcement of measures related to 
the conduct of arbitration and relations between arbitrating parties. 
44 See supra Chapter IV, Part 10. 45 See supra Chapter V, Part 1. 46 See supra Chapter V, Part 2. 
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However, the need is practically nonexistent, or very limited, for measures 
relating to the preservation of evidence. This is because drawing adverse 
inference generally satisfies such need. 
Due to the need for enforceability, it is generally felt that the lack of power 
to enforce an arbitral provisional measure causes a problem. This problem 
may result in infringement of par-ties' rights and it may thus hamper 
effectiveness of arbitration. 
In order to make arbitration more effective, legislatures in 34 jurisdictions 
offer various solutions to the problem of enforceability. This is done by, 
one way or another, lending state courts' executory assistance to 
47 
arbitration. Laws of many states permit enforcement of arbitral 
provisional measures where the seat of arbitration is in that state. The 
approach of such national laws differs: 
e an arbitral provisional measure is directly enforceable as if it is a 
court decision; 
0a court lends its executory assistance to arbitrators, 
0a court transposes an arbitral decision into a court order where the 
former one cannot be enforced in its original form; and 
0a court issues a provisional measure basing its order on the arbitral 
decision. 
Of these approaches, the combined reading of the second and third should 
be preferred. Under these approaches, there is a pro-enforcement bias. 
Court assistance for enforcement is given, but some safeguards are taken 
to protect the interests of the state and the arbitrating parties. The first 
47 See supra Chapter V, Part 3. 
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approach has no such safeguards; whereas the fourth approach requires 
additional court proceedings to give executory assistance for the 
enforcement of an arbitral provisional measure. 
Laws of a few states deal with enforcement of an arbitral provisional 
measure given by an arbitral tribunal whose seat is in a foreign state. 48 
The court assistance to foreign arbitration is tenable and desirable as the 
seat of arbitration is generally chosen, as a geographically convenient and 
neutral place, and often has nothing to do with the parties, the dispute and 
the underlying contract. A few bilateral treaties, but no multilateral treaty, 
49 deal with cross-border enforcement of arbitral provisional measures . 
Whether or not the New York Convention permits enforcement of an 
arbitral provisional measure is questionable. This author believes that the 
enforcement of such measure should be permitted so long as the measure 
is binding under the law of the state where the award was rendered. 
In this author's view, the enforcement issue may be resolved and 
harmonisation may be achieved if an additional protocol to the New York 
Convention dealing with this issue is adopted. In any case, a court's 
executory assistance should be given to arbitral provisional measures 
where certain safeguards are taken to protect the interests of the state and 
of the arbitrating parties. In establishing these safeguards, Article V of the 
New York Convention and Articles 34-36 of the Model Law may provide 
guidance. Nonetheless, in determining the safeguards, the features of 
provisional measures should be taking into account. 
48 See supra Chapter V, Part 3.2.1. 
49 See supra Chapter V, Part 3.2.2. 
362 
The above proposed solutions to the problems and uncertainties 
surrounding provisional measures in arbitration, in this author's view, 
satisfy, to a great extent, the business needs. The adoption of those 
solutions will enhance the effectiveness of arbitration by providing better 
interim protection of rights. It will also assist in better fulfilling the function 
of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism independent and distinct 
from litigation. 
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